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The English word “mobilize” has three Vietnamese equivalents: huy động, vận 
động, and phát động. A popular Vietnamese dictionary denes huy động as “to 
call upon the majority to work at some essential task;” vận động as “to propa-
gandize, to explain, to convince others to volunteer to do some sort of work;” 
and phát động as “to push something to action.”1 All three versions of “mobilize” 
reect themes explored in this study.
When Hồ Chí Minh and other Indochinese Communist Party (ICP)2 lead-
ers seized power in August of 1945, they did so with little cash and few reliable 
means of generating it. During the previous four years, these revolutionaries had 
promoted their Vietminh front3 as an organization that would “abolish the head 
tax and other French and Japanese taxes.” According to party propaganda, a 
Vietminh government would replace these taxes with a system that was “very 
light and fair.”4 Yet, when the party leaders established the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (DRV) on September 2, Hồ concluded his inspiring Declaration of 
Independence with a line that suggested the opposite: “To guard freedom and 
independence, the Vietnamese people are determined to contribute all their 
physical and mental strength, and to sacrice their lives and property.”5
The following day, September 3, Hồ chaired the rst ocial meeting of the 
new DRV government and, in the spirit of the old Vietminh propaganda, re-
quested that the government “immediately abolish” the head tax, market tax, 
and ferry tax as “inhumanely exploitative.”6 However, at the same meeting, he 
announced that every province should establish an Independence Fund. This 
would be aimed at “collecting money and goods that the people are happy to give 
to the government for the cause of national independence.” As a party newspa-
per explained, “before sacricing our esh and blood to preserve our freedom, 
we have a responsibility to sacrice our personal wealth.”7
On September 7, DRV leaders released a directive clarifying that, although 
the head tax would be abolished, all other taxes would be “changed gradually,” 
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which was to say, preserved for the time being.8 Yet, the patchy nature of what 
the historian Christopher Goscha calls the DRV’s “archipelago state,”9 com-
bined with widespread conditions of revolutionary upheaval, severely limited 
tax collection. That same day, DRV leaders announced that “anywhere the 
Vietnamese Liberation Army stays or passes through, the people must provide 
all possible help.” According to the announcement, “the Liberation Army has 
permission to seize needed things such as furniture, houses, cars, etc.” Owners 
of these commandeered articles would be supplied with “receipts” guaranteeing 
“full reimbursement.”10 For the moment, at least, the new government could not 
aord to pay for these items.
The DRV’s precarious nancial situation compelled the party leaders to 
adopt a similarly practical approach to the old colonial state’s salt, alcohol, and 
opium monopolies. Instead of disbanding these French colonial revenue gener-
ators, Hồ and his comrades decided to preserve them for the new DRV state.11
In the near term, though, the ability of these monopolies to strengthen the new 
government’s nancial situation was limited. Five years of occupation by Japan, 
isolation from France, and, more recently, bombardment by Allied planes had 
crippled Vietnam’s economy.
Another potential source of revenue was rice, the primary economic output 
of about 80 percent of Vietnam’s population. However, only six months earlier, 
during the winter of 1945, a famine had devastated northern Vietnam. Accord-
ing to a study conducted by Vietnam’s provincial governors in July of 1945, the 
total number of famine-related fatalities in the northern half of the country 
was 401,316.12 Most scholars feel that the number was closer to one million. Ex-
porting meaningful amounts of rice to raise cash would not be possible for the 
foreseeable future. With hunger still widespread, the Vietnamese population 
would need every grain of rice. And, even with the DRV state’s eorts to ght 
the “enemy famine,” an estimated eleven to twelve thousand people starved to 
death in northern Vietnam during the rst half of 1946.13
Hồ and other DRV leaders probably hoped to nd some nancial relief 
through control of potentially lucrative coal mines, textile factories, and agri-
cultural plantations. But these also proved to be of little help to the DRV govern-
ment. Four years of war, the accompanying shortages in fuel and spare parts, the 
lack of technical expertise, and the overall atmosphere of lawlessness le most 
of these economic assets in an unproductive state.14 Generally, as the historian 
David Marr demonstrates in his remarkable account of the early DRV’s “mate-
rial dreams and realities,” Hồ and other party leaders realized by March of 1946 
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that government expenses “far outweighed” revenues.15 In the words of Judy 
Stowe, the DRV simply had “few nancial or economic resources.”16
The challenges facing the DRV grew greater still in December of 1946. At that 
point, the ocial outbreak of war with France forced DRV leaders to abandon 
Vietnam’s cities and relocate to the countryside. As Hồ and his comrades moved 
their center of operations from Hanoi to a secure region north of the capital, the 
French reestablished control over the country’s major roads, railroads, factories, 
mines, and so on. Especially damaging was France’s seizure of Vietnam’s best 
ports, a reality that restricted the ability of the “Hồ Chí Minh Government” (as 
party leaders sometimes called it) to engage in international trade.
Faced with these nancial challenges, and placed in circumstances of interna-
tional isolation, the DRV leaders in early 1947 relied almost completely on the 
countryside. As Goscha shows, the DRV regime was able to nd plenty of cracks 
in the French wall, exploiting old trade networks with Southern China and es-
pecially with Thailand. But, despite many ingenious eorts and small successes, 
the DRV ultimately lacked the money needed to equip a modern army.17
Vietnam’s rural population comprised about 85 percent of the country’s eigh-
teen million people. But the ICP’s inuence in the countryside was uneven, 
meaning that much less than the entire rural population could be targeted for 
mobilization campaigns. Generally, the DRV enjoyed a “far stronger position” 
in the country’s northern half (about ten million people).18 Even there, though, 
DRV inuence was hardly complete. Large areas of the Red River delta to the 
east of Hanoi would remain under French inuence throughout the coming 
war. To the west and south of Hanoi, heading toward Central Vietnam, several 
Catholic-dominated enclaves resisted DRV inuence as local priests warned that 
the new government was led by “godless” Communists.19
Vietnam’s party leaders built their DRV state in the context of the First In-
dochina War, a conict that claimed an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 lives. 
Of those killed, roughly three quarters were Vietnamese soldiers and civilians.20
Like the Second Indochina War (1954 to 1975), the First Indochina War dees 
easy categorization. Depending on the time, place, and person, the conict could 
be seen as a civil war, a war for national liberation, a regional war for control over 
Indochina, and a proxy war of the Cold War. In 1949, the French ocially estab-
lished a non-communist alternative Vietnamese government called the Associ-
ated State of Vietnam. The purpose was to draw support away from the DRV, 
whose regions of control comprised an estimated ten million of Vietnam’s eigh-
teen million people.21 The newly established State of Vietnam would eventually 
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mobilize an army of 200,000 soldiers to oppose the DRV forces. From 1945 
until 1950, the DRV side, lacking weapons, was forced to limit the scale of mil-
itary engagements with their much better armed French enemy. Aer 1950, the 
weapons gap was signicantly reduced as the DRV began to receive Soviet and 
Chinese military aid. This enabled the party leaders to transform troops from 
their People’s Liberation Army into seven infantry divisions. The ghting took 
on a more conventional and lethal character as both sides put the latest Eastern- 
and Western-bloc weapons to use on each other.
This study looks at the party’s mobilization eorts between 1945 and 1960 in 
the northern half of the country. It was in this region that today’s Vietnamese 
state was rst constructed, largely as a response to the reality that the country’s 
“entire people” were not always “determined” and “happy” to sacrice every-
thing for “freedom and independence.” No country’s people ever are. At some 
point, as fatigue and suering grow, political leaders need an increasingly auto-
cratic power to mobilize that necessary sacrice.
Northern Vietnam: Geography, History, Culture
Since this story takes place primarily in northern Vietnam, some basic descrip-
tion of that region’s geography, history, and culture may help the reader better 
understand the narrative that follows. Today, Vietnamese think of their country 
in both halves and thirds. When thinking in halves, the terms “North” and 
“South” are oen associated with the twenty-year (1954–1975) division of the 
country into the DRV (North Vietnam) and the Republic of Vietnam (South 
Vietnam). When thinking in thirds, North and South are reduced in size to 
make room for a third region, the Center. This way of viewing Vietnam dates 
back to the reign of the emperor Minh Mạng (r. 1820–1841). From 1832 to 1834, 
he made South, North, and Center ocial administrative units of his king-
dom of Đại Nam (the Great South).22 When the French colonized Đại Nam 
over the course of about thirty years (1858 to 1887), they adopted Minh Mạng’s 
three-section schema as a tactic of divide and rule. Hoping to stanch the growth 
of Vietnamese nationalism, the French gave each region—now named Tonkin 
(North), Annam (Center), and Cochinchina (South)—its own set of laws and 
regulations to discourage Pan-Vietnamese solidarity.
Though Vietnamese patriots during the colonial period resented this division 
of their country, the terms “North,” “Center,” and “South” remain in general 
use today. Distanced from the stigma of colonial divide-and-rule tactics, the 
terms now seem to refer, in a matter-of-fact way, to Vietnam’s obvious regional 
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dierences of climate, landscape, dialect, and custom. To avoid confusion, I will 
use the terms “northern Vietnam” or “the North” and “southern Vietnam” and 
“the South” to refer to the country’s two halves. When thinking in thirds, I will 
use the terms “Tonkin,” “Central Vietnam,” and “Cochinchina.”
The northern half of Vietnam is roughly the size of England and Wales. Gen-
erally, its rivers originate in the mountainous regions of Laos to the west and 
China to the north, and ow in a southeasterly direction into the South China 
Sea. The largest of Vietnam’s northern rivers is the Red, which cuts diagonally 
across Tonkin. Most of northern Vietnam has four seasons that show signicant 
temperature variation. In Hanoi, for example, winter temperatures can drop 
into the 40s; summer heatwaves can push temperatures up over 100 degrees for 
days on end. Closer to Central Vietnam, the variation steadily declines as the 
climate shis to a two-season pattern of rainy and dry.
Scholars estimate that people began to inhabit the Red River delta in about 
3,000 BCE. The origin of these early inhabitants remains a mystery. Some may 
have come down from the “North” (i.e., the region that now comprises the mod-
ern nation of China); others may have moved northward from more southerly 
regions of Southeast Asia. By around 2,000 BCE, bronze drums and farming 
equipment had come into use in the region. Were the people who used these 
items “Vietnamese”?23 If the term has a geographical meaning, referring simply 
to the ancient inhabitants of the territory now comprised by the borders of the 
Vietnamese nation, yes. If, however, the term also carries with it a strong cultural 
meaning, as DRV leaders insisted, the appropriateness of labeling them “Viet-
namese” is more questionable.
The scholar Keith Taylor, wary of Vietnamese Communist identity politics, 
has argued that a Vietnamese “cultural core” cannot be disentangled from three 
thousand years of Chinese cultural inuence. 24 That inuence, thought to have 
begun around 2,000 BCE, stemmed partly from the peaceful movement of 
Chinese people into the Red River delta and partly from northern Vietnam’s 
subsequent millennium (111 BCE to 978 CE) as the southernmost province of 
the various Chinese empires. As Taylor argues, attempts to connect Vietnamese 
culture of today with a pre-Chinese past are about “self-armation,” not “schol-
arly endeavor.”25
Wet-Rice Agriculture
The bronze drums from northern Vietnam’s pre-Chinese past do, however, in-
dicate one obvious connection between the ancient inhabitants of the Red River 
delta and the more modern citizens of Hồ Chí Minh’s DRV: an economic life 
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focused on rice farming. Though methods of irrigation had changed, the basic 
realities of this crop had not. For centuries, northern Vietnam’s climate and soil 
had enabled two rice harvests a year: usually one in October (vụ mùa) and an-
other in May (vụ chiêm).26
Because of wet rice’s sensitivity to temperature changes, the crop needs to grow 
in water, which provides an insulating eect. It is no accident, then, that the most 
densely populated regions in Vietnam are those at lowland areas best suited to 
water management. Conversely, the most sparsely populated regions are areas to 
the north and west where at rice elds would need to be carved laboriously into 
mountain slopes. Of the North’s lowland areas, the most notable is the triangu-
lar-shaped region of the Red River delta. It fans out eastward about 140 kilome-
ters from the inland city of Hanoi toward the coastal city of Haiphong. As the 
earliest known location of Vietnamese speaking peoples, the Red River delta is 
considered by Vietnamese to be the “cradle” of their civilization.
The ancient Vietnamese, like most farmers around the world, appreciated the 
relationship between land and security. Survival usually required access to land, 
and, whether peasants were “moral” or “rational” economists, the most appealing 
means of assuring that access was through owning the land one tilled. 27 A far less 
appealing means was through renting land—that is, acting as a tenant farmer. 
According to the scholar Christine White, “landlordism,” the renting out of 
land to laborers, was common throughout Vietnam. French land statistics from 
1938 suggest that more than 80 percent of the total farmland in Cochinchina 
was farmed by renters. In Central Vietnam, the gure was probably around 30 
percent, and, in Tonkin, the gure was probably about 50 percent.28 Peasant 
desire for land was a force that Communists hoped to exploit. Yet, peasant land 
hunger also contradicted the ideals of the DRV’s party leaders. As Marxists, 
these revolutionaries considered private property to be the root of exploitation 
and dreamed of its elimination.
Most Vietnamese elites of the late colonial period appear to have recognized 
the problem of agricultural productivity. About 80 percent of Vietnam’s popu-
lation still earned their living primarily by growing and selling rice, yet the 
productivity of Vietnamese agriculture was one of the lowest in Asia. In 1940, 
Vietnam’s average yield for one hectare of paddy (wet-rice eld) was calculated to 
be 1,330 kilograms. At that time, Japan’s was calculated at 3,300 kg per hectare; 
China’s, 1,900 kg; Thailand’s, 1,800 kg; Burma’s, 1,700 kg; and Indonesia’s, 1,500 
kg.29 The productivity level of Vietnam’s rice elds was fundamental to the na-
tion’s health. How could an independent Vietnam hope to compete in the world 
if its rice elds trailed far behind those of its neighbors?
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In the North, agricultural productivity was complicated by overpopulation. 
Writing in 1936, the great French geographer Pierre Gourou began his study of 
the Tonkin Delta with the line: “The Tonkin delta is a plain of limited expanse: 
it covers only 15,000 square kilometers; but it is extremely populous because it 
must nourish. . . 6,500,000 peasants.” This, Gourou explained, gave the delta 
an “extremely high” population density of 430 people per square kilometer. As 
the northern population continued to grow, the Tonkin delta region lost the 
ability to comfortably feed itself.30 Increasingly, rice surpluses from the South 
were needed to make up the decit in the North. In 1937, Cochinchina had 
a population of about 4,600,000 while Tonkin’s was nearly double at about 
8,700,000. Yet Cochinchina’s total area of rice cultivation (2,300,000 hectares) 
was nearly double that of Tonkin’s (1,200,000).31 To Vietnamese revolutionaries, 
the seriousness of this economic and demographic problem in the North justi-
ed radical solutions.
Vietnamese Communist Explanations:  
Class and Colonialism
Most of Vietnam’s Communist Party leaders also came from elite rural fami-
lies, but, through study of Marxist-Leninist theory, had adopted a “proletarian 
viewpoint.” To these revolutionaries, Marx’s stress on class conict applied all 
too well to village life in Vietnam. Wealthy families accumulated ever greater 
quantities of land, dominated village politics, and exploited the labor of the poor 
majority. As the father of Vietnamese communism, Nguyễn Tất Thành (later 
known as Hồ Chí Minh), wrote in his 1927 book, The Road to Revolution:
The capitalists of the countryside are the landlords. They want to maintain 
the feudal system and hold onto the people’s land. In the countryside, all 
power lies in the hands of these elites. They treat the peasants like bualos 
and pigs, forcing them to stay quietly in one place to till the landlord’s 
elds. In their dealings with traders, the landlords want a free hand to tax 
merchant goods, and they demand that traders ask permission to travel 
through local areas [. . .]. In many ways, the landlords inhibit the growth 
of new trade.32
The comment about inhibiting the “growth of new trade” added a national crime 
to the landlord class’s local ones against peasants. The landlords were backward, 
and they selshly thwarted the development of Vietnam’s native bourgeoisie, 
which the nation needed to modernize and strengthen.
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Vietnamese Communists also connected landlordism with colonialism. As 
the future party Politburo members Trường Chinh (1907–1988) and Võ Nguyên 
Giáp (1911–2012) argued in their 1938 study, The Peasant Question:
Since the French came to Indochina, land has become more and more con-
centrated in the hands of the great landlords, especially in the hands of 
priests and French colonialists.
The reason is that the French who came to Indochina brought capital-
ism with them, which transformed old Vietnam’s entire economic system.
To Indochina, they brought capitalists who opened trading rms, con-
structed factories, dug mines, and built plantations. Industry and trade 
began to develop. On the one hand, they produced some goods here; on the 
other hand, they brought French goods here to sell to people in the colo-
nies. Industrial goods . . . ooded into this country. Native producers went 
bankrupt because they could not compete. This especially hurt peasants, 
the majority of whom had produced handicra goods to supplement their 
income between harvests. No longer able to sell their wares, many peasants 
went bankrupt and were forced to sell their land to landlords. Peasants 
would have to go work for the landlords and rich peasants, or work as labor-
ers in provincial towns, toiling in factories, in mines, and on plantations.33
In their 1938 book, Chinh and Giáp pointed out the myriad ways in which 
the colonial economic system was rigged against the Vietnamese. The colonial 
government, usually through taxes or direct intervention, “can and usually does 
prevent colonial goods from owing into the French market where they could 
compete with French-made products.” This was done “to support industry and 
crasmen in France.” Similarly, Chinh and Giáp noted how France’s colonial 
and metropolitan governments “taxed only very lightly” raw materials sent from 
Indochina back to France. This was another way in which colonial economic 
policies promoted the development of French capitalism at the expense of Viet-
nam’s development. In a similar vein, Chinh and Giáp described the exploitative 
nature of the colonial government’s alcohol, salt, and opium monopolies. The 
French attempted to ensure that their Vietnamese subjects would have to pur-
chase these items only from the colonial government and at prices higher than 
would have been the case in free-market conditions.34 As the scholar Gerard 
Sasges describes in his study of the Indochina alcohol monopoly, the French used 
“nes and imprisonment” to suppress native competition.35
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Collectivization
Nguyễn Tất Thành, Trường Chinh, Võ Nguyên Giáp, Phạm Văn Đồng 
(1906–2000), and other DRV leaders apparently believed that Vietnam’s rural 
population, if pushed (or forced) to try a collectivized system, would ultimately 
“awaken” (giác ngộ) to its superiority over the old private property system. Initial 
peasant anger at losing their land to the state eventually would turn to gratitude 
as they saw the greater security and superior productive capacity of a collective 
farm. The Communists took it on faith that this revolutionary change was both 
desirable and inevitable. As Shawn McHale points out, the DRV leaders were 
“didactic” and “elitist” in their approach to the people. Like other educated Viet-
namese, they “assumed that they had the right and the duty to tell the masses 
how to act and think.”36
Some Vietnamese doubted whether a collectivized system would work with 
wet-rice farming. One such person was the scholar Hoàng Văn Chí (1913–1988). 
He had served the DRV cause until 1954 when the party’s radical land reform 
campaign turned him into a strong anticommunist. Chí came from an elite rural 
family in the Northern province of Thanh Hóa, about 160 kilometers south of 
Hanoi. The irrigation aspect of wet-rice farming struck Chí as something that 
would challenge a collectivized system. Because northern Vietnam’s rice elds 
required the maintenance of set water levels, farmers had to construct dikes 
around their elds to hold water in place during the long periods of little rain. 
As Chí explained, “The rice grower’s greatest worry, which is always with him, 
is the possibility of a break or hole in one of the dikes which could permit the 
water to ow away.” Such a circumstance could mean the loss of the entire crop:
During the period of private ownership of land in North Vietnam, it was 
common to see the peasant farmer strolling about his land for hours on 
end, inspecting the dikes, while his wife and children ceaselessly hunted the 
small crabs which burrow into, and sometimes through, the dikes of rice 
eld. Whenever it began to rain, he would abandon whatever task he might 
be engaged upon and run to his rice elds with all speed. There he would 
watch his dikes to ensure that they were equal to the strain of the increased 
weight of water, strengthening them in the weakest places, and seeing to 
it that his neighbor did not break them so as to steal water from his elds. 
So great was the peasant’s solicitude for water in pre-Communist Vietnam 
that noisy disputes about water stealing, which frequently degenerated into 
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noisy scues, were part of daily life in villages. So essential is water for rice 
growing that negligence on the part of the farmer might easily result in the 
loss of the whole crop and the consequent ruin of his family.37
Chí doubted that dike maintenance and other labor-intensive tasks of rice farm-
ing, which tended to ruthlessly punish carelessness, would receive adequate at-
tention if responsibility for them were spread collectively.
He also questioned the potential benets of applying Soviet-made farming 
machines to rice farms in the DRV. Agricultural mechanization was an import-
ant part of the party leadership’s rationale for combining small, individually 
farmed elds into large, collective ones. How would a farm machine such as 
a tractor operate in the watery environment of northern Vietnam’s rice elds? 
How could a machine replace human hands for the process of planting rice, 
which required placing partially grown rice seedlings delicately back into the 
underwater soil, one by one?38 At the time of Chí’s writing (1962), Japan was 
only just starting to develop a “rice transplanter” machine that could seed a wet- 
rice eld.39
The Nationalism of the DRV’s Party Leaders
Vietnam’s Communist Party leaders were militant nationalists in the broad 
sense of that term: they loved their country, fought with tireless courage for its 
independence, and yearned to restore dignity to the Vietnamese people aer 
decades of French domination. Upon seizing power in the “August Revolution,” 
the party fed the Vietnamese people a steady diet of inspiring nationalist propa-
ganda, none better than that produced by Nguyễn Tất Thành himself. Thành—
frequently using his constructed character, Hồ Chí Minh—assured Vietnamese 
from all walks of life that their lives and actions mattered. He exhorted young 
and old to look beyond family and village, to see that their nation, Vietnam, the 
“fatherland,” needed them. Especially in the revolutionary atmosphere of 1945 
and 1946, this nationalist message was a potent component of the DRV regime.
But Thành and his comrades were also true Leninists, and this shaped their 
way of using nationalism. First, they followed Lenin’s two-stage revolutionary 
strategy for seizing power in colonized countries. During the rst, “bourgeois 
democratic” stage of the revolution, the party would aim at mobilizing all 
classes for the nationalist goal of expelling the foreign power. Aer this initial 
“anti-imperialist” stage, the party would shi to the second, “socialist” stage of 
the revolution. At that point, the native bourgeoisie and the landowning class in 
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the countryside (yesterday’s allies) would become the new revolutionary targets. 
The viability of this two-stage strategy depended on concealing long-term goals 
of socialist transformation behind the moderate progressive slogans of the par-
ty’s Vietminh front. The upshot of this strategy was that the party, in the words 
of William Duiker, took power in 1945 “under false pretenses,” having disguised 
its “true face and objectives.”40
This reality relates to the second Leninist characteristic of Vietnam’s party 
leaders: their absolute refusal to share power with any other political organiza-
tion. Having important political beliefs and goals to conceal—the elimination 
of private property and the market, for example—these revolutionaries could not 
engage in substantive policy debates or discussions with rival political parties. 
Thus, aer taking power, Thành and his comrades kept the political discourse 
brutally simple. Members of the Communist-controlled Vietminh front were 
“patriots.” Members of other political parties were “traitors.” Only the Commu-
nist Party and its supporters were legitimately nationalist.
In support of their domestic mobilization eorts, the party leaders tirelessly 
promoted a notion of Vietnamese identity based on resistance to foreign aggres-
sion—a notion that became an axiomatic part of Western explanations for the 
Communist Party’s remarkable military successes.41 According to this narrative, 
mobilizing peasants to carry out “people’s war” against a foreign foe primarily 
required awakening in the Vietnamese people a consciousness of what 2,000 
years of history had allegedly programmed them to do. In this study, I argue 
that, behind closed doors, Thành and other party leaders were more realistic. 
They probably understood that their notion of a Vietnamese essence based on 
resistance to foreign aggression was a selective interpretation of the past that 
ignored countervailing evidence (hundreds of years of peaceful existence under 
Chinese rule and lots of ghting between Vietnamese groups). Their denition 
of national essence was “prescriptive,” to borrow Patricia Pelley’s term.42 It was 
how Vietnamese were supposed to think and act—but could not be trusted to 
do. Through years of tireless indoctrination reinforced by inspiring victories 
over the French and then over the Americans, the party leaders made this con-
structed national identity “true” for millions of Vietnamese—but never true 
enough to obviate the need for a powerful authoritarian state.
Sources
My narrative is based on information obtained from sources that can be broken 
down roughly into three categories: archival, public, and human. Only a small 
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fraction of this material is presented in this book, which paints mostly in broad 
brush strokes. But all of the material contributed to my overall understanding 
of the period. Of the archives that I was allowed to visit, the most important 
was Vietnam’s National Archives III, which contains records of the Communist 
state from 1945 to today. In those archives, I read documents from the Oce of 
the Prime Minister, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
the Central Land Reform Committee, and the National Assembly. On a more 
limited basis, I was able to read and collect documents from two provincial ar-
chives in Vietnam (Nghệ An and Hà Tĩnh) and from France’s Archive National 
d’outre-mer in Aix en Province.
A second source category comprises a variety of materials, mostly found in 
Vietnam, that are available to the broader public. First is the Vietnamese gov-
ernment’s y-nine-volume Party Documents series and other similar ocial 
document collections sold in major bookstores and increasingly available on-
line. Second is DRV-era pamphlets, journals, and books sold in two prominent 
used-book stores in Hanoi. Third is DRV-era books and newspapers held in Ha-
noi’s National Library. Fourth is memoirs of varying reliability written by Viet-
namese who lived through the early years of the DRV.43 Some of these memoirs 
are available in Vietnam’s National Library, some are available on the internet, 
and some were printed in the West.
A third source category is the human one comprising Vietnamese who lived 
through the years examined in this study (1945–1960) or who, though born aer 
the period, have special insight into those years as a result of work or family. 
Since the Communist Party’s adoption of Đổi mới (new change) in 1986, the 
country has become a more open place. This has made it easier for foreigners to 
speak with Vietnamese about past episodes that the ruling Communist Party 
sees as sensitive. Numerous older scholars and witnesses shared their memories 
and thoughts with me. In some cases, people provided me with sensitive docu-
ments that I, as a foreigner, probably would have been unable to access in the 
archives. To describe Vietnam as “a more open place,” though, is not to say that 
the country has become truly open. The legacy of widespread state repression in 
the past and the continued fear of its more limited practice in the present still 
poses a challenge to research in the country.
In addition to the primary sources mentioned above, many secondary sources 
shaped the book’s narrative. I owe a special debt to outstanding scholarship 
on Vietnamese Communism produced by researchers during the past twenty 
years.44 In general, this scholarship has beneted from improved access to ar-
chival materials in Vietnam and from the growing chronological and emotional 
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distance from the intense politics of the Second Indochina War. I also owe a debt 
to ne works of scholarship produced by people who worked under the more 
challenging conditions of the Cold War era.45 In 1950, the DRV came under 
heavy inuence from Mao’s China. Studies of that country’s revolutionary pro-
cess arm the depth of Chinese Communist inuence on DRV policies, espe-
cially during the 1950s.46
This book builds especially on ideas argued by Christopher Goscha in his 
pathbreaking 2011 history of the First Indochina War, Vietnam, un etat né de 
la guerre. Goscha points out the strong connection between DRV state build-
ing and the mobilization of men and materials for war. He also takes seriously 
the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the DRV’s party leaders. And, perhaps most 
liberating for fellow scholars, he normalizes the Vietnamese people ghting on 
the DRV side. Goscha points out that the DRV’s leaders needed extraordinary 
levels of coercion to make their soldiers prevail on the battleeld. This reality is 
crucial to understanding the strong totalitarian thrust of DRV state building. 
In adopting a straight chronological approach (as opposed to Goscha’s thematic 
one), I take the reader through the gradual process of radicalization that culmi-
nated in the party’s controversial land reform campaign carried out from 1953 
to 1956. I place that campaign in the context of seven years of frustration felt by 
party leaders over the diculties of mobilization.
This book also takes inspiration from Tuong Vu’s recently published study 
of Vietnamese Communism, Vietnam’s Communist Revolution: The Power and 
Limits of Ideology (2017). Vu is a meticulous and perceptive reader of the party’s 
internal documents, many of which are now easily available in the Vietnamese 
government’s Party Documents series. I share his belief in the value of these doc-
uments. One thing that they reveal is the strong logic of the Politburo’s program 
of socialist transformation. Since the political legitimacy of these DRV leaders 
was tied to the Bolshevik model, Soviet-inspired policies had a sacred character; 
their correctness had to be protected from poor results. As in the Soviet Union 
and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this protection tended to come in 
two forms. The rst was through identifying scapegoats (usually local cadres and 
internal enemies). The second was through interpreting poor results as exciting 
signs that the time for a more radical policy had arrived. The incessant need of 
Vietnam’s party leaders to nd scapegoats appears over and over again in internal 
party writings and is a central theme of this book.
An important assertion of Vu’s book is the consistent true belief in 
Marxism-Leninism held by Vietnam’s party leaders up through the 1980s.47 I 
believe that doubts about the economic ecacy of Communist-bloc policies may 
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have arisen in outwardly doctrinaire party leaders as early as the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. “Situation reports” (tình hình chung) and other DRV-state docu-
ments in Vietnam’s National Archives 3 reveal that party leaders received little 
positive local feedback on their Soviet and Chinese-inspired economic policies. 
A powerful combination of pressures was probably sucient, though, to ensure 
ideological orthodoxy in the face of countervailing evidence: the need for Soviet 
and Chinese support, the personal pride of the party leaders, the terrible costs of 
war, and the fact that most Vietnamese would not do voluntarily what the party 
leaders felt was necessary for victory. In the minds of Vietnam’s party leaders, 
the value of Soviet institutions as weapons of war and methods of regime pres-
ervation probably outweighed their apparent weaknesses as economic engines.
Finally, I build on Goscha and Vu’s handling of the DRV leader, Nguyễn 
Tất Thành (Hồ Chí Minh). Both scholars leave behind the old debates about 
whether Thành was a true communist. He was a founding member of the 
French Communist Party (1920). Five years later in 1925, as a Comintern agent, 
he founded Vietnam’s rst Communist front organization, Thanh niên (Youth). 
Five years later, he oversaw the founding of Vietnam’s rst ocial Communist 
Party. Around that same time, Thành also helped to establish Communist par-
ties in Malaya and Siam. By the time he nally returned to Vietnam in 1941 aer 
thirty years abroad, Thành was y-one years old. He had been in and out of the 
Soviet Union for much of his adult life, including a four-year stint from 1934 to 
1938. Given his advanced age and experiences, it seems reasonable to conclude, as 
Goscha and Vu do, that his ideas about communism, the Soviet Union, and the 
capitalist world had reached a point of stabilization by the time he took power 
in August of 1945. Under that assumption, I analyze his behavior and policies.
A consistent and crucial feature of Thành’s professional life was his use of 
aliases. Every time he wrote something, he decided whether to sign it as “Hồ Chí 
Minh,” “C.B.,” “Trần Lực,” “Chiến thắng,” “Trần Dân Tiên,” “X.Y.Z.,” or one 
of dozens of other aliases that he sometimes used. To follow convention and sim-
ply use “Hồ Chí Minh” as Thành’s real name, labeling all other names as aliases, 
distorts the fact that “Hồ Chí Minh” was no less an alias than the other names. 
Indeed, Thành’s writings under non–Hồ Chí Minh aliases are probably more 
accurate reections of his political beliefs. Thành’s mythical character, “Hồ 
Chí Minh,” the center of a personality cult in the DRV, was a mixture of posi-
tive traits. Some aligned with Thành’s own character (intelligent, determined, 
charismatic, courageous, condent, and patriotic), and some did not (simplistic, 
modest, accessible, and straightforward). For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I 
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refer to the DRV leader throughout the remainder of this text by his real name, 
Thành (pronounced as though written “Tine”).
Book Structure
As mentioned above, this book follows a simple chronological structure. The 
rst two chapters cover the sixteen-month period of the Vietnamese Revolution, 
from August 1945 until December of 1946. These two chapters describe such 
things as the establishment of the Hồ Chí Minh personality cult, the party’s 
attack on rival Vietnamese political parties, and the subtle promotion of Marxist 
ideas through the DRV press. The book’s third chapter covers the DRV lead-
ership’s move from Hanoi to the countryside and looks at some of the regime’s 
basic political institutions in the countryside.
The fourth and h chapters cover the period from 1949 to 1952. During 
this phase, the victory of Mao’s Communist forces in China led to the DRV’s 
integration into the Soviet bloc. Soon thereaer, Chinese military and political 
advisors arrived in the DRV along with generous supplies of Soviet weapons. 
Vietnam’s party leaders were able to put this material support to good use, win-
ning a spectacular victory against the French in October of 1950 and threatening 
their control of Hanoi the following February. The French forces were able to 
recover and repulse these DRV attacks, delivering punishing blows to exposed 
enemy troops. The period also saw the establishment of the Associated State 
of Vietnam in 1949, a non-communist alternative government that the French 
hoped would lure Vietnamese away from the DRV regime.
The next three chapters cover the period from 1952 to 1953 and focus on the 
DRV’s radical new policy, the Maoist inspired “mass mobilization through rent 
reeducation and land reform.” In chapter six, I explore the process by which 
Thành decided to adopt this controversial policy. In chapter seven, I outline im-
portant elements of the mass mobilization’s basic structure. Chapter eight looks 
at the way in which the DRV leaders propagandized the campaign. Ultimately, I 
argue that virtually every oddity of the campaign’s structure and accompanying 
media campaign can be traced back to the Politburo’s overriding fear that mass 
mobilization cadres would not nd enough “landlords” to make into targets 
of struggle.
Chapter nine, “Hunger: 1953,” is based on a roughly 500-page DRV govern-
ment le containing documents that deal with the growing problem of famine 
in DRV-controlled areas. I use this le to scrutinize the party leadership’s claims 
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that most of the hardships in DRV-controlled areas stemmed from feudal land-
lord exploitation. Looking at local reports on the causes of famine in 1953, I show 
that the DRV’s heavy agricultural tax, along with the disruptive conditions of 
war, were more important contributors to peasant hunger and hardship than 
alleged “feudal exploitation.”
Chapters ten, eleven, and twelve cover the years 1954 and 1955. I describe the 
DRV’s victory at Điện Biên Phủ followed by the Geneva negotiations that ended 
the war and partitioned the country into North and South. I look at the ways 
in which the DRV regime adjusted its land reform campaign to avoid being 
charged with violations of the Geneva Accords, which guaranteed democratic 
freedoms for all Vietnamese. I also consider the Geneva Accords’ clause allowing 
Vietnamese to move freely between North and South for a period of 300 days 
following the end of the war. The DRV leaders viewed the departure of about 
800,000 northerners to the South as a public relations disaster and directly in-
tervened to prevent more people from leaving. In chapter twelve, I show how the 
party leaders, feeling more secure aer the closing of the seventeenth parallel 
border in mid-1955, attempted to reinvigorate their land reform campaign.
The book’s nal two chapters cover the period from 1956 to 1960. I describe 
how the party leaders navigated the diculties posed by the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union’s (CPSU) 20th Congress held in February of 1956. Khrush-
chev’s shocking “secret speech” denouncing Stalin’s “cult of personality” (i.e., 
his crimes) posed many dierent challenges to the DRV’s party leaders. I de-
scribe how Nguyễn Tất Thành and the Politburo handled such awkward issues 
as Stalin’s legacy, the Hồ Chí Minh cult of personality, and fallout from the 
regime’s violent land reform campaign. The nal chapter, titled “Re-Staliniza-
tion,” moves quickly through the four-year period from 1957 to 1960. I show 
how the regime found its footing aer the tumultuous events of 1956 and, under 
its new leader, Lê Duẩn, moved North Vietnam promptly through agricultural 
collectivization.
17
Ch a pter 1
The Vietnamese Revolution,  
August 1945 to March 1946
From their Tân Trào base about 125 kilometers north of Hanoi in the province 
of Tuyên Quang, Nguyễn Tất Thành (Hồ Chí Minh) and other ICP leaders 
followed events in Europe. In early May of 1945, German forces in various the-
aters began a succession of surrenders that would bring the European war to an 
end. In mid-July, Stalin, Truman, and Churchill met in Potsdam, Germany to 
negotiate postwar arrangements. In keeping with the policy of Roosevelt, who 
had died on April 12, Truman insisted that Charles de Gaulle be excluded from 
the conference as he had been ve months earlier in Yalta. This was despite the 
fact that de Gaulle’s Free France regime had been given a share of occupation 
duties in Germany. During the Potsdam conference, Churchill and Truman 
worked out basic arrangements for how Japan’s surrender would be handled in 
Southeast Asia, including in Vietnam.1
Roosevelt had had warm feelings toward the non-Communist Chinese Re-
public and had been eager to promote the regime on the international stage. As 
for de Gaulle and France, he had borne a grudge against both, feeling that their 
contribution to the Axis defeat had been minimal and that de Gaulle’s sense of 
entitlement to the victors’ spoils had been oversized.2 As for the Empire of Viet-
nam, the nominally independent Vietnamese regime established by the Japanese 
in April of 1945, it appears to have generated little attention or opinion from 
Washington or London. (Thành, however, appreciated the potential inuence 
of the Empire of Vietnam’s leader, Emperor Bảo Đại (1913–1997), and developed 
a plan for his neutralization during the August seizure of power.)3
With respect to Indochina’s postwar arrangements, Truman and Churchill 
agreed that Great Britain would oversee the Japanese surrender in the southern 
half of Vietnam while Nationalist Chinese forces would do so in the northern 
half. Through a combination of clever maneuvering and luck, Thành would 
maximize the potential of this peculiar surrender arrangement, buying six 
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precious months for his edgling DRV regime in northern Vietnam before the 
arrival of French troops.
The Seizure of Power and Six Months with the Chinese 
Nationalists (August 1945 to March 1946)
Through sophisticated radio equipment brought to their base by ten American 
agents working for the Oce of Strategic Services (OSS),4 Thành and other ICP 
leaders at the Tân Trào base could follow the four events that brought the Pacic 
War to an end in early August: the US bombing of Hiroshima on August 6, the 
Soviet Union’s declaration of war on Japan on August 8, the US bombing of 
Nagasaki on August 9, and the Soviet invasion of Manchuria that same day. On 
August 13, while Tokyo was still deliberating its response to these dire circum-
stances, ICP leaders in the North began a three-day Central Committee meet-
ing during which Thành announced that the time to seize power had arrived.5
One immediate task that must have been discussed was the staging of a “Na-
tional People’s Congress.” The congress, which Thành held at Tân Trào on 
August 16, involved convening “representatives” of the Vietnamese nation from 
North to South. An idea of Thành’s since October of 1944,6 the National Peo-
ple’s Congress would be held to make the seizure of power by one political party 
seem like a nationally sanctioned multiparty aair. The presence of the Amer-
ican OSS team at the party’s Tân Trào base surely gave the congress additional 
meaning. No doubt Thành hoped that the meeting would leave a democratic 
impression on his American guests, whose assessments might inuence U.S. gov-
ernment policy in favor of Thành’s regime. Participants at the congress allegedly 
elected a People’s Liberation Committee,7 but we can assume that the congress 
merely went through the ceremonial act of approving a committee already se-
lected by Thành’s leadership group during the previous three days.
The committee included Thành and three younger ICP leaders who 
would, with Thành, evolve into the DRV’s leading foursome. The rst was the 
thirty-nine-year-old Phạm Văn Đồng, a tall, quiet revolutionary from Central 
Vietnam. He would serve the regime as deputy prime minister from 1947 until 
1955 and then as prime minister from 1955 until his retirement in 1987. The 
second was the thirty-eight-year-old Trường Chinh (Đặng Xuân Khu), whom 
Thành had made party general secretary in 1941. Chinh was born in the North-
ern province of Nam Định, about 100 kilometers south of Hanoi. He would 
serve as general secretary until 1956, when, I believe, Thành would orchestrate 
his demotion as a response to fallout from the party’s land reform campaign 
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(1953–1956). Chinh would remain a Politburo member, though, and even enjoy 
a ve-month twilight return to the general secretary position before retiring in 
late 1986. The third of the three was the thirty-four-year-old Võ Nguyên Giáp, a 
charismatic high school teacher with Đồng in Hanoi and a frequent collaborator 
with Chinh in the city’s lively newspaper scene of the late 1930s. He would serve 
as the DRV’s minister of defense from 1946 until 1980.
All three came from elite rural families, studied at the best French colonial 
schools, recognized Thành’s brilliance as a leader, and gave him their absolute 
loyalty. On the People’s Liberation Committee, they were joined by eight other 
party members and four “fellow travelers,” that is, non-party members who, as 
a result of close personal ties and ideological sympathies, supported party rule.8
At this time, Thành and his comrades also released an “Action Plan” that 
reviewed the basic tasks to be completed during the seizure of power:
Wherever we seize power:
1. Destroy the enemy’s regime; government documents, seals, tax information, 
etc. (land registers and village registers) should be handed to the People’s 
Committee.
2. Liquidate Vietnamese traitors.
3. Establish a people’s regime; implement the Vietminh’s 10 policies.
4. Establish an oce of the Vietnam People’s Liberation Committee. That 
committee should establish a new administration (Central government, 
People’s Committees at the regional, provincial, district, etc.), take power, 
announce Vietnam’s independence.
5. Have armed squads carry out propaganda in areas that the army does not 
pass through.
6. Occupy and use the enemy’s propaganda organs, requisition private pub-
lishing equipment and radios.
7. Carry out a general mobilization of the masses to maintain the spirit of 
seizing complete independence and overcoming all diculties.9
The order of the Action Plan’s items suggests a top-down approach to the seizure 
of power. Comrades would mobilize small groups of reliable supporters to carry 
out a revolution from above, seizing the country’s most important symbols of 
power (Hanoi, Saigon, and Huế rst and foremost, followed by as many dis-
trict capitals as possible in the provinces). In conditions of political breakdown 
and uncertainty, small groups of determined and well-organized revolutionaries 
could punch far above their weight. Having seized power from above, the ICP 
could then project its propaganda message downward to facilitate the “general 
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mobilization of the people.” At this point, the truly large-scale recruitment of 
people into the party’s mass organizations would begin.
The ICP took power in Hanoi on August 19, three days aer the conclusion 
of the People’s Congress at the Tân Trào base. The takeover started at about 
8:00 in the morning with a boisterous meeting in front of the Hanoi Opera 
House. ICP agents led members of the crowd to march on the nearby symbol 
of Vietnamese power in Hanoi, the Northern Viceroy’s Oce (Bắc Bộ phủ).10
Emperor Bảo Đại’s viceroy (a king’s special representative) during the preceding 
period of the Japanese-backed Empire of Vietnam (from March to August of 
1945) was an old acquaintance of Thành’s named Phan Kế Toại. He had been 
cultivated by the ICP during the summer and had surely been promised that co-
operation would lead to clemency and a respectable position in a new Commu-
nist-led regime. A few days before the ICP seizure of power, Toại had resigned 
from the Empire of Vietnam government. Leaving his oce, he had instructed 
secretaries there to open the doors for the party’s agents when they arrived.11
Since the founding of his Vietminh front in May of 1941, Thành had dog-
gedly pursued Allied recognition for his organization, hopefully as the exclu-
sive representatives of the Vietnamese people. He continued to pursue this goal 
during the August seizure of power and beyond. To keep potential political ri-
vals o balance, the ICP employed a policy of terror, leniency, and recruitment.12
ICP members and their followers chased down and killed several leaders of Viet-
nam’s Trotskyist Party, which was too small to seize power but likely to artic-
ulate compelling criticisms of ICP policies.13 Party members also assassinated 
inuential French collaborators such as leading man of letters Phạm Quỳnh. 
Another target was the oldest son of the powerful Central Vietnamese Ngô 
family, whose younger son, Ngô Đình Diệm, would become the leader of South 
Vietnam about a decade later. Remarkably, Thành captured Diệm as well and 
attempted to recruit him to work for the DRV state, despite the assassination of 
his older brother.14
In Hanoi, ICP agents surrounded the Nationalist Party headquarters and ar-
rested eight of this rival party’s central committee members—yet released them 
shortly thereaer. Thành also sent groups of armed agents to the Chinese bor-
der to arrest Nationalist groups based there. The ICP’s strategy focused on in-
ducing Nationalist Party defections to the Vietminh and giving defectors what 
appeared to be prestigious positions of authority. It was hoped that this would 
encourage further defections and demoralize those who remained loyal to the 
Nationalist Party. Later, the ICP’s policy sharpened. As a former member of this 
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rival party explained, “Those who cooperated with the Viet Minh were taken to 
Hanoi and used as tools; those who refused were shot.”15
On August 20, 1945, ICP agents in Hanoi announced the establishment of a 
Provisional Revolutionary Government. Thành, using the alias “Hồ Chí Minh,” 
served as National Chairman (chủ tịch nước) and as Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs. Võ Nguyên Giáp was Minister of Internal Aairs while Phạm Văn Đồng 
served as the Minister of Finance. Trường Chinh, as the party general secretary, 
did not take an ocial position in the Provisional Revolutionary Government. 
But he was fully involved in governmental aairs. In late September, aer the 
DRV’s ocial establishment, Chinh would serve with Thành and three other 
ICP leaders on a seven-person committee charged with draing a constitution 
for the DRV.16
The following day, August 21, 1945, Thành traveled secretly into Hanoi, his 
rst time in the city, where he took up residence at an inconspicuous house in 
the famous Old Quarter. Meanwhile, party leaders in Vietnam’s other major 
city, Saigon, initially wavered in their resolve to seize power, still wary of the 
Japanese forces there. Seeing the successful takeover in Hanoi, though, these 
comrades prepared to follow suit. Four days later (August 25), the southern Party 
leader, Trần Văn Giầu, organized a march on Saigon to seize power. His instru-
ment was thousands of patriotic youths from the Empire of Vietnam’s Vanguard 
Youth, an organization under the leadership of a covert ICP recruit.17
Four days earlier in Huế, the emperor Bảo Đại had abdicated the throne as he 
had been warned to do by his secretary, another secret ICP asset. This secretary 
had been instructed by the party leader in Huế (Tôn Quang Phiệt) to mention 
the fate of French King Louis XIV as a means of winning the emperor’s com-
pliance. Following secret instructions on which his life probably depended, Bảo 
Đại abdicated and traveled to Hanoi.18 There, as citizen Vĩnh Thụy, he served 
as “Supreme Advisor” to the DRV until the summer of 1946. What Thành val-
ued in Bảo Đại was not advice but the broad-based image his presence gave the 
DRV.
Meanwhile, throughout the country, in many district capitals, small numbers 
of party members led groups of local recruits in takeovers. As Thành had antic-
ipated, most local leaders were le isolated at the end of the war. They were in 
no position psychologically or materially to resist even small groups of aggressive 
revolutionaries acting with courage and a sense of purpose. Because of the strong 
agenda of party histories of the seizure of power, which ICP leaders named the 
“August Revolution,” determining the actual extent of the party’s control over 
the country is dicult and may never be resolved. David Marr and others have 
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sensibly pointed to the fact of the ICP’s small size—allegedly about 5,000 mem-
bers. How much control over Vietnam could such a small group have had?19
I believe that the party’s immediate goal in the revolution was not to con-
trol the country but to seize control over strategic assets that other claimants to 
power could use to spread inuence. If the party could seize power at the top, 
suppress rivals, propagandize a compelling message, and exude an aura of com-
petence and staying power, people would ow into their Vietminh front and into 
the party itself. For the time being, inability to enforce policies in vast swaths 
of the country was acceptable as long as those swaths contained no organized 
political forces capable of mobilizing a challenge to the DRV regime.
The Complex Inuence of Foreign Powers in Vietnam
Japan’s three-and-a-half-year occupation of Southeast Asia tended to exacerbate 
existing political and ethnic divisions in the region’s countries, oen forcing 
people to choose between collaboration and resistance. Those who chose col-
laboration were put in a vulnerable position by Japan’s ultimate defeat. For Viet-
nam, the complexity of the country’s postwar political situation was magnied 
by the US decision to divide between Great Britain and Nationalist China the 
responsibility for overseeing the Japanese surrender. These two powers, like all 
foreign powers involved with Vietnam (with the exception of France), viewed 
the country as an ancillary piece of more important agendas elsewhere. Further 
complicating the situation was the fact that neither Great Britain nor Nation-
alist China was the ultimate authority in the region. That position belonged to 
the United States, which had borne the brunt of the ghting in the Pacic War 
and had recently detonated two atomic bombs.20
For the world’s two most powerful countries, the United States and the So-
viet Union, Vietnam was part of the Cold War struggle for France. Because 
French Communists had been among the most courageous resisters of the Nazi 
occupation, the country’s Communist Party (FCP) enjoyed a postwar surge in 
popularity.21 As a result, the FCP had a chance to win electoral victory and pos-
sibly bring the country into the Soviet bloc through parliamentary means. Since 
maintenance of the French Empire was a popular policy among members of both 
the Right and the Le in France, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
dared impose an anticolonial agenda on respective French political allies battling 
for control of the country.22
For Great Britain and Nationalist China, the two powers charged with tak-
ing the Japanese surrender, Vietnam had a dierent meaning. The British were 
able to emerge from WWII with head held high, but the war had exposed their 
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country’s material limitations and le it a second-rate power. Like France’s lead-
ers, Churchill was determined to reestablish his country’s empire and the ac-
companying material and prestige benets that this brought. With this British 
policy goal in mind, he saw the importance of supporting French and Dutch 
recolonization in Southeast Asia.23
For Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Chinese Republic, Vietnam was a neighbor 
whose politics mattered for a looming struggle with Mao Zedong’s Communist 
forces. Chiang wanted a non-Communist Vietnam. Ideally, it would be an in-
dependent Vietnam led by Nationalists who were friendly with Chiang and his 
regime’s ideology. But, if this were not viable, a French-occupied (and, therefore, 
non-Communist) Vietnam would suce. In this case, Chiang would use his 
army’s occupation of Vietnam to wrest useful political and material concessions 
from France. Finally, in taking the Japanese surrender in northern Vietnam, 
Chiang wanted his regime to look the part of a respectable world power. This 
meant no embarrassing troubles, such as outbreaks of violence and bloodshed, 
that would make the Chinese Nationalist troops in particular and the Chinese 
Republic in general seem incompetent.24
Thành and members of his inner circle surely understood these international 
dynamics. With the FCP poised to seize power through electoral means, Stalin 
would be an irresponsible leader of the Communist bloc if he were to overtly 
support the DRV regime. Also, French Communists argued to Vietnamese com-
rades that, aer seizing power in France, the FCP would liberate Vietnam.25
Surrounded by anticommunist powers, the ICP needed to continue to down-
play the Communist nature of their regime. Obtaining eventual support from 
the Soviet Union, though, required that Thành send Marxist-Leninist signals 
to Moscow. Thus, despite his stress on concealment, the DRV still provided 
perceptive observers with obvious clues about the actual political orientation of 
the regime’s leaders.
The Arrival of Foreign Guests and Domestic Rivals
By late August 1945, it was clear that the party’s assumption of Japanese 
non-interference in domestic Vietnamese politics had been correct. What the 
party leaders had been unable to predict was how Allied powers would behave 
when they entered Vietnam. Would the Chinese Nationalists attempt to remove 
the Communist DRV regime from power and replace it with a regime run by 
Vietnamese Nationalists, who had been supported by Chiang Kai-shek since 
the 1930s? The main Nationalist groups in southern China were the Vietnam-
ese Revolutionary League (Việt Cách), led by an old patriot named Nguyễn Hải 
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Thần (1878–1951), and the Vietnamese Nationalist Party (Việt Quốc), led by a 
forty-seven-year-old revolutionary named Vũ Hồng Khanh (1898–1993).
From Thành’s perspective in Hanoi during the latter days of August 1945, the 
fact that both of these two Nationalist leaders had yet to arrive was probably an 
encouraging sign. On September 1 in the Chinese city of Chongqing, the Na-
tionalist Party leader Khanh and a handful of other members had pleaded with 
Chiang Kai-shek to y a group of them into Hanoi before the arrival of the Chi-
nese troops. In the propaganda battle for the hearts and minds of Vietnamese, 
every second mattered. Yet Chiang refused this reasonable request, forcing these 
Vietnamese Nationalists to take the slow overland route with China’s Yunnan 
Province Army, to which he had assigned the task of occupation.26 This delay 
played into the hands of the ICP, giving its members precious time to begin 
consolidating their power with little hindrance. The delay also showed Chiang’s 
lack of commitment to helping Vietnamese Nationalists take power in Vietnam.
While these Vietnamese Nationalist Party leaders in China were lamenting 
their delayed return to Vietnam, Thành, Võ Nguyên Giáp, Phạm Văn Đồng, 
Trường Chinh, and other ICP leaders were busy organizing a dramatic “Dec-
laration of Independence” ceremony in Hanoi’s main square. During the days 
leading up to the ceremony, Thành met with America’s OSS representative in 
Hanoi, Archimedes Patti, to discuss the DRV “Declaration of Independence.”
As Thành had done with members of OSS Deer and Cat teams that had 
spent the summer at his revolutionary base north of Hanoi in Tân Trào, he 
played to American vanity. As though a great admirer of American democracy, 
he praised the US Declaration of Independence. What Thành wanted Patti to 
know (and to pass on to his superiors in Washington) was that the DRV inde-
pendence declaration’s opening lines were borrowed from that American doc-
ument.27 No doubt Thành hoped the move would be interpreted by Patti and 
Washington ocials as a attering sign of DRV reverence for the United States 
and its political system.
On September 12, as Chinese Nationalist troops were still making their way 
toward Hanoi, Britain’s General James Gracey arrived in Saigon with 20,000 
soldiers to oversee the Japanese surrender. In keeping with Churchill’s aim to 
reestablish Britain’s own empire, Gracey set about facilitating France’s return 
to power. He released imprisoned French troops, provided them with arms, and 
authorized them to take control of important buildings in Saigon. Extremely 
bitter aer the humiliations of WWII, these French troops rampaged through 
Saigon, beating random Vietnamese on the street. Ten days later, 30,000 French 
troops arrived in Saigon via American transport ship, a fact noted by ICP leaders 
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attempting to determine US government policy toward Indochina.28 With Brit-
ish and even Japanese help, these French troops began the process of recoloniza-
tion. France was, as David Marr put it, attempting to “turn back the clock” in 
Vietnam, hoping that the memory of WWII could be erased.29
The following day, Vietnamese revolutionaries of unclear political aliation 
entered Saigon’s French quarter and slaughtered about 120 French civilians, in-
cluding women and children.30 Another hundred French hostages were taken 
for a period and then killed as well. These events in the South lled Gracey’s 
counterpart in Hanoi, the Chinese Nationalist general Lu Han, with dread. At 
a meeting on September 22, 1945, he assured Thành that, as long as law and order 
were maintained in the North, the Chinese Nationalist forces (roughly 150,000 
troops) would not disband the DRV regime in Hanoi.31
Meanwhile, the South erupted into a complicated anticolonial and civil war. 
In keeping with the ICP’s overall approach of focusing on the elimination of 
Vietnamese rivals, Communist forces in the South attacked the leaders of the 
region’s two large religious sects (an estimated 300,000 followers), the Cao Đài 
and the Hòa Hảo, who refused to subordinate themselves to Communist con-
trol. There was nothing comparable in the North to these religious sects, which 
had been supported by the Japanese and which had soon transformed themselves 
into potent paramilitary forces.32 A history written by a member of the Hòa Hảo 
estimates that about 10,000 people were killed in the struggle between the ICP’s 
forces and the two religious sects.33
By October 1945, a clearer picture of the DRV’s situation was beginning to 
emerge. First, and most importantly, France was determined to reconquer Indo-
china. Paris had already used troops to reestablish control over the South, and, 
next door in Cambodia, had arrested the independence-minded Cambodian 
prime minister, Sơn Ngọc Thành. Second, the French were only prevented from 
clearing the DRV regime out of Hanoi by the presence of China’s Yunnan Army. 
For the time being, at least, the Chinese Nationalists, whose arrival in Hanoi 
had lled Thành with dread,34 were proving to be more helpful than harmful 
to the DRV cause. Third, though the ICP leaders, particularly Thành and Võ 
Nguyên Giáp, had successfully won the hearts of some American OSS mem-
bers,35 the US government, like that of the Soviet Union, would not intervene to 
prevent a French takeover in Indochina. Both superpowers prioritized the Cold 
War struggle in France.
On November 11, 1945, the ocial organ of the ICP, Liberation Flag, notied 
the public that the Communist Party had dissolved itself, no longer acting as a 
part of the Vietminh.36 This auto-dissolution was done in name only. In reality, 
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the party fought as doggedly as ever to consolidate power and to recruit new 
members. Was there a particular event, though, that triggered this dramatic po-
litical stunt? Scholars have yet to uncover any internal explanation. It is possible, 
though, that the auto-dissolution was a defensive move partly related to the im-
minent publication of a new Nationalist Party newspaper, whose rst issue was 
released on November 15, four days later. This seems an unlikely trigger until one 
considers the obsessive attention that the ICP’s two main newspapers in Hanoi 
paid to this single Nationalist newspaper.
Titled Vietnam, the newspaper was run by a cultural luminary named Khái 
Hưng who, during the 1930s, had been a leading editor of the country’s most 
successful literary magazine, These Days. Other giants of the literary world, in-
cluding Nguyễn Tường Tam and Phan Khôi, were associated with the newspa-
per as well.37 Moreover, because Vietnam enjoyed Chinese protection, its editors 
could not be intimidated into following the ICP line. Thành and other party 
leaders may have feared that the Communist nature of the DRV government 
was likely to be a favorite topic of Vietnam. Perhaps these expected attacks could 
be countered by claiming that the ICP no longer existed, a claim that Vietnam 
dismissed in its second issue.38
DRV Propaganda
Immediately upon seizing power, ICP leaders used newly acquired print media 
assets to project their message to the broader population. That message was, 
rst and foremost, one of Vietnamese nationalism. During the war, France had 
surrendered to Germany in Europe and to Japan in Indochina. The Vietnamese 
were now independent and would not allow their country to be subjugated again 
by France. Over this electrifying nationalist background, ICP leaders propagan-
dized three other themes. First was a nuance-free patriot-versus-traitor narrative 
that distinguished between those who belonged to the party’s front organiza-
tions (the Vietminh, the ICP-run Democratic Party, and the various National 
Salvation Associations) and those who belonged to alternative political orga-
nizations. Second was the creation of the Hồ Chí Minh personality cult. And 
third was a hybrid political message that combined classic Western democratic 
ideas with thinly disguised Marxist-Leninist ones.
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The Patriot-Traitor Narrative
The party leaders constructed their patriot-traitor narrative to justify suppres-
sion of other political groups, to intimidate regular people into not supporting 
ICP rivals, and to avoid substantive policy discussions that risked revealing long-
term revolutionary intentions. An important part of the patriot-traitor narrative 
was creating the appearance of a multiparty system in the DRV. Party leaders 
therefore oversaw the establishment of two fake political parties, the afore-men-
tioned Democratic Party (established in June 1944) and the Socialist Party (es-
tablished two years later in July 1946). These parties gave the ICP the appearance 
of being merely one part of the Vietminh front and tolerant of diverse politi-
cal voices—the opposite of reality. The presence of two fake political parties 
in the ICP front organization helped conceal the party-versus-party nature of 
the ICP’s attacks on other political groups. The ICP was to act in the name of 
large, vague concepts such as “the people,” “the nation,” or “the fatherland” when 
dealing with rival political groups.
One of the early targets of ICP propaganda was the Japanese-supported Great 
Vietnam National Confederation (Đại Việt Quốc gia Liên minh Hội). This al-
liance of ve dierent Nationalist parties had sought Japanese support against 
the French. Japan’s defeat, though, le the confederation vulnerable, and ICP 
leaders were quick to impose the patriot-traitor template on these rivals. The 
September 7, 1945 issue of the party newspaper National Salvation (ocially the 
“Organ of the Vietminh Front”) included a front-page article titled “To Mem-
bers of Japanese-Friendly Political Parties:”
Under the Japanese rule, many people became over-excited and thus 
unthinkingly joined parties that had a traitorous character.
The government clearly understands that regrettable mistake and is 
ready to forgive those children of the Fatherland who chose the wrong 
road—except the leaders, whose degree of national betrayal is clearer.
At this time, it’s not too late to repent, and the Fatherland is still hop-
ing that those confused children will quickly return to their countrymen 
to serve the cause of national independence, to sacrice for the people’s 
liberation.
With this doleful appeal, the Fatherland awaits you.39
In the same issue of National Salvation was a similarly toned article titled 
“The Dubious Actions of the Vietnamese Revolutionary Alliance.” Having 
come from southern China and having been associated with the anti-Japanese 
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cause, the Revolutionary Alliance could not be branded as traitors for enjoying 
Japanese support. Therefore, the ICP’s approach was to label them traitors for 
not having joined the Vietminh and to imply, falsely, that the Vietminh had 
spent the war ghting against the Japanese:
During the people’s liberation struggle, working for the country’s freedom, 
independence, and happiness, the Vietminh, during the past several years, 
unceasingly called upon all elements, all parties, whether inside or outside 
the country, who shared this goal of national independence, to participate 
in the United People’s Front to ght against the general enemy and to build 
a new Vietnam. But there are still groups of people who—we don’t know 
for what secret and deceitful reason—have not responded to that appeal. 
Moreover, these people make up things, instigate troubles, and make other 
countries suspicious of the Vietminh. In that group is the Vietnamese 
Revolutionary Alliance, which includes a gang of people who ed the coun-
try years ago.40
The vague language about the Vietnamese Revolutionary Alliance’s alleged ten-
dency to “make up things” and to “instigate troubles,” making foreign powers 
“suspicious” of the ICP’s Vietminh front surely referred to eorts to point out 
the reality of Communist Party control.
The most common target of the ICP’s patriot-traitor narrative, however, was 
the second of the two major Nationalist political organizations headquartered 
in southern China during the war, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party. Thành, 
Trường Chinh, and other Communist leaders appear to have viewed this party 
as their most dangerous rival. First, the Nationalists had a history of brave an-
ticolonial resistance comparable to that of the Communists. Second, the ICP’s 
two-stage revolutionary strategy meant that its propaganda largely replicated the 
Nationalist Party’s simple message of national liberation and moderate social 
reform.41 Third, the Nationalists enjoyed a measure of celebrity cachet, being led 
by some of the country’s most successful intellectuals. In a free market environ-
ment, Communist newspapers would struggle to out-compete those produced 
by established men of letters and Nationalist Party leaders.
What was threatening about Vietnam’s criticisms of the DRV regime was 
that they nearly always contained an element of truth that could not be neatly 
refuted. For example, a front-page Vietnam article in early January discussed 
the Soviet Union’s actions during the war, pointing out Stalin’s peace agree-
ment with Hitler in August 1939 and the subsequent Soviet invasions of Poland, 
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Romania, and Finland. The article also noted the Soviets’ more recent invasion 
of Manchuria. The overall point was that Soviet Russia was still an “imperialist 
power” following the same policy of self-interested empire building pursued by 
Nicholas II and other Russian czars.42 For Vietnamese Communists, refuting 
this view would be dicult without claiming that the Soviet Union’s occupa-
tions of other countries were liberations because of the regime’s Marxist-Leninist 
ideology—a claim that Vietnam’s editors would have been eager to debate.
Not surprisingly, one of Vietnam’s main criticisms of the DRV regime was 
its liberal use of terror, especially against other political parties. In early De-
cember, the ICP leaders responded with an anonymous open letter published in 
their two main newspapers, National Salvation and Truth. The letter was titled, 
“Bitter Medicine Cures the Disease,” a phrase that ve years later would become 
the title of a book containing various hard-hitting editorials penned by Thành. 
Indeed, it is likely that the open letter was written by Thành himself. The main 
subject of discussion was Vietnam’s contention that patriotic Vietnamese should 
not shoot other patriotic Vietnamese—in other words, a refutation of the ICP’s 
traitor-patriot narrative. According to Thành and his comrades:
We regret that the seven minimal principles advanced by the Vietnamese 
Nationalist Party, the Vietnamese Independence Alliance, and the Viet-
namese Revolutionary Alliance on December 19, 1945 did not include the 
fairly important principle that “patriotic organizations must together liq-
uidate traitors.”
Your policy is that [Vietnamese] should “never shoot Vietnamese” (Viet-
nam no. 10). But do you see that establishing independence requires not 
only shooting the foreign enemy but also traitors? The revolutionary his-
tory of every country proves the painful truth of that necessity. I would 
have thought that you were more than clear on that.
We don’t say that all those who follow the Great Vietnam National 
Socialist Party, the Cao Đài, or the Hòa Hảo are traitors. Within their 
ranks, there are many loyal elements who, because they lacked a clear polit-
ical perception, mistakenly followed [those organizations’] traitorous lead-
ers. But there are also those elements who have betrayed the country one 
hundred percent and hide behind the guise of the Vietnamese Revolution-
ary Alliance or the Vietnam Nationalist Party to avoid the punishment of 
the people and the Government. You tolerate them and, moreover, accept 
them into your ranks. That means that you separate yourselves from the 
people; of course it is not anybody else who separates from you.43 
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To diminish the prestige of political rivals and enhance the narrative of them 
as “traitors,” ICP attacks oen used language that conveyed an image of the 
rival as limited and nite in character. One means of creating this eect was 
including the address of the Nationalist Party headquarters in the title of arti-
cles criticizing their behavior: “The Vietnamese Nationalist Party Take Action 
on Quan Thánh Street,”44 “The Vietnamese Nationalist Party of Quan-Thánh 
Street Terrorize Mr. Trương Trung Phụng,”45 and “A Vietnam Nationalist Party 
Style Protest on Quan Thánh Street.”46 In contrast, party newspapers provided 
few concrete details about the DRV regime, giving it a vague ubiquity.
Personality Cult
Thành developed the Hồ Chí Minh personality cult, one of the DRV’s most im-
portant mobilization tools, immediately aer the party’s seizure of power in Au-
gust 1945. Construction of the cult required three things. First, Thành’s actual 
work and politics could not be too closely associated with the national leader, Hồ 
Chí Minh. Thus, Thành would use the alias “Hồ Chí Minh” only sparingly in 
the press, usually for messages of a more general nature. When publicly commu-
nicating ideas that revealed the extent of his leadership over the nuts-and-bolts 
aairs of the party and state, Thành would oen use any of dozens of dierent 
aliases (Chiến thắng, X.Y.Z., C.B., Trần Lực, Trần Dân Tiên, etc.). A second 
requirement of the cult was concealment of the fact that its construction was an 
ICP policy meant to serve the specic agenda of the Communist Party. Thus, 
many of the cult-building articles in DRV newspapers were written under aliases 
not traceable to a particular party member. A third requirement was that the 
party have the means of suppressing alternative interpretations of Hồ Chí Minh, 
which meant gaining control over the media.
The character “Hồ Chí Minh” would reect a mixture of positive traits, 
some of which aligned with Thành himself and some of which did not. The 
rst category included intelligence, charisma, courage, condence, and deter-
mination—all of which Thành possessed in abundance. The second included 
modesty, simplicity, and openness. These were traits that Thành and the party 
leaders necessarily lacked in public life because of their conspiratorial approach, 
their policy of liquidating political rivals, and their two-stage revolutionary 
strategy, which precluded full disclosure of intentions.
Politically, the character “Hồ Chí Minh” would initially stand above and 
apart from the interests of any political party. Like other traits in the second 
category, this element of the cult probably stemmed from anxiety over the extent 
to which the opposite was closer to Thành himself. He was, aer all, the father 
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of Vietnamese Communism and had fought hard for the party’s exclusive hold 
on power in the country.
The following are a few early examples of cult-building phrases from the 
party’s main newspapers, National Salvation and Truth. The phrases must be 
viewed in the context of ICP “Traitor-Elimination Teams” (Đội danh dự trừ 
gian) traveling around Hanoi, hunting down and arresting, or immediately ex-
ecuting, political rivals. An article in the October 9, 1945 issue of National Sal-
vation described Hồ Chí Minh at a press conference: “Aer rm handshakes, 
Chairman Hồ looked over the newspaper representatives, smiled, and made a 
happy and simple remark that gave the conference an atmosphere of great inti-
macy.” The article, which was signed “Citizen,” may have been written by Thành 
himself since it explained aspects of the DRV’s foreign policy, which he alone 
oversaw. Next to this article was an advertisement for photographs of Chairman 
Hồ. “Starting on October 8, 1945, the Independence Fund will set aside valuable 
photographs for those who admire Chairman Hồ. The price of each photograph 
will be 500 đồng and they will be sold every day from 3:00 to 5:00 pm.”47
The October 17, 1945 issue of National Salvation reects some of the dilem-
mas of building the Hồ Chí Minh cult. First, the newspaper contains at least 
two (and probably three) articles written by Thành, showing the extent of his 
involvement in the regime’s day-to-day propaganda grunt work. Since his rst 
article was titled “Letter from Chairman Hồ,” Thành had to use a dierent alias, 
“Victory” (Chiến thắng), for this second article, “Stop that Method of Making 
Money!” which criticized corrupt local political practices. Thành seems to have 
sensibly calculated that some of Hồ Chí Minh’s aura would be lost if the na-
tional leader were known to have authored two articles for one newspaper issue.
Comparison of the original article in National Salvation and the version 
that appears in The Collected Works of Hồ Chí Minh shows that the following 
sentence had been removed from the original newspaper article: “During this 
time, when people are promoting Gold Day, Cultural Day, selling photographs 
of Mr. Hồ, and performing plays to collect money for this or that fund . . .”48 The 
passage must have been excised from the Collected Works volume because of the 
phrase, “selling photographs of Mr. Hồ,” which reveals Thành’s promotion of 
his character, Hồ Chí Minh.
The third article in that October 17, 1945 issue was titled “Chairman Hồ 
Visits Quán-Sứ Pagoda and Enjoys a Vegetarian Meal.” It was also written by 
the mysterious author, “Citizen.” According to the article, “Mr. Hồ was over-
come with emotion when he heard news of the vegetarian dinner celebration 
and decided that he must attend. Because of his surprise visit, the meal became 
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extremely intimate.”49 The article emphasizes the extreme eorts of women in 
attendance to approach and gaze at Mr. Hồ and then describes the auction of a 
Hồ Chí Minh photograph at the meal’s end. The stress on Mr. Hồ’s “intimate” 
relationship with regular people, which was a common theme of the personality 
cult, seems calculated to compensate for the distance that Thành kept between 
himself and the Vietnamese public. In addition to not revealing his name, he did 
not discuss his Comintern career, his family life, his education, his relationship 
with the ICP, or his goals of socialist revolution.
Similar themes of public adoration and intimacy appear in another article 
titled “The First Time a Locality Enjoys a Visit from Chairman Hồ to the Eight 
Ly Emperors Ceremony,” also written by the mysterious “Citizen”:
Arriving at the temple, one more time, the sound of hoorays for Chairman 
Hồ boomed forth. People craned their necks to look. People asked, “Is that 
Mr. Hồ?” Another person said: “Mr. Hồ is plain [giản dị] like that?” A per-
son in the crowd said, “That’s the way he is. He is always plain and simple 
like that. In Hanoi, when he attends formal ceremonies, he also only wears 
common clothes like that.50
For the progress of the cult’s construction, Thành’s May 19th birthday 
marked a watershed moment. On that occasion, the party’s ocial organ, Truth, 
published an article titled “Hồ Chí Minh: Son of the People.” Probably written 
by Trường Chinh, the newspaper’s editor-in-chief, the article gave a vague sum-
mary of Thành’s revolutionary career without specically mentioning “commu-
nism,” the “Communist Party,” “Marx,” “Lenin,” or the “Soviet Union.” The 
Truth article brought the expression of reverence for Chairman Hồ to a new 
level, using for the rst time a capital “N” for the Vietnamese third person pro-
noun “người” in the same way that the Bible capitalizes the pronoun “He” when 
referring to “God:”
Everybody feels and sees a leader in the precious older man with the simple 
appearance. He has the self-eacing courtesy of a sage, the deep vision of 
a scholar, the smile of an evangelist, the gentle heart of a mother, the pas-
sionate soul of a poet, and the determined mind of a king establishing a 
country. Everybody admires Him as a leader of a heroic people.51
As the DRV moved toward recognition by the Soviet bloc (which occurred 
in January 1951), Thành would adjust his public persona, “Hồ Chí Minh,” 
to become a great national and Communist leader. However, the combina-
tion of personal traits established in the early days of the cult—intelligence, 
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courage, determination, simplicity, kindness, and accessibility—would remain 
throughout.
Politics
Thành brought to ICP strategy a greater eort to disguise party control over 
mass organizations and to conceal long-term goals of socialist transformation. 
This was in keeping with Lenin’s two-stage revolutionary strategy. Nevertheless, 
behind this overall policy of disguise, the party leaders still promoted Commu-
nist ideas with genuine zeal. By November of 1945, as it became clear that the 
Chinese Nationalists were unlikely to oust the DRV regime and that the French 
were coming, the promotion of the Soviet Union, Stalin, and Marxist-Leninist 
ideas became more overt.
This approach appears in National Salvation’s seven-part series titled “Basic 
Politics” (Chính trị thường trực), which ran over a span of four weeks.52 The 
rst article was titled “Citizen” and explained the rights and responsibilities of 
a citizen. It contained nothing remarkable except the promise that the lives of 
citizens would be “completely guaranteed by the government.” The second ar-
ticle in the series addressed the National Assembly and promised readers that 
this Western democratic institution would “have the power to decide all things 
in the nation.” As for the crucial question of the Communist Party’s role in the 
democratic republican regime or the role of political parties generally, there was 
not a word. With respect to the functioning of the National Assembly, the arti-
cle explained that a People’s Executive Council (Nhân dân Chấp hành Ủy viên 
Hội) would “divide up dierent ministries.” This institution was a direct copy 
of the Soviet Union’s Council of People’s Commissars. But nothing was said of 
the institution’s Soviet origins.
The subtle promotion of Marxist, Soviet, and Leninist ideas and institutions 
continued in the third article, which set out to explain the term “people” (dân 
tộc) by rehashing Stalin’s denition of an ethnic group explained in his 1913 
text, “Marxism and the National Question”—but with no mention of Stalin. A 
fourth article in the series tackled the term “society” (xã hội). It explained that 
the “economic relationship [between people] was the base from which society 
develops” and that “[s]ociety’s other organizational forms, such as culture, poli-
tics, law, religion, philosophy, etc. all stem from that base.” Without specically 
mentioning social classes or class warfare, the article’s explanation for “society” 
conveyed the idea that class struggle was the driver of history. The h article, 
“How to Read Political News” contained the revealing claim that “whether news 
is correct or incorrect depends on the political standpoint of the source.”
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The sixth article, “What Is a General Election?” appears to foreshadow the 
National Assembly in the DRV and in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) 
today. According to the article, “in a new-democratic political system, the people 
have control over the government.” What was important about an election, the 
article repeatedly stressed, was the people’s “ability to select carefully (kén chọn) 
a worthy representative who knows how to satisfy the people’s will in order to 
work toward the greater good.” Missing from the general-election description, 
with its dire warnings about the need to pick worthy representatives, was the 
notion of elections themselves as a exible corrective institution. The desire of 
incumbents to win reelection should incentivize them to satisfy their constit-
uents, and the use of term limits should help to limit the damage caused by a 
poor representative. The article’s foreboding tone and its singular focus on the 
selection of “representatives” coheres well with how the party leaders ran the 
1946 general election. As an internal party document instructed:
With respect to the upcoming election, we need to press forward with our 
organization of it, and every province needs to establish immediately a list 
of names of those who are going to run so that there is enough time to mo-
bilize people to vote. The principle with respect to the election list: party 
members will comprise 1/3, people who are in the [Vietnamese Alliance] 
front’s mass organizations will comprise 1/3, and people outside of the front 
will comprise 1/3 (but in any province where the strength of the opposi-
tional parties is strong, we can increase the number of [our own] party 
members). Those elements who are Communist [c.s.] or who are from the 
Vietnamese Alliance should not use their organizational aliation when 
they run for oce in order to demonstrate that they are not competing for 
inuence or trying to strengthen a political party. Rather, [it should show] 
that their only goal is to save the country and that they win the election 
because they have the love and faith of the people.53
People in the DRV would soon learn that “elections” were not democratic events 
but stage-managed public rituals meant primarily to disguise a party dictator-
ship. The important thing was stocking the National Assembly and other bour-
geois democratic institutions with obedient personalities willing to play along.
Temporary Alliance with the French:  
February to March 1946
In February 1946, Thành, the French, the Chinese Nationalists, and the 
Vietnamese Nationalists worked out a succession of agreements that would 
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ultimately result in the gradual departure of the Chinese, the arrival of 15,000 
French troops in northern Vietnam, the Communist Party’s liquidation of 
remaining Vietnamese Nationalist forces, and an invaluable nine additional 
months of existence for the DRV regime in Hanoi.
Again, the presence of Chiang Kai-shek’s 150,000-person Yunnan Army 
in northern Vietnam worked to the ultimate advantage of the DRV regime. 
The Chinese wanted to avoid in the North a repeat of the bloody violence that 
had occurred in the South when French troops had arrived there in September. 
Therefore, the Chinese general in Hanoi informed the French that he would 
not allow their forces to enter the North until a Franco-Vietnamese treaty had 
been signed. The French must have wondered when the humiliations of WWII 
would end.
In mid-February 1946, the French diplomat Jean Sainteny began negotiating 
with Thành in Hanoi. Though desperate to sign an agreement to expedite the 
departure of the Chinese, Sainteny still insisted that Thành’s signature would 
not be enough for a Franco-Vietnamese agreement. France did not consider 
the Vietminh front to be an adequate representation of the will of the Viet-
namese people. Thus, Thành would need to convince his Nationalist counter-
parts, Nguyễn Hải Thần and Vũ Hồng Khanh, to sign as well.54 Because of the 
major concessions given to the French in the agreement (particularly the return 
of French troops), Thành would benet from having Nationalist Party rivals 
share responsibility. Ultimately, he was only able to secure Khanh’s coopera-
tion. On February 24, these two Vietnamese party leaders signed an agreement 
to form a coalition government. It would be coalition in name only, though, 
since these Nationalist Party members would not be given a morsel of real power 
in the DRV.
On February 28, as Thành and his lieutenants had expected, the Chinese and 
French nally signed an agreement that facilitated the departure of the Yun-
nan Army from northern Vietnam. The French would leave Chiang Kai-shek 
their old concessions in Shanghai, Hankou, Guangdong, and Guangzhou and 
sell him all the French-owned Yunnan railroads. The French would also amend 
rules and regulations in favor of Chinese in Indochina (such as a tax-free zone 
in the northern port city of Haiphong and the allowance of tari-free trade in 
northern Vietnam). The two sides agreed that French troops would replace Chi-
nese ones during the two weeks between March 15 and March 31.55
The day aer signing this treaty with the Chinese, French troop ships set sail 
from Saigon to Haiphong. They were now only days away from bringing soldiers 
into Hanoi and completing their reestablishment of French Indochina. But this 
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plan depended on Chinese cooperation. Meanwhile, to provide tangible proof 
of the new coalition government, Thành called a rushed rst meeting of the 
National Assembly. Of the assembly’s 403 seats, he set aside seventy for the two 
Nationalist political parties. Since the National Assembly had no actual power, 
this move was a safe political gesture to assuage the concerns of both the French 
and the Chinese.
On March 3, 1946, the day aer the new “coalition government” had been 
hurriedly rubber-stamped by the National Assembly, Thành and the ICP lead-
ership released an internal memo titled “The Current Situation and Our Pol-
icy.” Dealing with the DRV’s foreign relations, the memo opened by pointing 
out that Britain, America, and China had agreed to “yield to” France regarding 
the issue of Indochina, allowing the French to bring their army into northern 
Vietnam to take the place of the Chinese. According to Thành, who had either 
draed the memo or contributed the main ideas, the goal of the British and 
Americans was to use the French colonialists to “surround the Soviet Union” 
and to prevent anti-colonial revolutions. Thus, the Americans and British had 
given France and Holland the task of guarding Indochina and Indonesia, which, 
in Thành’s thinking, would “free the hands” of the Americans and British to 
“hinder the expansionary power of the Soviet Union.”56
The second part of the memo explained why a compromise with France, 
rather than immediate resistance war, was the correct policy. According to 
Thành, the compromise policy had “two potential dangers” and “two potential 
benets,” the latter outweighing the former. On the negative side, a compromise 
would provide the “gang of Vietnamese reactionaries” (i.e., the Vietnamese Na-
tionalists) an opportunity to “exploit the ghting spirit of the masses to propa-
gandize and deceive them, accusing us of being traitors, of selling the country 
to the West.” Second, the French could use an agreement to continue increasing 
their forces until one day when they could renege on the treaty and “liquidate” 
the DRV regime in the North.
As for the two potential benets, the memo explained that, rst, a compro-
mise would allow the party to “ruin the scheme of the Chinese Whites, the 
fascists, and the Vietnamese traitors and preserve our forces.” Second, the pol-
icy would allow the party “to gain a little time to prepare for a new struggle 
that could be coordinated with the struggles of the French people and geared 
toward the achievement of complete independence.”57 In the coded language 
of the party, “coordinated with the struggles of the French people” probably 
meant coordinated with the policies of France’s Communist Party. Here I be-
lieve that Thành was angling for eventual Soviet support by showing that his 
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regime could be a reasonable, cooperative, and disciplined member of the So-
viet bloc. The DRV would show respect for Stalin’s “Peace Movement” and for 
Communist-bloc interests in France by exhausting all opportunities to work 
with that country’s Communist movement before turning to war.
To “exploit” a policy of compromise with the French, the document ex-
plained, eight things needed to happen:
1. Vigorously explain to the masses that our policy is the only one that 
is correct.
2. Exploit the period of compromise with France to liquidate [Vietnamese] 
reactionaries and the running dogs of the Chinese Whites while elimi-
nating all provocative actions [by them] intended to separate us from 
the French.
3. Avoid being attacked by the French by taking extreme care during and aer 
our signing of a treaty with France not to be provoked by the discourse of 
the French colonialists.
4. Make close contact with the French Communist Party to coordinate our 
actions with our French comrades.
5. Exploit new possibilities to expand our international propaganda—send a 
delegation of representatives to all meetings of the United Nations.
6. Reorganize our ranks, train cadres, and consolidate our movement.
7. Figure out ways to resolve the issue of the people’s livelihood.
8. Determine a wise, clever, and correct policy with respect to the landlords, 
the mandarinate, the bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, etc. etc.
As Thành explained toward the end of the document, the “essential thing” was 
that when negotiations with the French began, the party must “not stop for a 
minute the task of preparing, getting ready to carry out a resistance struggle at 
any time and place.” Additionally, it was essential that party cadres not let nego-
tiations with the French “dampen our people’s will to ght.”58
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Coexistence with the French,  
March to December 1946
Nguyễn Tất Thành, the French diplomat Jean Sainteny, and the Nationalist 
Party leader Vũ Hồng Khanh signed the Franco-Vietnamese Preliminary Agree-
ment in Hanoi on March 6, 1946. As the historian Stein Tonnesson points out, 
the agreement had been imposed on France by the Chinese, who feared that 
the arrival of French troops would lead to another burst of violence similar to 
what had occurred in Saigon the previous September.1 Once again, the Chinese 
acted in a manner that slowed the process of French re-conquest and beneted 
the DRV regime.
France agreed that the DRV was a “Free State having its own government, 
its own parliament, its own army, and its own nances, forming a part of the 
Indochinese Federation and the French Union.” (The terms “Indochinese Fed-
eration” and “French Union” were new versions of the old colonial terms “French 
Indochina” and “French Empire.”) With respect to the issue of reuniting Viet-
nam’s three regions—Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina—the French agreed 
to hold a Vietnamese referendum at some future date. The DRV would permit 
15,000 French troops to take the place of China’s 150,000 in northern Vietnam. 
A	er the rst year, though, France would be required to withdraw 3,000 of its 
troops every year so that by 1951, none would be le	 in the North. The March 6 
agreement also stated that a ceasere would take place in the South to “create a 
favorable atmosphere necessary to the immediate opening of friendly and sincere 
negotiations.”2
Three days a	er signing the treaty, the party leaders circulated to comrades 
an internal memo titled “Compromise to Advance.” The memo reminded party 
members that diplomatic compromises should be viewed as temporary strate-
gic moves. “Complete independence” under the party’s leadership remained 
the only acceptable long-term goal. For the time being, the memo instructed, 
the party would need to adjust its slogans to accentuate the notion of a France 
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divided between two forces, a “reactionary” one that was pro-colonialist and 
a “new democratic” one that was potentially pro–Vietnamese-independence. 
“New democracy” was the party’s code word for “communist” or under Com-
munist Party rule, so we can assume that a “new democratic” France meant a 
France led by its Communist Party. Thus, the slogan “Resist the French Colo-
nialist Aggressors” was to be changed to “Equal Alliance with New France” or 
to “The French and Vietnamese Peoples Unite against Reactionary France.” An-
other unstated benet of this policy was that it aligned with Moscow’s contin-
ued hopes that France might be brought into the Soviet bloc through electoral 
means.3
Over the next nine months until the outbreak of open war in December of 
1946, Thành would push the potential of an alliance with “New France” to the 
limit. He and his lieutenants did this for domestic and diplomatic reasons. On 
the domestic front, the DRV regime probably paid some price in popularity for 
their conciliatory approach toward France. However, from the perspective of 
the regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of Vietnamese, the benet of simply existing 
in Hanoi as an independent government surely outweighed the costs associated 
with temporary compromise. Moreover, a temporary alliance with France facil-
itated the departure of the Chinese Nationalist troops who had provided the 
party’s Nationalist rivals with a measure of protection since the August 1945 
seizure of power. If all-out war with France could be delayed for a few months, 
the party could concentrate its still-limited human and material resources on the 
thousands of Nationalist troops who remained a presence in northern Vietnam.
Reorganizing the Public Security Forces
While he was beginning to negotiate a deal with the French in February 1946, 
Thành decided to reorganize his police forces into one centralized agency. This 
may have been done in anticipation of conditions that would permit a more 
vigorous surge of repression against domestic rivals. Therefore, as the historian 
Francois Guillemot explains, the former Traitor Elimination Honor Guards 
(Đội danh dự trừ gian), the National Salvation Police (Cảnh sát cứu quốc), and 
the Special Investigative Units (đội trinh sát) were put into one organization 
called the Vietnamese Public Security Bureau (Việt Nam Công an Vụ).4 The 
head of this large new police apparatus was an ICP member named Lê Giản 
(1911–2003). As Giản recounted in his memoir, “Uncle (Thành), Võ Nguyên 
Giáp, and Central Committee members cared a great deal about the Public Se-
curity apparatus.”5
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The March 6 agreement was supposed to have created in the DRV a “coalition 
government” that gave some power to the Nationalists. To disguise the Com-
munist Party’s control over the police and to reect the external appearance of a 
coalition, Thành had Giản step aside as director of the Public Security Bureau 
so that a non-Communist gurehead could be inserted at the top as the ocial 
director. All power continued to reside in Giản’s hands, despite his demotion to 
“vice-director.” As Giản recounted years later, Thành and other Party leaders 
called this strategy “painting the head white.”6
Though the Nationalist Party leader, Vũ Hồng Khanh, had been cajoled into 
signing the March 6 Franco-Vietnamese Preliminary agreement, Thành still 
expected trouble from many Nationalists who rejected any compromise with 
the French. In late March, the DRV issued a decree permitting local Adminis-
trative Committees (the regime’s primary political structure in the villages) to 
arrest any person who disturbed the peace.7 The aforementioned party direc-
tive, “Compromise to Advance,” had cautioned comrades to “resist the actions 
of the reactionary political parties” who try to “cut in front of ” the party lead-
ership and sow divisions between the Hồ Chí Minh government, the French, 
and the Chinese so as to “annul” somehow the Franco-Vietnamese Preliminary 
agreement:
With respect to the faction that is friendly with the Chinese, we need to 
take advantage of the moment when they are confused, when they feel that 
they are about to be abandoned by the Chinese, and when they waver in 
their political views a	er the signing of the Franco-Vietnamese agreement, 
to divide their ranks. We need to carefully take on board the honest (trung 
thực) elements [of their party] and lure them over to our side. We need 
to show the masses that the leaders of the Vietnam Nationalist Party are 
nothing but a gang of cowardly opportunists because they only know how 
to obey orders from foreigners and put their own interests above those of 
the people.8
The party leaders projected onto their Nationalist-Party rivals those character-
istics and criticisms that they (the ICP leaders) probably feared might be leveled 
against themselves. A later order released on April 14, 1946 spoke of organizing 
May Day celebrations. Aware that their political tune had suddenly changed in 
a way that could be characterized as opportunistic, the DRV leaders cautioned 
rank-and-le party members: “We must prevent the Trotskyists or other reac-
tionary groups from using May Day to protest in a sectarian manner or from 
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secretly entering a crowd of our own protesters and shouting past slogans of ours 
that are not appropriate at this time.”9
Negotiations
When Thành, Sainteny, and Vũ Hồng Khanh signed the March 6 preliminary 
agreement, 21,000 French troops were already ve days into a journey from Sai-
gon to Haiphong. These soldiers arrived in Hanoi on March 18, beginning what 
would be a nine-month period of DRV-French coexistence in northern Viet-
nam.10 Six days later, Thành, along with the Nationalist Party cultural luminary 
Nguyễn Tường Tam, met with the French admiral and arch-colonialist Thierry 
d’Argenlieu. During the meeting, Thành was able to convince his French coun-
terpart to support a proposal for further high-level discussions.11 In the rst half 
of April, a “friendship mission” of ten DRV National Assembly members was 
to travel to France to meet with members of the French National Assembly. At 
roughly the same time, a “preparatory conference” was to be held in the highland 
town of Dalat, roughly 300 kilometers to the northeast of Saigon. That con-
ference would involve twelve representatives from France and twelve from the 
DRV. In Dalat, the two sides would attempt to lay the diplomatic groundwork 
for a more “denitive” conference to be held in Paris in late May.
Thành must have been ecstatic. First, D’Argenlieu’s agreement to talks meant 
that the French would be unlikely to oust the DRV regime from Hanoi in the 
immediate future. The Paris location for the second round of talks would add 
signicant time to the negotiating process, likely giving the DRV at least a few 
extra months in Hanoi. Second, Thành himself could travel to France for the ne-
gotiations. Even a meager amount of red carpet rolled out to him by the French 
government would help to solidify his image as national leader. Thành could 
be sure that the DRV’s main newspapers, all under the control of trusted party 
editors, would exploit to the maximum the propaganda potential of his visit 
to France. Third, the trip would give Thành a chance to gauge France’s mood, 
to meet quietly with members of the French Le	, and to assess their political 
prospects.
Why did the French agree to such a plan, which, on the outside at least, 
seems to have been so benecial to the main obstacle blocking re-colonization, 
the DRV regime? Three factors may have played a role in their thinking. First, 
in negotiating with the French in Hanoi and especially in Haiphong, Thành 
had taken a great and brilliant risk, at times placing himself completely at their 
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mercy. As Sainteny later recalled, this was a “splendid vote of condence” in 
the honor and word of the French.12 Thành’s trust may have made it more dif-
cult for the French to suddenly use violent means to expel him and his regime 
from Hanoi.
A second factor was the moderate, accommodating image of himself that 
Thành conveyed to French diplomats. For the most part, the French bought 
this contrived image and came to believe in a narrative promoted by Thành that 
positioned him as a French-friendly moderate struggling to hold back hotheaded 
Vietnamese comrades. As a result, some French leaders thought that by extract-
ing Thành from Hanoi and the inuence of his alleged radical lieutenants, he 
might be convinced to cooperate with France in its reassertion of control in 
Indochina.13 That was an important miscalculation.
A third factor, which was probably the most important, was the lingering 
presence of the Chinese Nationalist Army. Its generals would adopt a go-slow 
approach to leaving northern Vietnam. Not until September 1946—six months 
a	er the signing of the Preliminary Accord—would the last Chinese units de-
part from Haiphong. Writes Tonnesson, “As long as at least some Chinese occu-
pation troops were present in northern Indochina, an outbreak of open hostil-
ities between France and Vietnam risked having international repercussions.”14
The Dalat Conference: April 22 to May 11
In assembling the twelve-person negotiating group for the three-week prepara-
tory conference at Dalat, Thành and his lieutenants again selected people who 
would make the DRV government appear coalitional in character. Applying his 
“paint-the-top-white” strategy, Thành called on the services of the aforemen-
tioned Nationalist Party leader Nguyễn Tường Tam, installing him as the del-
egation’s ocial chairman. A	er the March 6 agreement, Tam had been DRV 
foreign minister, but exercised no power in this position. All involved in the 
Dalat negotiations—both the Vietnamese and the French—seem to have un-
derstood that the real power of the DRV delegation lay with its vice-chairman, 
Võ Nguyên Giáp.15
In recent years, Tonnesson has stressed the uidity of DRV-France relations 
in 1946, arguing that war between them was not inevitable. If only cooler heads 
had prevailed, a peaceful accommodation could have been achieved, avoiding 
thirty years of bloody warfare.16 The issue of war’s inevitability touches on the 
question of whether Thành negotiated in good faith with the French. Did he 
believe that an acceptable peaceful resolution was possible? Or were his long, 
drawn-out negotiations mostly a delaying tactic meant to give his regime more 
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time to consolidate its position, to liquidate rivals, and to prepare for war against 
the French? I believe that the second interpretation is the more likely.
Were he pressed to defend himself on moral grounds, Thành surely would 
have pointed to the eighty years of colonial rule, the many ruses employed by 
the French in their colonial project, and the countless humiliations that both the 
ruses and the project had brought upon the Vietnamese people. To Thành and 
many other patriots, the French probably had long lost a moral leg to stand on, 
especially as they sought to recolonize Vietnam—in other words, they deserved 
every trick in the book.
In my view, the three-week Dalat Conference, held from April 22 to May 
11, removed all reasonable doubt of France’s intention to re-colonize Vietnam. 
Several things from the conference impressed upon the Vietnamese delegation 
France’s determination to follow this course. First, the French negotiators ini-
tially refused to discuss one of the Vietnamese delegation’s most pressing issues, 
France’s intention to create an “Autonomous Cochinchinese Republic.” The 
DRV regime insisted on the unity of Vietnam, which included Cochinchina, 
and insisted that the people of the South carry out a referendum on the issue of 
unication with the rest of the country. The French reneged on that promise.17
Just as revealing were the Dalat Conference’s small-group discussions. These 
were divided into four categories: politics, economics, defense, and culture. In 
the eld of politics, the French would not allow Vietnam to conduct its own 
foreign a­airs. In the eld of economics, the DRV state would not be allowed 
to issue its own currency. In the eld of military a­airs, France was willing to 
discuss the stationing of DRV troops above the sixteenth parallel but rejected 
the possibility of stationing any below it. With respect to culture, France would 
not allow the Vietnamese language to replace French as the primary language 
of instruction in Vietnamese universities. And finally, the French delegation 
insisted that it had a duty to protect the ethnic minority peoples in Vietnam, 
helping them to form their own countries protected by France—a rejection of 
the territorial unity of Vietnam.18
A	er three weeks of dicult negotiations, the Dalat Preparatory Conference 
came to a dramatic ending. Continued French refusal to allow a referendum in 
the South on the question of national unication brought about a moment of 
tense silence. An older member of the Vietnamese delegation, Hồ Hữu Tường, 
stood up with tears of anger and frustration in his eyes and walked out of the 
room. A few moments later, Võ Nguyên Giáp followed suit. As a Vietnamese 
participant described it, “[Giáp] [s]uddenly stood up, grabbed his briefcase, 
and stormed out the door before the astonished eyes of all delegation members, 
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giving the door a thunderous slam behind him.” Remembering that moment, 
this participant wrote that Giáp’s door slam had lled him with a sense of fore-
boding—it was the “rst thunderclap in a storm that would draw the Vietnam-
ese people into a forced war for the independence and unity of the Fatherland.”19
A	er the conference, Giáp returned to Hanoi and to his duties as Minister 
of the Interior. With Thành, he no doubt discussed at length his three-week 
experience negotiating with the French. They had given ground on no import-
ant DRV principles, showing a determination to re-colonize Vietnam and, by 
implication, dispose of the Hồ Chí Minh Government. Yet, every day that the 
DRV could continue to exist in Hanoi helped to convince a few more Vietnam-
ese that the regime was a reality. Thus, the outbreak of war was to be delayed as 
long as safely possible.
The inevitability of war was also signaled by a major referendum held in 
France on May 5, six days before the end of the Dalat Conference. The refer-
endum put to the French people the question of a new constitution that would 
abandon France’s bicameral system through abolition of the Senate. All political 
power would fall into the hands of the National Assembly. Conservative oppo-
nents of the new constitution, which had been proposed by the Communists 
and Socialists, cautioned the French people that such a unicameral system would 
provide a means for the radical Le	 to dominate France’s political system and 
possibly bring the country into the Soviet bloc.20
Nearly eighty percent of France’s voting population participated in the ref-
erendum, which saw the proposed constitution’s rejection by a margin of 52% 
to 48%.21 The failed referendum reduced the possibility of a complete seizure 
of power by French Communists. Despite this important setback, the FCP re-
mained the country’s most popular political party, meaning that the dream of 
a Communist takeover was still intact, if somewhat damaged. Since the French 
public had rejected the proposed unicameral constitution, the National Assem-
bly was dissolved, and new elections were called for June 2, 1946—just when 
Thành and the DRV delegation were supposed to arrive in France. This “provi-
sional” National Assembly would be charged with dra	ing yet another constitu-
tion, whose ratication or rejection would be followed by yet another legislative 
election.22
Consolidating Power
During the summer of 1946, while Thành and Phạm Văn Đồng were overseas 
negotiating in Paris, Võ Nguyên Giáp and Trường Chinh oversaw three tasks 
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that helped the DRV consolidate power. One was the purging of the party’s ap-
paratus in the South. A second was the establishment of three additional front 
organizations: The United Citizens of Vietnam Association, the Socialist Party, 
and even a new Progressive Nationalist Party. A third task, made possible by the 
ongoing departure of Chinese Nationalist troops, was the more vigorous repres-
sion of Vietnam’s Nationalist Party members.
The Party Founds a New Front Organization:  
The United Citizens of Vietnam Association
Through his negotiations with the French diplomat Jean Sainteny and through 
his reading of the international press, Thành probably realized that his Viet-
minh front was now viewed by many people as Communist-led. Therefore, it 
no longer served its purpose as a front organization that would give the DRV 
the appearance of political plurality. This may have been the impetus behind 
Thành’s establishment of a new front organization called the United Citizens of 
Vietnam Association (Hội liên hiệp quốc dân Việt Nam). This new organization 
was ocially announced on May 29, 1946, the day before Thành’s departure for 
France. As he tended to do, Thành le	 the explanations and theoretical justica-
tions to Trường Chinh. In the June 1 issue of party newspaper Truth, the party 
general secretary explained the new front organization:
First and foremost, the United Peoples of Vietnam Association is not a 
united front that belongs specically to patriotic parties, like the Vietminh, 
for example. [Rather,] it is a united bloc that combines parties, factions, 
and segments of the population who are not aliated with a party or 
faction but who have one common goal: the betterment of the nation. It 
is a unied front of the entire people. Moreover, the United Peoples of 
Vietnam Association not only has as its goal the freedom and liberation 
of the Vietnamese people, it also ghts for the cause of the wholeness of 
Vietnam, and for Vietnam to quickly attain the status of a prosperous and 
powerful country.23
Chinh’s appeal for the new front organization mentioned the diculties fac-
ing the country, namely the South’s having been “swallowed” by the French and 
the “Democratic Republic regime” having come under attack from both domes-
tic and foreign “reactionaries.” Chinh was careful to insinuate that the Commu-
nist Party was an open-minded, welcoming, and generous political actor in the 
country. Its adversaries were the ones motivated by party politics and therefore 
unwilling to unite. He explained that the “entire people” had to be “molded 
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into one unied bloc.” According to Chinh, “All class prejudice, all interparty 
competition, and all religious and racial envy must be cleared from the road of 
the Vietnamese people’s development.” With the establishment of United Viet-
nam, argued Chinh, the Vietnamese people were now united, “not only in the 
government but out in the masses of people.” The nation’s citizens “had seen the 
form of broad-based people’s unity.” Chinh asked rhetorically in his new Truth 
newspaper article: “Do the backgrounds of the founders the United Citizens of 
Vietnam Association not show clearly its broad-based and unied form?”
As for the propaganda value of the United Vietnam Association, Chinh 
explained:
The establishment of the United Citizens of Vietnam Association is an 
appropriate response to the French reactionaries who are looking for every 
means of dividing our compatriots in the South and North, our compa-
triots who are religious and those who are not, the Vietnamese who are 
wealthy and the Vietnamese who are poor, the ethnic Kinh citizens and the 
Highland minority citizens. The establishment of this Association is also 
an appropriate response to the various reactionary Vietnamese traitors who 
are resigned to serving as the running dogs of foreigners, to opposing the 
rights of all the people and to relying on the strength of people who want 
to create an “autonomous local administration.”
Chinh’s explanation made no mention of communism as a potentially divisive 
dynamic in Vietnamese political life. This was the key issue that could not be 
discussed openly, even in the party’s ocial organ. Chinh le	 his readers with 
the following advice on the United Vietnam association: “Do not be suspicious; 
do not be bitter. We must follow the model of Chairman Hồ and be lenient and 
generous of spirit. Do not unify here and split apart there. We must follow the 
model of Chairman Hồ and be sincere and thoughtful.”24
Attacking the Nationalists: Summer of 1946
While Thành and Phạm Văn Đồng were away in France, Chinh and Giáp took 
over the leadership of the DRV. In June, these two oversaw another reorgani-
zation of the DRV’s Public Security apparatus, creating a special new agency 
called the Hanoi Public Security Force. As Francois Guillemot explains, this or-
ganization appears to have been created specically for a renewed e­ort against 
Vietnamese Nationalist Party members in the city. The Hanoi Public Security 
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Force would soon play a leading role in one of this campaign’s most well-known 
episodes.25
In June of 1946, despite the continued presence of some Chinese National-
ist troops, the party had begun to ramp-up suppression of various Vietnamese 
Nationalist forces spread around the North. On May 15, DRV troops struck 
against Nationalist forces to the east of Hanoi along the highway to Haiphong. 
On May 22, the DRV troops had attacked again and then pulled back, giving 
way to Hanoi-bound French troops, who promptly took up the attack against 
the Nationalists. By August, these Nationalist forces would all be driven across 
the border into Southern China.
According to Guillemot, Giáp was “obsessed by the clandestine actions of 
non-communist revolutionaries.”26 Apparently, he feared that Nationalist Party 
members would attempt to provoke France into war as a means of eliminating 
the DRV regime in Hanoi. On June 21, Giáp’s forces launched an attack on 
northwestern provinces, through which passed the railroad from Hanoi to the 
Chinese border. This region, particularly the province of Phú Thọ, had been 
the stronghold of the Nationalist groups since November of 1945. Giáp sent a 
force of 3,000 troops against roughly 350 Nationalist soldiers. A	er nine days 
of ghting, the Nationalist forces were dislodged from Phú Thọ and forced to 
retreat northwestward to the border province of Lào Cai.27
At the end of June, Giáp met with a French military leader in Hanoi to ask 
his thoughts about a DRV operation against Vietnamese Nationalists in the 
city. Having been assured that the French had no objection to such an action, 
Giáp had a free hand. In the minds of the party leaders, a major push of re-
pression needed a good story behind it to serve as justication. As Guillemot 
explains, the justication had two components. The rst was the notion that 
the Nationalists were preparing a terrorist action against the French and the 
DRV regime. The second was the notion that the Nationalists, as a criminal 
and sadistic group, posed a great danger to apolitical Vietnamese citizens. Giáp 
wanted one sensational episode to serve a propaganda purpose as a symbol of 
Nationalist Party evil.
On July 11, 1946, he held a lengthy meeting with leaders of the party’s police 
apparatus to discuss a purported Nationalist attack planned for July 14. At the 
time, he had only “slim proof ” that such an attack was in the works. However, 
during that meeting, a new report suddenly arrived from a spy at the Nationalist 
Party headquarters on 132 Duvigneau Street (Bùi Thị Xuân) showing plans to 
print appeals calling for the overthrow of the DRV government. At 4:30 a.m. 
the following day (July 12), Giáp’s police forces raided the house, allegedly seized 
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posters calling for the DRV regime’s overthrow, and arrested about twenty Na-
tionalist Party members. Over the next two days, the DRV security apparatus 
continued its operations in Hanoi, attacking various other houses known to have 
groups of Nationalists.28
The Ôn Như Hầu Aair: July 14, 1946
The most important of these raids in Hanoi occurred at a modern-style villa 
on 7 Ôn Như Hầu Street (the neighborhood of Xóm Hạ Hồi today). The “Ôn 
Như Hầu A­air,” as it was labeled by party historians, foreshadowed decades of 
similar Soviet tactics employed by the party’s security forces against perceived 
political threats. Giáp decided that the villa on Ôn Như Hầu Street would be set 
up as a house of debauchery and death. To create such a scene, he needed dead 
bodies that could be “discovered” during the raid and presented to the public 
as evidence of Nationalist Party atrocities. To this end, Giáp sent police agents 
to the local hospital in the middle of the night to seize several cadavers. These 
were brought to the house at Ôn Như Hầu Street and arranged for propaganda 
photographs as part of the overall raid. Giáp’s narrative turned the Nationalist 
Party house into a sadistic torture chamber whose victims were buried in the 
backyard.29
An “Ôn Như Hầu A­air” article published in the party’s police newspaper, 
New Public Security, begins with the lines, “How shocked people are when they 
return from the countryside and, hearing news of ‘Ôn Như Hầu,’ come to view 
the special house.”30 The article creates suspense and the feeling of discovery 
by proceeding from the outside of the villa to the inside, revealing successively 
more gruesome details. The rst section, titled “Oces in an Execution Nest,” 
assures the reader that 7 Ôn Như Hầu looks “like a normal house.” The rst 
oor contains a dining room and bedrooms. However, on the second oor, “we 
nd a secret meeting room, a torture room with tangles of electrical cords, a 
colored tile oor, brick walls, an ‘experiment’ room, and a connement room.”
The article then begins to reveal the alleged nefarious activities in the house, 
following the trope of innocent and unsuspecting people gradually discovering 
the true horror behind faintly suspicious behavior. A section titled “Shadows in 
the Dark Night” describes the experience of neighbors who had heard “sudden 
bursts of singing” late at night. We learn that this “abnormal” singing had been 
done to cover up the screams of people being tortured and executed. Fearful 
neighbors also “worried when they saw shadows ‘bent over’ and heard the ‘sound 
of shovels digging dirt.’” In the New Public Security article, the police raid on 
7 Ôn Như Hầu had helped these neighbors to nally understand that these 
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strange digging noises had been Nationalist Party members burying their tor-
ture victims. The article rises to a climax with lurid descriptions of the exhumed 
bodies followed by a concluding message:
There is not a single person who, with revulsion and pain, does not see 
clearly that that fake political party only hid behind wonderful slogans in 
order to steal from and kill people, to assault people before exploiting them. 
They were a lazy group of bu­alo heads and horse eyes, with no jobs, who 
gathered together to nd a means of existing outside the law.31
Meanwhile, the attacks on Nationalist forces in the countryside continued. 
In July, Giáp sent forces to the northeast of Hanoi, driving Nationalist soldiers 
northeastward to the border town of Lạng Sơn. A few weeks later in August, 
DRV forces attacked again. By September, the last remnants of these Nationalist 
soldiers had retreated across the Chinese border. Also in July, Giáp launched 
an attack to the southeast of Hanoi toward the South China Sea, striking Na-
tionalist groups in the provinces of Hưng Yên and Thái Bình. In the former, 
DRV forces captured and summarily executed about 300 Nationalist troops. 
That same month, DRV forces mopped up pockets of Nationalist troops based 
in Central Vietnam.32
As Guillemot points out, the Nationalist forces su­ered from crucial weak-
nesses. One was a lack of e­ective cooperation and unied command among 
di­erent groups. Sometimes, e­orts to join forces failed with disastrous results. 
A second problem was the internal dissention caused by the Communist Par-
ty’s “carrot-and-stick” policy. In one case, the defection of a Nationalist leader 
led to the capture and imprisonment of around 500 troops. A third weakness 
in some areas was the loss of logistical and material support su­ered when the 
Chinese Nationalist army withdrew. A fourth issue for the nationalists was an 
arms disadvantage relative to their Communist rivals, whose seizure of power 
had a­orded them many opportunities to capture weapons and ammunition.33
A nal Nationalist disadvantage was the occasional French support that the 
DRV enjoyed. For the French saw the Nationalists as dangerous anti-Western 
zealots and were happy to see them hunted down by the DRV. As one French 
general explained later in reference to a combined DRV-French operation 
against Nationalists to the northeast of Hanoi: “Of course, it was not a matter 
of going alone or against the Vietnamese government, but with it. That would be 
an excellent occasion to obtain a Franco-Vietnamese military cooperation that 
linked the fate of the Vietnamese government more closely to us.”34
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The Case of Hoàng Cân
One of the most hotly contested regions in the Communist-versus-Nationalist 
struggle was the provincial capital of Phú Thọ province, Việt Trì. About 80 ki-
lometers northwest of Hanoi, Việt Trì was one of the major stops on the railroad 
from Hanoi to the Chinese city of Kunming. The French archives contain an 
extensive DRV le on a Việt Trì resident named Hoàng Cân, whose case cap-
tures well the complicated political environment of the time.35
Forty-one years old, Cân was a well-educated former ocial who had served 
the colonial state for eighteen years as a cartographer and land specialist. Cân’s 
work involved creating accurate maps that reected administrative and property 
boundaries. While his wife, father, and four children were based in Việt Trì, 
Cân worked for periods in Cambodia, Sơn Tây province (west of Hanoi), and 
most recently in Hưng Yên province (southeast of Hanoi).
When the Communists seized power in August of 1945, their agents in Hưng 
Yên quickly arrested Cân and ve other government ocials. As important co-
lonial ocials, all probably resided in the provincial capital. ICP agents held 
Cân prisoner until September 7, 1945. A	er being released, he immediately trav-
eled by boat up the Red River, past Hanoi, and back to his family home in Việt 
Trì. There, as he claimed in a statement to the DRV police, he decided to stop 
his government work and spend time cleaning and repairing his house, which 
had recently been damaged by ooding.
Soon a	er his return to Việt Trì, local revolutionaries attempted to recruit 
Cân to serve as a “commissar” (chính trị viên) for the district. This was an es-
pecially important position because the district included the provincial capital, 
Việt Trì. Cân must have been amazed at how quickly he had shi	ed from target 
of repression to target of recruitment. In his deposition to the police, he claimed 
that he “did not dare accept” this commissar position because he was “unfamil-
iar with the job and afraid I would not be able to do it.” He asked to be given 
the same commissar position at the subdistrict level (a subdistrict was a unit of 
four to eight neighboring villages) to gain some experience. Was this the reason 
that Cân had refused the district-level commissar position? Uncertainty about 
the permanence of the DRV regime may have factored into his thinking. Com-
mitting himself to an important leadership position in the DRV could lead to 
trouble down the road if the regime were deposed by the French.
Cân’s life became more complicated in November 1945. As he recounted in 
his deposition:
Coexistence with the French, 1946 51 
At the beginning of November 1945, the Vietnamese Nationalist Party 
came to Việt Trì. The district [Administrative] Committee and my village 
Committee both attempted to stay away from the Nationalists. My village 
had a group of people who denounced and exposed us [as Vietminh sup-
porters]. I was arrested [by the Nationalists] and had my house searched. 
Luckily for me, Mr. Phung, who was a follower of the Chinese Army, re-
turned to Việt Trì and secured my release. Having avoided being arrested 
again, I su­ered from the presence of the Chinese Army, who o	en both-
ered my household and me until this past February.
According to Cân’s police statement, he applied for work at the cartography 
oce in Hanoi two times, but with no luck. Then, a	er the “union” (đoàn kết) 
occurred (presumably the March 6 agreement between the DRV, the Nation-
alists, and the French), a “Việt Trì Economic Oce” was formed. A friend of 
Cân’s recommended that he join the new oce, assuring him that it was an 
ocial “Government oce.” However, it appears that the oce was associated 
with the Vietnamese Nationalist Party, who still controlled Việt Trì. Here the 
Communist Party’s two-week imprisonment of Cân probably paid dividends, 
making him reluctant to join this Nationalist organization. To his Việt Trì Eco-
nomic Oce recruiters, he claimed that he must see an “ocial edict” from the 
DRV in Hanoi before joining. None came, so it appears that Cân continued to 
lie low at his home.
At the end of February, the Nationalist Party army, having heard of Cân’s 
expertise with maps, came and took from him a map of Việt Trì and demanded 
that he print more copies for their use. Lacking the necessary materials, Cân 
could not fulll this demand. The Nationalists also “forced” Cân’s village to 
establish a youth group. In March, he could no longer avoid being brought into 
the competition between the two political parties. According to his police state-
ment, he had conferred with two “Vietminh Party members” named Sinh and 
Chuộn about what to do. The three decided to encourage local youth to re-
main neutral and to engage in local mutual aid activities rather than in politics. 
Cân claimed that, soon therea	er, he was housebound for a month with a case 
of diarrhea.
Concluding his case, Cân insisted on the “truth” of his account. The accusa-
tions against him “only stemmed from somebody’s hatred of me.” Cân assured 
his readers that the “physical and mental hardships of prison have made me thor-
oughly repent.” He also promised that, if pardoned and allowed to work for the 
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government’s cartography oce, he would focus only on that and not “go down 
other roads.”
What were the “accusations” against him? Cân’s appeal written from prison 
makes no direct mention of these things, but his le contains a brief transcript of 
his police interview with the Head of the Phú Thọ Public Security Department 
and the Head of the Political Board. He had been arrested for “contradicting 
DRV propaganda” (phản tuyên truyền) and for “Giving bandits a map to help 
them attack government troops.” The DRV leaders adopted the French colonial 
practice of referring to political challengers as “bandits” (thổ phỉ). We do not 
know the circumstances in which Cân gave his confession. It is possible that 
he had been pressured into confessing falsely to certain things that the party 
leaders feared others like Cân might be tempted to think, say, or do. His arrest 
and punishment would then serve as a warning to others.
A	er questioning Cân about his involvement with the Nationalist Party (the 
map and the Nationalist Party youth organization were the focus), his two in-
terrogators asked him the following questions:
What bad things did you say about the government?
Answer: I was foolish enough to say that the Government right now is 
Communist, that Mr. Hồ Chí Minh is friendly with France, and that 
Mr. Võ Nguyên Giáp and Trần Huy Liệu are both Communists. I said 
that the government had not immediately established a bank to hold the 
gold that it had collected in order to unify its currency. [I also said] that 
Administrative Committees from the village up to the district level were 
mostly incapable of doing their jobs.
Question: Why did you help the Vietnamese Nationalist Party?
Answer: I helped the Vietnamese Nationalist Party because the Chinese 
were sure to help them overthrow the Government and seize power.
Cân’s le also contains appeals for his release from prison written by his wife and 
by his father: At some point in October, Cân was released, but he was not allowed 
to leave Việt Trì and was not permitted to work for the DRV government.36
Thành’s Trip to France: May 30 to October 18, 1946
Thành and the National Assembly delegation le	 Hanoi for Paris on May 31, 
1946. They ew in two Douglas DC-3 passenger planes accompanied by a few 
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French ocials, including the diplomat Jean Sainteny and a general named 
Raoul Salan, who was soon to play a major role in the First Indochina War. 
The airplane journey lasted eleven days as a result of stops for maintenance, 
weather, and brief tourist visits in Rangoon, Calcutta, Agra, Karachi, Baghdad, 
and Cairo.37 Because the French government had not yet been formed, Thành 
and his French minder, Sainteny, agreed that he would divert to the southern 
French resort town of Biarritz. There, with Sainteny hosting him, Thành passed 
the time until June 22. On that day, the two nally ew to Paris, where Thành 
was greeted by ecstatic crowds of Vietnamese.38 On July 2, 1946, he was nally 
hosted for an ocial diplomatic reception by the newly elected French Prime 
Minister, Georges Bidault. As for the actual negotiations in Paris, they began on 
July 6—thirty-seven days a	er the delegation had departed Hanoi.
Both Thành and the French seem to have been in no rush. As William Dui-
ker speculates, the French may have hoped that drawing out the discussions 
would help defuse the tense situation in Vietnam, sucking some of the revolu-
tionary oxygen out of the country and facilitating eventual French reassertion of 
control. In what appears as a sneaky move, the French government announced 
its recognition of the “Autonomous Cochinchinese Republic” while Thành was 
in Egypt and therefore unable to launch an immediate protest.
But the extra time was surely far more valuable to Thành and his DRV regime 
than it was to France. As the case of the cartographer Hoàng Cân suggests, every 
additional day of the DRV’s existence had the psychological e­ect of convincing 
more Vietnamese that the regime was a reality and the only viable government 
for national independence. By October 1946, Cân had changed from a person 
cautiously attempting to lie low and steer clear of any signicant political com-
mitment to the DRV to a person begging for a position serving the regime in 
Hanoi as a cartography specialist. The party’s destruction of the Nationalists in 
the summer and autumn of 1946, which was easier to accomplish because of the 
long negotiating delays, also was surely a net gain for the DRV, outweighing any 
advantages that the extra time had a­orded the French.
The ocial DRV-French negotiations were held about 50 kilometers south 
of Paris in the town of Fontainebleau. There, Phạm Văn Đồng and the other 
DRV negotiators quickly ran into the same problems that had beset Võ Nguyên 
Giáp during the negotiations at Dalat. The French did not recognize the unity 
of Vietnam. They would not allow the DRV regime to carry out an independent 
foreign policy and would not allow it to print its own money or to control its own 
economy. Major economic assets such as the coal mines of Hòn Gai (north of 
Hanoi) would remain France’s to exploit. On the issue of future independence, 
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the French negotiators also made no promises that Đồng and the Vietnamese 
delegation could have used to justify further concessions.39 War was coming.
The DRV delegation at Fontainebleau employed the same basic negotiating 
strategy that had been employed at Dalat two months earlier: Push hard on im-
portant issues, but not so hard that the talks break down. Even if the irreconcil-
ability of the two sides is obvious and war a certainty, recognize that the French 
will be reluctant to crush the DRV regime in Hanoi while the talks are ongoing. 
Thus, no matter how hopeless the talks seem, string them along as much as 
possible. When the talks did break down at one point, Thành, who had kept his 
distance from the negotiations, intervened to restart them.40
On September 10, however, Đồng and Thành decided that enough was 
enough and nally ended the negotiations. Three days later, Đồng and the DRV 
negotiators boarded a ship for Vietnam, leaving Thành behind. The French were 
eager to see the DRV leader leave the country as well and o­ered to y him to 
Hanoi. He declined this o­er, however, having a few more things to accomplish 
in France.41 Again, playing the role of embattled moderate, Thành pleaded with 
his French handlers for an agreement to bring back to Vietnam, as though re-
turning “empty handed” would jeopardize his position back home.42 The French 
might have questioned the truth of this narrative by considering the remarkable 
length of Thành’s visit. It was now September—he had le	 Vietnam in May. 
Such a lengthy absence (over 100 days) was not the behavior of a leader who was 
insecure about his position. In reality, thanks to the work of Trường Chinh, Võ 
Nguyên Giáp, and other party leaders back in Vietnam, Thành’s political power 
in the DRV had improved markedly.
On September 11 and 12, he paid two visits to the American Embassy, where 
he employed the same strategy that he had used with American military person-
nel in China and Vietnam the previous year. Again, the point was to make the 
Americans think that he admired their political system and would be eager to 
form a close partnership. If he could whet the imperialist appetite of the Amer-
icans, perhaps they would be less enthusiastic about helping France’s recoloni-
zation of Indochina. Any division between the US and France helped the cause 
of the DRV.
With the US ambassador to France (Je­erson Ca­ery), Thành attempted to 
make the case that he was not a Communist. To the ambassador’s rst secretary, 
Thành professed his admiration for Franklin Roosevelt and suggested that the 
DRV would favor American economic investment in Vietnam. Contradicting 
his entire career as a founding member of the French Communist Party, as the 
father of Vietnamese Communism, and as a Comintern agent, he even promised 
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that the DRV would give the American Navy use of Vietnam’s deep-water port, 
Cam Ranh Bay.43 There was not a chance, of course, that he would have followed 
through with such a promise.
Thành then called upon the Minister of Overseas France, an old Socialist 
friend named Marius Moutet, to sign an agreement. Moutet proposed a modus 
vivendi, which is a temporary peace agreement between two conicting parties. 
According to this eleventh-hour agreement, both sides would oversee a ceasere 
in Cochinchina and engage in yet another round of negotiations in January. 
With French national elections scheduled for November, there was still theoret-
ically a possibility that the French Communist Party would win a major victory 
at the polls, seize control of the government, and change French policy in the 
favor of DRV independence.
Thành did not wait to see. With the modus vivendi in hand, he secured pas-
sage on a French naval ship headed to Vietnam. On the morning of September 
19, 1946, the ship le	 Marseilles, arriving in Vietnam twenty-nine days later on 
October 18.
The War Begins: December 19, 1946
Thành returned to northern Vietnam during a growing crisis that focused on 
the issue of customs in the port city of Haiphong. Desperately low on cash, the 
DRV needed the tax money that could be collected from managing customs 
at the busy port. In mid-October, the French stepped over the DRV regime in 
Haiphong and established import-export controls. As Tonnesson explains, this 
aggressive French move led to a state of “almost constant nervousness” among 
the Vietnamese.44
Meanwhile, the DRV regime and the French continued their edgy coexis-
tence in Hanoi. In France, the legislative elections of November 10 resulted 
in a remarkable FCP victory. France’s Communist politicians won more than 
twenty-eight percent of the popular vote, the highest of any party. Second was 
the Popular Republican Movement party, which took twenty-ve percent. The 
Socialist Party was third with seventeen percent. As the head of the party that 
had won the most votes and held the most seats in the National Assembly, the 
Communist leader Maurice Thorez demanded that he lead the government. 
His non-Communist allies, though, the Popular Republicans and the Socialists, 
refused, and the Socialist Leon Blum was put into the position.45
The DRV leaders in Hanoi waited for signs of a policy change. Meanwhile, 
the French continued to tighten their grip on the city, where rumors spread of an 
impending French attack.46 On November 20, the customs crisis in Haiphong 
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escalated to a new level. A Chinese cargo ship containing gasoline for the DRV 
government became a test of resolve for the two sides. DRV troops attempted 
to contest France’s conscation of the ship and its cargo, leading to a violent 
tug-of-war. This quickly developed into a brutal show of force by the French, 
who shelled the city of Haiphong on November 23, killing hundreds of civilians. 
French forces seized the port city and the border town of Lạng Sơn, which lay 
about 200 kilometers to the north of Haiphong.
Surely this move by the French injected a sense of urgency into the DRV 
leaders about how and when they would evacuate their regime from Hanoi. Had 
they scoured the French press for signs of ocial protest against the shelling 
of Haiphong, Thành and other party leaders would have found nothing to in-
spire hope.47 Indeed, by December, the impressive Communist electoral victory 
had brought about no signicant change in French policy toward Vietnam. I 
doubt that Thành was surprised. But he probably remained determined to delay 
a break from peaceful relations a little longer—long enough to show Moscow 
that he had given the FCP a chance to change French policy.
By mid-December, Thành nally felt that the danger of continued coex-
istence in Hanoi was too great to justify extra days of respect for the French 
Communist Party’s prospects in France. In Paris, the Communist-dominated 
government had been in power for over a month and had done nothing. As the 
scholar Milton Sachs observed, the French Communists would only criticize 
French colonial policy when they were an opposition party and not actually 
responsible for the undoing of France’s empire.48
On December 16, 1946, Vietnamese party leaders in the North sent a 
one-paragraph message to the Southern Party Branch informing them that the 
situation was “extremely tense” and that the DRV’s ability to “hold large towns 
and cities would not decide the war.” (In other words, they were about to pull 
out of Hanoi, Hue, and Haiphong). Comrades of the Southern Party Branch 
were to “prevent France from bringing to Northern and Central Vietnam all the 
military assets used for the conquest of the South.” This meant attacking Saigon, 
especially military supplies in the city and transport ships.49
Thành planned the break for the evening of December 19. That day, he 
penned a brief appeal to the country to join the ght against the French—it 
would be read over the DRV radio the following day. During the evening, DRV 
forces detonated explosives at the Hanoi power station. Under cover of sudden 
darkness, troops attacked French soldiers. Meanwhile, DRV terror squads en-
tered the French residential areas, whose inhabitants had been supplied with 
guns and grenades. Well-armed, these 7,000 French civilians defended their 
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homes “with determination.”50 According to Philippe de Villers, “Daybreak 
came to a city still in full combat, where everything said war: houses burning, 
bodies lying on sidewalks, puddles of blood, trees shredded or fallen, barricades, 
electric wires burning on the ground, etc. . . .”51
Later that day, Thành’s “National Appeal for Resistance War,” as it is called 
in Vietnam, was broadcast over the radio:
Compatriots all over the country!
As we desire peace, we have made concessions. But the more concessions 
we make, the more the French colonialists press on, for they are bent on 
reconquering our country.
No! We would rather sacrice all than lose our country. Never shall we 
be enslaved!
Compatriots! Stand up!
Men and women, old and young, regardless of religious creed, politi-
cal aliation, or nationality, all Vietnamese must stand up to ght the 
French colonialists and save the Fatherland. Those who have ries, use 
ries. Those who have swords, use swords. Those who have no swords, 
use spades, hoes, or sticks. Everyone must oppose the colonialists and save 
his country!
Members of the army, the self-defense corps, and the militia!
The hour for national salvation has struck! We must shed even our last 
drop of blood to safeguard our country.
Even if we must endure the greatest hardships in our war of resistance, 
with our determination to face all sacrices, we are bound to win!
Long live independent and unied Vietnam!
Long live the victorious Resistance!52 
Generally, the French forces were able to get the better of the nighttime skir-
mishes and reestablish control over the city (and over other locations in northern 
Vietnam that had come under DRV attack). Still, pockets of DRV troops would 
remain in Hanoi and harass their French and Vietnamese enemies sporadically 
for the next two months. In her 1955 account of the First Indochina War, Ellen 
Hammer estimates that France’s “indiscriminate repression” following the De-
cember 19 attack claimed “several thousand Vietnamese civilians.”53 This was 
the context in which many Vietnamese heard or read Thành’s and the DRV 
regime’s patriotic appeals for “resistance.”
The party leaders must have understood that the December 19 issue of Truth 
would be the last for some time, making its content especially important. The 
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issue contained six articles. The rst, titled “France’s Policy of Provocation,” 
argued vehemently that the DRV attack was an entirely justied response to 
France’s deliberate policy of provocation. The rst section of the article was writ-
ten in oversize block letters on the front page:
Those people who act on behalf of France in Indochina met with each 
other the previous day (16–12–46) in Haiphong, and the following day (17–
12–46), big provocations occur in Hanoi: French troops inconsiderately 
shoot, kill, and pillage regular [Vietnamese] people, occupy the Finance 
Oce, wreck the national defense constructions of our people and, during 
the night, send Vietnamese traitors dressed as members of the National 
Defense Brigades out to disseminate iers attacking the Government.
Who thought, organized, and acted rst?
The Vietnamese people and the French people will respond appropri-
ately to this gang of reactionaries.54
This pithy statement, which was followed by a long article further explaining 
its main ideas, reected the party leadership’s continued determination to stay in 
line with the broader Soviet policy of “protecting peace.” Indeed, the day follow-
ing the attack (and on many occasions therea	er), Thành was quick to broadcast 
appeals to the French for peace. In addition to staying in line with Moscow, 
Thành’s appeals for negotiations had the benecial e­ect of sowing discord in 
the French camp. Some French considered these appeals to be propaganda; oth-
ers saw them as signs that they could negotiate with Thành a settlement that 
would leave Indochina in French hands.55
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The Shi to the Countryside, 1947–1948
Historians tend to see the DRV attack on the evening of December 19, 1946 as 
the ocial start of the First Indochina War. Unocially, the war had begun 
over a year earlier in Cochinchina with the British arrival in September of 1945. 
During the Conference at Dalat, held in late April and early May 1946, one 
of the sticking points had been the issue of a ceasere in Cochinchina. There, 
small DRV forces had hindered the French eort to reestablish control. The 
December 19 attack marked a turning point because it ended the Hồ Chí Minh 
Government’s sixteen-month legal existence in Hanoi.
The party leaders, notably Nguyễn Tất Thành, Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn 
Đồng, and Võ Nguyên Giáp, retreated to a secure area in the mountainous re-
gion about 180 kilometers north of Hanoi in the province of Bắc Cạn. For sev-
eral months, this served as the DRV “Safe Zone” (an toàn khu or ATK) for the 
oces of the top party leaders. In the autumn of 1947, the French learned the 
location of this Safe Zone and organized a 1000-man commando raid. Carried 
out in early November as part of a larger operation, the raid appears to have 
caught some DRV leaders “badly o guard,” nearly resulting in their capture.1
From this point, Thành and his comrades shied the DRV Safe Zone south to 
the province of Thái Nguyên, which lies about sixty kilometers north of Hanoi.
It appears from the publication of the party’s ocial organ, Truth, that the 
DRV leaders required about three months to become truly settled in their new 
environs. Looking at the print run of Truth, we see that its sixty-ninth issue was 
released on December 19, 1946, the day of the attack against the French. The 
next issue, number seventy, appeared on March 4, 1947. As the scholar Tuong 
Vu shows, the DRV’s party leaders drew encouragement from the development 
of world events. The Soviet Union would establish the Cominform in October 
of 1947 and begin to promote more vigorously the “Zhadanov Doctrine,” which 
held that the world was divided into two irreconcilable camps: the “imperial-
ist anti-democratic camp led by the United States” and the “anti-imperialist 
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democratic camp led by the Soviet Union.” In 1948, the DRV would receive 
encouraging news about the military successes of Mao Zedong’s Communist 
forces in China. According to Vu, these developments would help embolden the 
DRV’s party leaders to a carry out a “radical turn” in 1948. This would mean a 
more overt imposition of party rule over the DRV apparatus and a more aggres-
sive promotion of Marxist-Leninist ideas.2
The French Response to the December 19 Attack
The DRV’s December 19, 1946 attack and subsequent evacuation to the coun-
tryside convinced French leaders in Paris that, rst and foremost, they needed 
to establish law and order. A strong military response, they hoped, would con-
vince Thành and his followers to negotiate an end to the conict, which meant 
an end to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.3 It took the French about four 
months to stabilize their presence in northern Vietnam. With only 26,000 
troops available for operations in the North, they were limited to launching 
raids to secure strategic areas. First was Hanoi and Highway 5, the road that 
connected the city to the port of Haiphong. DRV forces had cut that road in 
twenty dierent places. During the early months of 1947, the French carried out 
a round-the-clock airli to Hanoi that involved about one hundred and y 
DC-3 ights a day. The reassertion of control also involved sending troops out to 
dozens of garrisons in the countryside near the city. These were in a dangerously 
weakened and isolated state.4
In Hanoi, pockets of DRV guerrillas continued to ght sporadically in the 
city’s Old Quarter up until February 18, when they nally retreated to the coun-
tryside. In mid-April, the French sent a parachute battalion into Hòa Bình prov-
ince to the west of Hanoi, taking control of the main road that connected the 
city to what the French called the “Tai Country” (i.e., the Tai ethnic minority 
region). The French had arrived late to northern Vietnam but were still able to 
mop up pockets of resistance with ease, promptly pushing the DRV forces into 
the cover of mountain bases to the north and northwest of Hanoi. Encouraged 
by their ability to reassert themselves in Tonkin, the French began to “presume 
a rapid victory.”5
When the dust had settled toward the end of April 1947, the French had taken 
control of a strategic corridor stretching across northern Indochina. It was now 
possible for a person to disembark at Haiphong harbor, travel along Highway 
5 to Hanoi, and continue west to the Laotian border. In Central Vietnam, the 
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French had cleared pockets of DRV guerrillas out of Huế and secured the 300-
km stretch of Highway 1, the road from Hanoi to Saigon, from Đồng Hới down 
through Huế, Đà Nẵng, and Hội An. However, with only limited numbers of 
troops available for operations in northern Vietnam, the French were forced to 
leave enormous parts of the region untouched.6
The Party’s War Strategy
In early April 1947, as the French reassertion of control was in its nal stage, the 
party Central Committee held an important meeting during which top leaders 
discussed their new situation. How would the French be defeated? Thành saw 
the war as having three stages. During the rst stage, the enemy would occupy 
the main cities, roads, military bases, and economic centers (as the French had al-
ready done). The enemy would use mechanized vehicles to transport their army 
over a wide area. During this rst phase, the DRV’s “main war goal” would be 
to “deplete the enemy’s forces and slow them down while, at the same time, 
preserving our main forces.” This meant avoiding “disadvantageous battles” and 
“pulling backward to a certain extent while still conducting partial attacks to 
deplete a part of the enemy’s forces.”7
The second stage of the war, according to the party’s predictions, would see 
the French make more use of ground troops to “pillage food” and “terrorize” the 
DRV’s defenses. This stage would also see an eort by the French to combine 
politics with ghting, to establish a “puppet government” (as the French had 
already tried to do in Cochinchina) and to force the DRV to surrender. “We 
will ruin that strategy of the enemy by abandoning [to them] a large number of 
urban areas and establishing military strongholds in the countryside and in the 
mountains.” The enemy’s strategy would also be ruined because the DRV forces 
would expand their mobile guerrilla warfare, bringing the ght into the areas 
“temporarily” controlled by the enemy, including, at times, the big cities. This 
strategy would enable the DRV to “deplete and liquidate” the enemy’s forces 
while at the same time bolstering its own forces in preparation for a “general 
counter-oensive.”8
The third stage, the “general counteroensive,” would involve an all-out at-
tack on the enemy’s forces, which, at that point, would be signicantly weakened 
due to repeated smaller attacks from mobile guerrillas. “With both the subjec-
tive and objective conditions ripe, we will quickly concentrate our forces and use 
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mobile warfare with set-piece battles and guerrilla attacks as support to mount 
a counterattack along the entire ont to destroy the enemy and retake lost areas.”
According to the Central Committee resolution, Vietnam’s geography pre-
vented it from having “broad and secure bases” as Mao Zedong’s forces had en-
joyed in China:
All bases in Vietnam are vulnerable to an enemy attack or an enemy siege. 
But Vietnam has a unied front of the entire people, who have experienced 
broad democracy and would die to preserve that regime. The situation in 
France is especially dangerous and France is tens of thousands of kilometers 
away from Vietnam. Therefore, Vietnam can still carry out armed struggle 
and seize victory by opening up the front in any place where the enemy is. 
We can strike behind the enemy’s back, in his guts, and we can organize 
bases not only in the mountains but also in the deltas.9
The policy statement did not directly discuss the most awkward issue facing 
Thành and the other DRV leaders—the lack of Soviet recognition and military 
aid. How could the Vietnamese people be convinced of the superiority of the 
Soviet Union and the Communist bloc if Moscow provided no support? How 
could the DRV military, the People’s Liberation Army, no matter how deter-
mined its soldiers, evict the French from Vietnam without a supply of weapons? 
How could Thành hold a Communist Party Congress, an important ritual for 
the consolidation of his power, without Soviet recognition and the presence of 
a Soviet representative?
The DRV’s Rural Apparatus
At some point during the preparations for the August 1945 seizure of power, 
the party leaders had divided Vietnam into a straightforward system of mili-
tary zones. Vietnam’s three regions—North, Center, and South—would each 
be divided into three zones comprising several provinces. The zones would be 
numbered from one to nine and progress mostly from north to south. From 1946 
to 1951, the party leaders would adjust the zone system ve times, nally ending 
up with a smaller number of “interzones” [liên-khu]. By late 1949, the system 
was mostly settled. Though the new administrative boundaries were ocially 
“interzones,” DRV leaders frequently abandoned that more cumbersome term 
and called the new groupings “zones” as before.
The most important zones for the regime were the Vietnamese North (Việt 
Bắc), which included the seventeen provinces to the north of Hanoi extending to 
the Chinese border. In the middle of this zone was the secret party headquarters. 
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Extending southward from the lower border of the Vietnamese North Zone was 
Zone 3. It generally comprised Hanoi and the provinces extending west from the 
city to the Laotian border and east to Haiphong, covering much of the Red River 
delta. Below Zone 3 was Zone 4, which covered north-central Vietnam. Zone 
4 began in the large, poor, and densely populated province of Thanh Hóa and 
extended southward along Vietnam’s neck down through the provinces of Nghệ 
An, Hà Tĩnh, Quảng Bình, Quảng Ngãi, and Thừa Thiên—the province that 
contained the old imperial capital of Huế.
My impression from reading archival documents is that the party leaders in 
the Vietnamese North Zone had less information from and less control over 
zones 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, which covered the rest of Vietnam moving southward 
from Huế toward Saigon. All zones were led by a military chief (khu trưởng) 
and a party commissar, both of whom reported to the DRV’s core leaders in the 
Vietnamese North zone to the north of Hanoi.10
As noted, during the August Revolution, the Communist Party contained 
an estimated 5,000 members. Aer seizing power, the party leaders called upon 
comrades throughout the country to recruit new members. If local leaders 
seemed loyal and eective, they were to be recruited for membership. A DRV 
directive from January of 1948 speaks glowingly of comrades in the North hav-
ing been able to recruit over 10,000 new members in one two-month period. 
This was thanks in part to the “zealous abolition of the disease of narrowness” 
in recruitment.11 The following August, Politburo member Lê Dức Thọ calcu-
lated that the party had 110,000 members—a ratio of one comrade for every 240 
citizens in Indochina. The party was strongest in the North, having there a ratio 
of one member for every 130 citizens.12 By late January of 1949, the recruitment 
drive had pushed the party’s ranks up to 155,000.13 The majority of these new 
members would have entered the party’s ranks via participation in mass organi-
zations such as the Vietminh, the United Vietnam Association, and the various 
National Salvation Associations. The local party branch was the pinnacle of 
power in any DRV-controlled community.
Second to the party branch were the community’s two political institutions, 
the People’s Committee and the Administrative Committee. In early September 
of 1947, Thành released a directive calling for the establishment of Resistance 
War Committees at the zone level. A few days later, the DRV leaders decided to 
extend these committees down to the subdistrict level. It is unclear how far this 
process went, but on October 1, the DRV leaders released a follow-up directive 
stating that the newer Resistance War Committees and the original Adminis-
trative Committees were to be combined into one unit called the “Resistance 
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War Administrative Committees . . .” For the sake of simplicity, I will hence-
forth refer to them simply as “Resistance Committees.” At the subdistrict level, 
the Resistance Committees were to contain seven members: ve would be re-
sponsible for administrative tasks, a sixth for human resources, and a seventh 
for military aairs.
When the DRV regime abandoned Hanoi and moved to the countryside in 
December 1946, two centers of administrative and intellectual gravity emerged. 
The most inuential was, naturally, the region to the north of Hanoi that would 
become the Vietnamese North Zone. As mentioned, it contained the Safe Zone 
where Thành, Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and Võ Nguyên Giáp had their 
oces. Many inuential DRV intellectuals who had been involved with the par-
ty’s rst cultural newspaper, Vanguard (Tiên Phong), also worked in the Viet-
namese North in locations not far from the party headquarters.14
A second center of gravity—clearly inferior to the Vietnamese North but 
important nonetheless—was the region in northern central Vietnam that com-
prised Zone 4 (especially the provinces of Thanh Hóa and Nghệ An). Many 
important DRV scholars had headed southward from Hanoi to Zone 4 at the 
time of the DRV’s December 1946 attack on the French. Aer arriving in this 
region, sometimes with piles of books in tow, these DRV scholars would set up 
a makeshi university.
Downplaying the Party’s Role
In the early spring of 1947, the party leaders grew concerned about a French 
attempt to create a non-Communist alternative government in Vietnam that 
could draw support away from the DRV. Paris wanted to change the narrative 
of the war from “national liberation” to a choice between communism and 
non-communism. Thành and his comrades also still worried about the actions 
of various Vietnamese Nationalists and their United National Unity Front (Mặt 
trận Thống nhất Quốc gia Liên hiệp). Leaders of this group were calling for the 
former emperor, Bảo Đại, to establish some sort of alternative government. In 
their propaganda, the DRV leaders rarely allowed the anti-communist aspect 
of their domestic rivals to become a topic of public discussion. Thành and his 
comrades stuck to simple nationalist formulations such as “independence” and 
“unity.”15 DRV press attacks on these non-Communist rivals stayed within the 
bounds of the patriot-traitor formula and nonpolitical character assassination.
Thus, Lê Văn Hoạch (leader of the French-backed autonomous Cochinchina 
Republic) was the “traitor ringleader in the ‘puppet government of the South.’” 
The Nationalist Party leader and cultural luminary, Nguyễn Tường Tam was “a 
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depraved drunkard writer who stole two million dollars from our Government 
and ed to China—before, he was the right-hand man of the Japanese, then of 
the Chinese, and now of the French.” As for Nguyễn Hải Thần, leader of the 
Vietnamese Revolutionary League, he was “the former ringleader of a gang of 
tigers, a man who forgot his mother tongue—he was the servant of the Chinese 
and now of the French, and, in spirit, he was the criminal behind the thes and 
murders committed on Ôn Như Hầu Street.”16
Some of the party’s renewed motivation to downplay the Communist char-
acter of their regime may have stemmed from US President Truman’s articu-
lation of what came to be called the “Truman Doctrine.” In March of 1947, 
he had asked Congress to approve 400 million dollars in aid to help “demo-
cratic” nations under pressure from Communist challenges. Truman’s target 
for this money was the Turkish government and the non-Communist forces 
involved in the Greek Civil War. Thành and his colleagues could see how the 
French might use American anticommunism to secure US aid for the struggle 
against the DRV.
Therefore, party members were to “raise the prole” of the DRV’s mass orga-
nizations so that they could better serve as a “weapon for uniting broadly all of 
the people.” For the United Vietnam Association:
We should invite popular gures, representatives of political parties (even 
the Vietnamese Socialist Party, the Revolutionary Alliance League, the fac-
tion of Bố Xuân Luật and the reformed Nationalist Party); older leading 
members of the Catholic Church and other religions; and wealthy locals 
not aliated with any party. We should invite all these people to stand up 
and deliver public appeals calling for opposition to the French reactionaries 
and the puppet gang.17
The party leaders called for similar eorts to bolster the prole of their 
Communist-founded and Communist-controlled “Democratic Party” and the 
Vietminh front organization. Cadres were to “reorganize” the Democratic Party 
at the zone and provincial level and to “return Democratic Party cadres back to 
the Democratic Party.”
As for the Vietminh front, DRV leaders wanted a greater eort to make it 
seem less a tool of the Communist Party. Within three months, the Vietminh 
was to be “separated” from the Communist Party “at all levels” and “all work of 
the Vietminh front should be sent up through the V.M. hierarchy.” Cadres were 
to “pay attention” to keeping Vietminh reports separate, not allowing them to 
be “mixed up with” the party’s reports. Generally, this movement was organized 
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to “[o]ppose the slanderous propaganda of the French and of the Vietnamese 
Nationalists saying that our Government is communist, that the Vietminh is a 
condence trick (bội tín), that the Vietminh use terror . . .”18
A few weeks later, Politburo member Lê Đức Thọ (1911–1990) released an 
internal party announcement explaining new orders to “change a number of 
members” of the DRV government:
Comrades,
1. Because we want our Government to reect more clearly the great unied 
bloc of our entire people.
2. Because we want to counter the French colonialists’ scheme to establish a 
puppet government.
3. Because of its advantages with respect to our international propaganda
It has been decided to change a number of members of the Government: we 
are going to reduce the number of people associated with the Vietminh and 
recruit more patriotic personalities not belonging to any party (especially 
those patriotic personalities who belong to the bourgeoisie, landlord, or 
intellectual class).19
According to Thọ’s instructions, the announcement of these personnel changes 
was to be followed by local-level “explanatory meetings” with soldiers and mem-
bers of the general public. At the meetings, cadres were to explain that these per-
sonnel adjustments did not signal a DRV plan to “come to an arrangement” with 
the French. In Thọ’s instructions for how these local meetings were to transpire, 
we can see the strong theatrical element of party rule:
During these explanatory meetings, pay attention to allowing representatives 
of the Vietminh and representatives of the United Vietnam Association to 
make appeals together for unity. They should state clearly the French co-
lonialists’ scheme along with the determination of our government in the 
resistance war. On this occasion, [local Party members] should have the 
representative of the United Vietnam Association praise the attitude of the 
Vietminh for always putting the interests of the people above all (so as to 
refute the idea of the reactionaries who frequently say that the Vietminh is 
power-hungry). Also, the masses who participate in the meeting should vote 
to send a telegram in support of the new government.20
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As the internal party documents reveal, these moves were cosmetic in nature, 
involving no actual reduction in the party’s control over its mass organizations. 
Part of being a citizen in the DRV involved acting out these stage-managed dis-
plays of plurality, democracy, and support.
The Economics of People’s War
Within months of the DRV leadership’s relocation to the countryside, the real-
ity of the economic challenges facing the regime became all too apparent. In the 
party’s discourse on economics, we can see the combination of harsh wartime 
conditions and socialist ideals that would work together to reduce agricultural 
production. The DRV had no eective means of generating the revenue needed 
to pay for a war against a wealthy opponent like France. This meant that the 
regime had to extract from peasants an enormous quantity of free rice, just as 
the Japanese and French had needed to do during the dislocations of WWII. 
As a party policy report stated, “[The people] should only produce those things 
needed for the front and for the life of the people. [Their] production needs 
to be controlled by the Government.”21 Over the next few years, however, the 
party leaders would learn that they could control the extraction of rice, but not 
its production.
Economic statements from 1947 and 1948 show the incoherence and contra-
dictoriness of the regime’s policies as party leaders attempted to square benevo-
lent socialist ideals with the brutal realities of wartime economic management. 
A resolution from April 1947 explained how the DRV economy was supposed 
to function:
[The Government] will carry out inspection and manage foreign trade. 
This means that individuals will not have a monopoly on hoarding and 
exploitation, yet [we] will still get them to enthusiastically invest capital, to 
do business, to participate in production, and to supply and pursue benets 
for themselves and for the country. At the same time, we will establish a 
state economy and an economy that has a collective character (individuals 
combine their resources, combine their energies, and work together).22
The Resolution concluded its economic section with the following:
Our economic policy basically includes a few things: increase production, 
decrease consumption, (these two things must be done according to a plan), 
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reduce the contribution of the people (implement a new tax system during 
the resistance war), develop collective production, call upon the wealthy 
to invest, implement rewards and punishments (come up with prizes, pro-
mote labor heroes, punish those who are corrupt), unify the nancial sec-
tor, and preserve the value of Vietnam’s currency.23
These economic goals raised dicult questions. Why would a capitalist “en-
thusiastically invest” in the economy if the government’s intention was to reduce 
popular consumption? How could a “capitalist” or any person run a business 
if he or she did not have control over inventory, as the intention to eliminate 
“hoarding” suggested? And how would a reduction of the people’s consumption 
square with a reduction of the burden on them? Was a reduction of people’s 
consumption a policy goal or was it a reality that was happening regardless of 
the regime’s intentions? What would be the relationship between the planned 
state economy and the existing private economy—could the two compete for 
the same markets?
By the beginning of 1948, the party leaders were beginning to see how the 
problem of production in particular and of the economy in general could im-
peril the DRV’s war eort and the regime’s overall viability. “If we want to have 
the people enthusiastically participate in the resistance war and support the 
resistance-war Government, we must pay special attention to improving the peo-
ple’s quality of life.” As the resolution warned, “If the people are too miserable, 
they are easily swindled by the enemy and easily develop tendencies toward skep-
ticism and despondency.”24 The shortage of rice also sometimes directly aected 
the ghting capacity of the DRV’s troops:
Generally speaking, we can provide for our own grain needs, but we are not 
yet self-sucient in the eld of textiles and everyday commodities. Because 
there are places that are not self-sucient, the problem of supply has be-
come critical. In Quảng Bình, Cao Bằng, and Bắc Cạn provinces, hunger 
has become an issue, and in many places, the army has had to pull back only 
because of lack of supply.25
All aspects of the economy were struggling. Industry was “very poor.” Some 
machinery had been taken into the DRV-controlled zones with the intention of 
reassembling it there. That proved impossible in most cases, meaning that in-
dustrial productivity “dropped dramatically.” As for the “handicra” economy, 
a lack of materials in the DRV zones made it dicult for these small businesses 
to survive. “Many professional crasmen and handicra workers have become 
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jobless and returned to the French-occupied cities hoping to reestablish their 
old trade there.”26 On the crucial agricultural front, the trend toward leaving 
farmland uncultivated was already apparent:
In many farming areas, more elds have been farmed, but there are also 
many places where the lack of manpower or its high expense, or because 
of proximity to the enemy, compels people to leave a part of their land 
unfarmed. Those plantations that we conscated from the French have 
been ruined, especially those devoted to farming agricultural products for 
industry. We have not paid attention to them and also do not yet have the 
ability to farm or manage them. Yet we also have not been willing to divide 
that land up for the peasants (at the very least we could distribute it to them 
for rice farming to be managed by the people’s administration).27
The DRV leaders were reluctant to oversee a true redistribution of land. Redistrib-
uted land was to be “managed by the people’s administration,” which meant that 
the new user of the land would not own it (i.e., could not sell the land). In fact, the 
party leaders always referred to their policy as “temporary distribution” (tạm cấp), 
with the adjective “temporary” meaning that the state retained ownership.
Economic Solutions
One thing that Thành, Trường Chinh, and other party leaders noted was the 
relationship between the circulation of goods and their production. “Among 
those conditions needed for the stimulation of production, transport is funda-
mental, because there are many commodities and agricultural products that 
are produced, but there is no way of selling them. So, they accumulate and lose 
their value, discouraging the producer.” Meanwhile, in other places, a shortage 
of goods was raising the price of essential commodities like rice, salt, and tex-
tiles. The party leaders viewed this problem through a Marxist lens: What was 
needed, therefore, was intervention by the DRV state, which would overcome 
the irrationality of the market and “sell essential goods cheaply to places that 
needed them.”28 As the resolution warned:
These days, our economy is not yet self-sucient; foreign trade has come 
to a halt, and products are scarce. Therefore, products from the areas con-
trolled by the enemy are ooding into our free area. If we do not increase 
our production appropriately and get our transportation stabilized, our 
economy will be under the sway of the enemy’s and the issue of the people’s 
material wellbeing will be dependent on the enemy’s economy.29
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In other words, the peasants would have to buy from and sell their rice to areas 
controlled by the French. This would result in peasants parting with two things 
that the DRV regime desperately needed: agricultural products and hard cur-
rency (i.e., French piastres). Thus, we can see how the presence of nearby markets 
threatened the DRV regime’s ability to mobilize the materials needed to wage 
war. More generally, we can see how the demands of war could reinforce funda-
mental Communist beliefs such as the suspicion of markets. The danger posed 
by the loss of material wealth to French-controlled zones set the DRV leaders 
on a path toward nding ways of denying peasants access to those markets. To 
this end, Trường Chinh began to promote the slogan, “Vietnamese use Viet-
namese goods.”30
In September 1948, anticipating the coming October rice harvest and French 
troop movements in DRV-controlled areas, Lê Đức Thọ called upon comrades 
in the apparatus to “organize group harvesting” (tổ chức gặt tập đoàn). Because 
of the typical lack of labor during harvest time, “administrative oces and local 
mass organizations need to release a strict order along with the following slo-
gans: ‘No ripe rice le in the eld!’ and ‘Harvesting rice needs to be like striking 
the enemy!’”31
With respect to the DRV’s “nancial” situation, Trường Chinh noted:
We have not printed money fast enough to meet the daily growing demand. 
Some places like small bills, making trade and exchange dicult. Other 
places rely on printing money and neglect the need to increase production, 
meaning that ination has become a risk. Oces and mass organizations, 
along with private enterprises, compete with each other to exchange for 
Indochinese Piastres in order to buy foreign goods. Meanwhile Vietnam-
ese money does not yet have value in the international market. In many 
places the value of Vietnamese money has fallen relative to French money 
(even to the extent that, in Cao Bằng, one French piastre is worth three 
Vietnamese dollars).
 Our country’s nancial situation is still stuck in the situation of earning 
little and spending a lot. To ll in the gaps in our budget, we only know 
how to print more money. Therefore, the money collected for our reserves 
has been depleted for many reasons. We have not yet organized the inspec-
tion of our national nances from top to bottom.32
Time and repeated “inspections” would show that there simply were no eec-
tive measures to address the nancial situation in the extraordinary conditions 
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of war. The party would be “collecting a little and spending a lot” for the next 
four decades.
Traitor Lists and the First Ocial  
Patriotic Emulation Campaign
In early January 1948, the party Central Committee convened for its normal 
beginning-of-year meeting. The DRV leaders discussed the poor results of the 
land conscation and redistribution policy and expressed their intention to give 
this policy a push in the interest of increasing production. About a month aer 
the conclusion of the Central Committee meeting, the party leaders released an 
“Order on the Land and Belongings of Vietnamese Traitors.” About one page in 
length, the order mentioned that the Central Committee had decided to “cons-
cate the lands of Vietnamese traitors and distribute it to the tillers.”33
Thành and his lieutenants liked to have the more radical communist policies 
originate from the National Assembly so that they would appear to have the 
sanction of the people through a Western democratic process. To the outside 
world and perhaps to the Vietnamese themselves, this National Assembly path 
would make the policy seem to have originated from elected ocials responsible 
to their constituents rather than from a group of ve or six Communist Party 
leaders. As the order explained: “In order to implement that Resolution, the 
Government Party Committee will send the request to the Government at some 
point in the near future. The Government will then create an order.”34
The internal order explained briey how the conscation and redistribution 
of property were to be carried out:
The immediate responsibility of the zone-level [Party branches] is 
as follows:
1. Make a list of Vietnamese traitors since before the revolution until now 
and then inspect their land and belongings. They should be investigated 
before the law (even if absent). The Ministry of Justice will carry out the 
conscation. Pay attention: If the Ministry of Justice shows any hesitation 
[lừng chừng], then they must be pressured to move quickly.
2. Figure out a way to divide up the land evenly and appropriately.
In carrying out the Resolution of the Expanded Meeting of the Central 
Committee, people should pay attention to the following:
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1. If you want to put somebody on the list of Vietnamese traitors, it must be 
based on concrete, not vague, actions.
2. With respect to those who are opportunists, we must be lenient.
3. When we conscate the land and personal belongings of Vietnamese trai-
tors, we must allow for their wife and children to have some means of mak-
ing a living if they had nothing to do with [the traitorous activity].
4. In carrying out propaganda, we should not make the capitalists and land-
lords misunderstand and think that this is a rst step toward conscating 
the land of landlords. This could make them confused and worried.35
From the above directive, it is apparent that the question of whether somebody 
were put on the “traitor list” was decided by party members at the zone level and 
had little to do with the DRV’s Ministry of Justice. Aer the targeted person’s 
guilt had been established by a party member, the Ministry of Justice would be 
called in to “investigate.” The DRV legal representative would then announce 
the targeted “traitor’s” guilt—as though the issue had been determined by scru-
pulous legal procedure—and carry out the arrest and property conscation.
The First Patriotic Emulation Campaign: March 1948
As another means of addressing the problem of declining production, on March 
27, 1948 the party launched its rst “patriotic emulation campaign.” This was a 
mobilization technique that would become a xture in Vietnamese life under 
the party-state. The author of the order, Trường Chinh, used his romanticized 
writing style to announce and explain the campaign. Eager to conceal the DRV 
regime’s arbitrary and authoritarian way of operating, Chinh described the cam-
paign as having arisen spontaneously from the people:
Aer the glorious feat of arms of our army and people in the Vietnamese 
North, a wind of enthusiasm has blown throughout the country. In mass 
organizations as much as in individuals, in professional oces as much as 
in army units, one and all feel in themselves a sense of high emotion and 
burning desire. Everybody wants to do something remarkable to contribute 
to the resistance war and national construction.36
The campaign’s stated goal was to inspire the DRV population to “try hard to 
work quickly, work well, and to work beautifully,” regardless of one’s occupation. 
The emulation campaign was entirely spiritual in character—people were sup-
posed to work hard primarily so that their own self-improvement would bring 
benet to the nation. On a practical level, the lack of material incentives for the 
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campaign was essential because the government could not aord to reward peo-
ple. The little money that did remain in the DRV’s coers had to be used for the 
purchase of such expensive items as weapons and medical supplies.
The details of the emulation campaign suggest how some of the joy could be 
drained from the movement. The campaign was to be carefully controlled by the 
party, with work norms devised by higher-ups for those beneath them to meet. 
For the majority of people (peasants), this meant receiving production targets 
from local party ocials. As was oen the case, the attempt at a new mobiliza-
tion technique required the establishment of new bureaucratic positions to lead 
and monitor the campaign. “When the [emulation] plan has been put forward, 
so as to guarantee its implementation, [cadres] need to organize the supervision 
and expedition of the work, its inspection, and the method of providing rewards 
and punishments.”37
To ensure the success of the Patriotic Emulation campaign, Trường Chinh 
envisioned the creation of three new bureaus and two subcommittees:
1. Emulation Bureau [Ban Thi đua]: responsible for managing and pushing 
forward the emulation movement.
2. Inspection Bureau [Ban Kiểm tra]: responsible for observing the emulation 
work in order to draw lessons and x weaknesses and mistakes in a timely 
fashion. It will help the Emulation Bureau manage the campaign.
3. Judging Bureau [Ban Chấm thi]: responsible for judging the accomplish-
ments of the emulation campaign. The bureau also needs to set the regu-
lations for rewards and punishments in a just and enlightened manner.38
In addition to these three new bureaus, Chinh called for the establishment of a 
Propaganda Subcommittee to focus solely on “pushing forward” the movement 
and a Professional Subcommittee “to think constantly of ways to improve work-
ing technique.”
Subsequent parts of Chinh’s order stressed the techniques party members 
should use to make the emulation movement a success. Again, the focus was 
always on a spirit of sacrice for the “resistance war” and for “country and race.” 
There was no mention of traditional sources of motivation such as love of family 
and community along with that natural human desire to eat well. The descrip-
tion of the emulation campaign stressed “enthusiasm” and “excitement” but le 
unexplained what the role of “punishments” would be in the process and why, if 
the people yearned to do something for the resistance war, punishments would 
be necessary. Ultimately, Chinh concluded that the emulation movement was 
an “opportunity to apply the principles of the new way of living and to put into 
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eect the work style of our Party. As Stalin said: ‘Combine American practical-
ity with Russian revolutionary spirit in our work.’”39
Anti-Spy Work
The combination of being ideologically wedded to policies while being con-
fronted with their lack of encouraging results led Thành and the other party 
leaders to promote various scapegoat narratives. These took on dierent forms 
but shared the common function of exonerating sacred party policies from poor 
results. As Trường Chinh explained in the summer of 1948, “Many of the Par-
ty’s policies are very correct, but they have not been implemented eectively 
partly because of weaknesses in the Party’s organization. The organization can-
not guarantee the implementation of resolutions and orders.” Another section 
placed the blame on the failure of the party to expand its membership adequately. 
“Party policies have not been implemented completely enough mainly because 
the Party has not expanded enough or because its composition is complicated.”
Another key discourse, closely related to these “organizational weaknesses” 
was the idea that the party’s purity had been compromised by “spies” who 
were “sabotaging” its “correct policies.” This was particularly the case with 
land policies, “which cannot be implemented because many comrades in the 
subdistrict-level Party cells as well as in the Party Committees of the Resistance 
War Administrative Committees are petit-bourgeois intellectuals, rich peasants, 
or landlords.”40 Echoing these same sentiments, Politburo member Hoàng Quốc 
Việt, in his report to the conference, stated that “in admitting bourgeois intellec-
tuals into the Party, especially those who had belonged to other political parties, 
[we] must be extremely careful and take precautions against opportunistic ele-
ments, elements whose minds are thoroughly infected with nationalist thinking 
and who worm their way into the Party.”41
By September of 1948, the party leaders were promoting the idea that “spies” 
had inltrated not just the party but the entire DRV apparatus. “The Standing 
Committee sees that in many places, a number of spies have inltrated Gov-
ernment military and administrative oces.” There were allegedly places where 
these “spies” had “climbed into positions of signicance” and had “inltrated 
the Party’s ranks.” The directive warned that these spies, wanting to “earn trust 
so as to be placed in important positions, give o the impression of being very 
enthusiastic and hardworking.”
The party Standing Committee reminded members of the six methods of 
countering spy inltration. These included carefully inspecting the “dossiers” (lý 
lịch) of party members before awarding promotions or approving the transfer of 
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a cadre from one location to another. More signicant for the work atmosphere 
of the DRV state were the fourth and h measures:
4. Organize mutual inspections of each other’s actions, lifestyle, social inter-
actions, spending habits—even those of the most enthusiastic and hard-
working [co-workers]. Increase criticism and self-criticism.
5. Immediately begin a secret inspection of the dossiers of workers in govern-
ment and military oces. Do the same for Party members.42 
Two weeks later, on October 10, 1948, Chinh announced the establishment 
of yet another bureaucratic instrument: The Central Committee Inspection Bu-
reau (Ban Kiểm tra Trung ương). As the resolution explained: “All work of the 
Party needs to penetrate from top to bottom, and the Party’s policies must be 
thoroughly implemented.” For this reason, the party leaders had established the 
new Inspection Bureau, which was to travel to the various zones to “determine 
whether the Party’s policies were being implemented and whether they were im-
plemented correctly.”43
The Evolution of Land Policies
A sacred principle of DRV’s leaders was that poor peasants, especially landless 
ones, would support the regime and become enthusiastic producers if given land. 
As we have seen, though, in areas controlled by the DRV, large areas of farm-
land were being le fallow. Landowners were struggling to nd people willing to 
rent their land. By August 1948, the DRV leaders were edging toward punitive 
measures to motivate farmers to start cultivating fallow land. A report draed 
by Politburo member Hoàng Quốc Việt instructed comrades to expropriate any 
land le fallow for more than two harvests and “temporarily distribute” it to the 
families of local soldiers.44
Should the party’s land policy be changed? A long policy report that was 
probably penned by Trường Chinh described how land reform was approached 
by “new democracies” of the Eastern Bloc:
Each new democracy carries out the “land reform” program that is suitable 
to the country’s own conditions. For example: Poland conscates the land 
of land owners who have more than 200 hectares. Czechoslovakia cons-
cates with compensation the land of landowners who have y hectares 
or greater, and, in China, the people’s government conscates the land 
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of landlords in general, but leaves landlords with some land—enough for 
their families to live on.45
Chinh made no judgment about which policy seemed most suitable to Viet-
nam. The point was to illustrate the exibility of the Soviet bloc. But certainly, 
within Vietnam’s Communist movement, conscation of the land of “landlords 
in general” (the policy of the Chinese Communists) had been the basic goal 
consistently since the late 1920s.
For the present, Chinh signaled a shi to a slightly more aggressive land re-
form policy, stressing that the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggles could 
not be entirely separated. He was careful to explain that circumstances had 
changed since 1941 when, at the 8th Plenum, the party had advanced its policy 
of allying with the landlords. At that time, Chinh had argued that the patrio-
tism of the Vietnamese people was enough to earn support for the anti-French 
struggle. Now, if the party “did not abolish feudal remnants and carry out land 
reform, a very large proportion of the masses would be determined not to take 
the risk (liều) of participating in the resistance war in a zealous and reliable 
manner.”46
For all Chinh’s elaborate justication, though, the party’s land policy changed 
only slightly. Three times in the space of his roughly two-page description of the 
current land reform policy he stressed the “gradual” nature of the process by 
which “feudal remnants” would be reduced and nally eliminated. He reminded 
comrades that land reform policies could only be carried out “within the scope 
of actions that do not harm the Unied Front against the French Colonialist Ag-
gressors.”47 Later in his report, Chinh claried that the party’s policy was to “rely 
on the landless, poor, and middle peasants, to unify with the rich peasants, and 
to win over the landlords.”48 And again, despite his talk of the inseparability of 
the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal tasks, Chinh still stressed the need for rural 
elites (“landlords and rich peasants”) and the rural poor (“landless and poor 
peasants”) to “compromise” and “make concessions” with each other.
Rent Reduction
The problem with production tempted the party leaders to intervene in ever 
deeper ways in local economies. One of the reasons why a large amount of land 
was being le fallow was the expense of hiring labor. Thus, Chinh stated that 
the party would solve this problem by “setting wage prices” so that the laborer 
would “not suer a loss” and the land owner would “not suer too great an ex-
pense.”49 In a similar spirit, Chinh decreed that “land owners do not have the 
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right to ‘lay o’ laborers or to take back rented land if the renter is still paying 
rent regularly (except in case of a lost harvest).” As for the renters, they “must 
pay enough rent in accordance with Government regulations.” What were the 
government regulations? All land rents were to be reduced twenty-ve percent 
from the pre–August Revolution level.
A simpler method of dealing with land-rent rates might have been for the 
DRV government to x them at a certain percentage of the harvest. I believe 
that ideological reasons made Thành, Chinh, and other party leaders loathe to 
follow this path. If the regime were to announce a particular rate (for example, 
een percent of the harvest), it would be tantamount to publicly acknowledg-
ing the existence of a non-exploitative rent level. Such a move might suggest 
that exploitation could be resolved peacefully by the state through the means of 
reforms. In such circumstances, it would be more dicult to justify continuing 
the revolutionary process to a large-scale expropriation of elite land. Elites could 
claim that they had followed the rate set by the “people’s government.”
Lack of Science in DRV Land Policy Discourse
The party’s discussions and justications of land policy rarely, if ever, included 
any positive argument based on actual experiences in DRV-controlled areas. At 
no point did Chinh or any other party leaders claim that data on peasant par-
ticipation in the resistance war (such as the speed and completeness with which 
villages met military conscription quotas relative to each other) or data on agri-
cultural productivity showed that villages having carried out the party’s reforms 
had experienced a boost in either participation or productivity. It seems safe to 
assume, then, that the actual results did not support the party’s contentions.
Indeed, Trường Chinh’s “two new conditions” justifying a more aggressive 
land policy had nothing to do with the success of those policies in Vietnam:
First, aer the August Revolution, the state passed into the hands of the 
people; a democratic republican regime in Vietnam was established with a 
fairly progressive constitution. The state had a new democratic character 
which means that it belonged to the various classes of people carrying out 
resistance war, and it [the state] was under the leadership of the working 
class [i.e., the Communist Party].50
The rst condition concerned the level of control held by the Communist Party 
in the regime (i.e., about whether the party was in a position strong enough 
to carry out the reforms). The second focused on the favorable international 
situation:
78 chapter 3
Second, aer the recent world war, the new democratic forces in the world 
increased signicantly. The Soviet Union was completely victorious [in the 
war] and is now large and powerful. Many new-democratic countries have 
been established, anti-colonial revolutions are in full swing, and, most note-
worthy of all, revolutionary China has achieved a succession of victories. In 
the context of such a seething world revolution, the Indochinese revolution 
cannot but be inuenced by the world revolution. [The Indochinese revo-
lution] must nd in the world revolutionary movement new sources of help 
and new experiences in order to move forward.51
Neither of the two conditions for changes in land policy (level of party con-
trol and “seething world revolution”) stemmed from results-based facts on the 
ground in DRV-controlled areas. Instead, land policies were closely tied to ex-
ternal factors—such as positioning the DRV as an orthodox and loyal “new de-
mocracy” worthy of Soviet recognition and aid.
Looking at the rst three years of the party’s rule, we can see early versions of 
features that would, in 1953, become fundamental elements of the land reform 
campaign. First was the staging of a sadistic and sensational crime scene (the Ôn 
Như Hầu Aair) to demonize a targeted group (the Nationalist Party) and to 
justify its suppression. Second was the creation of lists of traitors who could be 
targeted for land and property expropriation. Third was a scapegoat narrative of 
local party impurity—the notion that “spies” and “saboteurs” had “wormed their 
way into” the DRV apparatus—to explain the poor results of policies. Fourth 
was the use of “criticism and self-criticism” as a means of compelling party un-
derlings to accept blame for disappointing results. And h was the positive 
connection between the development of party policies and the proximity of 
Communist bloc allies.
That nal element, the proximity of Communist bloc allies, would be re-
solved in late 1949 with the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communist forces in 
China. Within a few months, Mao, Stalin, and the Eastern Bloc countries would 
all grant the DRV diplomatic recognition. Soviet weapons and Chinese advisors 
would arrive in northern Vietnam soon thereaer, fundamentally changing the 
complexion of the war in the DRV’s favor. However, Thành and other party 
leaders would nd, to their frustration, that a change in the war’s complexion 
would not reverse the regime’s growing economic troubles.
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The Turning Point, 1949–1950
In the spring of 1947, French leaders had begun to realize that they could not ne-
gotiate an acceptable settlement of the Indochina crisis with their adversary, Hồ 
Chí Minh. In December of that year, Paris had moved to “Plan B,” which was 
the establishment of a noncommunist and French-friendly alternative govern-
ment that would hopefully draw support away from the DRV. The Vietnamese 
Nationalist leaders whom the French were able to recruit for this project insisted 
that the former emperor, Bảo Đại, be brought on board. Though he had agreed 
in principle to this “solution,” Bảo Đại refused to play this new role unless the 
French agreed to two terms. The rst was ocial recognition of Vietnamese 
independence and the second was incorporation of Cochinchina, which the 
French had separated from the rest of the country, into the new noncommunist 
Vietnamese government. Throughout 1948, Bảo Đại dug in his heels on these 
conditions until Paris nally yielded. On March 8, 1949, the two sides signed 
the Elysée Accords, which made ocial the establishment of the Associated 
State of Vietnam.1 The term “associated” meant that this alternative Vietnam-
ese government would be “associated” with Laos and Cambodia as part of the 
French Union.
Though the “independence” enjoyed by the State of Vietnam (as it is usually 
called) was limited, Nguyễn Tất Thành and the Politburo took seriously the 
threat that this noncommunist alternative posed to their regime. By the begin-
ning of 1949, they had begun to establish “denunciation” (tố cáo) as a feature of 
DRV political culture. In the summer of 1948, the responsibility for uncovering 
traitors had been conned to members of the DRV state. In January of 1949, the 
Politburo ordered local cadres to “make clear to the people the responsibility of 
counterespionage” and to “praise members of the population or of the apparatus 
who discover nests of spies.” The Politburo also called for more eorts to propa-
gandize anti-spy cases “as an example” for the people and to “develop [in them] 
both a consciousness of and sense of responsibility for counterespionage work.”2
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From a professional perspective, the party leaders called on Public Security 
oces to “train a number of their professional cadres for the task of interrogat-
ing suspects” and to “send a number of Public Security and intelligence workers 
overseas for study.” In addition to these measures, security cadres were to train 
local militia members how to “ask for papers” from people. And nally, the party 
leaders called upon the security apparatus “to make for the whole country a trai-
tor list, organized by severity of crime, so that these people could be monitored 
closely.”3
The “Buy Rice for Hồ Chí Minh” Campaign
In early August 1949, the party Central Committee decided that the results of 
measures taken over the summer to ensure the supply of rice to the army were 
“not as wished.” Therefore, a new form of mobilization focusing on the person 
of Hồ Chí Minh would be carried out. Thành would write a letter to the people 
imploring them to sell their rice to the government.4 As the Central Committee 
directive explained:
From the Central Committee to Inter-Zone Party Branches:
The reason for this Directive is that, during the last one or two months, 
shortages of rice and salt in the army have reached very dangerous levels, es-
pecially in the Vietnamese North region. Last month, the enemy attacked 
Tuyên Quang and Phú Thọ; this month they have attacked Bắc Ninh and 
Bắc Giang. Meanwhile, our soldiers have to eat porridge and then go ght 
the enemy.
Our policy of price-setting has been implemented but has not attained 
the results we had hoped for.
Therefore, Mr. Hồ is writing this letter, using Mr. Hồ’s own prestige to 
spur on our countrymen. With careful mobilization, it will lead to victory. 
However, we will still carry out the policy of price-setting.
This attempt to motivate our countrymen to sell rice in this manner will 
reach the ears of the enemy, and they will use it to counter our propaganda. 
But whether we do it or not, they will still say bad things about us and 
still fabricate things for which to criticize us. Therefore, we should not be 
reluctant for that reason.5
The three-page directive provided detailed instructions about how the Hồ Chí 
Minh letter was to be used. First, party members at the zone level were to print 
the letter in an “artistic manner” and send a copy to every “inter-subdistrict” 
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party branch and, ideally, to every village. Attached to the directive was a simple 
design for the creation of a rice-sale signup sheet. This was to be posted in some 
prominent place in a village.
This having been completed, the party leaders hoped, but probably did not 
expect, that many people with spare rice would, of their own volition, sign the 
register. Aer the push for “donative rice sales” had been made, the directive ex-
plained, cadres should tally and publicize the donations for each subdistrict, dis-
trict, and province to create a friendly competition—the “patriotic emulation.” 
With respect to rewards, the directive explained: “Aer you have received the 
[rice-donation registration] forms, you should print out a number of certicates 
of praise from Mr. [Hồ] to give as rewards.”6
Presuming that this voluntary approach would not be sucient, the “Buy 
Rice for Hồ Chí Minh” directive explained how the campaign was to be pro-
moted in a subdistrict meeting. Local cadres would read the Hồ Chí Minh letter 
aloud and then open the rice-purchase registry book. “One or two people should 
volunteer to go rst, rich as well as poor. Then, have another person follow them; 
then, get one or two more volunteers; then, continue taking turns like that until 
none is le.” The local party members running the meeting were to note which 
family members had not attended. At the conclusion of the meeting, the respon-
sible cadres were to take the rice-purchase registry book along with the Hồ Chí 
Minh letter to those absent households and explain what was required.7
So “essential” was this mobilization for the sale of rice to the DRV state that 
the directive instructed all levels of party and government to “set aside for it the 
most skilled and respected comrades.” If the best cadres were busy with other 
work, party leaders were to “arrange that work so that another person could do 
it during the period that the [outstanding cadre] is busy purchasing rice.” As for 
the length of the rice-buying campaign, it was to take no more than seven days.
The rice collected from the campaign may have been intended for the DRV 
military’s rst infantry division (roughly 15,000 troops), which was created on 
August 28, 1949 by combining three regiments and one battalion. In addition 
to needing rice, this new division, named the 308th, needed arms and ammuni-
tion. Though the PRC had not yet been ocially established, Thành may have 
calculated that an imminent Chinese Communist victory presaged the arrival 
of long-hoped-for military aid. The 308th Division would be the rst recipient 
of aid when it arrived. In January of 1950, the DRV would put together a sec-
ond infantry division (the 304th). By the end of 1951, the People’s Liberation 
Army would have seven infantry divisions ready for action, all outtted with 
Soviet weapons.8
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Socialist Bloc Recognition, January 1950: 
Thành’s First Meeting with Stalin
On October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the PRC, 
marking the ocial end of the Chinese Civil War. Within a few days of this 
announcement, Thành sent two envoys to Beijing for discussions of military 
assistance. By the time they arrived, Mao had already le the PRC capital for 
Moscow to negotiate a treaty with Stalin.9
As was his tendency, Stalin gave Mao a chilly reception, questioning whether the 
Chinese leader was a true Communist or just a nationalist. Stalin even suggested 
that Mao might be an “Asian Tito,” a reference to Yugoslavia’s independent-minded 
Communist leader, Josip Tito.10 This approach was a common tactic of Stalin’s, 
the point being to put his guest on the defensive and perhaps to justify the Soviet 
Union’s lack of support for his guest. (Stalin’s similar treatment of Thành in Mos-
cow a few weeks later should be viewed as typical behavior and not as a sign that 
the Soviet leader harbored special suspicions of his Vietnamese counterpart’s 
commitment to Marxism-Leninism.)
While Stalin and Mao were becoming acquainted in Moscow, the PRC 
vice-chairman and third-in-charge, Liu Shaoqui, oversaw daily aairs for the 
newly established regime. On December 24, 1949, he called a meeting of the 
CCP Politburo to discuss recognition of the DRV. According to the historian 
Qiang Zhai, the issue at hand was how much the PRC cared about or needed of-
cial French recognition for their government. Obviously, Chinese recognition 
of the DRV was likely to preclude French recognition of the PRC. The CCP 
Politburo concluded that support for the DRV against the “imperialist bloc” 
was the more important consideration.11 Liu then cabled Mao in Moscow and 
asked for permission to recognize the DRV, which the latter gave. On Decem-
ber 28, Liu sent a cable to Thành expressing the PRC’s willingness to establish 
ocial diplomatic relations and stating that the Soviet Union and the other 
Communist-bloc countries might soon follow suit. In other words, the PRC was 
going to lobby the Soviets on behalf of the DRV.12
Indeed, back in Moscow, Mao promoted the DRV to Stalin, suggesting that 
he recognize Thành’s regime and invite him (known to the Soviets as “Din”) 
to Moscow as well—a suggestion that Stalin accepted. Mao’s crucial support 
for Thành meant that the relationship between China and the DRV began on 
an unequal footing, with Thành indebted to his Chinese counterpart. That 
unequal character became more pronounced when Stalin decided to assign Mao 
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responsibility for advising the DRV and managing the dispensation of Soviet 
military aid.13
Aer guring out ocial protocols surrounding the recognition of each oth-
er’s governments, Liu needed someone to manage a PRC mission to the DRV. In 
early January, he chose a man named Luo Guibo (in Vietnamese, “La Quý Ba”), 
who was director of the CCP Central Military Commission. At age forty-two, 
Luo was a generation younger than the y-eight-year-old Thành. As Luo notes 
in his memoirs, the original plan was for him to spend three months in the DRV, 
where he would investigate the situation and determine what sort of Chinese aid 
was appropriate. He would end up working in Vietnam (eventually as the rst 
Chinese ambassador) for the next eight years.14
On January 18, 1950, the PRC announced its recognition of the DRV—the 
Soviet Union followed on January 30. Four years and three months aer the 
establishment of the DRV back in September of 1945, its isolation was over. The 
importance of this moment for Thành cannot be overstated. As the leader of 
Vietnam’s Communist Party, his duty was to deliver Soviet support. Having 
worked for the Comintern during the 1920s and 1930s, he was supposed to be 
well connected with Moscow. Among the Vietnamese people, Stalin’s four-year 
cold shoulder had helped neither Thành’s prestige nor that of the Soviet Union, 
which, since the late 1920s, Vietnamese Communists had promoted tirelessly as 
the champion of anticolonial movements.
Thành’s Meeting with Stalin and Mao in Moscow
Aer learning that the PRC would recognize the DRV, Thành prepared 
for a prompt journey to Beijing (and hopefully to Moscow). This involved a 
seventeen-day journey across the Vietnamese North zone to the Chinese bor-
der, where he met with CCP representatives who transported him to Beijing.15
No doubt news of his trip to Beijing was leaked to Central Committee mem-
bers who were convening near the party headquarters for their standard begin-
ning-of-year meeting. One can imagine the delight with which comrades at the 
meeting received a letter from Thành, who explained his exciting absence with 
droll, ironic humor: “Comrades, I regret that, because I am a little tired, I cannot 
meet with you at this All-Nation Party meeting.”16 Thành arrived in Beijing 
on January 30, 1950, spent two days in the PRC capital, and le for Moscow on 
February 2. Aer taking o from Beijing, his aircra ew almost directly north 
over Mongolia to the Russian city of Chita, which lay on the Trans-Siberian 
Railroad.
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A message sent by Thành to Stalin during this stop on the journey suggests 
that the DRV leader had been worrying about the “optics” of his Moscow visit. 
His professed reason for asking that his visit be kept a secret was concern that 
the French might “undertake political and military actions.”17 It is unlikely that 
Thành was worried about whether party leaders back home—Trường Chinh, 
Phạm Văn Đồng, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and others—could be trusted to handle 
any situation that arose. (Recall Thành’s 140-day trip to France during 1946.) 
Thành’s real concern, I believe, was the potential damage to his prestige that ap-
athetic and disrespectful treatment from Stalin could cause among Vietnamese.
In 1946, when he had visited France, a capitalist country that theoretically had 
every motivation to reduce Thành’s prestige, the French had rolled out the red 
carpet and, for the most part, treated him with the dignity of a national leader. 
If Thành’s visit to the capital of the socialist bloc became public knowledge, and 
it became known that Stalin had ignored him for a few days or had otherwise 
given him less than red-carpet treatment (as Stalin had done with Mao), some 
Vietnamese might be upset and question the wisdom of joining the Soviet bloc. 
This concern may have been what motivated Thành to write to Stalin that the 
visit could be ocial if the Soviet leader preferred. However, in that case, wrote 
Thành, “Upon arrival, I would like you to permit me to come directly to you.”18
The most famous story from Thành’s February 1950 Moscow visit was re-
counted by Khrushchev in his memoir. Thành, Mao, Stalin, and Khrushchev 
were at a reception held to celebrate the signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 
Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance. Thành approached Stalin and 
asked him lightheartedly why he could not sign a similar treaty with the DRV. 
Stalin replied that signing such a treaty would reveal Thành’s presence in Mos-
cow, which was supposed to be a secret. According to Khrushchev, Thành had 
responded to this comment by suggesting that Stalin arrange a plane to take him 
(Thành) up into the air for a few minutes and then land at the Moscow airport. 
An ocial red-carpet greeting for Thành could then be staged as though the 
DRV leader had just arrived. According to Khrushchev, Stalin laughed o this 
proposal.19
The General Mobilization Decree:  
The Totalitarian Push, February 1950
In Thành’s absence, the party Central Committee held its yearly January meet-
ing. The “main focus” would be the “mobilization eort to shi toward the 
general counter-oensive” in the war against the French and their Vietnamese 
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allies, the State of Vietnam. Among the roughly two hundred pages of reports 
that Trường Chinh, Võ Nguyên Giáp, Hoàng Quốc Việt, and Phạm Văn Đồng 
read at the meeting, one of the most signicant sections appears roughly midway 
through Chinh’s opening report. The section is titled “The General Mobiliza-
tion of Human, Material, and Intellectual Resources for Victory.” Chinh began 
by stating that shiing to a “general counter-oensive” was going to require a 
“general mobilization.” Up to that point, the party had “tended toward the use of 
inspiration and persuasion in matters of mobilization and had been light on the 
use of compulsion.” The method of mobilizing people through “patriotic emu-
lation movements” now needed to be supplemented by the creation of a “general 
mobilization law.” As Chinh explained:
This is true. When mobilizing through patriotic emulation movements, 
whoever loves his country works a lot, whoever loves his country a little 
works a little. And if somebody does not participate at all in the patriotic 
emulation, then it matters not at all. As a result, the poor and miserable 
working class people usually sacrice their life, labor, and property for the 
nation with enthusiasm. Meanwhile, the majority of those people who 
live through exploitation are selsh, enriching themselves. Or they only 
contribute what they refer to as “for the resistance war” while using their 
nancial inuence to evade their responsibility.
While our compatriots are sacricing everything to ght the French, 
there are still those who enrich themselves through speculation, those who 
still engage in scams, who pilfer public property, who still are more inter-
ested in having fun. There are those on the government payroll who have 
not accomplished anything in their work.
Our regime has been too so.20
At this point, Chinh nally stated directly what had been implied in many 
dierent ways by the party’s various policies:
There is still a great deal of potential in the people, but up to now, a large 
part of that potential has not been dredged out, has not yet been tapped. 
During this period of intense struggle, we must announce that the peo-
ple’s labor, property, tools, and materials are the Government’s to use. The 
Government has complete power to use [these things] to the benet of 
the resistance struggle. Whoever has goods must give goods. Whoever 
has labor must give labor. Whoever has intellect must give his intellect. 
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Nobody may stand outside the people’s resistance struggle. Everybody must 
serve the Fatherland according to his ability.21
As Chinh explained, the party leadership wanted a decree passed that would le-
galize the use of state power to mobilize all of the people’s wealth, time, and labor:
That decree has to be strict. Anybody who evades his responsibility and 
sabotages the resistance war in one way or another will be punished with a 
direct hand. We must shoot those who step out of line and engage in spec-
ulation in the same way that we need to shoot those who betray the country 
and who defraud their renters. At the same time, we need to punish any 
people who sabotage the decree on the general mobilization by intention-
ally trying to avoid that decree or who exploit that decree for their own 
selsh purposes.22
This party meeting in January of 1950 and the subsequent announcement of the 
General Mobilization Decree appear to mark the ocial beginning of an open 
push toward totalitarian-style governance.
The DRV State as “Special Legal Regime”
Another important development appeared in Phạm Văn Đồng’s report titled, 
“We Must Consolidate Our People’s Republic Regime in Order to Counterat-
tack and to Construct our Vietnamese People’s Democratic Regime.” Ocially, 
the DRV government was a “democratic republic,” but the establishment of the 
People’s Republic of China two months earlier and the imminent arrival of the 
CCP advisor team seem to have convinced Thành that an expression of seman-
tic conformity with Chinese models was expedient.
The theme of Đồng’s report, approached from the angle of the government, 
was the same one addressed by Chinh and fellow Politburo member, Hoàng 
Quốc Việt: more aggressive use of the state as an instrument for enforcing party 
policies. According to Đồng, “The Vietnamese people’s republican regime or, 
more specically, the State of the Vietnamese People’s Republic, is a dictator-
ship.” As the vice-prime minister explained, the DRV state was a “dictatorship of 
the Vietnamese people against the French colonialists and Vietnamese traitors.” 
The state was “determined to exterminate anything that harms the resistance 
war or harms Vietnamese independence.”23
This theoretical introduction amounted in practical terms to the “resolute 
implementation of a special legal regime” that would make possible the mobili-
zation of “all human, material, and intellectual power.”
Turning Point, 1949–1950 87 
Our resistance war is a revolutionary war, a people’s war, but only now, aer 
four years of war, have we decided to [implement this policy]. And it has 
been too late in coming. If we want to carry out a general counteroensive, 
we must implement this special legal regime and maintain a policy of doing 
whatever is needed to guarantee the complete and prompt implementation 
of policies.24
Đồng’s comment that radical new policies were “too late in coming” should be 
taken with a grain of salt. I doubt that the Politburo saw the shi to more radical 
policies as having come too late. More probably, the comment was inspired by 
the Politburo’s anxiety over appearances. Radical policies had not been on the 
table immediately aer seizing power because of a deliberate policy of concealing 
the Communist Party’s dominant role in the DRV government.
Famine, Land Policy, and Party Impurity
In mid-March 1950, the head of the party Organization Bureau, Lê Văn Lương, 
released what appears to be the regime’s rst major statement on the growing 
problem of famine in regions of DRV control or, at least, DRV inuence. Lương 
directed his notice at party leaders in ve of the most heavily populated prov-
inces of the Vietnamese North zone (Bắc Giang, Bắc Ninh, Thái Nguyên, Vĩnh 
Phúc, and Phú Thọ). He announced that the Central Committee was forming 
three delegations to visit these provinces and investigate the food shortage. “As 
a result of the purchase of rice [from peasants] at a xed price, the collection of 
civil servant salary funds in rice, and the collection of land tax in rice, localities 
have met with many impediments and diculties, and the price of rice is rising 
every day.”25
Lương acknowledged that the government’s xed-price rice purchases and 
rice requisitions for the DRV bureaucracy were a factor in local hardships. How-
ever, a couple of signs suggested that, one way or another, the party leaders in-
tended to assign blame for local hardships anywhere other than on themselves 
and their policies. First, the formation of three special “inspection delegations” 
showed a desire to nd causes at the local level. According to the notice, the 
primary task of these delegations was to “inspect documents related to the pur-
chase of xed-price rice.” This implied that local party members had not im-
plemented the policy correctly. Second, Lương insisted that these inspection 
cadres recruited by the Central Committee have a “clear class perspective,” a 
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sign that the party leaders wanted the causes of famine to be blamed primarily 
on local elites.
A few days later, on March 21, 1950, Trường Chinh released a directive titled 
“On Protecting Against and Eliminating Famine.” Chinh began his order with 
a list of the ve “main reasons” for the famine:
1. The French enemy have cut our supply roads, destroyed the harvest, burned 
rice, killed bualos and cattle, etc. in those regions where they have carried 
out sweeps. They have also occupied parts of the delta that are densely pop-
ulated and have a lot of rice.
2. Because of the war, some land has been le uncultivated. There is also 
a shortage of farm labor while the number of people whose jobs do not 
involve participating in production (such as the army, bureaucrats, cadres, 
etc.) has risen.
3. When the Government collects government salary tax [from the peas-
ants], buys xed-price rice, and collects tax in rice at 6%, the gang of 
hoarder-speculators hide their rice and then sell it to the people.
4. Recently, the weather has not been suitable for farming, lowering the pro-
ductivity of grains.
5. Additionally, the amount of DRV money printed has been greater than the 
number of products sold on the domestic market, impacting to some extent 
the cost of living and especially the price of rice.26
For the task of raising production, Chinh proposed that local cadres “research 
carefully the Government’s plan” and “set an appropriate plan” for their local-
ity. A second measure was to devise another plan that focused on “motivating 
and inspiring” communities to “make the eort to compete with each other in 
friendly emulation” in implementing the production plan. Chinh also recom-
mended that local cadres organize the “hiding of rice and the protection of the 
harvest in accordance with a careful plan.” And nally, he advised that local 
cadres continue to “push forward” the work of helping peasants raise production 
through such things as providing loans, distributing seeds, and helping with 
farm equipment. But these were all things that the party leaders had been in-
structing local cadres to do for the past three years.27
Along with their military aid, the PRC began providing food aid to the DRV. 
This reected a reality that would haunt Vietnam’s Communist leaders for the 
next thirty-seven years. They ruled an overwhelmingly agricultural population 
and yet desperately needed free food grown by the farmers of other nations. War 
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played an important role in this, but the food crises of the early 1980s would 
show that critically low agricultural productivity was simply a feature of their 
regime. According to the scholar Qiang Zhai, the Chinese shipped 2,800 tons 
of food to the DRV from April to September of 1950. This was enough to feed, 
over a six-month period, roughly 30,000 people or the equivalent of two military 
divisions. It appears, however, that this aid did little to stem the growing prob-
lem of agricultural production and hunger.28
In October, the head of the party’s Organization Bureau, Lê Văn Lương, is-
sued a notice to party leaders of the four major zones, reminding them to imple-
ment the main points of the party’s plan for “protecting the rice harvest.” This 
was a task of “extreme importance and urgency.” As Lương explained, “Winning 
this rice war with the enemy is to overcome a signicant diculty.”29 Perhaps 
thinking about all the mouths that the October rice harvest would have to feed, 
the party leaders began to look with concern on the size of the DRV bureaucracy. 
Lương released a directive titled “On the Task of Streamlining,” in which he 
discussed measures to “lighten” the bureaucracy.30
The previous month, he had called for the party to “temporarily stop” recruit-
ment. Lương claimed that in 1948 and 1949, the party had inducted 500,000 
new members, of which “many were loyal and enthusiastic.” However, “a num-
ber were not worthy,” lacking a “party consciousness” and a “class conscious-
ness.” According to Lương, the poor quality of cadres was evident in the dis-
appointing results of “rent reduction, interest reduction, and temporary land 
distributions,” all of which were supposed to boost agricultural production. A 
number of party members were “negative and passive, not implementing the 
Party’s resolutions.” Perhaps anticipating a future purge, he built on the existing 
narrative of saboteurs and spies having inltrated the party’s ranks: “There are 
even opportunistic elements who exploit the Party for their own benet and, in 
a number of places, it has been discovered that enemy agents have wormed their 
way into the Party to sabotage it.”31 The scapegoat narrative of local sabotage was 
growing.
Land Policy
The appearance of famine in several provinces surrounding the party headquar-
ters of the Vietnamese North zone stimulated new discussion of rural policies. 
Why had they not produced better results? For example, why had the “land do-
nation” campaign not raised production? In March 1950, Chinh recycled the 
same explanations that he had used to explain the poor results of other policies: 
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Local cadres had “not yet explained [the policy] thoroughly”; the mobilization 
was “still scattered”; cadres “lacked a continuous plan”; and they carried out the 
mobilization “in the wrong direction.”32
Although the land donation campaign had achieved poor results, Chinh 
could not abandon the basic model of distributed land as a source of revenue for 
the DRV state: “Donated land needs to be used appropriately. Our policy is as 
follows: 1. Continue to have farm workers rent [the donated land], paying their 
rent to the state so that it can be added to public funds. The main land rent will 
be light, and all the supplementary rents will be abolished.”33
Should the DRV go forward with large-scale land redistributions? Once again, 
Chinh insisted that addressing the “feudal task,” (i.e., land reform) must wait 
until aer the war. The general secretary argued that landlords and rich peasants 
had suered during the period of French-Japanese occupation during World 
War II and therefore still had something to contribute to the “anti-imperial 
task.” To those advocating an immediate move toward the expropriation and 
redistribution of all landlord property, Chinh argued:
They do not understand that conscating the land of landlords in general 
and distributing it to the peasants will, at this time, not only weaken the 
Unied People’s Front against Imperialist Aggression and push the land-
lords over to the imperialist side, but it will also strike fear into the capital-
ists and rich peasants. The tasks of the resistance war and the construction 
of the country would be ruined.34
Chinh armed that the “main goal” of the party’s land policy was still to 
implement the slogan “land to the tiller.” Ownership of land, being the “urgent 
desire” of the peasants, would inspire them to boost production. Why then, had 
the party’s “temporary distribution of land” policy not produced the expected 
boost in production?
The task of temporary distribution of land has been carried out slowly and 
carelessly. . . . When implementing the temporary land distributions, [cad-
res] at the local level have had many shortcomings. There are places where 
[local cadres] do not explain clearly to tenant farmers about the Party’s pol-
icy with respect to living on temporarily distributed land, resulting some-
times in peasants abandoning the land and leaving (as was the case in Tuyên 
Quang). There are places where, aer land has been distributed, tenant 
farmers send hundreds of letters of complaint to the provincial, zone, and 
even to the Central Committee level. They do this because temporary land 
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distribution cadres do not have a spirit of impartiality [công tâm] and do 
not pay attention to the ideas of the poor (Bắc Giang). There are places 
where [local cadres] only distribute one part of the land, using the other 
part to create a farm [trại nông]. This sometimes involves forcing peasants 
who received temporarily distributed land to pool their land together into 
a cooperative, inspiring resentment among these peasants.35
Local cadres received the brunt of the blame for problems with other policies as 
well. For example, in the recent general mobilization, cadres in many localities 
“lacked a careful plan,” assigned people for “ocial business” (i.e., working as 
a military porter) in a “sloppy” manner, or used manpower “inappropriately.” 
According to Chinh, these things “made life hard to bear for the people and 
negatively impacted production.” Indeed, “[i]nnumerable mistakes have dam-
aged the policies of the Party and Government.”36
Chinh was angry to learn that some local cadres were “carrying out a policy 
of permanent rather than temporary land distribution on the grounds that a 
temporary distribution did not satisfy the peasants, meaning that they do not 
enthusiastically increase production and participate in the resistance war.” The 
fault of the local cadres was that they did not “explain to the masses, making 
them understand that [temporary land distribution] is a victory made possible 
mainly by sacrice and struggle.”
The general secretary reminded comrades that the party’s goal was to imple-
ment socialism, which meant “changing the way the peasants worked from a 
private and backwards method to a collective and progressive one.” According to 
Chinh, “[W]e not only give the peasants land, we encourage them and help them 
to organize into collectives. And down the road, we will help them to organize 
collective farms, supplying those farms with tractors and combines, making the 
peasants, as a result of the collective road, gradually progress to socialism.”37
This was why the word “temporary” was attached to the land redistributions. 
Ultimately, Chinh and other party leaders hoped to eliminate private property, 
not build an agricultural sector based on small farmers.
Party Impurity
The narrative of party impurity also seems to have reached a turning point 
in January 1950. In explanations of poor cadre performance, class and espio-
nage began to replace Thành’s eight common party-member “diseases” listed 
in his 1947 book, The Way of Working. Trường Chinh stated that the party 
now had 450,000 members. Even accounting for some exaggeration, this was 
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an amazing increase from the days of the August Revolution when the party 
probably had about 5,000 members. According to Chinh, the low percentage of 
“worker-peasants” in the party—supposedly only 8.7 percent—helped to explain 
current problems:
In many places, Party development has been carried out by method of 
“emulation” quota fulllment, with new members accepted as a means of 
coping or because of personal relations. This has led to many complicated 
elements entering the Party. A number of rich peasants, former gentry, or 
the children of landlords, who do not yet have any consciousness about 
the interests of the workers, but did some work in their locality, have been 
accepted into the Party. As a result of that, in our mobilizations to lower 
rents and to report rice, to sell rice to celebrate and support the army, etc. 
etc., a number of party members, because of their own individual interest, 
have secretly sabotaged our Party’s policies.
This improper development has also led, in a few places, to spies slipping 
into the Party to sabotage us from within.38
Fellow Politburo member Hoàng Quốc Việt made the same claim:
We must admit that our cadres suer from the disease of empty politics 
and that the masses rarely see cadres bringing benets to them. As a result, 
the masses are not enthusiastic about our organization and are haphazard 
in their activities. Cadres only mobilize people to make a contribution—
one day it’s money, the next day it’s harvest support. The masses rarely re-
ceive anything that would help them materially or spiritually.39
Hoàng Quốc Việt went on to explain the relationship between mobilization 
and class warfare, along with the role that the people would play in xing what 
was allegedly wrong with local cadres. The upshot of this alleged situation 
was that a greater focus on “consolidating” rather than “expanding” the party 
would be needed in 1950. That consolidation would require careful inspection 
of the party’s ranks in order to “purge” members who were “undisciplined,” who 
“opposed the Party’s policies,” who were “opportunists,” or “provocateurs,” or 
“speculators.”
The complaints leveled by Chinh and Quốc Việt paint a picture of the DRV 
countryside as a place in chaos. According to them, local cadres were “giving 
orders,” “using state power,” and even “using government decrees to threaten” 
rather than focusing on “mobilizing, explaining, and persuading.” The reason 
for these and many other “mistakes,” according to Chinh, was that lower-level 
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party members “have little concern for the party’s policy of unifying the entire 
people to carry out the protracted resistance war,” “do not understand clearly 
the Party’s revolutionary strategy,” “do not aim at the main goal of developing 
production,” and “do not have a solid grasp of the mass perspective.” Assessing 
this general situation, Chinh claimed:
In many places, the party executive committees, the resistance commit-
tees, state bureaus responsible for rural issues, and the executive oces of 
mass organizations, remain complicated in composition, containing many 
landlord, village ocial, and rich peasant elements. Therefore, they oen 
have a negative attitude, being indierent to the interests of the peasant 
majority. But when implementing [rural policies], a number of their ranks 
take advantage in an opportunistic way, or they have a tendency to atter 
the peasants, carrying out leist deviations [làm quá tả].40
Here was the class explanation for the diculties in the countryside. This would 
steadily develop over the next three years, eventually becoming the foundation 
of the party’s land reform policy.
The Border Campaign and the Battle  
of Vĩnh Yen (October 1950 to January 1951)
In the summer of 1950, France’s intelligence services informed the military high 
command of the enormous boost in arms that China was providing to the DRV 
forces. This knowledge seems not to have changed French perceptions of their 
opponent’s capacity. Indeed, according to the historian Yves Gras, the primary 
concern of the French military establishment was the possibility of an invasion 
by Chinese Communist troops.41 Such an invasion would not occur, but Mao 
did send one of his top generals, Chen Geng, to work with Thành, Võ Nguyên 
Giáp, and other DRV leaders. Chen and Thành decided that they would use 
the DRV’s two newly created infantry divisions (now armed with Soviet weap-
ons) to attack a vulnerable French fort about 200 kilometers northeast of Hanoi 
along the Chinese border. The fort was located at the town of Đông Khê, which 
lay along Colonial Route 4. This rugged and, at times, spectacular road followed 
the section of the Chinese border that extended in a north-south direction.
Đông Khê was the middle of three important French forts on the northern 
third of Route 4. About forty kilometers to the north of Đông Khê was the 
major French fort at Cao Bằng. About twenty-ve kilometers to the south of 
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the middle fort was a smaller one at a town called Thất Khê. Chen and Thành 
planned to attack Đông Khê and wait to see how the French responded. This 
was the plan for the legendary “Border Campaign” (sometimes called the “Battle 
of Cao Bằng”) that would change the complexion of the war.42
Despite their appraisal of the ghting capacity of their Vietnamese foes as 
being limited, the French military leaders had decided to abandon the strategy 
of attempting to track down and destroy the DRV forces in their mountain 
bases northwest of Hanoi. The head of France’s military forces in Indochina, 
General Marcel Carpentier, advanced a new strategy that focused on pacifying 
the “useful” parts of the Red River delta.43 According to Christopher Goscha, 
the DRV leaders had learned of this new French plan by following discussions 
of military strategy in the French press.44
For over a year, Carpentier and other French military leaders had wanted 
to abandon the three remote forts. Cao Bằng was especially hard to access and 
posed a signicant drain on French resources. DRV forces had found the narrow, 
windy upper section of Route 4 where the three forts lay to be ideally suited 
to ambushes. At times, these ambushes became so deadly that the French were 
forced to divert large numbers of precious troops to carry out clearing operations 
along the route. This was the only way to keep the route passable for the long, 
vulnerable convoys that supplied these three forts. By the summer of 1950, the 
presence of DRV troops in that northeastern part of Tonkin had caused the 
French to rely almost exclusively on air transport for the resupply of Cao Bằng.45
Carpentier and the French command had been concerned about the psycho-
logical impact (negative for their side and positive for the DRV side) of a with-
drawal from Cao Bằng, the largest and most distant of the northern forts. Thus, 
the French found it dicult to proceed with the plan. Because of the base’s re-
mote location, proximity to DRV forces, ample supply of valuable weapons, and 
large civilian community, all of whom would presumably need to be evacuated, 
the operation presented prohibitive logistical challenges. The worst-case sce-
nario from the French perspective would involve DRV spies intercepting word 
of the planned evacuation, leading to an attack on a large, vulnerable convoy.46
Chen Geng decided that the DRV attack on Đông Khê would begin on Sep-
tember 16, 1950.47 As it turned out, this was also the day when Carpentier re-
leased his Special Order Number 46 calling for the abandonment of Cao Bằng 
and Đông Khê.48 What Chen Geng and Võ Nguyên Giáp had not expected was 
the French command’s blasé response to the threat posed by the fall of Đông 
Khê. Carpentier assumed that the fort could be retaken from the DRV with 
relative ease by a single French battalion (1,300 troops) heading north from Thất 
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Khê, the southernmost of the three forts. On this assumption, Carpentier de-
cided to continue with the evacuation of Cao Bằng.49
The French response to the DRV attack on Đông Khê probably inspired a 
quick reformulation of plans on the part of Chen Geng and Vo Nguyên Giáp. 
Almost all of the various French mistakes during the battle were tied to their 
underestimation of the DRV troops’ enhanced ghting capacity. A two-day 
delay in the departure of the French garrison at Cao Bằng provided more time 
for Chen and Giáp to bring the bulk of their troops to Route 4. Well-armed 
DRV forces were able to devastate not only the long convoy headed south toward 
them from Cao Bằng but also the undermanned French rescue columns heading 
north from the southernmost fort.50 Within a couple of weeks, 7,000 French 
soldiers and civilians were either dead or captured, many having been ambushed 
along Route 4 or killed during terrible ghting in the thick mountain forests 
surrounding the road.51 Among the ranks of the captured were a French general 
and a colonel.
At the end of the battle, Thành sent Stalin a letter in English: “Dear Com-
rade Stalin, Am I right in regarding our success, though relatively minor, as part 
of great victory of revolutionary internationalism whose the most heroic and 
beloved leader you are?”52 As for Chen Geng, Thành invited him to summarize 
his impressions of the Border Campaign at a meeting held with top DRV com-
manders between October 27 and 30, 1950. Over a span of four days, the Chinese 
general addressed the DRV leadership, who were no doubt interested in his views 
of how the battle unfolded. But Thành and his comrades probably also under-
stood the importance of attering Chen and, by extension, the CCP leadership 
to keep crucial PRC aid owing. Thành took the time to show his Stalin letter to 
Chen. And Giáp apparently made sure to tell the Chinese general that “the vic-
tory shows that Mao Zedong’s military theory is very applicable to Vietnam.”53
The French Aermath of the Border Campaign
Not surprisingly, the French disaster along Route 4 led to a profound crisis of 
morale in their camp. The DRV leadership, which appears to have begun the 
border campaign with the modest goal of taking one garrison, Đông Khê, and 
cautiously waiting to see what further opportunities the French response pro-
vided, suddenly saw signs of panic in their enemy.
Chen Geng, Thành, Giáp, Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and Luo Guibo 
(the lead Chinese advisor) must have been amazed to see the French execute 
a panicked evacuation of Lạng Sơn on October 18. This major town at the 
midway point of Route 4 (well south of the three forts) was guarded by ve 
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French battalions (roughly 10,000 troops). DRV forces were not near enough 
to Lạng Sơn to pose a signicant threat. Yet the French commander at the fort, 
infected like many others with a feeling of paranoia about the imagined power 
of the DRV forces in the area, called for the abandonment of the city. A few 
days later, when the DRV forces were nally able to reach this prize, which had 
been handed to them for free, they were able to take advantage of the garrison’s 
enormous store of weapons, supplies, and food. The French had been in such a 
hurry to leave Lạng Sơn that they had decided to destroy their supplies by means 
of air bombardment, which proved ineective.54
On November 1, 1950, the French retreated from the forts in the region to the 
northwest of Hanoi in the border province of Lao Cai. This meant that the en-
tirety of the Red River, from Việt Tri (about 85 kilometers northwest of Hanoi) 
to the Chinese border, was le to the DRV. On November 6, the French High 
Command decided to withdraw troops from the province of Hòa Bình, west of 
Hanoi, leaving the DRV with easy connection between the three key military 
zones of the North.55 Meanwhile, the French leaders (Carpentier in particular) 
began to discuss the possible need to abandon Hanoi. Thành and the Politburo 
had good sources of information in Hanoi and would have been well informed 
about the French atmosphere of defeat in the city.
It was clear that General Carpentier’s stint as commandant needed to be ter-
minated. He was replaced on November 23 by General Latour, France’s sixth 
military leader in Vietnam since 1945. When he arrived in Hanoi from the 
South, Latour saw what was surely reported to the DRV leadership: French resi-
dents selling all their belongings and preparing to leave the city. DRV spies also 
would have noticed that Latour had ordered seven mobile groups to be pulled 
from the Tonkin countryside and moved into the city—suddenly making it 
much easier for the DRV forces to move around the Red River delta. Another 
sign of the atmosphere of crisis and panic was Latour’s order to create a special 
fortied zone in Haiphong. These moves were all in preparation for a possible 
emergency evacuation of Hanoi.56
In my opinion, this crisis of morale on the French side combined with the 
immense economic diculties on the DRV side le the party leaders with no 
real choice but to take a calculated risk. In these unusual circumstances, a furi-
ous military push toward Hanoi might lead the panicking French to abandon 
the city and perhaps concede northern Vietnam to the DRV. If the push were 
successful, it would retrospectively be called the “general counteroensive.” If 
not, it would merely be another important battle.
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Had the French kept General Latour as the commandant for another cou-
ple of weeks, the DRV might have succeeded in their plan to push the reeling 
French into abandoning Hanoi. But that seems to have been staved o (barely) 
through a combination of luck and the remarkable eorts of the charismatic new 
French Commander-in-Chief, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. The French 
government had named him to the position on December 6, 1950; he arrived in 
Hanoi on the 19th.
The Battle of Vĩnh Yên: January 13-17, 1951
Thành, Giáp, Chinh, and Đồng would give their new French adversary no time 
to get settled in Hanoi. Aer resting their victorious troops briey in the wake 
of the Route 4 attack, Thành and his lieutenants formulated a new campaign to 
be named aer the famous Vietnamese general, Trần Hưng Đạo (1228–1300), 
the basic outlines of which the French were able to learn from radio intercepts 
of DRV preparations. Essentially, the plan involved launching two divisions, the 
308 and the 312, toward Hanoi from the vicinity of the Tam Đào Mountains, 
roughly 50 kilometers to the northwest of the city.57
At 1:30 a.m. on January 14, Giáp began the campaign by pushing his two 
divisions toward the major town of Vĩnh Yên, which lay only forty-ve miles 
northwest of Hanoi. This was the rst time DRV forces met the French in the 
open countryside. To meet the threat, General de Lattre sent 9,000 troops to-
ward Giáp. Aer four days of ghting, the French were able to repel the DRV 
forces and hold Vĩnh Yên. Since de Lattre had used all his reserves in the ght, 
a DRV victory at Vĩnh Yên would have opened the door to Hanoi. Ultimately, 
the movement of large concentrations of DRV troops in open spaces had played 
to French strengths in artillery and airpower.58
The Chinese Communists’ Civil War victory, Soviet and Chinese recogni-
tion of the DRV, the ow of military aid to its People’s Liberation Army, and 
the spectacular DRV victory in the Border Campaign changed the complex-
ion of the war. Before 1950, the DRV had carried out some eective guerilla 
attacks, but mostly had focused on surviving until help from the Communist 
bloc arrived. During the early years of the war, it was the French who were the 
aggressors, trying to hunt down and eliminate their DRV foes. Aer 1950, the 
roles would be reversed, with France mostly trying to survive and the DRV at-
tempting to win.
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Military Stalemate and Rice-Field Decline: 1951–1952
In the wake of the dizzying events of late 1950 and early 1951—the spectacular 
victory over the French along the northeastern Chinese border in November fol-
lowed by the tantalizing but costly near-miss with Hanoi in January—the DRV’s 
party leaders nally were able to hold their long-anticipated Second Party Con-
gress (Đại hội Đảng). It had been more than een years since the ICP held the 
party’s First Congress in 1935. Following this second congress, the party would 
abandon its semicovert status and ocially introduce itself to the Vietnamese 
people and the world as the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP).
On the military front, the party leaders would push their People’s Liberation 
Army to deliver war-ending blows. The French, however, under their inspiring 
new military leader, Jean de Lattre de Taussigny, would nd their footing and 
punish the DRV forces for bolder moves into areas closer to the centers of French 
power. The contest evolved into a stalemate as both sides recognized their own 
and their opponents’ strengths and weaknesses. For the DRV, forays into the 
Red River delta played to the French strengths (artillery and airpower). For the 
French, pushes toward the mountainous region of the Laotian-Vietnamese bor-
der played to the strengths of the DRV side (superior mobility over rough ter-
rain). Both sides learned how to avoid the type of catastrophic defeat that would 
have swung the war dramatically in the opponent’s favor.
Meanwhile, the economic struggles of the DRV continued to worsen. Talk of 
the need for an “inspection” of the countryside persisted. The ocial discourse 
about party impurity as an explanation for declining agricultural productivity 
continued to build. Perhaps inspired by their recently arrived Chinese Com-
munist advisers, in 1951, the DRV leaders introduced a new method of taxa-
tion: the “agricultural tax” (thuế nông nghiệp). Also, in 1951, “thought reform” 
(chỉnh huấn), a policy promoted by Chinese advisers, became an ocial DRV  
policy.
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The Second Party Congress: February 11–19, 1951
The party’s Second Congress was held in February in the province of Tuyên 
Quang, about 200 kilometers north of Hanoi. The party leaders had been 
hoping to hold a congress since back in August 1948.1 But how could Nguyễn 
Tất Thành have held a party congress without ocial diplomatic recognition 
from the USSR and without the participation of representatives from the Com-
munist bloc?
The ocially published materials for the Second Party Congress comprise 
493 pages of the Party Documents series. These pages include twenty-one dif-
ferent documents: eight major reports, four resolutions, a new party program, 
party regulations, a party manifesto, and a handful of other opening and closing 
speeches and telegrams. There was a speech delivered by the “Representative 
of the Chinese Communist Party,” who, we can assume, was Luo Guibo, the 
CCP’s head advisor to the DRV. But his speech was not included in the ocial 
publication and, as far as I know, has yet to be read by any Western historian. 
Thành delivered the opening remarks of the Congress in a twenty-six page 
“Political Report.” As usual, he put forward the Congress’s major ideas, which 
were then developed in greater detail in eight reports delivered mostly by Polit-
buro members.
The Second Party Congress was a landmark event for Vietnam’s Communist 
movement in several ways. First, it saw the ocial reestablishment of the party 
as the Vietnamese Workers Party—this was the name that it would keep for the 
next twenty-ve years. Second, the congress saw the election of a new Central 
Committee and Party Executive. Third, it saw the establishment of a new party 
newspaper, The People (Nhân dân), a name that Thành borrowed from the main 
organ of the Chinese Communist Party. Fourth, the congress made ocial the 
end of the Vietminh front, a move that had been in the works for months. This 
front organization was folded into the United Vietnam Association. Fih, the 
congress saw the clarication of some of the party’s regulations and ideologi-
cal beliefs, expressed in three separate documents: “manifesto,” “political plat-
form,” and “regulations.” Sixth, the congress saw the establishment of an ocial 
party history.
And seventh, the Second Party Congress marked a turning point for the 
“Hồ Chí Minh personality cult.” Since taking power in 1945, Thành had gen-
erally promoted “Hồ Chí Minh” as a folksy and courageous patriot who might 
have been vaguely connected to communism but who was, more or less, above 
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domestic politics. Now, with the party’s ocial establishment and its decision 
to operate openly, Thành, with help from his lieutenants, had to adjust the char-
acter “Hồ Chí Minh” so that he was closer in form to the leaders of the other 
“People’s Democracies.”
The Fight for Control of Villages in the Tonkin Delta
In his history of the First Indochina War, Yves Gras signals 1951 as a year when 
the French leadership felt that the DRV had been able to make signicant gains 
in extending their inuence in the Red River delta. Particularly serious, in the 
French view, was what appeared to be a strong consolidation of DRV political 
power in a large triangular chunk of the delta southeast of Hanoi. The French 
devoted much time and eort to pacication, but these slow, cumbersome op-
erations usually provided plenty of advance warning for DRV cadres to vacate 
a threatened area, only to return aer the French troops had le. Judging from 
party appraisals of the situation in the countryside, though, these sweeps and 
other eorts by the French and the Bảo Đại government (the French-sponsored 
State of Vietnam) to establish a new political apparatus in the countryside were 
perhaps more successful than the French had imagined.2
In his long report at the Second Party Congress held in the February 1951, 
Trường Chinh spoke about areas “temporarily occupied by the French.” As he 
oen did, Chinh began his analysis with a general characterization that reected 
the party’s ideological commitments more than the reality on the ground. 
Thus, the French-controlled areas were places where the enemy “plundered, 
destroyed, killed, raped, and exploited” members of the local community. The 
“brutality” of the enemy was “not less than that of the German and Japanese 
fascists.”3
Certainly, there were French troops who committed atrocities during their 
sweeps through Vietnamese villages. As the Vietnamese historian Đặng Phong 
explains, “the approach of the French government and military to people of the 
resistance forces was brutal and inhumane to the point of cruelty.” However, 
“the attitude of French toward those regions under their control and especially 
toward those Vietnamese considered to be loyal was friendly and respectful to 
an extent seemingly never seen before during the entire history of French rule.” 
Phong points out that the French charm eort involved such things as providing 
free medical treatment and even lending money to people who had recently come 
to French-controlled areas. Moreover, peasants who lived in French-controlled 
areas tended to have access to or to feel the benecial eects of urban markets.4
In French-controlled areas, agricultural goods could be sold at market price 
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for piastres, a valuable and internationally recognized currency. The desire of 
peasants to sell their rice to the French troubled the DRV’s leaders. As a party 
resolution from Zone 3 noted:
Recently, Party leaders at all levels have put forward as a serious issue the 
problem of resisting [French eorts] to destroy rice stores, and the people 
have shown a consciousness of the need to ght back against the enemy. 
But what is most worthy of our attention is the people’s lack of concern 
about the enemy’s eorts to throw money into rice purchases. On the 
contrary, the people still have the desire to bring over their rice and sell 
it [to the French] so that they, the sellers, can store the money or the gold 
more easily.5
Throughout 1951, the DRV leadership became increasingly concerned about 
the State of Vietnam’s success in recruiting Vietnamese for an anticommunist 
army. The party leaders of Zone 4 (Central Vietnam), in a resolution released 
in October, described enemy successes in organizing armed “village defense” 
groups in Catholic areas of the province of Quảng Trị. Before, party leaders had 
characterized the organization of these “village defense corps” as something that 
had been “forced” upon the local inhabitants. Now the language had changed 
to recognize that “many elements” among the ranks of the State of Vietnam 
apparatus had “volunteered.” As this section of the resolution concluded, “The 
organization of local defense corps is a success for the enemy in his competition 
with us for inuence among the people.” This success of the French and their 
Vietnamese ally, the State of Vietnam, “represents our greatest political failure, 
for places where there are local defense corps are places where the enemy has 
control over the people, where our base among the people has been slowly lost.”6
An October 1951 resolution produced by party leaders of Zone 3 (North Viet-
nam) tells a similar story. The resolution describes French successes in carry-
ing out its own “general mobilization” to recruit young people into the army in 
areas under its control. Weaknesses in the DRV eorts to resist this strategy had 
“made it easy for the enemy to impress into the army a large number of youths, 
with many villages seeing youths volunteer for the army in greater numbers than 
the enemy’s recruitment targets.”7 Why had the enemy been able to have this 
success in recruiting troops?
In the areas under [the enemy’s] temporary control, they combine terror, 
killing, and continuous small-sized sweeps with schemes to entice and con 
[the people]. The enemy distributes milk, fabric, and medicine—they build 
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wells and they bribe the people, sweet-talking a few into surrendering and 
becoming traitors. The enemy forces cadres who have been arrested to write 
letters of appeal to the people and to comrades, instructing cadres to partic-
ipate in sweeps and to dig up underground shelters. The enemy entices and 
bribes, intimidating the families of cadres, using their families to entice 
cadres into surrendering. The enemy sends spies into villages under their 
control to organize informers. They also send in the wives and children of 
puppet troops (Hà Nam) and use local school children to act as informers 
(Sơn Tây and a few Catholic areas). They combine the consolidation and 
development of the Nationalist Party to act as a loyal [organization] in the 
tasks of spying and informing. The enemy develops mass groups in order 
to steal the masses away from us. They develop Catholicism, organize the 
Buddhist League and the Cao Đài in order to pull these followers to them, 
in order to hypnotize the masses.8
Other eorts by the French and the Bảo Đại government included “distorting” 
the DRV’s battleeld victories, raising the prestige of the State of Vietnam gov-
ernment and of American aid in an eort to “split us from the democratic coun-
tries.” In other words, the French and the Bảo Đại regime were making a point 
of stressing the communist nature of the DRV regime and instilling a negative 
image of the Communist bloc countries. The French and the State of Vietnam 
called for people to concentrate their rice to prevent its use by DRV forces: “save 
[rice] for the people, resist the Vietminh’s eorts to steal it.”9
Yet the party’s assessments of the situation in the countryside also spoke of 
successes. One of the key goals of the recent Quang Trung campaign (May 1951, 
in the southeastern part of Tonkin Delta) had been to “win over” the people 
of this region. Among other things, this involved explaining the party’s policy 
to Catholic communities. “Aer the campaign, our Catholic countrymen un-
derstood our policy better and had more faith in us.” Apparently, part of these 
policy explanations involved assuring the parents of people who been arrested 
by the party that their sons and daughters were safe: “many people who made 
entreaties (cẩu khẩn) about sons arrested by us, or people who had learned that 
their sons had been arrested, now have peace of mind and are happy.” According 
to the resolution, this had had a “big inuence” on the party’s ability to rebuild 
its base in strongly Catholic areas such as Thái Bình, Bùi Chu, and Nam Định.10
As mentioned earlier, the DRV leadership’s methods of consolidating its 
power in villages, especially those whose loyalty was in doubt, usually combined 
vigorous propaganda with “anti-traitor” measures that frequently involved the 
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execution of community members identied as having cooperated with the 
French or with the State of Vietnam. Normally the party leaders were careful to 
be discreet in their ocial documents about what “anti-traitor” eorts involved. 
But occasionally they wrote more explicitly. An order from the Party Secretariat 
in January 1952 focused on ways of consolidating political control in areas of 
the North:
The elimination of traitors and the liquidation of puppet ocials [trừ gian 
diệt tề] must be done with determination except in those places where the 
movement is weak, forcing us to leave some form of the puppet administra-
tion intact. Where the movement is reasonably strong, the masses should 
be mobilized to carry out [the elimination of traitors and the liquidation 
of the puppet administration].
What is most needed is not to be mechanical but to recognize the 
advantageous situation right now. [Cadres] should not just follow the old 
methods, not daring to boldly act and thereby allowing the enemy time 
to consolidate. Naturally, a tendency toward leist deviation with lots of 
indiscriminate killing [giết bừa] also needs to be avoided so as not to create 
an atmosphere of terror among the people.11
These executions of alleged “traitors” were probably eective measures for con-
solidating control over a community. Yet they may have made it dicult to gauge 
the actual sentiments of the people.
The Battle of Hòa Bình: November 23, 1951—February 8, 1952
Since his arrival in Vietnam in December 1950, General de Lattre had found 
himself on the defensive. The battle of Vĩnh Yên (January 1951), along with 
three subsequent battles in March, May, and October of 1951 were all engage-
ments forced upon the French by DRV forces, who now had the initiative in the 
war. De Lattre longed to reverse this situation and was intrigued by the notion 
of a major operation in Thanh Hóa province (south of the Red River delta). 
This large, densely populated province had been an important source of men 
and rice for the DRV since the beginning of the war, and the French had never 
attempted to challenge the DRV presence there. To pacify Thanh Hóa would 
have the appearance of a major new advance.12
In de Lattre’s mind, a precondition for the investment of Thanh Hóa prov-
ince was the establishment of French control in the large, sparsely populated 
province to its north, Hòa Bình. This province to the southwest of Hanoi was 
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an important transportation hub for the DRV forces. It connected sectors in 
the northern part of the country with those in Laos and Central Vietnam. The 
rough mountainous terrain of Hòa Bình and its distance from Hanoi made it a 
battleeld that played to the strengths of the DRV forces.
In de Lattre’s thinking, these factors might tempt the DRV forces into en-
gaging in a major battle, providing the French with an opportunity to deliver a 
painful blow. Though the terrain was favorable to the DRV, de Lattre calculated 
that, in the nal analysis, Hòa Bình province was still close enough to Hanoi 
(sixty kilometers) to be accessed by ghter bombers operating from the city. 
Also, unlike Route 4 (the 1950 Border Campaign), Hòa Bình province was ac-
cessible by water, giving French forces more exibility for resupply, re support, 
and evacuation of wounded. For these reasons, de Lattre sent 15,000 troops into 
the province during the rst week of November 1951.13
The basic reasons for de Lattre’s investment of Hòa Bình were not lost upon 
Thành, Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and Võ Nguyên Giáp. On November 
24, 1951, in a directive titled “The Task of Wrecking the Enemy’s Attack on Hòa 
Bình,” Đồng provided VWP members with a brief analysis of the situation:
The enemy has decided to invade Hòa Bình in order to:
1. Cut our transport and communication link between the Vietnamese 
North to other regions to the south.
2. To ensure their defensive line in the southwest of the North’s mid-
land region.
3. Occupy a strategic position connecting Hanoi with the Northwest region 
where they have, for a while now, been isolated. [The occupation of Hòa 
Bình] will also help them to threaten Thanh Hóa.
4. Increase their area of occupation, establish a political base in the Mường 
region, expand the scope of their policy of making war to support war, of 
using the Vietnamese to ght the Vietnamese.
5. Create political inuence with the Americans and the British and create 
reactionary public opinion [in support] of the puppet government.14
Đồng explained that the enemy’s plan to occupy Hòa Bình would “naturally cre-
ate many diculties” for the DRV forces in their transportation from the Viet-
namese North region to more southerly regions. The French move would also 
create diculties for the DRV on the military, economic, and political fronts. 
“Faced with that situation, a few people and a few of our cadres have shown 
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themselves to be perplexed and worried because they have yet to recognize clearly 
the erce nature of this period of our resistance war’s second stage.”15
But, as de Lattre had expected, the DRV leadership also saw in the French 
campaign an opportunity to attack in favorable conditions. Đồng pointed out 
in his directive that “we must clearly recognize the enemy’s weak points and 
diculties right now in Chợ Bến and Hòa Bình.” First, the campaign in Hòa 
Bình forced the French to “spread its attack units out along a wide front in a 
mountainous and jungle-covered region full of obstacles.” Moreover, the DRV 
leaders estimated that the French had not yet had time to consolidate their po-
sitions through the construction of defense installations. The second weakness 
of the French position in Hòa Bình province was that it drew forces away from 
the Red River delta, providing good opportunities for the DRV to strike the 
enemy “behind his back, [. . .] especially on the le [i.e., northeastern] side of 
the Red River.”16
Accepting the challenge posed to them in Hòa Bình, the DRV leaders changed 
their original plans of channeling all their forces into the Red River delta. In late 
November, three DRV infantry divisions began making their way toward the 
province. In the two-month struggle over Hòa Bình, DRV forces scored some 
early successes, taking advantage of their superior mobility in the region’s rough 
terrain to inict heavy damage on patrolling French units. During the month 
of December, French forces suered 108 killed, 296 missing, and 394 wounded. 
In the engagements where the French had been successful, they counted 1,100 
enemy dead le on the battleeld. How many were wounded the French could 
not estimate.17
Toward the end of December 1951, the DRV leaders decided to strike against 
the two most isolated French posts in Hòa Bình province. The rst was small 
but well-defended. Goscha has pointed out the parallels between the type of 
ghting in WWI and in the First Indochina War, especially from the perspec-
tive of the DRV side.18 With their human wave approach and their lack of heavy 
artillery to weaken well-defended targets, the DRV troops sometimes suered 
terrible losses. An unsuccessful attack on the rst post (December 31-January 1) 
le its French defenders the gruesome task of removing 160 Vietnamese corpses 
stuck in the surrounding barbed wire.
Though the losses at the nearer post were heavy, Giáp remained determined 
to destroy the much more heavily defended post of Xóm Pheo, just two kilome-
ters to the west of the smaller post. This meant amassing four battalions for the 
attack (6,000 to 8,000 men). The post at Xóm Pheo was defended by a battalion 
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of the French Foreign Legion whose members had had time to construct a 
well-thought-out defense structure. With four heavily armed strongpoints stra-
tegically placed around the base, the Foreign Legion battalion was well prepared.
On the night of January 7–8, the DRV forces launched their attack. All 
through the night, Giáp sent wave aer wave of troops at the isolated post of 
Xóm Pheo, determined to “annihilate” it rather than just “attrite” it. But, as 
in World War I, the overwhelming advantage went to the defenders who, with 
superior re power, blew apart the waves of men coming at them. The legionaires 
were able to hold the post at Xóm Pheo, eventually forcing the DRV troops to re-
treat in the early morning, “followed by lines of coolies evacuating the wounded 
on bamboo stretchers.” The presence of over 800 Vietnamese corpses in the vi-
cinity of the post gave the area the look of a “mass grave” the following day.19
A few days aer the French had stabilized the situation in Hòa Bình, their 
generals decided to withdraw from the province. Maintaining their presence 
required too many troops, which were badly needed for pacication work in the 
Red River delta. Also, the DRV leaders were no longer willing to engage with 
the French in Hòa Bình. This meant that France’s occupation of the province 
no longer provided opportunities to destroy great numbers of DRV troops in 
large-scale battles. On February 22, the French pulled out of the province.
The Agricultural Tax
At the Second Party Congress in February 1951, the party leaders had announced 
their intention to abandon the policy of “general mobilization” and its use of 
(valueless) DRV money to purchase rice from the people at “xed prices.” As we 
saw, this system had generated famine in the party leadership’s backyard of the 
Vietnamese North. The inationary pressure on the DRV’s currency caused by 
the regime’s need to print money for rice purchases was surely enough on its own 
to render the currency worthless. Probably frustrated by the uncertainty of their 
earlier tactics for extracting rice, the party leadership decided to standardize this 
crucial process.
On May 1, 1951, Thành put his “Hồ Chí Minh” signature on Government 
Decree 13, which ocially ushered in the era of the “agricultural tax” (thuế nông 
nghiệp).20 The decree had ve clauses:
Clause 1:
In order to guarantee adequate supply for the resistance war, to develop 
agricultural production, to unify and simplify for the people their [tax] 
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contribution, and to make the people’s tax contribution fair, from this 1951 
harvest tax onward, [the Government shall]:
1. Abolish agricultural contributions to the National budget and to local 
funds such as: land tax, rice for government employees, [rice for] people’s 
literacy classes, rice for supporting local militias, rice for the subdistrict 
fund, rice for road construction . . .
2. Abolish xed-price rice purchases.
3. Establish an agricultural tax that is collected in rice, the quantity of which 
will be calculated according to a piece of land’s harvest in normal years.
The agricultural tax will be submitted by the person who brings in the 
yield. In addition to the agricultural tax, a few extra percentage points will 
be collected for the local Budget. Besides these two taxes, there will be no 
other contributions required of a land’s yield.
Clause 2:
The regulation for setting the agricultural tax will be set in a subse-
quent decree.
Clause 3:
While waiting for the promulgation of this regulation, the Government 
will borrow some rice from the people during the 1951 May harvest to help 
the national Budget. The amount of rice borrowed will then be deducted 
from the forthcoming agricultural tax. If the amount borrowed exceeds 
the tax level, the Government will return the dierence. If the amount is 
less than the tax level, then the people will have to submit the dierence.
In addition to the amount of tax borrowed for the National Budget, the 
Government will borrow for Local Budget a quantity of rice not to exceed 
20% of the rice borrowed for the National Budget.
Signed
Hồ Chí Minh
Thus the DRV’s agricultural tax involved assigning households an estimated 
yield based on land ownership. From that estimated yield, the government would 
take a set percentage of the harvest. In theory, this agricultural tax was supposed 
to motivate households to produce more. Because the tax burden was based on 
the government’s yield estimate, a family that outproduced the estimate would 
pay a smaller percentage of the harvest to the state and keep for themselves a 
larger total quantity of rice. The family that produced less than the government 
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estimate would be punished by having to hand over a greater percentage of their 
harvest and keep for themselves a smaller total quantity of rice. Obviously, the 
party leaders hoped that this carrot-and-stick approach would motivate peasants 
to produce more.
Normally, the Party Documents series reects a spike in agriculture-related 
directives and circulars around the time of the two harvests each year in May 
and October. The volume for 1951 does not contain from the year’s last two 
months any directives that shed light on the results of the October harvest and 
how the collection of taxes had gone. It appears from a directive of the party 
Secretariat released three months later on January 21, 1952 that the harvest and 
tax collection had been dicult again. The directive, which was sent to the party 
heads of northern Vietnam’s three major zones, began by stating that “agricul-
tural tax work (collecting the tax and carrying out the post-tax debrief) has been 
too slow.” What was responsible for this slowness were “the weaknesses of cad-
res, organization, and the [interzone] leadership.” The directive listed tasks for 
interzone party leaders to “implement with determination.” One of the most 
important concerned the collection of taxes:
1. Tax collection: The collection of taxes by the Interzones must be basically 
nished before February 1952. For those places that still have not com-
pleted the tax collection by that deadline, the Interzone Party leaders need 
to set a plan and send a capable cadre to help complete the task in the rst 
ten days of February. [You] must focus on those places that still need to 
collect a lot of rice or places that especially need help (for example: [places 
that have] not yet set their yields at the right level).21
With respect to the “capable cadres” sent to “slow” or “dicult” communities, 
it is likely that the infamous visiting cadre in the writer Võ Văn Trực’s histori-
cal novel, A Village Story Back Then, provides an accurate example. Trực wrote 
about his own village’s experience of tax collection in the province of Nghệ An 
during 1952.22 As Trực’s account shows, a local cadre who needed to have a “ca-
pable cadre” sent to “help” him collect the agricultural tax could be in serious 
trouble. (In the story, the visiting cadre tosses the local party leader in jail under 
brutal conditions.)
In March, Thành decided to mobilize another “production and economiza-
tion movement,” which focused on encouraging peasants to devise a “produc-
tion and economization plan.” This was needed to ensure that the resistance war 
could be carried out “for a long time.”
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In order to implement a production and economization plan, we need to 
create a deep and enduring mass movement. We need to propagandize, 
mobilize, organize, and lead the people to enthusiastically participate in 
the work of establishing a plan and implementing it. We must make the 
production and economization movement the central focus of the patri-
otic emulation movement. Every locality, every unit, every family should 
all sign a contract to compete with each other in implementing their own 
production and economization plan as a means of completing the general 
plan of the Government.23
This latest patriotic emulation movement was to end on Hồ Chí Minh’s birth-
day, May 19, which was also the anniversary of the founding of the Vietminh 
front. As in the past, the party leaders wanted May 19 to be an occasion when 
the “entire party and people expressed their faith in and gratitude toward Hồ 
Chí Minh and the cause of the Vietminh-United Vietnam front.” In practical 
terms, this meant that the entire party had to “study Hồ Chí Minh’s morality 
and work ethic, to zealously reform their thinking, and to study politics to serve 
the people.”24
The directive instructed local cadres to mobilize units and individuals to 
send letters and telegrams reporting their accomplishments in the emulation 
campaign and wishing Hồ Chí Minh a happy birthday. Again, the party leaders 
were not willing to take the chance that people would send these letters and tele-
grams on their own initiative. On this occasion, the party leaders also wanted a 
collection of Chairman Hồ’s writings and a biography of his life to be produced. 
The directive instructed DRV newspapers to release a “special issue” and to “[r]
emember to post excerpts from the people’s letters and telegrams sent to Chair-
man Hồ.” Cadres were to use a few dierent slogans to accompany the mass 
movement. Three focused on Hồ Chí Minh and were probably written on ban-
ners: (1) “The entire people are grateful to Chairman Hồ.” (2) “Follow Chairman 
Hồ’s model of hard work, sacrice, honesty, and selessness.” (3) “Chairman Hồ 
forever!”25
“Thought Reform” and the Party Purge
With the arrival of Chinese advisors to the DRV’s party headquarters came 
pressure to adopt Maoist revolutionary policies. One of the earliest and most 
important of those was “thought reform” (chỉnh huấn), sometimes referred to as 
“rectication” in Western scholarship. “Thought reform” began in the summer 
of 1951 and was initially a method of ideological instruction used in the military. 
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In that milieu, the purpose was to improve the ghting capacity of soldiers. A 
“thought reform” guidebook written in the summer of 1951 explains that, for the 
purpose of “cadres” (i.e., ocers), the reform aimed to “raise the organizational 
and command capacity.” With this military element came a political one aimed 
at “strengthening a cadre’s understanding of world events (thời sự), improving 
organizational discipline, and instilling a spirit of independent and zealous ac-
tion when working.” For regular soldiers, the program had a practical and ideo-
logical component. The rst focused on improving soldiers’ knowledge of how 
to use weapons. The second, “political” component, aimed at “strengthening 
[soldiers’] correct understanding of the democratic regime in the military” and 
“improving each person’s consciousness and zealous spirit.”26
About ten months later, in March of 1952, the Politburo decided to carry 
out a much larger program of thought reform that would be a part of a “Party 
reorganization” (chỉnh Đảng). The program would be applied primarily to DRV 
bureaucrats and intellectuals. As Thành explained in his opening remarks at a 
Central Committee plenum held from April 22 to 28, “Through reorganizing 
the Party the Party receives training. We reorganize and strengthen our ranks 
in order to carry out protracted resistance war and to prepare enough forces 
for a general counter-oensive.”27 Thành put “thought reform” and the party 
reorganization (a euphemism for “purge”) in the hands of the aforementioned 
Politburo member (ocially a “candidate member”), Lê Văn Lương. Since the 
Second Party Congress in February of 1951, Lương had served as head of the 
party’s Organization Bureau. In a front-page article published in the party news-
paper, The People, Lương explained that the purge was “a task of building and 
consolidating our Party according to the method of Mao Zedong . . .” That Mao-
ist method focused on “ideological development,” with the primary instrument 
being “criticism/self-criticism.”28
As was typical of the discourse of the party leaders, the justication for the 
purge focused on a list of “mistakes” that ocials and party members had com-
mitted to the alleged detriment of the “correct” policies of the party leaders. “Be-
cause they lack a rm political view and class perspective, many cadres and party 
members have lacked a spirit of absolute and unyielding struggle for the revolu-
tionary cause.” Other sins included “inability to distinguish between the enemy, 
friends, and us;” “being distant from the masses;” “being distant from reality;” 
“suering from the disease of corruption and waste;” and having an “unclear con-
ception of democracy and discipline in the Party.” Lương then described some of 
the diculties that lay ahead for the DRV, especially having to ght a protracted 
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war. “If our Party . . . does not eliminate the above mistakes and weaknesses in the 
thinking of cadres and party members, implementation of the Party and Govern-
ment’s policies in the coming period will meet many obstructions.”29
In a speech that Lương delivered before the Central Committee’s “thought 
reform class,” he was more explicit:
The experience of the Chinese Communist Party teaches us that: if we 
want to build our Party correctly, if we want to Bolshevize our Party, to 
make party cadres grasp the basic theories of Marxism-Leninism, we need 
to strengthen our education. Primarily that is ideological education by 
means of thought reform.
The primary theme of “thought reform” was “petit-bourgeois thinking.” Here 
Thành and Lương pointed out that over ninety percent of the party’s ranks, 
which they claimed to total 700,000 members (probably an exaggeration), came 
from either the peasant or petit-bourgeois class. “Though they entered the Party, 
received education to some extent, and have made some eorts, they have not 
yet scrubbed themselves clean of their petit-bourgeois thinking.” According to 
Lương, the “serious mistakes” committed by party members “were basically the 
result of a petit-bourgeois consciousness.”30
As was the case in China, “thought reform” involved pushing individuals to 
confess to various instances of petit-bourgeois thinking. The point was to confess 
to some sort of crime, thereby arming the party leadership’s picture of DRV-con-
trolled areas as full of potential traitors and saboteurs. Aer the “thought reform” 
session, each student had to write down a self-confession, which would then by 
placed in the person’s le. For the party leaders, having the self-confessions of 
rank-and-le party members generated leverage over them. In his history of the 
First Indochina War, Goscha mentions an example of a “thought reform” pro-
gram that dealt with 4,000 cadres. Every single participant ultimately confessed 
to either having “worked for the enemy” or having had “past relations with him.”31 
The DRV intellectual Vũ Thư Hiên remembered “thought reform” as a “sorcer-
er’s spell . . . that paralyzed a person’s sense of perception, creating a laziness of 
thought to the highest degree, removing all ability to resist, turning a person into 
a Party robot who knows only loyalty to the Party.”32
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The CCP Advisor Luo Guibo’s  
Preliminary Land Reform Program
One of the most interesting questions about the DRV is the nature of its re-
lationship with the CCP and Soviet Union. How much control did the head 
Chinese advisor, Luo Guibo have over DRV operations? On this question, the 
scholar Alex Thai Vo uncovered in the Hanoi archives one of the most reveal-
ing documents. Written by Luo on September 3, 1952, the document is titled 
“Preliminary Ideas about Mobilizing the Masses, 1953.” Luo sent a copy of it to 
Trường Chinh, who then passed a copy to Thành and probably to other mem-
bers of the Politburo.
What is remarkable about Luo’s document is that it provides instructions 
about how the DRV should begin a land reform campaign—instructions that 
Thành and Trường Chinh seem to have followed closely “from inception to 
fulllment.”33 Particularly revealing is Luo’s nal paragraph:
Prepare teams of cadres to carry out an experimental run [of land re-
form] in order to gain experience, then carry out criticism. The Central 
Committee should prepare twenty teams of [land reform] cadres. In the 
Vietnamese North and in Zone 4, choose ten subdistricts to carry out 
this test run.34
The DRV leaders would end up choosing six subdistricts in the Vietnamese 
North and six in Zone 4. As Alex Vo argues, Luo’s September 3, 1952 policy 
statement appears to have formed a “template” for the DRV’s mass mobilization 
campaign. His document outlines many of the campaign’s important elements 
such as the ideological justication, the propaganda campaign, the accompany-
ing party purge, and the use of land reform to boost tax collection.
The question that Luo’s document does not answer is whether his “ideas” 
about mass mobilization were received by Thành and Trường Chinh as an order 
that had to be implemented. In other words, does his letter’s date, September 3, 
1952, signal the beginning of the move to land reform? This is Vo’s interpreta-
tion. I suspect that Chinh sent Luo’s document to “Uncle” (Thành) wondering 
whether he would approve the proposal or not. I believe that Thành’s policy 
up to that point had been to appease Mao by lavishing praise on him as a the-
orist and by implementing many CCP policies in the DRV—the agricultural 
tax, thought reform, removal of “landlords” from mass organizations in the 
countryside—except land reform. Even in September of 1952, Thành probably 
still hoped to follow Lenin’s classic two-stage formula of expelling the imperial 
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power rst and carrying out major socialist transformation subsequently. I be-
lieve that it was Thành’s Moscow meeting with Stalin in October (see next chap-
ter) that marked the beginning of the DRV’s campaign of mass mobilization 
through land reform.
Trouble with the 1952 October Rice Harvest Tax Collection
The approach of the October rice harvest, as usual, stimulated party directives 
on tax collection, which oen included appraisals of the recent May harvest. Ac-
cording to an August 28 directive written by Trường Chinh, “In its agricultural 
tax work for the 1951 October harvest and the 1952 May harvest, all inter-zones 
had major shortcomings: under-collection, slow collection, and failure to com-
plete the job. This has hindered the Government’s plan to balance the budget 
and had a negative political inuence among the people.”35
As usual, the problems with the agricultural tax stemmed from the people 
responsible for implementation:
The main reasons for these shortcomings are as follows: the responsible 
oces and cadres do not yet understand the importance of collecting the 
agricultural tax. They lack a sense of discipline, of organization, and re-
sponsibility. They do not yet have a grasp of the policy and the means. They 
lack leadership and do not command in a concrete and timely manner. A 
number of cadres implement the policy and its methods incorrectly for 
their own personal interest.36
Chinh decided that local cadres should raise the yield levels from which the 
agricultural tax percentage was to be taken. “Because many places carried out 
incorrectly the agricultural inspection to determine yields (generally speaking, 
they are too low), we now have to adjust them.” Adjusting the agricultural yields, 
Chinh explained, would help give the peasants “peace of mind” and inspire them 
to “enthusiastically pay attention to production.”
Only a few sentences aer stating that adjusting the yield levels (upward) was 
going to bring the peasants “peace of mind,” Chinh candidly acknowledged that 
this task would be “dicult” and that cadres would need to “endure hardships” 
in convincing peasants to raise their yield levels. “Cadres must propagandize and 
explain thoroughly so that the peasants understand; they must also mobilize the 
masses to participate in democratic discussion.” Aer the yield levels had been 
adjusted upward, cadres were to create “tax books” based on that new level and 
collect the amount in the book.
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During the 1952 October harvest, one interesting new twist that was cer-
tain to make tax collection more dicult was the Politburo’s decision to col-
lect money as well as rice. The collection of money was not a substitute for the 
collection of rice—it was an extra tax added to the agricultural tax. The DRV 
leaders were determined to “balance their budget” and raise the value of their 
badly inated currency. By requiring that peasants pay an additional tax in DRV 
dollars, the government could reduce the supply of this currency and hopefully 
bring its value back up.
When the party had carried out its “xed-price purchases” of rice in the ear-
lier years of the war, it had used nearly worthless DRV money and demanded 
that peasants sell their rice to the state at prices lower than market value. Now 
that the party leaders were collecting the money, they became interested in ob-
taining market value for it. “In the task of collecting money, the price must be 
set closely to that of the currency’s market value and careful inspections must be 
organized to avoid corrupt practices.”37
With tax rates set at a certain level of the peasants’ yield, the collection of 
taxes should have been able to proceed based on that rate, with the amount that 
the state collected dependent only on the productivity of the peasants. But it 
appears that the party leaders were determined not to have peasants and weather 
determine how much rice they collected:
The tax for the 1952 October harvest will be collected one part in rice and 
one part in money. The Ministry of Finance will work with [the leaders of] 
each interzone to set the amount of rice and money to be collected in each 
interzone. These set amounts will be based on the potential of each inter-
zone. The interzone level leaders will then meet with provincial leaders to 
set the amount of rice and money to be collected in each province. The 
provincial leaders will do similarly with district leaders, and district leaders 
with subdistrict leaders. [Those responsible for tax collection] absolutely 
may not use authoritarian bureaucratic methods of collection as was the 
case before. With the rate having been determined on a solid basis and in a 
democratic manner, local cadres must resolutely implement [that rate]. It is 
an issue of responsibility and discipline.38
Chinh provided no explanation for why a tax system theoretically based on set 
percentages of agricultural yields needed to have collection quotas. Why not 
simply follow the established rate? To set collection quotas, no matter how 
closely they were tied to “potential,” gave the operation the smell of a giant rice 
and money requisition program. In light of this, it is perhaps understandable 
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why Chinh concluded his directive with “Chairman Hồ’s” words of advice about 
how cadres should approach the agricultural tax: “The agricultural tax is a cam-
paign. We must concentrate our forces and try to exceed the goal so that we can 
bring the campaign to victory.”39
To pressure cadres into delivering the agricultural tax, the party leaders de-
cided to make virtually the entire DRV apparatus involved in tax collection 
carry out “self-criticism” (kiểm thảo) for their allegedly poor performance during 
the previous two harvests. Aer comrades at all levels had carried out self-criti-
cism, it would be the turn of non-party members who sat on the executive boards 
of mass organizations or who were members of local people’s committees. Aer 
these self-criticisms had been performed internally, rst within the party itself, 
then within state organizations, they were to be performed in front of the people.
These self-criticisms must be performed before the people to give promi-
nence to the democratic working style of the people’s democratic state. [This 
should allow] the people to inspect the work of the state, making them 
recognize clearly that the state belongs to the people and works for the 
people. This will make the people enthusiastic, inspiring them to carry 
out zealously their responsibility to pay their tax at the right level and at 
the right time.40
In keeping with the stage-managed character of this exercise, the party leaders 
determined what things cadres throughout the apparatus were to apologize for 
and reminded them not to deviate from the issue at hand, which was the “clear 
recognition of weaknesses in the handling of the agricultural tax.” For individ-
ual cadres who performed self-criticisms before the people, this was to be man-
aged by their superiors in the party, based primarily on the content of the gov-
ernment’s circular on the agricultural tax, and focused mostly on “self-serving” 
behavior and “failure to set a good example.”
Since a higher-ranking cadre from the outside was to “help closely” in the 
self-criticisms carried out at the local level, it would appear (or was supposed to 
appear) that superiors in the party and state were not responsible for negative 
phenomena at the local level. A more detailed explanation of this self-criticism 
operation written by the party leaders of Zone 4 instructed that higher-ranking 
cadres overseeing local self-criticisms probe the people’s aspirations and “ar-
range” [bố trí] the discussions accordingly. If, during the discussion, a local cadre 
“starts to go o topic, [the Party member leading the self-criticism] needs to g-
ure out how to guide that person back onto the right track without interrupting 
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him in a mechanical way.” Such an action would “diminish the spirit of struggle” 
of those involved, and it would mean that “democracy was not guaranteed.”41
Battle for Nà Sản: Autumn 1952
In June 1952, French intelligence noted a spike in the Molotova truck trac 
along the route from Cao Bằng in the northeast of Tonkin across to the western 
part of the Red River delta. This, along with the subsequent assembly of four 
DRV divisions in the western part of Tonkin and 20,000 “people’s porters” to 
the north of Phú Thọ (western Tonkin) seemed to indicate a coming DRV at-
tack on the “Tai country,” as the French labeled it.42 The “Tai Country” was a 
mountainous region populated mostly by Tai ethnic minority people. Overlying 
a large chunk of the western part of Tonkin and the eastern part of northern 
Laos, this transnational region’s focal point was the border town of Điện Biên 
Phủ. The mountainous region played to the strengths of the DRV forces.
On September 13, 1952, anticipating attacks on French posts along the main 
road leading west from Hanoi toward the Lao border at Điện Biển Phủ, the 
French decided to reinforce two of the most important posts (Nghĩa Lộ and Nà 
Sản). The latter of the two, Nà Sản, had the only airport in the province (Sơn 
La) where the attack was unfolding, giving the post strategic importance for 
the French.
On the following day, September 14, the DRV began to approach the more 
distant post of Nghĩa Lộ with three divisions. Three days later, the DRV’s 
308th Division began the attack with the customary mortar barrage followed 
by human wave assaults. The ghting carried on through the evening and into 
the early morning, lit by a steady stream of ares dropped by circling French air-
planes. The soldiers fought under this lurid illumination until about 3 am, when 
fog compelled the airplanes to abandon the eort. By 8 am, the DRV forces were 
masters of the French garrison at Nghĩa Lộ.43
Over the next three weeks, the French focus turned to the second of these 
two garrisons, Nà Sản. There, they decided to create an “entrenched camp” that 
would seem weak enough and isolated enough to tempt the DRV command 
to attack but which would be constructed and armed well enough to repel a 
large force. The French would need four or ve weeks to create such a camp. 
With DRV divisions only days away, Nà Sản could come under attack before the 
preparations were complete. To avoid such an eventuality, the French command 
created an elaborate diversionary campaign, which successfully kept DRV troops 
away while construction of the “entrenched camp” at Nà Sản proceeded.44
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From late October through to late November 1952, the French forces worked 
feverishly to ready Nà Sản for the coming attack. Most of the material was own 
into the base on DC-3 cargo planes. During daylight hours, the base’s airstrip re-
ceived a new load roughly every six minutes. By November 23, Nà Sản had about 
12,000 troops. Over the preceding weeks, the base had been supplied with 1,100 
tons of barbed wire and 5,000 mines along with heavy artillery pieces, vehicles, 
tools, engines, etc. French soldiers at the base cut down most of the trees on 
the nearby hillocks and created ten defensive strongpoints. Surrounded as they 
were by DRV divisions, the French troops at Nà Sản well understood that their 
lifeline was the airstrip—it needed to be defended at all costs.45
The DRV leaders do not appear to have appreciated fully the measures taken 
by the French command to fortify Nà Sản. Toward the end of November, aer 
a few days of DRV attacks on French posts at the very outer edges of the en-
trenched camp, Võ Nguyên Giáp moved troops in place for an attack on two key 
hillocks overlooking the base. If these could be taken, the DRV troops would 
then have a direct line of re at the airstrip and a good chance of cutting the base 
o from its primary means of supply. In such a scenario, the French forces could 
be compelled to retreat along Route 6 where the DRV forces had prepared to 
carry out lethal ambushes.46
On October 25, about a month before the assault on Nà Sản began, the party 
leaders sent a message to a meeting of cadres associated with the “Northwest 
Front” (i.e., Sơn La province). The message praised the military for initial 
successes in the campaign, which included “destroying many of the enemy’s 
forces” and “liberating compatriots in a large area of the northwest.” Why had 
the army enjoyed these successes? According to the letter, DRV military leaders 
had “[a]bsorbed the resolve of the Party Central Committee, the Government, 
and Chairman Ho, and made that resolve become the resolve of the soldiers and 
people.”47
On the night of November 30, Giáp began the attack. Initially, his troops 
succeeded in taking the two strategic highpoints. A counterattack organized 
by the French forces dislodged the DRV troops from the rst highpoint by day-
break but failed to retake the second. However, as daylight set in, the French 
were able to reverse the DRV gain on the remaining second high point thanks in 
large part to intense aerial bombing (cluster bombs and napalm) on the exposed 
DRV position.
For the next three nights, Giáp threw his troops at Nà Sản, with ghting al-
ways taking place at night under the light of airs dropped by circling airplanes. 
But the “entrenched camp” held against the onslaught, inicting terrible losses 
118 chapter 5
on the DRV troops. On December 3, Giáp called o the attack and began prepa-
rations to withdraw his three divisions.48 To be able to overthrow a garrison such 
as Nà Sản, the DRV troops needed heavy artillery, something they did not have 
at the time. Roughly a year later, though, the French would construct another 
“entrenched camp” deep in DRV territory with the intention of again tempting 
the party leaders into another costly attack. But this time, in the valley of Điện 
Biên Phủ, the DRV forces would have the heavy artillery they needed. And the 
outcome would be dierent.
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Ch a pter 6
e Move to Land Reform: 1952–1953
At some point in September 1952, Nguyễn Tất ành departed the party’s base 
area in the Vietnamese North and began the long journey to Beijing. On Sep-
tember 30, shortly aer arriving in the PRC capital for discussions about the 
progress of the war, he sent a cable to Stalin requesting permission to attend the 
upcoming 19th CPSU Congress, which was scheduled to begin on October 9. It 
had been almost thirteen years since Stalin had held a party congress, so ành 
may have felt that such an occasion had a special importance. Among other 
things, attendance would give him access to Communist leaders from around 
the world, providing an opportunity to promote the cause of the DRV.
But, as the historian Ilya Gaiduk points out, surely the primary goal of 
ành’s visit to Moscow was, as stated in his telegram, to meet with Stalin him-
self. is would provide the DRV leader with the opportunity to shore up Sta-
lin’s support, and, if possible, convince him to increase Soviet aid. e People’s 
Liberation Army could then hope to achieve a decisive, war-ending victory over 
the French forces and those of their Vietnamese ally, the noncommunist Associ-
ated State of Vietnam. Always attuned to the importance of appearances, ành 
requested that he be allowed to attend the congress secretly to avoid giving his 
enemies a pretext for carrying out “political attacks” against him and to avoid 
“inconveniences” for Stalin and the Soviet leadership with respect to the orga-
nization of a proper “reception.”1
As with his rst visit to Stalin in early 1950, what ành probably wanted to 
avoid most was having his visit to Moscow make him appear to be a Soviet agent 
rather than the internationally respected leader of a nation. If his anticommu-
nist opponents in Vietnam, Paris, and Washington learned that he had arrived 
in Moscow with no ocial welcome, that he was known among Soviet leaders 
as “Comrade Din” rather than “Hồ Chí Minh,” these enemies might publicize 
this as evidence that he were under Moscow’s control. And again, lack of an 
ocial greeting in Moscow for “Hồ Chí Minh” might raise questions among 
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rank-and-le party members as well, who had already seen the Soviet Union 
wait more than four years before nally recognizing the DRV in January 1950.
ành was able to meet one time with Stalin, during which the Soviet leader 
encouraged him to carry out land reform in a manner similar to that carried out 
by the CCP. As Gaiduk points out, this advice was in line with Stalin’s general 
approach to Asian revolutions at the time.2 It may have been a way of deect-
ing demands for increased Soviet aid. Scholarly rumor in Hanoi has long held 
that Stalin, during his meeting with ành, had intimidated and challenged the 
DRV leader on the question of land reform: “is chair represents the landlords 
and this one the peasantry. Where do you sit?” According to this story, ành 
had replied that he wanted to “sit in both chairs,” that is, he wanted to be on the 
side of all Vietnamese in the countryside.
I have doubts about the veracity of this story. First, it receives no mention 
in Khrushchev’s account of the meeting and has not been veried by any other 
Russian source. Second, it seems unlikely, considering ành’s concern about 
his reputation, that he would have told Vietnamese comrades of this demeaning 
treatment by Stalin. It is possible that the story was leaked by a Vietnamese trans-
lator present at the meeting—this assumes, however, that ành, who had lived 
in the Soviet Union continuously from 1934 to 1938, had needed a translator to 
converse with Stalin. It is also possible that the story, like so many others about 
“Hồ Chí Minh,” had been fabricated. e intention may have been to accentu-
ate the idea of a plucky “Uncle Hồ” having stood up to Stalin courageously but 
ultimately having been bullied into submission on the issue of the land reform. 
Such is the toxic legacy of that radical campaign that a Hồ who bows to Stalin’s 
will may have been seen as preferable to a Hồ who believes in the land reform.
My guess is that ành, having come to Moscow to lobby Stalin for more 
weapons and aid, was disappointed to be told to carry out land reform. It does 
not appear from accounts of the French forces that the DRV military received 
any meaningful boost in weapons during the year following ành’s visit with 
Stalin. Upon leaving Moscow, ành sent a brief note to Stalin:
Very much beloved and respected Comrade,
Today I am leaving for my country. I thank you very much for what you 
have done for me. I promise you to work diligently in the realization of 
the agrarian program and in waging our patriotic war. I hope I will be able 
to come back in two or three years so as to submit to you a report on the 
results of our work. I wish you very good health and very long life.
I embrace you heartily,
Din.3
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e idea that ành made the decision to carry out the “agrarian program” 
(i.e., land reform) during this trip to Beijing and Moscow is also supported by the 
account of the high-ranking revolutionary Hoàng Tùng (1920–2010), a mem-
ber of the party Secretariat. He is most famous for having been the “managing 
editor” (the Communist term for “editor-in-chief ”) of the party’s main organ, 
e People, from 1954 to 1982. In an account of his experiences with “Uncle 
Hồ” written for a talk delivered to cadres during his years of retirement, Tùng 
claims that Stalin and Mao had been pressuring ành to carry out land reform 
since 1950:
Aer meeting with him, Stalin and Mao [in 1950] continued to pressure 
Uncle to act as they had, which meant to carry out the worker-peasant 
alliance led by the Party, establish a worker-peasant government, and then 
carry out land reform. Uncle did not yet want to carry out land reform. 
e three-stage theory that Trường Chinh put forward at the [February 
1951] Second Congress reected the idea of Uncle [có ý kiến của Bác]. 
According to the three-stage theory, land reform would be le for later 
while [the Party focused on] rent and debt reduction. Comrade Trường 
Chinh analysed this very well. In 1946, at a Regional Party branch meet-
ing, I heard him say: “Under the revolutionary regime, small reforms have 
a revolutionary meaning; many small reforms added together make a big  
revolution.”4
According to Tùng, in the summer of 1952, Mao and Stalin saw that there had 
been “no mention of land reform” from the VWP leadership since the Febru-
ary 1951 Second Party Congress. Contradicting the evidence found by Gaiduk, 
Tùng claims (erroneously, it appears) that Stalin and Mao had “called Uncle Hồ 
to visit” because of his foot dragging on land reform. As we saw above, though, 
ành seems to have taken the initiative to meet with Stalin. Similarly, the 
timing of ành’s visit to Beijing—so close to the 19th CPSU Congress—and 
his rapid departure from Beijing for that Congress, give the impression that he 
traveled to the PRC largely on his own initiative for the purpose of joining their 
delegation traveling to Moscow.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that Mao and Stalin were not “determined 
to force [ành] to carry out land reform.” According to Tùng, “only aer seeing 
that he [ành] could no longer refuse them did Uncle decide to carry out land 
reform.” Aer making the decision, ành, using the pen name “Lê Đinh” and 
perhaps writing in Moscow, penned an article titled “Terre et l’eau” [Land and 
Water], which he had published in the Cominform newspaper, For a Lasting 
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Peace, For a People’s Democracy. e main point of the article was that peasants 
needed to be given land.5
ành returned to Vietnam at some point in late November aer having 
spent over a month in Moscow. He wrote an article titled “Appeal to the Viet-
namese People on the Occasion of the Sixth Anniversary of National Resistance 
Struggle,” which was published in the December 19, 1952 issue of the VWP’s 
ocial organ, e People. Written under the name Hồ Chí Minh, this article 
seems to represent a turning point in the party’s public discourse, signaling that 
the DRV would be going forward with a dierent policy in the countryside.6
at was the most obvious signal. However, upon closer examination, we can 
discern in the November 27 issue of e People a much subtler sign of the change 
in policy.
Adjusting the Historical Record
e November 27, 1952 issue of e People printed an advertisement for the 
recent publication of a new book by Trường Chinh titled On the Vietnamese 
Revolution. e book was a publication of his long report delivered at the Sec-
ond Party Congress in February 1951: “Complete the Liberation of Our People, 
Develop People’s Democracy, and Progress toward Socialism.” One of the main 
themes of that speech had been the defense of Lenin’s two-stage approach to 
revolutions carried out by colonial and semicolonial peoples—the very policy 
that was now being discarded. (Hoàng Tùng had referred to it as the “three-stage 
theory,” but I interpret what Chinh described in his report as still following the 
classic Leninist framework of the two-stage approach.)
Before announcing the shi to land reform, ành and the other party lead-
ers apparently needed an internal domestic justication that could be publi-
cized as having anticipated or formed the basis for the present course (rather 
than Stalin’s command). Since no major party policy statements had advocated 
anything other than putting o a major attack on the landlord class until aer 
the war against the French, internal justication for the change had to be man-
ufactured. It was not possible to change the record completely since Trường 
Chinh had promoted the two-stage revolutionary approach in dozens of arti-
cles, speeches, and internal policy documents. Changing one crucial document 
would have to suce. Below is the original version of Chinh’s speech followed 
by the newer, edited version. One can see why Hoàng Tùng and perhaps oth-
ers described it as a “three-stage approach.” e adjustments are subtle, but 
signicant:
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[Original version read at the Second Congress, February 1951]
erefore, the basic tasks of the Vietnamese revolution are what? ey are:
a.  Drive out the imperialist aggressors, make Vietnam completely unied 
and independent (the anti-imperialist [task]);
b.  Abolish feudal and semi-feudal remnants, give land to the tiller, develop 
the people’s democratic regime (the anti-feudal [task]);
c.  Create the basis for socialism.
e rst of the tasks is the people’s liberation task. e second two tasks 
are democratic ones.
In order to overthrow the imperialist aggressors, we must, at the same 
time, overthrow the reactionary feudal forces and, generally speaking, the 
various levels of imperialist puppets and lackeys. On the other hand, in 
order to abolish the reactionary feudalist forces and the various puppet 
lackeys, we must overthrow the imperialist aggressors, because the imperi-
alists try to preserve those forces as a means of hanging on to Vietnam. [. . .]7
[Edited November 1952 version]
erefore, the basic tasks of the Vietnamese revolution are what? ey 
are to liquidate imperialists aggressors and to overthrow the traitorous 
Vietnamese puppets; make Vietnam completely independent and unied; 
abolish feudal and semi-feudal remnants; give land to the tiller; develop 
the people’s democratic regime; create the seeds of socialism in Vietnam.
Today, the imperialist aggressors and the reactionary feudalists collude 
tightly with each other.
In order to overthrow the imperialist aggressors, we must, at the same 
time, overthrow the reactionary feudal forces, because the reactionary feu-
dalists are the lackeys of the imperialists. On the other hand, if we want to 
overthrow the reactionary feudalist forces, we must overthrow the impe-
rialist aggressors, because the imperialists depend on those [reactionary 
feudalist] forces as a means of stealing our country. [. . .]8
e key change in the second version is the replacement of the two sentences, 
“e rst of the tasks is the people’s liberation task. e second two tasks are 
democratic ones,” with the sentence, “Today, the imperialist aggressors and the 
feudal reactionaries collude tightly with each other.” It is likely that Chinh ex-
cised the two lines from the 1951 version because they seemed too rigidly in the 
mold of the two-stage formula now being abandoned.
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Chinh’s changes to the original report’s section on landlords seem also to 
have been guided by the same imperative of making the current policy appear to 
have been anticipated more strongly by earlier statements:
[Original version of Trường Chinh’s February 1951 report]
Today, Vietnamese landlords can be divided into three categories: the 
large landlords, the majority of whom are counterrevolutionary and hug 
the legs of the imperialists; the middle landlords, who are undecided and 
negative; the small landlords, who, because their economic situation is not 
much better than that of the rich peasants, support or participate in the 
anti-imperialist eort. e imperialists want to turn all Vietnamese land-
lords into their rearguard forces. One of our strengths is that we have made 
a signicant number of Vietnamese landlords support our people’s liber-
ation, support the resistance war, or stand neutral but with sympathetic 
feelings toward the resistance war.9
With news from ành that the party would be moving forward with land re-
form, Chinh again made adjustments:
[Edited 1952 version]
Today, during the resistance war, Vietnam’s landlord class has split into 
clear groups: a number are reactionaries who hug the legs of the imperi-
alists, with the majority of their ranks being large landlords. A number 
are undecided, neutral, or support the resistance war but are negative and 
weak-kneed, the majority being middle and small landlords.
With respect to our democratic reforms, the landlord class nds ways of 
distorting or resisting them.
A small number of patriotic and progressive personalities come from the 
landlord class, but stand among the ranks of the people in the resistance 
war and support the people’s government.
Nevertheless, we should not forget that the landlord class is a feudal 
remnant. It exploits the peasant class, that is, the majority of the people, 
in a severe way. And it inhibits the economic, political, and cultural devel-
opment of Vietnam. Speaking from a class perspective, the landlord class 
is a target of the revolution. As the revolution moves forward, democratic 
reforms will continue to be pushed forward, and the reaction of the land-
lord class will continue to grow stronger.
However, while the spearhead of the revolution is pointed at the imperi-
alist aggressors as it is today, and excluding reactionary landlords, a number 
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of small and middle landlords can stand neutral or temporarily participate 
in in the people’s liberation. But that does not change at all the basic char-
acter and responsibility of the Vietnamese revolution.10
Chinh had decided to remove the original version’s nal sentence, which stated 
that support from “a signicant number of landlords” was one of the party’s 
“strengths.” He also added four paragraphs. ese were typically vague in char-
acter but, for the most part, appear to have been written to make the earlier 
document gesture more strongly toward the current decision to embark upon 
land reform during the war rather than aer it.
A New Inspection of the Countryside for the New Land Policy
While changing the ocial record of the party’s land policy to make it anticipate 
the sudden move to land reform, the party leaders also, according to custom, 
attempted to frame the new policy as a practical response to the actual situation 
on the ground. At some point in early December, they organized an “inspection” 
of the countryside in a few areas in the Vietnamese North zone (the provinces of 
ái Nguyên, Phú ọ, and Bắc Giang).
In the Hanoi archive can be found a “Preliminary Report” and a “Final Re-
port” on a ten-day “Meeting on the Inspection of the Countryside in the Viet-
namese North Interzone,” held from December 15 to 25, 1952. ese suggest that 
this “inspection” ultimately had no signicant impact on the party’s formulation 
of land reform policy. Rather, the inspection is better understood as a ritual 
organized by the Politburo to provide a quasi-scientic cover for the arbitrary 
nature of the land reform policy.11
e Preliminary Report from the conference contained three sections: (1) e 
Land Tenure System in the Countryside before the August Revolution; (2) As-
sessing the Interzone’s Implementation of Land Policy from the August Revolu-
tion up to Today; (3) Issues Requiring Discussion so that Appropriate Requests 
to the Central Committee Can Be Made. e report’s structure leads the reader 
to the conclusions that would form the party leadership’s ocial justication 
for the land reform. us, the rst part summarized the VWP’s narrative of the 
damage to rural life caused by the feudal landlord class before the arrival of the 
French, and aerward, as colluders with the French in their colonial project:
e agricultural economy in days past used to be a self-sucient one. Now, 
it has been ooded and captured by imperialist commodities. e peasants 
have been pauperized by high land rents and heavy taxes. Because of their 
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poverty, they have had to sell un-ripened rice and sell it cheaply. Moreover, 
they have had to buy expensive imperialist goods. As a result of this, they 
have become pauperized and their land concentrated in the hands of the 
landlords even more quickly.12
Expressed in this way, the inability of people in DRV-controlled areas to pur-
chase Western goods was cast as a liberating favor bestowed upon the population 
by the DRV regime.
Having planted a notion of landlord treachery in the reader’s mind, the re-
port moved quickly to the issue of the party’s rural policies since taking power 
in 1945. As we have seen, these policies had not been eective in stimulating an 
increase in productivity. How was that to be explained? Responsibility lay with 
the ruses of devious landlords and with the poor policy implementation of local 
cadres. An outside reader of the report on the countryside would have no idea 
about such things as the party’s frequent rice requisitions, its agricultural tax, 
its demands that family members serve as “people’s porters,” and its recruitment 
of young men for the military. e conceptualization of the countryside put 
forward in the “inspection” made no mention of the DRV state as an extractive 
player in the rural economic scene.
Since taking power in 1945, the party had distributed large quantities of 
conscated land. e Preliminary Report acknowledged that some land had 
been distributed “three or four times.” How was such an odd situation to be 
explained? Why would peasants, whose great desire was to own land, return land 
that had been given to them? According to the report, this resulted from local 
cadres having carried out the redistribution of land in a “perfunctory manner,” 
having “not understood that the ardent desire of the peasants is fairness and 
appropriateness.”
e Preliminary Report also had to explain why the distribution of “public 
lands” had been so disappointing. Here there were vague hints about why peas-
ants might have been unexcited about receiving public land, with brief mention 
of local cadres keeping public land “concentrated” and renting it out to local 
peasants, putting the rent collected on the land into “public works.” In other 
words, the land was not actually given to the peasants but merely rented out to 
them. But the way this was described made it seem like a local initiative that had 
nothing to do with state policies.
In an obvious nod to the coming land reform, the Preliminary Report stated 
that public lands had not been distributed “fairly and appropriately” because 
local cadres had “not yet mobilized the masses to participate in the distribution.” 
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Another reason for the poor results, the Preliminary Report argued, was that 
in some places women had not been given land or had only been given half the 
amount of land allotted to men. But this explained nothing about why those 
men who apparently did receive the lion’s share of the land were so unproductive.
In addition to the problem of distributions of conscated land and public 
land, the Preliminary Report had to explain why peasants had le so much farm-
land fallow:
ere are many places where land that used to be farmed has now been le 
fallow. [One cause of this] is the evacuation of areas attacked by the French; 
another is French sweeps and the establishment of no-man’s land areas. 
e quantity of this abandoned land is very large. . . . Recent calculations 
in Bắc Giang and Quảng Yên show that both have over 30,000 hectares of 
abandoned land. is is also the case in Vĩnh Phúc, and there over 20,000 
hectares of abandoned land in Bắc Ninh province. . . .
Some of this fallow land was originally public land; some belonged to 
small landlords and rich peasants. Because of the high price of labor, they 
do not farm the land but hang on to it nonetheless. In some cases, fallow 
land is the result of enemy sweeps and the establishment of a no-man’s land, 
in other cases it is the result of people having not yet zealously increased 
production. . . . Now, in many places, compatriots who had evacuated have 
returned to their villages, or there are places where people, as a result of the 
movement to increase production, have focused on farming land that had 
recently been cleared for farming. Because of all this, the Central Commit-
tee has released directives to [Party] executives instructing them to encour-
age [more] farming of fallow land. Places have implemented this policy but 
have not yet achieved concrete results.13
e second section of the Preliminary Report addressed the reasons why the 
party’s land policies had not yet been “completely implemented.” It began by 
arming that “the Central Committee’s policies were correct” and that “the 
peasant masses have a high spirit of struggle.” e three key causes of the lack of 
“complete” policy implementation pointed neatly to the solutions oered in the 
coming land reform campaign: (1) cadre weaknesses, (2) the class composition of 
the party in the countryside, and (3) a lack of consciousness among the peasants.
With respect to the weaknesses of cadres, they had “not yet recognized 
clearly that the peasants are the main force of the revolution and the resistance 
war;” they had “not yet fully absorbed the policies;” they still had a “supra-class 
notion of unity,” seeing dierent classes in the countryside as being similar 
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to each other; and cadres had “not known how to depend on the forces of the 
peasant masses when carrying out policies.” Second, as the report explained, in 
many localities, local political organizations were occupied disproportionately 
by members of the exploitative class. And third, with respect to the peasants 
themselves, their poor economic performance could be explained by their lack 
of education, which sometimes resulted in “incorrect thinking,” such as “rely-
ing too much on the government, on cadres, or on the goodness of landlords 
and rich peasants.”
e archival le on the “Meeting for the Inspection of the Countryside in the 
Vietnamese North Interzone” also contains a dra of the “Final Conclusions” 
of the conference. e agenda of this concluding report dened the parameters 
of discussion:
Issues that we need to assess:
1. What issues did we see in the countryside to report back to the Party?
2. In the implementation of the Party’s rural policies, we saw strength in what 
areas and weaknesses in what areas?
3. During this conference, we concretely helped the Central Committee in 
what ways with respect to its leadership of the countryside?
4. rough the work carried out at this Conference, what did cadres learn 
about ideology, political standpoint, and work style?
at is the content of the issues that we need to assess—that is the task of 
the conference.14
It appears that the party leaders set the meeting’s agenda to preclude any discus-
sion of the merits of the policies themselves. In discussions of implementation, 
there was always the danger that people would explore the question of how easy 
or dicult a policy was to implement, a topic that would head people down 
the road of assessing the policy itself. is seems to explain why so much of 
the report focused on establishing the weaknesses of the people implementing 
the policies.
e Concluding Report’s rst section, which dealt with the issues in the 
countryside to “report back to the Party,” began the landlord demonization that 
would drive the mass mobilization campaign. erefore, cadres, aer having 
“gone deep into the countryside,” had seen a number of landlord crimes: “allying 
with the imperialists,” “using nefarious schemes to occupy land,” and, of course, 
“exploiting the peasants” in a number of “cruel,” “sadistic,” “despotic,” “feudal,” 
and other ways.
Move to Land Reform, 1952–1953 129 
We see clearly that the landlords and the church, through the use of super-
stition and the exploitation of land rents, are forcing peasants to remain in 
a state of ignorance and hunger.
We see that the peasants before the August Revolution suered from 
impoverishment and ignorance because they were repressed and exploited 
by the imperialists and the landlords. At the same time, we recognize that, 
at the moment, peasants are still in a weak political position in the coun-
tryside because we have not yet mobilized the masses to solve the legitimate 
demands of the peasants.
What we have learned during this conference on the situation in dif-
ferent rural locations has given us, cadres and Vietnamese Workers’ Party 
members, a responsibility. We must go deep into the countryside, and we 
must overthrow all reactionary forces there to resolve the urgent desires of 
the peasants.15
As for the “concrete” ways that the conference had contributed to helping the 
party, the Concluding Report attempted to suggest that the VWP leaders would 
base their policy on the picture of the countryside that had been “reected back” 
to them through the inspection. erefore, the nal conclusions, probably as a 
result of the party leadership’s anxiety about the arbitrary nature of the decision 
to carry out land reform, which came primarily from Stalin and Mao, needed to 
accentuate the importance of the inspection as the basis for the policy. “[e in-
spection] has enabled the party to see more clearly the importance of inspecting 
the countryside. Only by inspecting closely every aspect of the rural situation 
can concrete policies be formed.”
Toward the middle of the Concluding Report was a brief section on issues 
that have “not yet been resolved.” is included “concrete documents” and “ac-
curate gures” on the “whole situation” of dierent localities in the country-
side. e rst example put forward seems pregnant with meaning for the overall 
purpose of the campaign: “district A or province B or subdistrict C has how 
many landlords; they have occupied how much land; how many poor peasants 
are there; and how much land do they have?”
e second-to-last section of the Concluding Report was titled “e Reasons 
for the Conference’s Success.” e rst three of the ve reasons were the con-
sistent eorts of the participants, the alleged fact that reports of the situation 
“stemmed from the grassroots level of subdistricts, districts, and provinces,” and 
the inspection’s focus on provinces (Phú ọ, Bắc Giang, and ái Nguyên) 
where land was “concentrated.” As for the last two of the ve reasons for success:
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e conference combined the task of inspection with the task of study-
ing the experience of actual struggle against the landlord at the plantation 
in Đồng Bẩm [subdistrict] in order to help representatives discover more 
problems in localities and, at the same time, to help representatives study 
more the experience of struggle.
e conference’s success was thanks to the helpful attention of the Cen-
tral Committee. [It also succeeded] because it was attended by a [Chinese] 
Advisor, who was present throughout the entirely of the Conference, who 
participated in the assembly hall, in small groups, and in everyday consul-
tations, leading the Conference to achieve many good results.16
It appears, therefore, that at least one CCP advisor had helped to shape what 
DRV cadres carrying out the inspection were supposed to nd in the countryside.
It is worth mentioning as well that the two documents summarizing the re-
sults of the rural inspection contained very little if any technical discussion of 
the science of agriculture. ere was no discussion of dierent crops, of new 
ideas for irrigation, of regions that seemed to have unusually strong productivity, 
of rainfall levels, salinity, erosion, etc. e inspection seems to have been orga-
nized to give the impression that virtually all problems in the countryside could 
be solved through purging, land redistribution, and a more vigorous attempt to 
implement the party’s same policies for stimulating production.
Announcing the Land Reform Policy
Nguyễn Tất ành’s previously mentioned article, “Chairman Hồ’s Appeal 
on the Occasion of the Resistance War’s Sixth Anniversary,” published in the 
December 19 issue of e People, was the rst article in that organ to mention 
directly the party’s intention to adopt a new approach to the countryside in the 
coming year. Aer providing an inspiring assessment of the war against the 
French, he turned to the issue of domestic policy:
A weakness of ours is the fact that we have not yet implemented correctly 
the land policy that the Government has promulgated for a long time now. 
Nearly 90 percent of our countrymen are peasants. Within the ranks of 
our National Defense forces, local militias, and people’s guerrillas, over 
90 percent are peasants. Whether it be paying taxes or serving as people’s 
porters, the majority are peasants. Our peasant countrymen contribute the 
most to the resistance and sacrice the most for the Fatherland. Yet for all 
that, the peasants are still the poorest and most miserable because they lack 
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land. e reduction of land rent and loan interest rates is a legitimate right 
of the peasants, and it has not yet been implemented thoroughly. at is 
an unfair situation. erefore, this upcoming year, the Government, the 
Party, and the Front will resolutely mobilize the peasantry to implement 
completely the policy of rent and interest reduction in order to guard the 
legitimate rights of the peasants.17
As for how the campaign would be implemented, ành mentioned the idea 
that the peasants would have a role to play. “With respect to the peasants, they 
must act on their own volition, be conscious, organize tightly, and support en-
thusiastically the policy.” In retrospect, ành’s description, though vague, ap-
pears to foreshadow the theatrical role that would be required of the peasants 
in the coming campaign. ey would have to provide visible signs that they had 
“come to consciousness.” e “Chairman Hồ Appeal” also foreshadowed the 
party leadership’s special attempt to give a veneer of legality to the mass mobili-
zation, almost always stressing the program as having derived from the govern-
ment and mass organizations rather than from the party (or, more accurately, 
from the Politburo).
Aer ành’s appeal, e People began to publish a series of articles written 
by members of the Politburo. All articles, in some way or another, built upon the 
general themes advanced in ành’s original appeal and prepared the way for 
the upcoming mass mobilization campaign. us, in the January 15, 1953 issue 
of the newspaper e People, the party leaders printed excerpts from a speech 
apparently delivered by Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng to the Council of Min-
isters at the end of the year. With their constant encouragement of members of 
the party rank and le to engage in self-criticism, the party leaders could not 
completely forgo this ritual themselves. Yet, again, apparently to avoid the crisis 
of faith that an admission of error risked triggering, their self-criticisms were 
carefully constructed to conform to the overall narrative of top-party correct-
ness and lower-party error:
As for the upper level [of the Party], rst and foremost the oces of the 
central committee, the work of leading and directing has suered from the 
following weaknesses: [they] have not outlined very clearly the responsi-
bilities and tasks of cadres along with the methods of implementing those 
tasks. For example: with the plan for production and thri, [the central 
committee oces] have not explained clearly how the plan should be seen, 
have not shown clearly the extent to which [the plan] must be carried out, 
how it must be carried out, and have not determined concretely the demand 
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and goal of the plan. As a result of this, people at the local level have badly 
misunderstood [the Party’s policies], have been totally confused, wasting 
a great deal of time and eort and, in the nal analysis, not achieving any 
concrete results. ere are actually many places where, because of concern 
over production and economization, [local cadres] have paid little or no 
attention to the work of collecting agricultural taxes.18
With respect to the party’s apparatus at the local level, Đồng also expressed 
disappointment with its performance, describing it as suering from “pretty se-
rious” weaknesses. e organization was “impure,” meaning, as the prime min-
ister explained:
A signicant number of those local cadres belong to the petit-bourgeois, 
rich peasant, and landlord class, who, for a long time now, have not received 
education or reform. Because of this, their thinking is still heavily infused 
with a self-serving perspective, and they do not understand and implement 
policies correctly. ey even intentionally carry out the policies incorrectly. 
With respect to their style of working, they are not only bureaucratic and 
autocratic but despotic and militaristic as well.19
According to Đồng, these “subjective weaknesses” of the higher echelon of the 
party’s “leadership and guidance” had “hindered” the completion of the party’s 
tasks for the year 1952.
In addition to complaining of this problem, the prime minister stressed in 
his speech that another factor had “limited” the positive results of the regime’s 
policies—results that “should have been achieved.” Echoing the basic idea that 
we saw in the “Final Conclusions” of the recent inspection of the countryside, 
Đồng stated that the party had “not yet used the enormous force of the masses, 
especially the peasant masses.” As the DRV prime minister explained, “We have 
not yet relied upon that force to strictly implement our policy, to complete our 
task.”20 us one of the key tasks for 1953 would be the “mobilization of the peas-
ant masses,” to inspire them to “stand up” and demand their “legitimate rights.” 
According to Đồng’s narrative, this would unleash the productive forces of the 
poor-peasant majority.
e prime minister’s speech, reprinted in e People, had all the elements 
of the mass mobilization narrative that would animate the campaign over the 
next three and a half years. e unsatisfactory results of the party’s agricultural 
programs and the general retreat of the peasants from agriculture in the face 
of the party’s rice requisitions, and so on, were to be framed in the language 
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of class struggle. e party’s correct policies had achieved poor results due to 
local cadres—who came from or who had strong relations with the exploitative 
classes—dragging their feet and refusing to implement policies. For this reason, 
part of what was needed was a “reorganization” (chỉnh đốn tổ chức) of the local 
party apparatus. As tens of thousands of local cadres would learn over the next 
three years, the term “reorganization” meant “purge.”
As we examined above, Trường Chinh had published a reworked version of 
the speech he had given at the 1951 Second Party Congress. e People had ad-
vertised the release of that new book in the November 27, 1952 issue, but had 
provided no commentary on its content. Apparently, by January 22, 1953, Chinh 
felt that enough time had passed for the rewritten speech to be “discovered” by 
a e People sta writer named Minh Nghĩa. His article would show that Chinh 
had actually anticipated the early move to land reform back in February 1951. 
e rst paragraph of Nghiã’s article, which was titled “A Sharp Weapon: Read-
ing Comrade Trường Chinh’s Book On the Vietnamese Revolution,” reveals the 
book’s function vis-à-vis the appearance of the land reform policy:
During the Congress for the founding of the Vietnamese Workers Party 
(2–1951), and following Chairman Hồ’s “Political Report,” Comrade Trường 
Chinh read a report titled “On the Vietnamese Revolution.” is report 
was discussed with great intensity because, as was also the case with 
Chairman Hồ’s “Political Report,” it discussed an issue closely related to 
the destiny of our party today and tomorrow. And [the report] is the foun-
dation for the Party’s new policy.21
e part of Chinh’s published (i.e., the edited) version of the original speech 
that was quoted at length by Nghĩa was the part that had been quietly rewritten 
by the general secretary sometime in November. Nghĩa’s depiction of Chinh’s 
rewritten version made it seem even more pointed toward the land reform than 
the general secretary’s rewrite. is was done by adjusting quoted passages 
from Chinh’s rewritten version of the 1951 speech, removing lines that had 
a hint of ambiguity to them or that still bore traces of the original two-stage 
policy.
Apparently to further the legitimacy of this argument about Chinh’s speech 
as the “foundation” for the recent shi to land reform, Minh Nghĩa spent much 
of the second half of his article criticizing “many cadres” for “not yet recogniz-
ing the closely intertwined relationship between the anti-imperialist and an-
tifeudal tasks,” for “not yet looking deeply into the character of the landlord 
class,” for “not yet recognizing the crucial role of the peasant class,” and for “not 
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recognizing clearly that the landlord class is a target of the revolution while the 
peasant class is its main force.” Two of these three criticisms about the lateness 
of party members to “recognize clearly” key principles related to the land reform 
were backed up with the sentences that Trường Chinh had added to the Febru-
ary 1951 speech in his November 1952 rewrite.
e 4th Plenum of the Party’s Central Executive 
Committee: January 25–30, 1953
e rst ocial party meeting held aer ành’s return from Moscow and Bei-
jing with the basic plan for the land reform was the 4th Plenum of the Party 
Executive Committee. e decision to move forward with land reform having 
already been made, the late January plenum was the rst opportunity for DRV 
leaders to formalize and present to members of the Central Committee some of 
their thinking about basic aspects of the campaign. As was customary, ành 
delivered the opening report, setting forth in a condensed form the major ideas 
to be discussed in greater detail by his lieutenants in the Politburo (Trường 
Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, Võ Nguyên Giáp, Hoàng Quốc Việt, etc.).
e desire of VWP leaders to stay in the good graces of Stalin and Mao, 
the DRV’s sources of material and spiritual support during the war, is apparent 
in the opening lines of both ành’s and Trường Chinh’s reports. e former 
began as follows: “In opening this Meeting, speaking on behalf of the entire 
Central Committee, I begin by sending the warmest greetings to comrade Sta-
lin and comrade Mao Zedong.” Chinh was no less eusive in the opening of 
his report:
Comrades,
is meeting of the Central Committee is taking place aer the publica-
tion of comrade Stalin’s new work, Economic Issues of Socialism in the Soviet 
Union and aer the 19th Congress of the CPSU decided its new guidelines 
and tasks for pushing forward the consolidation of peace and the Soviet 
Union’s gradual move from socialism to communism.
is meeting of the Central Committee is [also] taking place aer the 
People’s Republic of China’s victorious completion of land reform, its start 
of a large-scale ve-year plan for national construction, and the prepara-
tions for general election for a National Assembly as well as for the draing 
of a Constitution.22
Frequently the workhorse in these matters, Chinh devoted the entirety of 
his report’s rst section (eight pages), titled “Our Path Has Been Further 
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Illuminated,” to a description of the ways in which Stalin’s new book, along 
with the report he delivered at the CPSU 19th Congress, served as the “ex-
tremely bright guiding light that illuminates our revolutionary path.” Accord-
ing Chinh, Stalin’s new book “further developed Marxism-Leninism” and 
included “many extremely important theoretical and practical matters.” Fur-
thermore, “Comrade Stalin showed clearly the enormous dierence between 
socialist and capitalist regimes.”
On the international front, Economic Issues of Socialism in the Soviet Union 
“illuminate for us the world situation today, enabling us to see clearly the decay 
of the capitalist system and the unceasing development of socialism.” With re-
spect to the prospects of the Soviet-led “peace movement,” Chinh quoted Stalin’s 
book: “If we want to eliminate the unavoidability of war, we need to abolish 
imperialism.” He had seized upon a line that could be interpreted as supporting 
the notion that, in ghting the French, the DRV were participating in Stalin’s 
peace movement.
According to Chinh, Stalin’s assessment of the peace movement was “truly 
clear and profound” (thật là rõ ràng, sâu sắc). And, in conclusion, “as with the 
people of other countries, our people, under the leadership of Chairman Hồ, 
are progressing along the road to peace, democracy, and socialism that comrade 
Stalin has illuminated.”23
ành’s Opening Report at the 4th Plenum
ành’s opening report devoted relatively more time to praising the results 
achieved by Mao and the PRC, particularly those related to the land reform:
e distribution of land to peasants in China has been a tremendous 
success. At the end of 1952, more than 500 million peasants enjoyed 
700 million hectares of land. Previously, every year peasants had to give 
landlords 30 million tons of rice in land tax, but now that amount belongs 
to the peasants. Because [the Chinese peasants] have escaped from the op-
pressive yoke of the landlords, they have increased production with great 
enthusiasm. e clear result is that compared with 1949, food production 
in 1950 was up 20%, and in 1952 it was up 40%. [. . .] e peasants have 
helped the Government liquidate more than two million bandits [thổ phỉ]. 
ey have dug canals and built dikes, [transporting] 1,700 million cubic 
meters of soil. is has enabled them to save 6,600,000 hectares of land 
from ooding and drought. No longer exploited by landlords, the peasants 
consume in abundance. Compared with 1949, [Chinese] peasants in 1952 
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saw their buying power increase by 25%. As a result of this, technology and 
commerce have developed quickly. Culture has also developed rapidly.24
Most of these ideas about land reform in China were then echoed by ành 
in his description of what a similar reform would bring to Vietnam. Discussion 
of that policy comprised the second of his report’s two major sections, “Mobilize 
the masses this year to completely reduce rents and interest so as to progress toward 
land reform.” Laying out the justication for land reform that would be repeated 
hundreds of times in various party publications over the next three years, ành 
linked diculties faced by the party in “bolstering its forces among the people 
and its forces for the resistance war” to the lack of proper implementation of the 
government’s order to reduce land rents, which had been promulgated shortly 
aer the 1945 August Revolution. Seven years later in the beginning of 1953, 
“some places had not reduced land rents the right amount and other places had 
not yet reduced them [at all].” As a result, in 1953 the party had to “resolutely and 
thoroughly implement rent reduction.”
How would this be done?
To do so, we need to make an eort to mobilize the peasant masses, to make 
the masses awaken and voluntarily step forward to struggle for an absolute 
reduction of rents and interests, and to seize political predominance in the 
countryside. e Party and the Government must lead, organize, help, and 
inspect [that process].
Aer rents and interest have been reduced, aer the peasants have been 
mobilized, aer our political organization has been stabilized, aer our 
forces have been adequately strengthened, aer laboring peasants have 
achieved political predominance, and aer a majority of peasants demand 
it—we will carry out land reform.25
Turning his attention to the land reform itself, ành, in a spirit similar to 
that of Trường Chinh with his editing of the 1951 speech, tried to redene an 
older two-stage slogan so that it seemed to cohere with the new move to land 
reform. He explained in his speech that “the foundation of the national issue 
is the peasant issue because the vast majority of the people are peasants.” e 
peasants were not only the “foundation of the national issue,” ành argued, but 
they were the “foundation of the democratic revolution;” they were the “largest 
revolutionary force against feudalism and imperialism.”
If the peasants were the “foundation of the democratic revolution,” why had 
the party waited seven years to carry out land reform? ành explained:
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e past few years, because of special circumstances, we only carried out 
rent and interest reduction. And to do so was correct.
But today, the resistance war has carried on for seven years now; our 
peasant countrymen have sacriced for the Fatherland and for the resis-
tance war a great deal. And they remain prepared to sacrice and contrib-
ute more still. But they remain the poorest and most miserable class of 
people because they either have too little land or no land at all. at is 
something extremely inappropriate.
If we want the resistance war to be brought to complete victory and 
people’s democracy to be truly implemented, then we must actually raise 
the economic and political interests of the peasants; we must distribute land 
to the peasants.
To carry out land reform, ành argued, would “solve a number of problems” 
for the party. First, on the military front, it was expected to make the peasants 
“even more enthusiastic about participating in the army” and help to “break apart 
the puppet army,” that is, the army of the French-backed State of Vietnam. On 
the economic front, land reform in Vietnam, as ành had described for China, 
would help the peasants to have “enough food to eat and clothes to wear, [gen-
erate] a great increase in production, and [generate] agricultural development.” 
is would result in the peasants having money to buy goods, which would help 
the growth of handicras, commerce, and technology, leading ultimately to 
the growth of industry. Moreover, carrying out land reform, ành explained, 
would make the peasants “enthusiastic about paying the agricultural tax,” which 
in turn would “bring an abundance” to the state’s nances.26
Why were the state’s nances in such a bad state of aairs at the moment? 
e answer to this question related to the planned purge of the party apparatus, 
especially at the local level. It appears that the party leaders had been seriously 
considering carrying out this purge before the end of the war as something sep-
arate from the land reform. But now, it was going to be coupled with the cam-
paign. ành explained:
e agricultural tax is still collected slowly and not to the right level. e 
Government’s policy is very correct, and our countrymen are very enthu-
siastic to contribute. Why, then, is the tax collected slowly and not to 
the correct level? e reason is that many cadres, especially at the lower 
level, have impure class backgrounds. Or, they do not grasp the Party 
and Government’s policies, do not correctly follow the mass line, and do 
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not set a good example, with the result being that they do not complete 
their duties.27
ành’s and the Politburo’s shi to land reform involved many minor changes 
to and slight misrepresentations of the past record. e content of these adjust-
ments is not as important as what they reect about the psychology of the VWP 
leaders. ey were nervous about appearances and took bizarre and tedious mea-
sures to assuage that anxiety. Part of their motivation surely stemmed from con-
cern that rank-and-le party members might suspect a connection between the 
decision to carry out land reform and ành’s secret visit to Beijing and Moscow. 
is could raise questions about the nature of the relationship between the DRV 
and its two main allies.
If ành had decided himself, without pressure from Stalin and Mao, to de-
part from the original plans and make the sudden move to land reform, would 
he and the Politburo still have felt the need to show continuity with earlier 
policy statements? I believe so. What ành, Trường Chinh, and the other 
DRV leaders expected was a quasi-religious faith in their leadership and in the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology on which it was based. at ideology was supposed 
to give them the ability to see the future, meaning that they should not have to 
contradict earlier assessments and predictions.
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e Basic Structure of the Mass Mobilization
Over the next three years (1953–1956), Nguyễn Tất Thành, Trường Chinh, 
Phạm Văn Đồng, and other party leaders would produce thousands of pages 
of explanations, clari	cations, and exhortations all dealing with aspects of the 
land reform campaign (ocially called the “mass mobilization through rent re-
duction and land reform”). In addition to these writings, an enormous amount 
of material on the campaign was produced by DRV intellectuals in the form 
of poems, short stories, reportage-style accounts, songs, and even novels. At a 
third level, the party leaders organized simple mass mobilization newspapers 
that were to be produced mostly, as it seems, by lower-level DRV journalists em-
bedded within land reform “brigades” (groups of several hundred rent-reduction 
or land-reform cadres working in one region under the control of one leader).
Most of the basic structure of the campaign, though, was explained over the 
course of 1953. The peculiarities of that structure, which I will examine pres-
ently, stemmed primarily from the inescapable logic of land reform as a tool of 
mass mobilization. The meaningful redistribution of land and belongings re-
quired that every community have some members targeted as landlords. Added 
to this basic material logic were two psychological ones. The 	rst was the party 
leadership’s intention to use the landlord class as a scapegoat for six years of 
unsuccessful economic policies and other unpleasant aspects of rural life in the 
DRV’s “liberated zones.” For this narrative to hold weight, landlords and traitors 
needed to be active in every community.
The second factor, which may have been the greater of the two, was the need 
to please Mao Zedong, the person who controlled the dispensation of the DRV’s 
Soviet aid. The party leaders had no adequate means of generating money for the 
purchase of weapons. Increasingly headed down the road to famine, their win-
dow of opportunity in the war was starting to close. They needed to inict on 
the French a major military defeat that would compel their withdrawal. A min-
imum requirement of such a victory was the continued supply (and, hopefully, 
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the increase) of Soviet weapons, which were distributed to the DRV at Chinese 
discretion. Since land reform was Mao’s policy, Thành and other DRV leaders 
must have felt pressure to implement that policy in a way that showed Vietnam-
ese Communists to be Mao’s worthy pupils.
Looking at the structure of the land reform as it was described in 1953, we can 
see that just about every oddity of the campaign stemmed in one way or another 
from the challenge of ensuring sucient targets for struggle. A crucial mecha-
nism for meeting that challenge was the landlord quota expressed as a percentage 
of the total population. Generally, the DRV leaders followed Chinese precedent 
and set that ratio at 	ve percent, with the 	gure 5.68 percent becoming standard 
toward the later waves of the campaign.1 Thành and the Politburo leaders knew 
full well that nowhere near 	ve percent of the countryside could reasonably be 
considered “landlords.”
An ocial census carried out by the DRV’s Bureau of Statistics (Nha Thống 
kê) in August of 1951 shows the arbitrary and exaggerated nature of the party’s 
	ve-percent-landord claim. In the DRV, the standard operating procedure for 
carrying out a new government policy was to choose a few “typical” (điển hình) 
areas where the policy could be tested. This test area was then supposed to serve 
as a model for other areas to follow. In the minds of the DRV leaders, the district 
of Diễn Châu in the Central Vietnamese province of Nghệ An was a typical one 
from which general conclusions could be drawn.2
The census for the agricultural tax contained forty-six dierent categories, 
one of which was social class. The regime divided social class into the 	ve cate-
gories developed by the Soviets in their assessment of the countryside: (1) Land-
less peasant (cố nông), (2) Poor peasant (bần nông), (3) Middle peasant (trung 
nông), (4) Rich peasant (phú nông), and (5) Landlord (địa chủ). According to 







Out of a total adult population of 30,147, only ninety-	ve people were identi-
	ed as landlords by cadres from the Bureau of Statistics. This meant roughly 
one landlord for every 300 people—a landlord ratio of about 0.3 percent of the 
district’s total population. The party leaders’ landlord ratio of 	ve percent was 
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roughly 	een times higher than the ratio found in the supposedly “typical” 
district of Diễn Châu less than two years earlier.
Thus, for Thành and other DRV leaders, the challenge of 	nding sucient 
landlord targets is apparent. To make the campaign work, the party leaders 
would need to 	nd ways of pressuring mass mobilization cadres into identifying 
tens of thousands of regular peasants as “cruel and despotic landlords.”
The Three Phases of the Mass Mobilization
In line with the CCP model, the DRV’s land reform was initially conceived as 
having three phases. The 	rst was called “mass mobilization for rent reduction” 
(phát động quần chúng giảm tô), the second was the “mass mobilization for land 
reform” (phát động quần chúng cải cách ruộng đất), and the third was “reinspec-
tion” (phúc tra). The more moderate “rent reduction” phase, which was to be 
the focus of 1953, was supposed to prepare the way for the much more aggres-
sive “land reform” phase. During the rent reduction phase, cadres would limit 
their attack to “ringleaders” (đầu sỏ) of the landlord class. During the succeeding 
“land reform” phase, cadres would expand the attack to the entire landlord class 
and “thoroughly implement” the slogan “land to the tiller.”
Contrary to what had been suggested in the February 1951 version of the Party 
Platform, mass mobilization would be carried out not in the part of the country 
where agricultural land ownership was most concentrated—the South—but in 
the northern half of the country. And it would be implemented only in those 
“free” areas that were under “	rm” DRV control.3 The campaign was to be de-
veloped in the manner of a “spreading oil stain.” As Trường Chinh explained, 
mass mobilization brigades under the direct control of the Central Committee 
would work together with zone and province-level party leaders to carry out 
mass mobilization in a few “representative” or “typical” subdistricts. Lessons 
from that initial experience would then serve as the basis for the prompt expan-
sion of the campaign (again, in the “spreading oil stain” manner) to surrounding 
subdistricts.
Attendees of the 4th Plenum learned that there were four basic “principles” 
to the mass mobilization campaign:
1. The mass mobilization is to be based on the urgent near-term desires of the 
majority of the masses in a locality, with cadres putting forward slogans 
that are appropriate [to those desires].
2. Cadres need to patiently educate the masses, making the majority of them 
awaken and struggle on their own volition. Cadres must absolutely not take 
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an authoritarian approach, acting in place of the masses, and cadres should 
not act as though doing favors for the masses.
3. Cadres need to 	nd loyal and zealous elements of the masses to act as back-
bones [cốt cán] to help the Party lead the movement.
4. Both peasant men and women will be mobilized, and cadres should rigor-
ously reorganize the local Peasant National Salvation Association so that 
it can serve as the core of the movement.4
With respect to the “general strategy” of the mass mobilization in its initial 
rent-reduction phase, Chinh explained that cadres would need to “rely on land-
less and poor peasants, unify closely with the middle peasants, neutralize rich 
peasants, struggle against landlords, and overthrow reactionary Vietnamese trai-
tors.” As for the speci	c strategy to be used in the struggle with the landlords, 
Chinh described it as “hit and pull them, while pulling them hit them, while 
hitting them pull them, hit them 	rst, pull them aer.”5
Preparatory Tasks for the Mass Mobilization
For the mass mobilization to attain “good results” in 1953, Trường Chinh 
stressed four preparatory tasks: (1) inspection, (2) policy preparation, (3) ideolog-
ical preparation, and (4) organizational preparation. The 	rst task, inspection, 
involved “investigating the implementation of the Party and Government’s land 
policies along with the strength of the enemy, French puppets, feudalists, and 
reactionaries.” In other words, though the mass mobilization for rent reduction 
was to be carried out in areas that were supposedly under 	rm DRV control, 
in some cases having been so for years, cadres were to assume that the “enemy” 
existed in every community. They were also to inspect each subdistrict’s 	ve 
principal political organizations: the local party cell, the Resistance Committee, 
the People’s Committee, the Peasant National Salvation Association, and the 
United Vietnam Association. Chinh instructed that mass mobilization cadres 
should “determine clearly the class backgrounds of those organizations as well 
as the thinking and conduct of subdistrict-level cadres.”6
The second item, policy preparation, involved having the government pro-
mulgate a “land law” related to the “main slogan” of 1953: “completely reduce 
rents and implement loan interest rate reduction.” Chinh explained that, in ad-
dition to and separate from the government’s land reform law would be an in-
ternal directive released by the Central Committee “stating clearly the peasants’ 
political program of struggle as well as the disciplinary regulations for cadres in 
their implementation of the land policy.” It appears that “cadres” here refers to 
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local cadres rather than to the outside cadres who would be sent into communi-
ties to carry out mass mobilization.
The third item, thought preparation (chuẩn bị tư tưởng), referred to the par-
ty’s eorts to “propagandize, explain, and publicize the land policy” with the 
goal being to “win over the thinking of cadres, party members, and regular peo-
ple.” Perhaps with the thousands of future land reform cadres in mind, upon 
whom the DRV leaders would need to rely for carrying out the mass mobiliza-
tion, Chinh stressed the need to overcome ways of thinking that were likely to 
hinder the movement: “fear of harming [national] unity, fear of landlord resis-
tance, contempt for the [power] of the landlord class, or pessimism in assessing 
the basic situation resulting in [a cadre’s] not daring to mobilize the masses, etc.” 
It appears that the Politburo, from the campaign’s beginning, was realistic about 
the enormous challenge posed by the task of compelling thousands of cadres to 
	nd tens of thousands of landlords who simply did not exist.
Finally, the fourth item was organizational preparation. This meant “con-
centrating cadres, teaching them the policy, and organizing them into individu-
ally commanded brigades (đoàn) so that they could help localities mobilize the 
masses and help the Central Committee lead the mass movement.”7
The Method for Inspiring Attacks on Landlords
By early 1953, the Politburo had already begun to use “speak bitterness” (tố khổ) 
sessions as a means of aiding the consolidation of DRV power in areas that had 
recently been won from the French and the State of Vietnam. In those circum-
stances, cadres were to go into recently “liberated” villages and organize meet-
ings where peasants would be prompted to speak publicly about the terrible 
condition of life in the village while under enemy control. Organizing “speak 
bitterness” sessions would be a fundamental part of a land reform cadre’s work 
in a village. In these sessions, cadres had to help peasants “describe the crimes of 
landlords” so as to “topple the prestige of the landlords and raise the prestige of 
the peasants.” Through participation in “speak bitterness” sessions, the peasant 
masses “would be educated to develop their class consciousness.”
As for the particulars of how the struggle during these “speak bitterness” ses-
sions would be carried out, Trường Chinh explained:
The struggle must be dierentiated according to whether the target is big 
or small and the character of each type. [Land reform cadres and peasants] 
need to combine the following forms of struggle: struggle through argu-
ment (base oneself on reality and crush the mealy-mouthed arguments of 
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the landlords); struggle through force (use the power of the masses to force 
the landlord into submission), struggle through law (use the law of the state 
to deal with cruel and stubborn landlords).
Despite the menacing tone of his description, Chinh insisted that “during the 
struggle, [cadres and peasants?] absolutely may not use torture, may not strike 
out rashly, and may not kill indiscriminately.”8
Two Speeches by Nguyễn Tất Thành
Speech 1: All-Nation Meeting of Peasant and 
People’s Mobilization (February 5, 1953)
The People’s Mobilization Organization (Dân vận) had been put together and 
expanded by the party leadership in the earliest days of the 1945 August Revolu-
tion. It appears that the “peasant mobilization” branches of that overall organi-
zation would end up being transformed during the mass mobilization campaign 
into the party’s Land Reform Committees (Ủy ban cải cách ruộng đất). On 
February 5, 1953, members of these committees listened to Thành speak about 
the coming campaign:
Our country must head toward true democracy. True democracy is 	ghting 
against the feudal landlords and the imperialists.
Aer 80 years of slavery, our people have risen up and overthrown the 
imperialists to win independence. The feudal landlords are scheming to 
sell out our country. Who is in the puppet Government? Bảo Đại and 
other ringleaders are all great feudal landlords. The imperialists exploit 
the feudal landlords to steal our country. The feudal landlords cling to the 
imperialists in order to oppress and exploit our people. Therefore, if we 
want to be victorious in the resistance war, we need to overthrow not only 
the imperialists but also the feudal landlords.9 
Thành then turned his attention to the precedent set by other countries in 
the Communist bloc:
The new democracies like China and North Korea along with the European 
[new] democracies all distribute land to the peasants. The basic content of 
the democratic revolution is liberating peasants and giving them land. The 
content of the national revolution is also the liberation of peasants. True 
democracy exists only when the peasants truly hold political power in the 
countryside, when the peasants have been liberated.
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The timing of the shi to land reform, being a departure from earlier theoretical 
statements and policies, continued to be a source of anxiety for Thành. Again, 
the current demonization of landlords inevitably raised questions about yester-
day’s alliance with them. Had the earlier policy between incorrect? As Thành 
again explained, because of the “special circumstances” in which the August 
Revolution had occurred, the party leaders had opted only to carry out rent and 
debt reduction. To do so was correct; the problem was that these policies had not 
been “implemented thoroughly.”
The Party and Government’s policies are correct, so why have they not 
been implemented thoroughly?
One reason is that cadres have not understood the policies and have 
lacked a 	rm political standpoint. They have wanted to win the hearts of 
both the peasants and the landlords, and sometimes of the landlords more. 
Another reason is that cadres have been out for themselves. Although they 
are Party members, their feudal landlord tails have stuck out. They have 
not yet scrubbed themselves clean of their feudal landlord thinking. They 
get the peasants to lead the charge but do not join the charge themselves. 
[Local cadres] have even been corrupt and wasteful. Cadres from the zone 
down through the province, district, and commune levels have all, more or 
less, committed the above mistakes. Basically, the minds of cadres are still 
heavily infused with landlord thinking.
All of you need to scrub yourselves clean of feudal landlord thinking.10
Lest his audience at the “people’s mobilization” meeting lose heart—most of 
them probably came from elite families—Thành oered some words of encour-
agement. There were “a few” landlords who had become revolutionaries. Despite 
their landlord backgrounds, these revolutionaries “stood on the side of the pro-
letariat and were members of the working class.” Harkening back to his days as a 
Comintern agent in Republican China during the 1920s, Thành instructed his 
audience to think of the Chinese revolutionary Peng Pai:
Probably all of you have heard of comrade Peng Pai in China. He came 
from a great feudal landlord family, but he organized and led the peasants 
to struggle with great ferocity against the feudal landlords.
It is true that family background matters. However, if a person comes 
from a landlord family but stands 	rmly on the side of the peasants, that 
person is no longer a landlord. In China they refer to landlords who wel-
come land reform as “civilized notables.” Therefore, if you resolutely scrub 
146 chapter 7
yourselves clean of your landlord thinking, even if you come from a land-
lord family you can still participate in the revolution.11
Then Thành turned his attention to tasks associated with serving as a land 
reform cadre, a job that most of his audience had been selected to perform. The 
fact that the party’s rent-reduction policy still had not been carried out “thor-
oughly” four years aer the promulgation of the 1949 Rent Reduction Decree 
showed that the problem was “not simple.” Indeed, according to Thành, the 
problem was one of “class warfare, with the peasant class struggling against the 
landlord class.” The mass mobilization was like a “military campaign,” Thành 
explained, but it was larger than the Hòa Bình province or Northwest cam-
paigns because it would be “implemented throughout the entire country.” And 
like all other military campaigns, he added, the mass mobilization needed to 
be well organized and carefully led with clear policies. “As is the case when we 
attack the enemy, we need to know what we can do, what we cannot yet do, how 
to do it, what the 	rst step is, the second, and third.”
What was the key to following the appropriate plan and leading the mass mo-
bilization correctly? According to Thành, a mass mobilization cadre’s “political 
standpoint had to be solid and his thinking clear.” This would contribute to a 
cadre’s having “unity of thinking and action, unity of theory and practice.” An-
other key to success was the “absolute avoidance of subjective thinking.” Thành’s 
explanation of what “subjective thinking” meant was hardly clear, but seemed to 
have something to do with not being fooled by appearances:
[The cadre who is guilty of subjective thinking] imagines that, with a 
method and a policy, everything can be accomplished smoothly. He is 
so interested in grasping everything, in doing everything, and doing it 
quickly, that he fails to grasp the main point. Experience has shown that 
the landlord class has a great many schemes, is extremely Machiavellian 
[xảo quyệt], and extremely cruel. . . . The landlord class has a thousand 
ruses, from buying o cadres, to inviting cadres to eat, to oering cadres 
their daughters. [The landlords] even sabotage the harvest, sow disorder, 
and assassinate both cadres and peasants. The landlords stop at no evil 
scheme, and dealing with them is no easy task. They have thousands of 
years of experience in their reign and have many wicked tricks. If we un-
derestimate the enemy, we will fail.12
Thus, according to Thành, a cadre who entered a village that had been under 
DRV control for years, as was especially the case in the early part of the mass 
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mobilization campaign, and found himself treated hospitably and respectfully 
by a local “landlord,” should see that behavior as a “wicked trick,” a “Machiavel-
lian” scheme to sabotage the mass mobilization. To take that polite behavior at 
face value, it appears, was to be “subjective.” To impose on that community the 
party’s narrative of landlord treachery, regardless of how things appeared, was 
to be “objective.”
Before ending his speech to these peasant mobilization cadres, Thành gave 
them one last instruction:
There is one more thing that you need to understand: The Party leads the 
peasants; the peasants do not lead the Party. All of you need to recognize 
clearly that you are the working class leading the peasants. The cadre who 
says “I am standing in for the peasants” is speaking incorrectly. As a party 
member, you need to serve the peasants and lead them in their resistance 
struggle to build the country, but you do not stand in the position of the 
peasant.13
This appears to be a vague warning to prospective land reform cadres that peas-
ants, though supposedly the bene	ciaries of the reform, might not all appreciate 
the program brought into their communities by cadres.
Speech 2: Opening Ceremony of Thought-Reform 
Class for Central Committee Oces
A second Thành speech targeted “intellectuals” who had been recruited to 
work as aides in Central Committee oces and who were just beginning their 
“thought reform” course. As we saw earlier, the overall goal of thought reform 
was to cleanse party members of “petit-bourgeois thinking,” or—as was being 
stressed more and more frequently, “landlord thinking.” The basic method in-
volved dividing students into small groups in which individuals would have to 
carry out criticism and self-criticism. The leaders of the thought reform would 
put forward a pool of possible sins and a cadre would need to choose the ones 
that seemed most appropriate in his or her speci	c case, oering a public expla-
nation for how, where, and why this sin had become manifest.
Thành began his speech to these intellectuals by pointing out the basic ac-
complishments of the “heroic” party: carrying out the August Revolution and 
leading the people in the resistance war.
If the Party is so perfect, why do we have to reform it? The reason is that, 
while there are a number of model party members, who put everything into 
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serving the revolution, the people, and the [working] class, there are still a 
number, and that number is not small, of party members who do not cor-
rectly implement the Party and Government’s policies, who do not follow 
correctly the line of the people, who are still hare-brained.
Those party members are not yet sound in character, so they must be 
reformed.14
Thành then addressed the notion, apparently common among DRV writers 
and artists, that the party did not appreciate or respect intellectuals. This was 
not true, he explained, since revolutionary parties needed teachers to raise the 
people’s cultural level, doctors to raise the people’s health, and engineers to de-
velop technology. “In summary, the revolution really needs intellectuals, and, in 
actuality, only the revolution knows how to value intellectuals.” In fact, Thành 
argued, “the only intellectuals who are able to develop, who are respected, and 
who are nurtured, are those in the Soviet Union and in the other new demo-
cratic countries.”
As for DRV intellectuals, they had “many, of course not few, weaknesses that 
were the result of feudal-imperialist brainwashing and a divisive, slave-oriented 
education.” More speci	cally, Thành stated, intellectuals were “individ-
ualistic, irresolute, hesitant, detached, conservative, self-deprecating, and 
status-conscious.” To overcome these “weaknesses,” what intellectuals needed 
to do 	rst was carry out “thought reform.”
Aer carrying out self-criticism, the 	rst step in the reform, you will have a 
political standpoint with respect to which side you stand on. At that time, 
you will need to be resolute, determined, and solid.
Are you going to stand on the side of those who are oppressed—the 
workers and peasants—or are you going to stand on the side of the exploit-
ers? You must make up your mind—you can’t sit on two chairs.
Be sure! Be resolute! Are you going to stand on the side of the peasants 
or on that of the landlords? Probably you also know: What forces do the 
imperialists rely upon? Vietnamese traitors, feudalists, and landlords.
Who are the Vietnamese traitors? They are all feudal landlords, with a 
number of [Vietnamese traitors] coming from the ranks of the comprador 
bourgeoisie as well.15 
Perhaps as a means of motivating his audience, which was composed of both 
party-and nonparty members, Thành spoke of major changes afoot. Part of that 
change would involve inviting people outside of the party’s ranks to “participate 
in meetings, to speak, and to criticize.”
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If a Party member does not set a good example, a person outside the Party 
can speak up and say that he is not worthy of membership. Or those outside 
the party who act in an exemplary way can request that the Party recognize 
them as members.
The Party will become truly a Party of the popular masses. Only in this 
way can weaknesses be 	xed and strengths developed.
The opportunist elements who entered the Party will be inspected by 
the Party and by the people. These opportunists will be purged and the 
Party will become puri	ed, exemplary, and sincere in its service of the peo-
ple and the revolution. All the new party members will become exemplary 
people, unifying and helping those people outside the Party.
That step is no longer far o for the Party.16
Foreshadowing the central role that denunciation would have in the coming 
mass mobilization, Thành’s comment was a warning to DRV intellectuals that 
their positions were not secure.
The Three Mass Mobilization Directives: 
149/SL, 150/SL, and 151/SL
As preparation for the land reform campaign, Thành, playing the role of Hồ 
Chí Minh, the democratically elected chairman of the DRV state, signed three 
decrees on May 12, 1953: (1) Decree 149/SL On Land Policy, (2) Decree 150/SL 
On the Establishment of Special People’s Courts, and (3) Decree 151/SL On the 
Punishment of Landlords. These provided a legal veneer for the campaign. As 
with most DRV decrees, they began with the lines, “In consideration of current 
needs and following the resolution of the Council of Ministers aer coming to 
agreement with the National Assembly Standing Committee . . .” Again, the 
idea was to make the impetus and content of the decrees seem to come from 
facts-on-the-ground analysis carried out by the Council of Ministers and the 
National Assembly rather than from Thành in response to pressure from Stalin 
and Mao. The three decrees, along with a related “edict” from the prime min-
ister’s oce, appeared in The People’s May 21, 1953 issue, which was specially 
devoted to the mass mobilization.17
Decree 149 on Land Policy
The 	rst of the three decrees, “On Land Policy,” contained 40 dierent clauses 
divided into eight sections dealing with such things as land and rent reduction; 
the distribution or handling of donated, public, uncultivated, or absentee-owner 
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land; and (in the 	nal section) the creation of a government oce for imple-
menting land policy. Decree 149 on land policy stated, as the party leaders had 
agreed internally, that land rents were to be reduced by 25 percent from their 
level before the 1945 August Revolution and that landlords were not to demand 
in rent any more than one third of the harvest. The more important question 
was the extent to which rents could be reduced. “In the case of rented land being 
of poor quality or hard to farm, requiring a lot of work, the rent might need to be 
reduced by 50 percent or even more. This issue will be determined by the Peasant 
Association or through a peasant discussion session.”
“Decree 149/SL on Land Policy” had some interesting clauses dealing with 
debt reduction. The 	rst part of the decree listed all the circumstances that 
would lead to the complete abolition of a debt. Three of the four were reason-
able, but probably not especially meaningful for peasants. One stated that all 
debts accrued before 1945 were to be waived. It is hard to imagine that, by 1953, 
aer the upheavals brought about by eight years of war, many peasants worried 
about having to pay a debt from 1944 or earlier. Perhaps more applicable was 
the clause stating that a debtor who had already paid back twice the value of 
the original loan would be absolved of having to make any further payment. It 
also seems to have been reasonable to dismiss the debts accrued by people who 
had died serving the war eort in some way. The most ominous clause, from the 
perspective of the coming mass mobilization, was the one stating that any debt 
owed to a person convicted of being a Vietnamese traitor would be abolished. 
In other words, for those who were in debt, Decree 149 provided a way out: 
denounce one’s lender as a Vietnamese traitor.
Decree 150: On the Establishment of Special People’s Courts
The mass mobilization campaign would operate outside the government’s normal 
judicial system, being served instead by a system of “Special People’s Courts” (Tòa 
an Nhân dân Đặc biệt). As Decree 150 explained, these courts were to be estab-
lished as a temporary district-level (or interdistrict) judicial institution according 
to the recommendation of the provincial-level Resistance Committee and the ap-
proval of the Interzone-level Resistance Committee. The courts were to operate 
under the leadership of the provincial Resistance Committee and travel from sub-
district to subdistrict in areas undergoing mass mobilization, passing judgement 
on cases in each locality. “When the Special People’s Court carries out its work, it 
must rely on the masses in a particular locale to help the court inspect and collect 
real evidence. And the court needs to deliver its verdicts quickly.”
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What speci	cally were the cases that the Special People’s Courts would try? 
Decree 150 listed three basic categories that fell under the traveling courts’ 
jurisdiction:
a. Punish counterrevolutionaries, cruel despots, and those who resist or sab-
otage the land policies.
b. Adjudicate conicts over property and land involved in the cases above 
[outlined in number one].
c. Adjudicate conicts over class demarcation.
The decree’s sixth clause stated that “When questioning [a defendant], beat-
ing and torture must absolutely not be used.” The ubiquity of “beating,” “tor-
ture,” and other forms of abuse during the campaign suggest that Thành and 
the Politburo inserted this clause primarily for propaganda purposes. Privately, 
they probably understood that torture would be necessary to obtain confes-
sions in many cases because far too few actual landlords or traitors existed in 
DRV-controlled areas. How else other than through torture could mass mo-
bilization cadres convince a loyal party member to confess to being a traitor or 
a Nationalist Party member? Publicly, “Hồ Chí Minh,” the Politburo, and the 
DRV government could not appear to tolerate or advocate torture. Internally, 
they gave the mass mobilization apparatus a mission that could not be accom-
plished without it.
Decree 151: The Punishment of Landlords
The decree on the punishment of landlords contained fourteen clauses, which 
described various crimes and their punishments ranging from light (three to ten 
years in prison) to heavy (life imprisonment and execution). The lighter crimes, 
for the most part, included various actions that the accused landlord might take 
to save himself or otherwise “sabotage” the mass mobilization campaign. An im-
portant one in this category was “dispersing” (phân tán) his land and belongings 
in order to escape classi	cation as a landlord:
In order to inspect and resolve correctly the conicts over land that arise 
during the mobilization of the peasant masses, landlords may not disperse 
their property, belongings, or land in any of the following ways: pawn o, 
sell, give away, distribute as inheritance, or any other secret scheme.
Again, the Politburo’s fear of not having enough targets for struggle is appar-
ent. Landlords were also forbidden from slaughtering and eating their livestock, 
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from spreading antigovernment rumors, and from doing anything that would 
“damage the peasants’ unity.”
With respect to the more serious crimes, these included the following:
1. Allying with the imperialists, the puppet administration, or spies. Founding 
or leading reactionary organizations or political parties intended to 	ght 
against the government, to sabotage the resistance war, to hurt the people, 
and to murder the peasants, cadres, or government employees.
2. Allying with the imperialists and the puppet administration in order to 
establish or lead armed organizations for the purpose of insurrection.
3. Beating and injuring, beating to death, or assassinating peasants, cadres, or 
government employees.
4. Committing arson against houses, supply stores, food, harvested crops, or 
irrigation systems.
5. Inciting or leading a group of people to sow disorder.
These crimes could be punished by long prison terms or execution. However, 
as clause seven stated: “If a person who has committed any of the above crimes 
sincerely confesses to them before the crimes have been discovered, that person, 
depending on the seriousness of his crime and the genuineness of his repentance, 
will be treated with more leniency or even pardoned altogether.” This clause 
seems to have been aimed at tempting the accused into false confessions as a 
survival strategy. The false confessions would have the eect of arming the 
party’s narrative of the countryside as riddled with traitors, spies, cruel land-
lords, Nationalist Party members, etc. As for the average person in the village, 
the directive stated that he “has the right and the responsibility to denounce any 
person he knows to have committed one of the above crimes.”
The Five Steps of Mass Mobilization at the Village Level
At some point in August of 1953, the Politburo became concerned about the 
length of time mass mobilization cadres were spending in villages. Thus, in Sep-
tember, Trường Chinh released a directive that explained in more detail the 
	ve steps of mass mobilization and even provided the number of days each step 
should require. The following is a condensed version of the document as it ap-
pears in the Party Documents series.
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1. Step One (10 days): “Propagandize, educate, and strike root.”
Propagandize. Upon entering his assigned village, the land reform cadre was to 
hold meetings with residents for the purpose of propagandizing the mass mobi-
lization through rent reduction policy and its goal of preparing the way for land 
reform later. At these initial village meetings, the cadre was to announce “regu-
lations” for the punishment of landlords who did not follow the law. Landlords 
were to be supervised as a means of preventing acts of sabotage from the “trai-
tors” and “cruel despots” among their ranks. In order to “sow divisions among” 
(phân hóa) and to “settle down” the landlord class, the cadre was to announce 
that dierent types of landlords would be treated dierently.
Educate. Trường Chinh wanted mass mobilization cadres to begin by edu-
cating members of the local party cell about the government’s land policy and 
about the cell’s responsibility during the mass mobilization process. Aer this, 
the cadre was to make members of the party cell carry out self-criticism with 
respect to their implementation, past and present, of the party and government’s 
policies. Following this initial instruction and self-criticism, the mass mobiliza-
tion cadre was to expel from the cell those who had committed “big mistakes.” 
The rest were to either help investigate the “landlord situation” in the commu-
nity or to take charge over monitoring the activities of “village bullies” so that, 
in the case of any trouble, the mass mobilization team could be noti	ed in time.
Strike Roots. Aer educating and purging the local party cell, the mass mo-
bilization cadre was to 	nd one or two enthusiastic “roots” (rễ). This referred 
to members of the poor peasant class who could form the basis of a core group 
of “backbone” elements to lead the attack against the landlord class. As Chinh 
explained, mass mobilization cadres were to identify “one or two good people 
and carry out a preliminary mobilization of their thinking.” Aer that, these 
“roots” were to recruit other poor locals to the cause. The land reform cadre was 
then to “divide up and investigate” these new people, train them and, if neces-
sary and possible, “survey the masses” to 	nd out what the broader community 
thought about these “backbone” recruits. As Chinh reassured the mass mobili-
zation apparatus, “This method yields correct results and is also quick. In every 
subdistrict, 	nd 15 to 20 people.”18
2. Step Two (10 days): Hold study meetings with 
the roots and select the targets of struggle.
Aer the mass mobilization cadre had found his or her “roots,” he or she was 
to bring them to the “focal point subdistrict” (xã trọng điểm) where they could 
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observe the mobilization process and further study its policies and goals. The 
majority of the mass mobilization cadres, unless they needed to remain in their 
communities to continue investigating the situation, were also to converge on 
the “focal point commune” to participate in the study sessions. These were to 
involve “speak bitterness” sessions to further “raise the class consciousness” of the 
local recruits and to teach the mass mobilization cadres more about the “land-
lord situation” in their assigned village.
Aer discussing the policy and the situation, the cadres and roots were to 
come up with a “concrete plan” for carrying out the mobilization in each sub-
district. They were to determine which landlords would be targeted for struggle 
and which would be sent to the provincial authorities for study. According to 
Trường Chinh, “The mass mobilization team needs to verify and grasp the list 
of struggle targets (in each subdistrict, there should be from 1 to 3 people, except 
especially populous subdistricts of over 10,000 people, where 4 to 5 targets may 
be chosen and no more). If the number of landlords for struggle cannot be set 
during this phase, there is no need to force things as the number can be deter-
mined later.”
3. Step Three (10 days): “Organize the spreading of contacts [xâu chuỗi] 
and carry out a preliminary reform of [political] organizations.”
According to Chinh’s instructions, the third step of mass mobilization would 
begin about three weeks aer the cadre’s arrival in his or her assigned village:
Aer the roots have returned to their subdistricts, the district-level Party 
Committee will, basing itself on the list of struggle targets determined at 
the meeting, notify the Subdistrict Party Committee to announce the sur-
veillance of those landlords selected to be targets of struggle. (This is to 
prevent them from carrying out sabotage, running away, or committing 
suicide.) As for the second-and third-rank cruel and despotic landlords 
who were not selected for struggle, the provincial-level Party Committee 
should announce that these landlords are to be sent to the provincial head-
quarters for study.
This, according to Chinh, had the advantage of reducing the concerns of the 
masses and reducing the incidence of suicide or sabotage. It also would help 
to avoid having the scope of the struggle broaden while the masses were being 
mobilized.19
It was during this third step (still only ten days) that the mass mobilization 
cadre was to make more contacts with poor peasants and to train them how to 
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carry out the “speak bitterness” sessions. This meant teaching local recruits how 
to speak about their lives using the party’s vocabulary of class warfare. All hard-
ships were to be attributed, in one way or another, to the alleged crimes of land-
lords. The cadre was then to send these local recruits throughout the community 
to organize similar sessions, recruiting more adherents. When twenty percent of 
the local population had been recruited in this speak bitterness movement, the 
cadre was to announce the establishment of a new Peasants Association com-
posed of these recruits. “Good” poor peasants who had been members of the old 
Peasant Association and who had participated in the speak bitterness sessions 
could become members of the new Peasant Association.
What was to happen to the “second-and third-rank cruel despotic landlords” 
who had been sent away to the province for study? The directive explained that 
the province-level Resistance Committee needed to “clearly point out their feu-
dal crimes of oppression and exploitation, explain the policy to them, and state 
clearly the principle on which the Government shall deal with them.” As Trường 
Chinh explained, “only if they sincerely bow their heads and admit their crimes 
will they avoid being put before the peasants as a target of struggle.” If these 
“landlords” were compliant in that demand, they were to be forced to “carry out 
a self-criticism, to analyze it, and then to promise that they will implement the 
[party’s] policies.”20
Indeed, the directive went on to command the Provincial Resistance Com-
mittee to “make a tally of truths about the landlords’ crimes and send it back 
to the subdistrict so that the tally can be compared with the peasants’ speak 
bitterness documents.” The mass mobilization cadre was supposed to check for 
discrepancies or places where the second and third rank landlords had “lacked 
thoroughness” in their confessions. If such an issue were found, the landlord 
would have to do his confession and analysis again. Even aer completing 
their confessions with the Provincial Resistance Committee, these second-and 
third-rank landlords still had to return to their villages and issue a variety of dif-
ferent apologies to their “victims” individually and to the community publicly.21
4. Step Four (10–15 days): “Overthrow the cruel despots, redistribute 
the landlord’s belongings obtained through struggle.”
In the fourth step, roughly a month from the time the mass mobilization cadre 
had entered the village, he or she had to organize the struggle session(s) (cuộc 
đấu). Sharing characteristics of a staged show, the struggle session required the 
cadre to play the role of theater director. As the directive explained, “thorough 
preparations” had to be made for this crucial event. These included “prepping 
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the poor-peasant victims” so that they could deliver convincing public denunci-
ations, collecting documents on the “crimes” of the landlords targeted for strug-
gle, 	nding and organizing witnesses to verify the alleged crimes, and organizing 
the public meeting that was to become a struggle session. Once the meeting had 
been called and the stage properly set, with the selected landlords, their poor 
peasant denouncers, and the supporting witnesses in place before the gathered 
audience, the session was to “begin immediately.”22
Aer the struggle session had begun, it was crucial that it be “victorious.” As 
Trường Chinh explained, “if the struggle session fails, immediately 	gure out 
the reasons why, mobilize the masses again, organize another struggle session, 
and do not stop until the struggle targets have been ‘knocked out’ (bị ngã gục).” 
As the party leaders repeatedly stressed, “when carrying out the struggle session, 
only arguments and the law should be used—the use of torture and beating is 
strictly forbidden.”23
Another important clari	cation that Trường Chinh made about the struggle 
sessions was that they should be limited to the targets placed on the list during 
the general meeting of cadres and “roots” that occurred during the second step. 
Cadres “may not drag out for struggle people who were not originally set as 
struggle targets.” The focus was to be on a few “ring leaders” (đầu sỏ), the ma-
jority coming from the landlord class, and cadres were not allowed to deviate 
from the original plan and “expand the scope of the attack.” The Special People’s 
Courts were to be used primarily to support the cases that involved landlords 
targeted for the public struggle sessions.
Chinh provided only one instruction concerning the function of these mo-
bile courts: “The Special People’s Court should coordinate with the struggle 
sessions, trying the cases in a timely fashion.” That was the only sentence in the 
entire directive about how these makeshi courts were to function. There was 
no mention, for example, of how cadres and members of the Special People’s 
Court might work together to consider the various cases or what the procedure 
would be if disagreement occurred between the two sides. The ability to judge 
cases “rapidly” to maintain the remarkable speed of the mass mobilization pro-
cess seems to have been the most valued quality of the court.24
Some of the important secondary tasks of the mass mobilization for rent 
reduction were to be carried out at roughly the same time as the struggle ses-
sions. “During the period of the struggle sessions or aer their conclusion, cad-
res should immediately carry out rent reduction, the collection of back rents, 
and the reduction of debts.” This was also the time to con	scate the land and 
property of “French imperialists, Vietnamese traitors, reactionaries, and the 	rst 
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rank of cruel despots against whom the struggle was to be aimed.” As for the 
other “Vietnamese traitors,” the directive explained, the masses would subse-
quently supply evidence (“documents”) to the local police, who would then carry 
out further investigations, with the cases being decided in the normal “people’s 
courts.” The period aer the conclusion of the struggle session was also the time 
to deal with the second-and third-rank landlords who had recently returned 
from their “study” session with the provincial Resistance Committee. Their 
cases were also to be handled by the local police and normal courts.
The 	nal task of the fourth step was the redistribution of the land and prop-
erty that had been con	scated from “Vietnamese traitors, reactionaries, and 
cruel despots.” Chinh instructed that land was to be distributed on a temporary 
rather than permanent basis during the mass mobilization for rent reduction. 
(During the coming land reform phase of the mass mobilization, the land would 
all be redistributed on a permanent basis.) With respect to the con	scated be-
longings (“bualos, farm tools, rice, etc.”), this was to be distributed among the 
community according to need and as fairly as possible. At the same time, though, 
the mass mobilization cadre had to provide some special privileges in this matter 
to the “poor-peasant victims” (khổ chủ) who had done the lion’s share of the de-
nouncing during the struggle session. Therefore, they were to receive (a perhaps 
disappointing) ten to twenty percent of the goods obtained from the struggle 
target whom they denounced.25
5. Step Five: “Reorganize local Party cell, educate 
the masses, and divide up the subdistrict.”
The primary task of this 	nal step was the “reorganization” of the local party 
cell. For the most part, this reorganization was to involve the expulsion of “land-
lords” from the party, but this was not always the case. If a landlord seemed to 
merit staying in the party, he could be permitted to do so, but he had to be sent 
to another region to work. “Young intellectual” party members who were the 
ospring of landlords and who wanted to “improve themselves,” were also to be 
sent out of the village. But, interestingly, they were to be sent to a mass mobi-
lization brigade (rent reduction or, later, land reform) in some other locality to 
work as cadres for the campaign.
Another secondary task of the mass mobilization was the partitioning of the 
subdistrict. It might be split into two subdistricts, with a new name given to one 
or both parts. Similarly, villages that had originally been a part of one subdistrict 
might be cut o and joined together with nearby villages that had belonged to 
a dierent subdistrict. The creation of new administrative boundaries provided 
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an opportunity for the establishment of new political organizations, reinforc-
ing the overall theme of change in the countryside brought about by the mass 
mobilization.26
And 	nally, the mass mobilization cadre needed to take the time during this 
last step “to educate the masses, to make the bulk of the peasant masses truly 
recognize that Chairman Hồ, the Workers’ Party, the Government, and the peo-
ple’s army belong to them and serve them—and through that recognition, the 
masses shall gain the determination to follow Chairman Hồ and the Party.”27
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Propagandizing the Land Reform
Nguyễn Thị Năm (1906–1953), the most famous target of the land reform cam-
paign, came from a family of traders who lived in a Hanoi suburb. As a young 
woman, she married the son of a wealthy businessman in Haiphong. According 
to the scholar Alex Thai Vo, Thị Năm’s husband quickly proved to be a poor 
partner both romantically and nancially. A heavy opium addiction combined 
with frequent philandering led him to burn steadily through his ample inher-
itance, forcing his smart and beautiful wife to assume the role of family bread-
winner. She began with a noodle shop and then shied to the scrap metal busi-
ness, soon accumulating enough money to establish her own trading company 
named Cát-Hanh-Long. Her success in the metal trade earned her the moniker, 
“Queen of Iron.” In 1943, Thị Năm purchased the largest plantation in northern 
Vietnam. Located in the middle of Thái Nguyên province, about 50 kilometers 
due north of Hanoi, the estate became a favored source of hospitality and protec-
tion for top party leaders during the dangerous years of the Second World War.1
The Vietnamese historian Dương Trung Quốc explains that Thị Năm met 
the party leaders through an early friendship in Haiphong with the revolution-
ary writer, Nguyễn Đình Thi. Highly patriotic, Thị Năm became a supporter of 
the party; her two sons joined the revolutionary movement and became ocers 
in the People’s Liberation Army. Dương Trung Quốc only mentions the party 
leaders Võ Nguyên Giáp and Nguyễn Chí Thanh as having enjoyed the hospi-
tality of her plantation in Thái Nguyên province.2 But other sources suggest that 
her guest list was broader. The managing editor of The People, Hoàng Tùng, for 
example, writes that Politburo members Trường Chinh, Hoàng Quốc Việt, and 
Lê Đức Thọ “frequently had meals at her house.”3
In addition to oering party members the use of her estate in Thái Nguyên 
province and supporting her two sons’ involvement in revolutionary activities, 
Thị Năm provided the early DRV government with nancial support. Looking 
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back at the revolutionary newspaper Democracy, which was run by party mem-
bers in Haiphong, we see a front-page article about Thị Năm in the September 
29, 1945 issue. The title of the article is “The Gold Record has been Broken! Ms. 
Cat-Hanh-Long Donates 110 lạng of Gold.”4 This was a reference to the party’s 
“gold week” campaign carried out from September 16 to 23 (primarily in Hanoi 
and Haiphong, it appears) to encourage donations to the regime.
In light of the false accusations later leveled at Thị Năm during the land 
reform, another important piece of evidence about her life is a September 1944 
article about her estate. The article, written by the respected Hanoi intellectual 
and future DRV supporter Vũ Đình Hòe, was published in his le-leaning jour-
nal, Forum. To research his article, Hòe spent a day at Thị Năm’s plantation, 
interviewing its manager extensively and also questioning some of its tenant 
farmers. Thị Năm’s manager stated that he had been given “full power of deci-
sion” at the estate. It does not appear that Thị Năm or anyone in her family spent 
much time at the property in the years aer purchasing it. In his investigation of 
the estate’s tenant farmers, Hòe found them to be poor and struggling. However, 
this stemmed mostly from the estate’s overall deterioration and from Vietnam’s 
economic struggles at the time. According to Hòe’s research, these farmers paid 
thirty percent of their harvest to Thị Năm’s estate. This was comparable to the 
maximum land-rent rate put forward by Trường Chinh in his 1952 party direc-
tive on land rents.5
In 1947, the party leaders had shied their secret headquarters from Bắc Cạn 
province to a remote location in the middle of Thái Nguyên province only about 
30 kilometers west of Thị Năm’s plantation. How it happened that the party 
leaders chose Thị Năm to be the model “cruel and despotic landlord,” whose 
trial and execution would kick o the land reform, remains unclear. The man-
aging editor of The People, Hoàng Tùng, was apparently invited to attend many 
Politburo meetings, including the one during which Thị Năm was chosen for 
this unfortunate propaganda role. In later years, Tùng provided a brief descrip-
tion of what he claimed to remember:
The decision to have Nguyễn Thị Năm as the rst person [to be targeted in 
the land reform as a cruel and despotic landlord] was the result of someone 
having suggested her to the Chinese advisers. At the Politburo meeting, 
Uncle [i.e., Nguyễn Tất Thành] said: “I agree that a person who has com-
mitted crimes needs to be tried, but I think it is immoral if the rst bullet 
is aimed at a woman, especially when that person has helped the revolution. 
The French say not to strike a woman, even if one hits her with a ower.” 
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Aerward, the Chinese adviser La Quý Ba [Luo Guibo] continued to in-
sist, and Uncle said: “I will follow the majority, but of course I still think it 
is not right.” And they just continued to do it.6
Other observers, notably Nguyễn Quang Duy, in his article “Hồ Chí Minh’s 
Role in the Land Reform,”7 have, by looking at the written record, raised ques-
tions about the plausibility of Hoàng Tùng’s account.
Over a span of four and a half months, from March 1 to July 21, 1953, The Peo-
ple published six articles about the struggle against Thị Năm. The rst ve were 
long, journalistic “accounts” of what was allegedly transpiring with her case. The 
author of those articles was a young man named Trần Đĩnh. Sixty-one years later 
in 2014, he published a memoir (Turning Lamp: The Fate of Vietnam under the 
Communist Regime) in which he discussed the episode.
Two aspects of Đĩnh’s account of the Nguyễn Thị Năm case seem especially 
signicant. The rst is his claim never to have attended any of her struggle 
sessions, which he described so vividly and dramatically in his The People ar-
ticles. His boss, Trường Chinh, had apparently told Đĩnh that he could base 
his articles on information gleaned from cadre reports of the struggle sessions.8
The detail reects the fantastical nature of the mass mobilization. It apparently 
mattered little to Chinh whether an eyewitness account of Thị Năm’s struggle 
sessions had been written by an actual eyewitness—her case had been fabricated 
for propaganda purposes, anyway. A second intriguing detail from the Đĩnh 
memoir is that Thành and Trường Chinh had donned disguises and secretly 
attended at least one of the Thị Năm struggle sessions.9
The sixth of the The People articles written about the Nguyễn Thị Năm case 
was penned by Thành himself under his pseudonym “C.B.” This was the name 
that he frequently used for his Leninist-avored column titled “Speak and Lis-
ten” (Nói mà nghe). Thành’s article appeared in the July 21 issue of The People—
according to Võ’s calculations, this was about a week aer Thị Năm and four 
other family members and friends had been executed by ring squad.10 Thành 
titled his article, “The Landlord is Cruel and Horrifying.” His assessment was 
entirely in the spirit of the ve earlier Trần Đĩnh articles, the idea being to pro-
mote Thị Năm as a symbol for the entire landlord class:
The gentle saints teach us that: “Muck and money go together.” Everybody 
knows that landlords are cruel: exploiting the peasants with high land rents 
and high-interest loans—a lazy tax collector. But now, imagine landlords 
who kill people without blinking an eye. Here is an example:
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The landlord hag Cát-hanh-Long along with her two children and a few 
other henchmen:
Murdered 14 peasants.
Tortured and beat dozens of peasants who are now disabled.
Caused the death of 32 families totaling roughly 200 people [. . .]
Raped to death [hãm chết] over 30 peasants [. . .]
So, the family of the landlord Cát-hanh-Long either directly or indi-
rectly murdered around 260 of our countrymen!11
The second part of Thành’s article focused on alleged methods of torture prac-
ticed by Thị Năm and her supporters in the village of Đồng Bẩm; this essen-
tially rehashed what had already been described in the earlier articles about the 
case in The People: tying the peasants up and hanging them from the raers of 
her house, jamming cattle prods into their mouths, pumping water into their 
stomachs and then stomping on them, using candles to burn the peasants’ skin, 
forcing sh sauce into people’s noses, carrying out the water-drip torture, and 
others. These were fabrications.
The third and nal part of Thành’s article shied to Nguyễn Thị Năm’s 
“counterrevolutionary crimes” directed against the DRV:
A few years back, she and her son formed an alliance with the French and 
the Japanese in order to arrest cadres. Aer the August Revolution, they 
allied with the French enemy and with the Vietnamese traitors in order to 
sabotage the resistance war.
During the mass mobilization [in Đồng Bẩm], our countrymen in that 
locale put forward enough clear evidence in their accusations. The hag 
Cát-hanh-Long and her son could not deny the evidence, and they admit-
ted as true all of the crimes against the country and the people. Truly:
Even if one cuts down all the bamboo in the forest for paper, it is still not 
enough to document all her crimes.
Even if one uses all the water in the ocean, her cruelty cannot be 
washed clean.
 C.B.12 
It is apparent from Nguyễn Thị Năm’s case that the use of half-truths, distor-
tions, and slander—what Thành and other party leaders would later refer to as 
the “errors” of land reform cadres—began at the top and was transmitted down 
to cadres recruited to carry out the campaign.
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Propagandizing the Mass Mobilization
In addition to ne-tuning their mass mobilization policies during 1953, the party 
leaders needed to develop a propaganda strategy that would facilitate the cam-
paign’s smooth implementation. For example, a circular released on June 29, 1953 
titled “On the Issue of Propagandizing the Mass Mobilization,” explained how 
the initial “rent reduction” part of the mass mobilization was to be publicized. 
The circular began by describing the impetus for the party’s propaganda strategy:
Based on the situation in a number of places, the Central Committee sees 
that we have not yet propagandized and explained carefully our decrees, 
land edicts, and mass mobilization orders. Even a number of leading cadres 
do not yet fully understand the Party and Government’s policy and mass 
mobilization line. Because of this, a number of spontaneous struggles have 
broken out. There are places where landlords have been beaten and tortured. 
Even middle peasants, poor peasants, ocials, students, etc., have become 
targets of struggle. In those places, there always occur incidents of landlords 
committing suicide. Even among rich, middle, and poor peasants there are 
those who fear becoming targets of struggle and therefore commit suicide. 
Those are incidents of disorderly struggle, with no strategy and no leader-
ship. They have neither the right intention nor the right struggle target.13
The circular then explained that, while some of these phenomena were unavoid-
able and “natural” results of class struggle, an eective propaganda campaign 
should reduce their incidence. In order to calm those who feared becoming tar-
gets of the campaign:
We must propagandize and explain our policy clearly to landlords and rich 
peasants so they know that everybody who follows the policy has nothing 
to worry about—the Government and the peasants only punish those who 
don’t follow the laws and who don’t show repentance.
Aer explaining the impetus for the party’s propaganda strategy, the circular put 
forward some ground rules for depicting the mass mobilization. With respect 
to the “fruits” of struggle (items taken from those people labeled as landlords), 
newspapers were only to mention “land, bualos, and rice . . . taken from reac-
tionary and cruel landlords” and not to mention “gold, jewels, clothing, etc.” 
On the key issue of how landlord executions were to be handled, the circular 
instructed:
164 chapter 8
Only propagandize executions of the most extreme arch criminals. Normally, 
executions should not be propagandized. Executions should only be pro-
pagandized in newspapers or by other means such as word of mouth, etc. 
They should not be announced over the radio.
Another part of the circular cautioned that “the execution of cruel despotic 
female landlords should not be publicized because the enemy could exploit it to 
counter our propaganda.” Propagandizing executions in the press or in meetings 
“should not create unnecessary alarm in society but rather court public sym-
pathy.” Regarding the procedure for propagandizing an execution, the circu-
lar stated:
In summary, propagandizing executions must be done carefully. Mass mo-
bilization brigades should send documents about big important struggles 
and executions to the Central Committee’s Propaganda and Instruction 
Bureau so that it can then send the information on to various newspapers.14
DRV journalists were to depict the campaign in the way that the party leaders 
thought would facilitate the campaign’s smooth implementation—such as by 
promising a nervous DRV population that everyone who followed the law would 
have “nothing to worry about.”
However, the party’s internal discussions of the campaign tell a dierent 
story. A Politburo directive released on May 4, 1953 stated that the VWP lead-
ers wanted to see the execution of one person for every thousand people during 
the more moderate rent-reduction phase of the mass mobilization.15 In other 
words, the party leaders had decided roughly how many people should be exe-
cuted during rent reduction before cadres had entered their respective villages, 
before they had had an opportunity to determine whether so-called landlords 
were law-abiding and “repentant” or not.
Extrapolated for the roughly eight million people who went through rent 
reduction in the DRV, the May 4, 1953 directive indicates that the Politburo 
wanted its mass mobilization apparatus to execute about eight thousand people 
during this initial moderate phase of the campaign.16 We do not know whether 
the Politburo also applied an execution ratio to the campaign’s more radical land 
reform phase, when the landlord class was to be “completely overthrown” (triệt 
để đánh đổ). Whether or not this was the case, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the party leaders planned for the land reform phase to involve the execu-
tion of more than eight thousand people (i.e., have an execution ratio greater 
than the rent reduction phase’s 1 per 1000.) Since Vietnam’s Communist Party 
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leaders continue to maintain a policy of secrecy regarding the mass mobilization 
campaign’s overall death toll, we are forced to estimate the toll based largely on 
intentions. Those intentions suggest that a toll of een to twenty-ve thousand 
deaths is a reasonable estimate.17
Evidence that the VWP leadership wanted to conceal the scope and char-
acter of the mass mobilization campaign from the public appears in a number 
of dierent internal documents. For example, Thành, during his closing re-
marks at the Fih Meeting of the Party Central Executive Committee and the 
First All-Country Meeting of Party Representatives (November 14–23, 1953) 
gave those representatives in attendance instructions regarding the upcoming 
land reform:
Now, on returning home, you may not speak loosely [nói lung tung] be-
cause this [policy] is a secret of our strategy to attack feudalism, to carry 
out land reform. If all of you shoot your mouths o before we have made 
preparations [sắp sửa], the enemy and the landlords will be able to make 
preparations before we do. For this reason, the Central Committee will 
issue a directive explaining how the land reform should be propagandized 
in general for all regions and how it should be propagandized specically 
for regions that have yet to undergo mobilization.18
Later in the speech, Thành again stressed the need for secrecy:
With respect to those of you from regions that have not yet undergone 
mobilization as well as those of you from other regions, you may not talk 
about this. You must keep it a secret. When you, as representatives, return 
[to your regions], you must report [the contents of this meeting] only to 
the Zone Party Committee and to no one else. Aerwards, it will be up to 
the Zone Party Committee to consider carefully the issue of to whom and 
to what extent the [land reform] policy will be disseminated. You are not 
to “blab” about either this report or the policy. Are all of you clear on this? 
You absolutely must remember this.19
As Thành had promised, nineteen days later, on December 12, 1953, the Cen-
tral Committee released a directive titled “On Propagandizing the Land Reform 
Policy.” Written by Trường Chinh, it contained two main sections. The rst 
discussed the “mission and content” of land reform propaganda and the second 
dealt with the “method of implementation.” For those with the most at stake 
in the mass mobilization, the so-called landlords, Chinh explained that propa-
ganda should “make them see that the land reform is just, appropriate, and legal; 
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land worked by the peasants naturally should be returned to the peasants.” To 
ease the minds of those who feared becoming struggle targets (lest they ee or 
commit suicide), the party general secretary instructed people involved in pro-
paganda work to stress that:
[T]he Government dierentiates in its treatment of each type of landlord 
according to his attitude toward the resistance and the people—of course 
landlords are not all lumped into one category [vơ đũa cả nắm]. The goal is 
to isolate the traitorous, reactionary, cruel, and despotic landlords, thereby 
stabilizing the morale of revolutionary and normal landlords. This should 
prevent the landlord class from taking measures to resist the policy and 
sabotage production.
In the section of the directive that described how the party leaders wanted the 
land reform to be propagandized in those places about to undergo the campaign, 
Chinh explained:
With respect to propagandizing and studying the land reform policy in 
these places, there is no need to organize study sessions, as was usually done 
in the past. When the land reform team enters the village to carry out land 
reform, it will organize sessions to study the policy then.20
Thus, it appears that the key details of the campaign were to be revealed only 
aer the land reform team had arrived and members of the community (espe-
cially those targeted for struggle) were unable to leave.
Legalizing the Land Reform: December 1953
Another aspect of the party leaders’ overall propaganda strategy was the diu-
sion of public responsibility for the land reform throughout the government. 
In November and December of 1953, Thành and his comrades held meetings 
with as many of the regime’s leaders and representatives as possible to obtain 
“approval” for the land reform campaign, building toward the release of an o-
cial Land Reform Law. From that point forward, the DRV press organs would 
usually refer to the mass mobilization campaign as the policy of the government 
and National Assembly.
The rst of these meetings, the 5th Plenum of the Party Executive, took place 
from November 14 to 23, 1953. It was followed by the larger First All-Nation 
Meeting of Party Representatives.21 In what appears to be an attempt to give 
agency to the larger, second meeting, The People reported that “The First 
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All-Nation Meeting [of Party Representatives] established the world and do-
mestic situations and came to a decision on an issue of special importance: In 
1954, implementation of land reform will begin.”22
Approval om United Vietnam and the National Assembly
On November 26, three days aer the conclusion of the two party meetings 
mentioned above, it was the turn of the United Vietnam Association to share 
in the responsibility for the land reform. This meeting was reported in the De-
cember 16, 1953 issue of The People in the article, “The Meeting of the United 
Vietnam Committee Succeeded Spectacularly.” The long article on the meeting 
had two subheadings, which together seem to reect the overall propaganda 
purpose of the meeting. The rst was “A Spirit of Democratic Negotiation;” 
the second was “Unied and Unanimous.” What did “democratic negotiation” 
mean in the DRV?
In the rooms used by the representatives, [one could see] their gray heads 
huddled together. There was Mr. Thi-Sơn, who had participated in the 
anti-French struggle alongside Đề Thám and who is now in the United 
Vietnam Front taking part in the resistance war. [With him] were Mr. Phan 
Kế Toại, the Minister of the Interior, the bishop Vũ Xuân Kỷ, and the High 
Buddhist Monk [thượng tọa] Phạm-thế-Long sharing ideas about church 
land, pagoda land, and about the approach to dierent ranks of landlord. 
Next to the meeting hall were Mrs. Phạm-quỳnh-Anh, an old revolutionary 
with nearly 40 years’ experience [serving the cause], Mr. Vũ-đình-Tụng, 
head of the Ministry of Injured Veterans, Mr. Vũ-đình-Hòe, head of the 
Ministry of Justice and a central committee member of the Democratic 
Party, Mr. Hoàng-tích-Tri, head of Ministry of Health, and Dr. Phạm Ngọc 
Thạch who just arrived from the South. They were enaged in a rigorous 
discussion about the land that would be distributed to injured veterans and 
about the method of carrying out compulsory sales [trưng mua] of land.23
The image of venerable old luminaries, mostly of non-Communist background, 
so intimately involved in discussing and approving the land reform policy, seems 
to have been carefully constructed in The People to give the campaign a benign 
appearance. Another theme of the image was the extreme care taken by members 
of United Vietnam to scrutinize every last detail of the land reform policy:
From basic principles to the details of implementation, the Party always 
sought the opinion of the [United Vietnam] representatives. There were 
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a few issues related to implementation that, because the Party did not yet 
have enough practical documentation, the Meeting decided to research 
further. The Party’s way of working was extremely meticulous and care-
fully considered. The Party’s respect for the ideas of the United Vietnam 
representatives not only demonstrated the spirit of democratic negotiation 
at the Meeting but also enabled everyone to see clearly the appropriate-
ness of the revolutionary line set forth by Chairman Hồ and the Central 
Committee.24
The second subheading, “Unied and Unanimous,” was followed by de-
scriptions of members of United Vietnam listening to accounts of the peasants’ 
“bloody struggle” against the landlord class, past and present. “Everybody saw 
that the time had come to abolish the landlord regime of land occupation, to 
implement a policy of land to the tiller, to liberate the forces of production in the 
countryside, and to push forward the resistance war and national construction.”25
The article continued in this vein with approving quotes from various mem-
bers of United Vietnam. It was supplemented by another article, “Democratic 
Parties, People’s Mass Organizations, and Democratic Personalities in the 
Front Enthusiastically Support the Land Reform Policy.” The entirety of the 
newspaper’s third page and part of its fourth were devoted to a collage of one-to 
two-paragraph quotes. All were from United Vietnam members and expressed 
enthusiastic support for the land reform.
The overall impression of the United Vietnam articles was that, in the land 
reform, rural elites who had contributed to the resistance war might be forced to 
sell some of their land to the DRV state, but little more. These articles included 
no mention of the terms “public denunciation” or “Special People’s Court.” The 
People had already published articles describing in some detail the “struggle ses-
sion” against the female landowner Nguyễn Thị Năm and a few other “land-
lords,” so this aspect of the campaign was not a secret. But it is obvious that the 
party leaders, at this time, wanted the coming land reform to appear as benign as 
possible. Again, I believe that the primary motive behind this propaganda tactic 
was fear of losing targets for struggle.
On December 1, 1953, a day or two aer the completion of the United Viet-
nam Association meeting, it was the turn of the National Assembly. To call its 
members together at this time was extraordinary because the assembly had not 
met since December of 1946, just before the outbreak of the war. For the last 
seven years, the party leaders had simply used the National Assembly Standing 
Committee to provide formal approval of party-generated laws.26 The December 
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26, 1953 “special issue” of The People was devoted almost entirely to the National 
Assembly and its passage of the Land Reform Law. The issue essentially followed 
the same form used in the newspaper’s December 21, 1953 issue on the United 
Vietnam Association. Indeed, the main article on the National Assembly was 
written by the same party journalist, Xuân Trường, who had written the main 
United Vietnam article.
Thus, members of the National Assembly also held “rigorous discussions” 
and the favored motif of “gray heads” hard at work, studying the details of the 
land reform policy, was again used as it had been in The People’s coverage of the 
United Vietnam meeting. Xuân Trường noted that members of the National 
Assembly approved the notion that, “for political reasons, we must distinguish 
between and treat dierently each landlord according to his political attitude, 
meaning that we need to carry out forced purchases of land belonging to demo-
cratic notables, resistance-war landlords, and normal landlords.” Yet again, The 
People laid out a collage of supportive quotes from a wide variety of National 
Assembly members. The newspaper described the National Assembly’s nal act 
related to the land reform campaign:
At the end of the part devoted to discussion, the National Assembly sig-
naled agreement with the report of Đỗ Đức Dục, the head of the subcom-
mittee for the approval of dra laws. At that point, Mr. Trần-công-Tưởng, 
Deputy Minister of Law, rose and read aloud the entirety of the land re-
form law. . . . With complete unanimity, [the National Assembly] approved 
the land reform law. . . . The slogans “Chairman Hồ forever” and “All Hail 
the National Assembly” echoed forth. . . . The song “Hồ Chí Minh” rose 
up. The slogans “Long Live Hồ Chí Minh,” “We Will Win the Resistance 
War,” and “The Land Reform Will Succeed,” could be heard on top of 
each other echoing forth. It was as though everybody wanted to shout out 
to express their happiness.27
For readers of The People who came from elite rural families and who were 
working in some capacity for the DRV state, the general thrust of the news-
paper’s two issues dealing with the United Vietnam and National Assembly’s 
approval of the Land Reform Law was one of reassurance.
The Land Reform Law
A close examination of the Land Reform Law itself, however, reveals a few ele-
ments that might have caused anxiety. The law had all the formal appearance of a 
“bourgeois democratic” legal document, with chapters, subsections, and clauses. 
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But the content of the document departed from a democratic legal tradition in 
both principle and spirit. The law also contained some subtle contradictions that 
shed light on the thinking of the party leaders. Again, when considered together, 
the odd aspects of the document seem to reect the overriding fear of the party 
leaders that the actual situation on the ground would not furnish enough land-
lords to make the land reform meaningful.
The Land Reform Law had thirty-eight clauses divided into ve chapters. 
The rst was titled “The Goal and Meaning of Land Reform.” It repeated the 
standard line on the campaign’s economic and political goals: the elimination 
of French colonialist, Vietnamese traitor, and Vietnamese feudalist land own-
ership; the “liberation of productive forces” in the countryside so as to boost 
agriculture; and the improvement of peasant livelihood—all of which would 
contribute to “pushing forward” the resistance war and national reconstruction.
In light of the party leaders’ enthusiastic and unequivocal internal discussions 
about the necessity of moving away from private ownership of land to a system 
of collectivized agriculture, the Land Reform Law’s forceful armation of the 
principle of private property is noteworthy. As the law stated, “to implement a 
system of peasant ownership of land” was the rst of the four goals that would 
be achieved with the elimination of “colonial,” “traitor,” and “feudal” land own-
ership in the countryside.
The second of the Land Reform Law’s ve chapters was titled, “Consca-
tion, Requisition, and Compulsory Sale of Land.” As clause 4 of that section 
explained, the price that the DRV state would pay for “compulsory sales” levied 
on “democratic personalities, resistance war landlords, and normal landlords” 
would be, for land, the equivalent of an average year’s yield, and for belongings, 
the current market price. Given the dire state of the DRV’s nances and the par-
ty’s plans to collectivize agriculture, there was little possibility of actually paying 
for these “compulsory sales.” Ocially, payment would come in the form of a 
ten-year government bond set at a yearly interest rate of 1.5 percent. In reality, the 
party leaders probably mentioned this bond for the sake of form only.
The third section of the second chapter contained what was arguably the 
law’s greatest departure from a democratic legal tradition. Clause 5 of that sec-
tion stated:
From the day when the rent reduction decree was promulgated (14/7/1949) 
to the day when the decree on the mass mobilization for complete rent re-
duction (12/4/1953) was released, any landlord’s dispersal [phân tán] of land 
with the goal of avoiding the rent reduction decree and the agricultural tax 
decree, shall be considered illegitimate.
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However, looking back upon the July 1949 Rent Reduction decree (sắc lệnh 78/
SL), we see that it covers only land rents. There is no mention of land sales, so it 
was “legal” according to the regime’s own laws for anybody to buy or sell land, 
regardless of motive. Now, according to the Land Reform Law, the purchaser 
of a “landlord’s” property aer 1949 would have that land “conscated, requisi-
tioned, or seized through compulsory sale according to each situation.”
Similarly, according to clause 6 of the Land Reform Law: “From the day when 
the mass mobilization for rent-reduction decree was promulgated (12/4/1953), 
the illegal dispersal of land by landlords shall not be accepted.” However, as 
with the decree from July 1949, the more recent April 1953 rent reduction decree 
in no way forbade the purchase or sale of land. In fact, clause 14 of that decree 
stated that “when a landowner sells land: (a) the tenant farmer who is renting 
that land has the rst right of purchase and may pay for the land gradually. (b) 
the tenant farmer has the right to demand that the owner pay him for work done 
converting uncultivated land into arable land.”
Since there is nothing in this April 1953 Rent Reduction decree outlawing the 
sale or purchase of land, the description of such an action in the Land Reform 
Law as “illegal” violates the principle outlawing ex post facto (or retroactive) laws. 
A state, upon promulgating a new law, may only apply that law to actions moving 
forward—it may not use that new law as a basis for taking legal action on acts 
committed before the law had been passed.28
The fourth chapter of the land reform law was titled “The Executive Oce 
and the Method of Implementing the Land Reform.” This section addressed the 
crucial issue of class demarcation. Obviously, the class that a family was assigned 
during the land reform was going to determine that family’s fate. Therefore, the 
criteria used to determine class were of the utmost importance from the perspec-
tive of the rural population, especially the better-o members of a community. Yet 
the Land Reform Law provided no concrete information on this issue, no quanti-
tative or qualitative measure that could be used by a family to determine whether 
they would be classied as “rich peasants” or “landlords.” As clause 34 stated:
• When determining class, it must be done according to the regulations for 
class demarcation in the countryside set by the Government.
• Class will be discussed and determined at a meeting of peasant representa-
tives. A person whose class is being determined must be allowed to attend 
the meeting and participate in the discussion.
• A subdistrict’s decision on class demarcation must be approved either by 
the provincial level Resistance Committee or by an oce delegated by that 
committee.
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• Should a conict arise, the case must be given to the Special People’s Court 
for resolution.
The Land Reform Law contained no wording that might restrict or tie the hands 
of the regime in its assignment of class to the rural population.
The vagueness of this ocial law stands in stark contrast to the quantitative 
precision that we see within the reports produced by the mass mobilization ap-
paratus. The reports on the campaign, produced primarily by brigade and team 
leaders, were full of numbers, percentages, and quantitative analysis related to 
the issue of class. Below is the opening summary of a report on the results of the 
second wave of the Mass Mobilization through Rent Reduction. It was written 
on December 16, 1953 by Hoàng Hữu Nhân, the head of the Second Mass Mobi-
lization Brigade operating in the Vietnamese North. This was only een days 
before the publication of the Land Reform Law in The People.
MASS MOBILIZATION BRIGADE 
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
The Vietnamese North Interzone 
Independence, Freedom, Happiness
REPORT
Brigade 2’s Mass Mobilization Work for Wave 2 and Preparations for  
Wave 3.
The details concerning the execution of each part of wave 2 and the prepa-
rations for wave 3 we have already reported. Here, we are only giving a 
general summary and putting forward the key features of the following:
1. The results of wave 2 of mass mobilization
2. The summing-up meeting for wave 2 of mass mobilization
3. Preparations for wave 3.
 
THE RESULTS OF MASS MOBILIZATION WAVE 2:
Wave 2 of the mass mobilization was carried out in 40 subdistricts that 
were a part of 6 districts located in the 2 provinces of Thái Nguyên and 
Bắc Giang. Thái Nguyên had 33 subdistricts belonging to the 4 districts 
of Đồng Hỷ, Đại Từ, Phú Bình, and Phú Lương. [In the province of] Bắc 
Giang, there were 7 subdistricts belonging to the two districts of Yên Thế 
and Lạng Giang. All these included 29,972 families, 141,373 people. The 
population of the smallest subdistrict was 927 and [of] the largest was 
12,012. The amount of farmland was 71,423 mẫu.
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The number of landlord families was 652, and we brought out for public 
denunciation 52 of them, that is, 56 people. (The subdistrict with the most 
people brought out for public denunciation had 4 and the least, 1). Relative 
to the total number of landlords, we brought out for public denunciation 8%. 
[Aside from them, the Special People’s Court] tried 72 people, 5 of whom 
were given the death penalty, 67 of whom were given prison sentences from 
3 to 20 years. Among the 40 subdistricts, there were 4 that had no targets 
for struggle: Tân Phú, Phú Cương, Hoàng Sơn, and Đồng Tiến subdistricts. 
There were 82 second-and third-rank cruel despotic landlords sent to the pro-
vincial [resistance committee headquarters] for study. In addition to the 56 
landlords who were struggled against, there were 2 who committed suicide.
Through mass mobilization we discovered some political incidents [vụ 
chính trị]. There were some cases that we did not know about before or 
only knew about vaguely with no concrete [details]. Now, having found 
clues, we carried out deep investigations, nding their organization. For 
example: with respect to the Thị Sa case and the sabotage of Phong Bridge 
case, we have only just seen clearly that the landlords function as an espio-
nage base for the imperialists.
Aer the struggle, landlords and rich peasants were compelled to hand 
over 1,206 tons of rice. We reduced this amount by 193 tons based on their 
ability to pay, leaving 1,012 tons. Currently, we have collected 850 tons. 
The “fruits” conscated were distributed to 8,682 peasant families, 2,493 
of which were landless peasants, 4,532 of which were poor peasants, 1,217 
were middle peasants, and 440 of which were local poor. The number of 
families who were given “fruits” comprised 29% of the total number of 
families. The number of landless and poor peasants comprised 123.5% [sic].
Organization:
Division of communes: 40 old subdistricts have been divided up into 84 
new subdistricts.
The consolidation of Party cells:
Party members. Before reorganization there were 3,504 party members: 41 
workers, 38 landless peasants, 675 poor peasants, 2,159 middle peasants, 
352 rich peasants, 93 landlords, 117 petit bourgeois. Of the total number of 
party members, 448 were found to be former bullies [kỳ hào cũ], occupying 
12% of the Party cell.
Through the reorganization we dealt with 344 people: 6 poor peasants, 
113 middle peasants, 129 rich peasants, 89 landlords, and 7 small owners. 
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The number of party members belonging to dierent categories: members 
of reactionary organizations, 3; members of the exploitative class, 255; cor-
rupt and depraved, 52; serious violations of the law, 6; and 30 party mem-
bers received warnings. Of the 344 party members, 38 asked permission to 
withdraw from the party.29
This nal report of the Second Mass Mobilization Brigade continues in this 
vein, applying these same quantitative measures of class composition to the party 
cell Executive Committee, to the Peasant Association, to the People’s Commit-
tee, to the People’s Militia, and to the local Public Security oce. The Land 
Reform Law, on the other hand, was completely devoid of this type of quanti-
tative discourse.
Hoàng Hữu Nhân’s report and others available for viewing in the archives 
suggest that the party leaders and their Chinese advisors monitored and mea-
sured the success of the campaign mostly by the numbers. How many people 
were in a subdistrict? How many landlords were found? How many of them were 
made targets of struggle? What percentage of the total number of landlords was 
that? How many prison sentences were there? How many people were purged 
from the local party cell and from the Peasant Association? What percentage of 
these two organizations do poor peasants now comprise?
Culture and the Mass Mobilization
Nguyễn Tất Thành, Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and 
other party leaders viewed culture through the lens of Marxism-Leninism. They 
saw cultural production as inherently political—there was no such thing as “art 
for art’s sake.” Works of art always reected the values and interests of a partic-
ular class, usually the class that nanced the art. The inseparability of culture 
and politics meant that a political revolution had to be accompanied by a cul-
tural one. Since they, the party leaders, understood and served the interests of 
the working class, they had the right to determine whether cultural production 
(literature, art, music, etc.) served that class.
As the scholar Kim Ninh points out, Vietnam’s party leaders during the early 
1940s obtained a copy of Mao Zedong’s inuential 1940 article, “On New De-
mocracy,” and made it the basis of their own cultural policy.30 In March 1943, 
Trường Chinh distilled Mao’s main ideas from “On New Democracy” into a 
brief “Outline on Vietnamese Culture.” As Chinh explained, culture included 
“ideology, education, and art” and rested upon “a society’s economic base and 
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accompanying economic system.” Culture, economics, and politics formed the 
Indochinese Communist Party’s “three fronts” and therefore were to be under 
the party’s control: “the vanguard party must lead the vanguard culture.”
In his 1943 outline, Chinh listed Mao’s “three principles of cultural mo-
bilization.” The rst was to “nationalize” the country’s culture, which meant 
“opposing the slave and colonial mentality, making VN culture develop inde-
pendently.” The second was to give Vietnamese culture a “mass orientation,” 
which meant creating culture that served the “majority of the population.” The 
third was to make culture “scientic” in character, which meant creating culture 
that neither included nor reected any “antiscientic” or “antiprogressive” ideas. 
Echoing Mao’s prescriptions, Chinh advocated a new type of culture that was 
“not yet socialist or Soviet.” It would be “national in form but new democratic 
in content.”31
Though borrowed from Mao’s “On New Democracy,” Chinh’s 1943 formu-
lations on culture also followed the pattern of the Vietminh front and the later 
DRV government. All were derived loosely from Lenin’s two-stage revolution-
ary strategy. Knowing that communism was not a well-understood or popular 
ideology in Vietnam, the party would begin by concealing their political control 
behind nationalist and “bourgeois democratic” institutions such as elections, a 
National Assembly, a legal system, and so forth. Neutral-sounding code words 
would be substituted for terms closely associated with communism. Thus, the 
vague term “majority” would replace “proletariat” or “workers and peasants.” 
Similarly, “scientic” or “new democratic” would replace “communist” or 
“Marxist-Leninist.”
By packaging communist content in familiar national and bourgeois dem-
ocratic forms, the party would help noncommunist Vietnamese move beyond 
their prejudices and give that disguised communist content a fair chance. Soviet 
ideals, institutions, and culture excited Vietnam’s party leaders. At least initially, 
they probably believed that the intrinsic value of Soviet models would be ap-
preciated by regular people if only the stigma of communism could be over-
come. As people recognized the superior quality of the party’s “new culture,” 
the party leaders would gradually reveal that it was “communist” culture and 
“Marxist-Leninist” content.
In the rst issue of the DRV’s original cultural newspaper, Vanguard, the 
party leaders published Chinh’s Outline on Vietnamese Culture. Thus, the doz-
ens of cultural luminaries recruited to the Vietminh front during the early days 
of the revolution must have known of the party’s intention to control cultural 
production. Over the course of the war, DRV intellectuals learned what party 
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control meant and occasionally pushed back against it. However, the extraordi-
nary conditions of war, the nationalist nature of the DRV’s ght against French 
recolonization, and the bonds of friendship between DRV intellectuals in the 
maquis seem to have convinced most of them to accept their loss of creative 
control. When the war ended in the summer of 1954, though, many of these 
intellectuals, while loyal to the DRV, believed that they had earned the right to 
produce literature, art, music, theatre, etc., on their own again. As we will see, 
for a few months in 1956, a number of them would attempt to do so.
Land Reform Literature
The party leaders shaped the content and style of land reform literature in four 
ways. First, they introduced DRV intellectuals to the PRC’s most famous work 
of land reform ction, The Hurricane (Mưa to gió lớn), and its most famous 
antilandlord lm, The White-Haired Girl (Bạch màu nữ).32 Second, DRV 
intellectuals were put through “thought reform” to cleanse their minds of 
“petit-bourgeois thinking” and to inculcate in them the theoretical justication 
for the land reform campaign. Third, the party leaders recruited most DRV 
intellectuals to serve as mass mobilization cadres or at least to observe a land 
reform struggle session. And fourth, the party leaders trained cultural ocials 
to intervene directly in the creative process, identifying politically problematic 
aspects of literature and making the author rewrite them to better accord with 
the party’s policy goals.
The literature produced to serve the mass mobilization campaign arguably 
marked the nadir of DRV cultural production. To justify the killing of thou-
sands of “landlords,” the regime’s writers had to demonize rural elites to the 
point of absurd caricature, turning the exception into a general rule. To create 
that “deformed vision” of rural society, as Georges Boudarel described it, DRV 
writers had to remove from their narrative virtually all the complexity and nu-
ance of human life, leaving their plots with one-dimensional characters. Poor 
peasants were entirely good and always had been; landlords were entirely evil 
and always had been. In addition to being unrealistic, the land reform literature 
promoted values that contradicted Vietnamese traditions and seemed unlikely 
to form the basis of a healthy new culture. Hatred was a noble sentiment. De-
nunciation of a neighbor for being a “spy” or “landlord” was honorable. Revenge 
was progressive, cathartic, and glorious. Forgiveness and pity were either foolish 
or grounds for suspicion.
A theme of land reform literature, like that of the mass mobilization itself, 
was the exoneration of the DRV government, the Communist Party, and Hồ 
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Chí Minh from the diculties of rural life since the 1945 August Revolution. 
Thus, a stock scene of the land reform literature showed poor-peasant characters 
awakening to the reality that all diculties stemmed, in one way or another, 
from landlord perdy. As a poor peasant in a short story by Nguyễn Công Hoan 
proclaims, “I know that the Revolution makes poor people not be poor anymore, 
but because they [the landlords] wormed their way into the regime, we have not 
enjoyed any benet of independence.”33
Another theme of land reform ction was poor-peasant gratitude toward the 
party and Chairman Hồ. Through the process of banding together, denouncing 
landlords, taking their belongings, and assuming leadership positions in local 
political organizations, poor peasants gained dignity and wholeness as people. A 
poor peasant from the writer Kim Lân’s short story, “Becoming Wife and Hus-
band,” declares at a meeting with other poor peasants: “Truly, the more I think, 
the more I thank Mr. Hồ. Without the land reform, when would it be like this, 
when would Mr. Thế be able to marry, when would all his neighbors help him 
like this?” Other peasants at the meeting chime in with armations about the 
happiness of their lives since the elimination of local landlords.
Later in the story, the poor peasant Thế asks the land reform cadre, Vân, 
whether he (Thế) should now marry his local poor-peasant sweetheart. “I only 
worry that I am so busy with work—maybe I should wait until independence.” 
To this, the cadre Vân replies: “There is still much work to be done, but we still 
get married. Do you think there won’t still be lots of work aer independence? 
Of course, we will have to build the country so we can have tractors and harvest-
ers like in the Soviet Union and China.”34
Since they wrote under the guidance of the party leaders, DRV writers pro-
duced land-reform ction that oen reected the Politburo’s unstated concern 
about nding sucient numbers of struggle targets. One fear was that the cam-
paign would lose struggle targets through suicide. In the short story “Dredging 
up Misery” (Gợi khổ), the narrator, who takes the perspective of a tough land 
reform cadre, describes the scene in a village shortly aer the arrival of the land 
reform team. A y-year-old villager named Tuyên has already been identied 
as a “cruel and despotic landlord” and his younger sister, Chỉnh, as a Nationalist 
Party spy. The following passage from the story indicates that an important task 
of the land reform cadre was to prevent the loss of struggle targets through ight 
or suicide:
The land reform team enters the commune. The guerrilla public security 
agents begin to monitor the landlords. [The landlord] Tuyên has many 
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unusual actions: what is he planning to do? Flee? Somehow get the peas-
ants o his track? Or, having studied, is he intending to commit suicide as 
the village chief of Trung Nghĩa did? If he wants to die, he has to settle his 
exploitative debts with the peasants rst.35
How could areas that had been under DRV control for the past seven or 
eight years have large numbers of Nationalist Party members, spies, and cruel 
despotic landlords? The following passage from Nguyễn Công Hoan’s Peasants 
and Landlords explains how land reform cadres were to make this implausible 
narrative a reality in a local community that seemed devoid of struggle targets:
The mass mobilization for rent reduction team entered a subdistrict during 
wave 1 and based itself on the local party leaders, asking them to introduce 
good poor peasants. But the team only met people who were impure [không 
trong sạch]. Therefore, for the past half month, the [cadres] have not been 
able to discover the cruel crimes of the landlord Giảng. They also have not 
been able to nd a single ringleader landlord [địa chủ đầu sỏ].
Because [landlord] Giảng carefully installed his henchmen in order to 
surround the [rent reduction] team, the team stumbled on a nest of ants. 
But the Team leader was alert and smart. Aer researching the history of 
the local party cell, he insisted that the Team take the long road, getting 
rid of their old roots [poor peasant recruits] and nding new ones by them-
selves and, at the same time, calling comrade Ngân to the community.
When comrade Ngân came, he demanded that the Team immediately 
repress Giảng. Aer that, the people became enthusiastic and denounced 
all his crimes.
Those cruel, despotic, and reactionary landlords who adopted the 
appearance of party members, who exploited the name of the Party in order 
to smear the Party, were punished appropriately.
Those poor peasants who had a clean history, who were loved by the 
people, who resolutely struggled, who were supported [by cadres] during 
the movement, were recruited into the Party.
The day the special people’s court announced its verdict on Giảng, sev-
eral thousand people clapped and cheered together for ten minutes. Aer 
that, one and all shouted:
Independent and unied Vietnam forever!
Chairman Hồ forever!
The Vietnamese Workers Party forever!36
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Hunger, 1953
By 1953, as Nguyễn Tất Thành (Hồ Chí Minh) and his lieutenants in the Po-
litburo were moving forward with land reform, the food situation in many 
DRV-controlled areas was either on the brink of, or heading steadily toward, 
disaster. The lack of food stemmed partly from the economic dislocations of war, 
partly from the French bombing of dikes, partly from the enormous amount 
of rice required to feed the growing DRV state and military, and partly from 
the party’s counterproductive policies. Generally, when governments want less 
of something in society, they tax that thing more. For the DRV leaders, they 
needed to tax agriculture more and also have more of it.
From the perspective of the Politburo, one challenge of the land reform was 
that the extraordinary conditions of war undermined two of the campaign’s 
most important ideological justications. The rst was that the “feudal landlord 
class” bore the greatest responsibility for the current diculties of peasants in 
DRV-controlled areas. Whatever challenges rural elites had posed to the rural 
poor in the past, evidence suggests that these had been surpassed by those gener-
ated by the DRV state and the realities of war. A second land-reform justication 
held that the rural poor were driven by land hunger. Had the tax demands of the 
DRV state been less onerous, most peasants, driven by hunger itself and by the 
prestige that came with land ownership, would have been eager to acquire more 
land and to produce more food. However, peasants understood that “temporary 
land distributions” were not the same as land ownership. Recipients of such land 
could not sell it to earn money. The land continued to belong to the DRV state, 
which, being responsible for prosecuting a war, had a hunger for rice and labor 
greater than that of most local elites.
Moreover, the DRV’s agricultural tax was calculated as a percentage of es-
timated yields determined by the state rather than as a percentage of actual 
yields determined by the farmer’s abilities and other objective factors such as 
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weather, soil quality, availability of cheap labor, and so on. In other words, the 
agricultural tax was an early form of command economy. Understanding that 
this system was rigged against them, many peasants were reluctant to take on 
more land for fear of being driven into debt to the government. This was an 
important factor contributing to the large areas of uncultivated farmland in 
DRV-controlled regions.
The Party Leaders Address the Spread of Famine
In their explanations for the food crisis, the DRV leaders were desperate to link 
rural hardships to the enemy—the French, the anticommunist State of Viet-
nam, or, increasingly, the landlord class—rather than to the exactions imposed 
upon peasants by the DRV state. So strong was the desire of the party leaders to 
deect blame away from the government that they created a propaganda cam-
paign linking the food shortage to locust plagues. There may have been some 
truth to a locust problem—however, there was no truth to the fantastical claim 
that the plague had been organized by the French. At a January 1953 meeting of 
the party Central Committee, Trường Chinh claimed that “Recently, based on 
zone reports, the enemy has used the incredibly wicked scheme of destroying the 
harvest through the release of insects.”1 Later in his report, Chinh instructed 
Central Committee members that they “must be alert to and take precautions 
against the enemy’s release of insects to destroy the harvest.”2 That Chinh would 
make such an absurd claim to Central Committee members suggests that a sig-
nicant distance existed between the Politburo and second-tier party leaders.
Famine Report of the Central Committee’s Peasant 
Mobilization Subcommittee (March, 1953)
The Central Committee’s Peasant Mobilization Subcommittee (the bureau-
cratic organ that would be turned into the “Central Land Reform Committee” 
a few months later) produced an important famine report in March of 1953. 
Although most internal government documents were directed toward oces 
or ministries, the Peasant Mobilization Subcommittee’s report on famine was 
simply addressed to “Uncle [Thành or Hồ Chí Minh], the Central Committee 
Oce, Mr. Thận [Trường Chinh], Mr. Tô [Phạm Văn Đồng], Mr. Việt [Hoàng 
Quốc Việt], Mr. Lương [Lê Văn Lương], Mr. Lành [Tố Hữu], and Mr. Thắng 
[Hồ Viết Thắng].
The Subcommittee’s report began with a brief survey of the various inter-
zones in Vietnam, noting provinces and regions where the food situation had 
become critical. For example, in Hà Đông, just south of Hanoi, ten subdistricts 
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were “short on rice, with only rich peasants and landlords having spare rice to 
eat; the majority of those who are hungry are forced to survive on craysh and 
snails.” Written in the margin next to this section was the comment, “The peo-
ple are hungry; landlords and rich peasants have extra rice to eat.”
As for the causes of the famine, the Subcommittee stressed a “lack of vigor 
in implementing the party’s land policies,” “terrible exploitation” by local elites, 
eorts by the French to “sabotage the harvest,” and “natural disasters, oods, 
drought, and insects.” These challenges had “reduced productivity in some 
places by three quarters.” There was no mention of the agricultural tax in this 
March 1953 document as a factor leading to famine. But the Subcommittee did 
conclude its assessment with the following statement: “In our opinion, it is very 
easy for cadres, comrades, and people to have false perceptions, to fall victim to 
the enemy’s counterpropaganda stating that the famine is primarily a result of 
the agricultural tax.”
Phạm Văn Đồng’s “Directive on Famine 
Prevention and Relief ” (May 12, 1953).
In May of 1953, a month aer the Peasant Mobilization Subcommittee’s famine 
report, the DRV prime minister, Phạm Văn Đồng, released a six-page directive 
devoted solely to the issue of famine. It began with an assessment of the scope of 
the problem: “Over the past two years, in a number of localities, famine has taken 
on a regular character, and there are places where it has become serious.” Đồng 
divided the causes of the famine into two categories, “objective” and “subjective.” 
The former referred to diculties created by nature and “feudal exploitation.” 
The latter referred to factors related to the eorts of local DRV leaders.
The regime of feudalist exploitation of the peasants in the countryside has 
played a not insignicant role in creating famine. In recent years, during 
the months of March and August, a number of landlords and rich peasants 
have refused to give loans to peasants or have waited until the local poor 
were especially needy so that loans could be given at a higher interest rate. 
There are even those who exploit the people’s diculties in order to engage 
in speculation and hoarding. In many locations, although there is famine, 
there is no lack of rice in the market and the price even declines. This phe-
nomenon proves that the rich and the speculators still have extra rice at the 
time when people are dying from starvation.3
Though feudal exploitation, enemy attacks, sabotage, and climatic challenges 
played a “denite role” in the spread of famine, stated Đồng, “we do not throw 
our hands up in the air in the face of those causes.”
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With better attention to the famine’s subjective causes, in other words, those 
stemming from the shortcomings of local leaders, the objective ones could be 
overcome. “Experience has shown that, under the correct leadership of the 
party and the government, in many places, the people have been victorious in 
the struggle against the enemy and the elements, protecting production.” As 
for feudal exploitation, Đồng pointed out that local cadres also had in their 
corner the party’s land policies, the “people’s government,” and the “forces of 
the masses.” This was “enough strength,” he stressed, to ght against the “illegal 
exploitation practiced by the landlords.” As Đồng explained:
But the truth is that in many places we have not resisted zealously the 
enemy’s eorts at sabotage; we have not struggled against the elements 
or against feudalist exploitation. In the same manner, we have not zeal-
ously organized the masses to help each other increase production and 
economize.
Then, when the famine happens, [local cadres] do not try to ght the 
famine, to curb it, to prevent it from spreading, to prevent it from becom-
ing critical. Many of our cadres lack a class political standpoint, a mass 
perspective. They do not care about the lives of the people and do not dare 
implement the needed and appropriate measures to address the famine.
Thus, the objective causes behind the famine are still a factor, but the 
subjective causes allowed the famine to develop and are more serious.
Rather than blame objective diculties, [local cadres] should carry out 
serious self-criticism with respect to their above shortcomings, correctly 
recognizing what is needed for famine prevention and relief work. [This 
should lead to] a zealous correction and reform of one’s work.4
Đồng exhorted local cadres to do more to increase production, to “correctly 
implement the Government’s production and economization plan,” and to focus 
on producing grains such as rice, potatoes, corn, and manioc. Local cadres were 
to lead members of their community to “produce enough to eat and enough 
to store.” This meant “thoroughly implementing the Government’s directives 
on anti-ood and anti-drought measures,” as well as ghting the enemy’s ef-
forts at sabotage such as the destruction of crops, agricultural tools, and irriga-
tion networks.
The third section of the prime minister’s May 12 famine directive provided 
specics about short-term tasks. Đồng stressed that, if possible, local cadres 
should solve the problem by using local resources rather than by compelling 
the government to give up rice collected from the agricultural tax, which was 
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desperately needed for the army. Thus, famine-relief solution number one in-
volved organizing attacks on local elites who still had rice:
The general method is as follows: resolutely take those places that still have 
food, those people who still have food, to save those places that are hungry, those 
people who are hungry. In more concrete terms, this means the following:
1. Mobilize and organize the masses to borrow the rice of landlords and rich 
peasants. The principle for borrowing rice is persuasion accompanied by force. 
At the same time, stop the payment of land rents and loan debts (both the 
original amount of the loan and the interest) to landlords and rich peas-
ants. The local administration must use its forces to help the hungry masses 
in this work.
2. Lend rice [to those who need it] from local rice-relief stores.
3. Request that the Government distribute some rice from its store to:
a.  Distribute to those who are suering from famine (rst aid)
b. Lend to poor hungry peasants
c. Use as payment for hungry people who can be used for work such as 
transport, road repair, irrigation, etc.
d. The Ministry of National Commerce can coordinate the transport of 
rice to be sold to the people while at the same time collecting forestry 
products from the people.5
The party leaders, as was frequently the case, wanted local cadres to hold meet-
ings to discuss the prescriptions put forward in the directive and to devise plans 
for implementation. But perhaps most of all (and this section was written in ital-
ics), local cadres needed to turn anti-famine work into a “mass movement”—in 
other words, “mobilizing, organizing, and leading the masses, bringing democ-
racy and the positive force of the masses into play.”6
A month and a half later, though, on July 30, 1953, Đồng released a directive 
titled “On Economic, Production, and Rationing Work.” He reiterated that 
weaknesses in local leadership were the “main overall reason for the situation 
of scarcity and hunger in the countryside.” These weaknesses included “short-
comings in tax collection (especially the agricultural tax), the mobilization of 
people’s laborers, corruption, waste, and bureaucratism.”7
With respect to the agricultural tax, the Politburo decided to raise the mini-
mum production level at which the agricultural tax would begin to be collected. 
Thus, anyone producing under 81 kilograms of rice (instead of the old rate of 
71 kilograms) was allegedly exempt from the tax. The party leaders also called 
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for a 5 percent reduction in the rate of “supplemental tax” to be paid to the local 
administration for their use. More importantly, though, Đồng stated that the 
government would not collect any more than 20 percent of a peasant’s harvest. 
These moves were made to “ensure supply for the resistance war while lightening 
the contribution provided by the small producers and the laboring poor.”8 But 
the idea that the state, even with large contributions of food aid from China, 
could feed an army and a growing bureaucracy with a 20 percent agricultural tax 
rate was not realistic. And, soon enough, the party leaders would again look for 
ways to increase the amount of rice that peasants would hand over to the state.
Some Views of Famine from Interzone 
and Provincial Level Cadres
1. Famine in Interzone 3
Interzone 3 was composed of provinces that lay to the west and south of Hanoi, 
including Nam Định and Ninh Bình, which had some of the largest Catholic 
communities in the country. 9 A thick archival le on hunger in 1953 contains 
many dierent reports on the situation in Interzone 3, one coming from the 
interzone leadership and others coming from provincial-level economic commit-
tees. Some of the reports have comments or instructions written in the margins. 
These were likely the comments of a high-ranking party ocial, possibly Phạm 
Văn Đồng himself. According to the report:
Famine occurred in every locality in the interzone, but because cadres at 
all levels care little for the livelihood of the masses, their descriptions of 
the situation sent to the interzone leaders are badly lacking, slow, or incor-
rect. Only when a group of interzone-level cadres went to the countryside 
to inspect the situation did it become apparent that in many places [the 
hunger situation] had become critical. And the cadres in communes and 
in hamlets were not themselves clear about the situation.
The earliest archival report on the hunger situation in Interzone 3 was writ-
ten in February 1953, by which time the party leaders had already begun their 
campaign to blame the food crisis and other problems on feudal exploitation. 
Aer that propaganda campaign had picked up momentum (around March 
and April), and especially aer Đồng’s May directive on famine, virtually all 
reports would be careful to follow his explanation: enemy, weather, and feudal 
exploitation. The reasons for the famine put forward in the February report 
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from Interzone 3 were close to those that Đồng would advance in May. The key 
dierence was that the Interzone 3 report mentioned the DRV state instead of 
feudal exploitation:
Reasons for the Famine
• Natural disasters, weather not good for the 1952 May harvest, which ended 
up being only 2/3 the level of the previous year. The October harvest was 
also badly damaged. In addition to that, crops were hurt by insects and mice.
• The enemy carried out many sweeps, wrecking things over the past years. 
Now, the people are exhausted.
• Poor peasants have not harvested enough rice to pay the agricultural tax for 
the October harvest. Having sold all their rice, paying the agricultural tax 
means they have no more food.
Concerns about the government’s agricultural tax were also listed in two 
other sections of the report titled “The people’s thinking,” and “What the 
people wish.”
The Government has not collected the agricultural tax since last May but 
is now collecting it. The people did not prepare to pay the tax by setting 
aside rice earlier. When they paid the tax, they were out of food. Indeed, 
for some households, aer paying the tax, everybody began to cry. There 
are some people who complain that the [estimated] yield level [on which 
the tax percentage was based] was too high (Bình Minh subdistrict). The 
people are concerned; cadres in the subdistrict have not calculated [the tax] 
clearly with the people, have not allowed the people to participate in the 
discussion when their estimated yields were determined, contributing to 
the yields having been set high.
The section titled “What the people desire” reported that the people “want the 
Government to pay back its debts to them (the rice borrowed by the province, 
district, or subdistrict)—the people would like to be able to subtract that debt 
from the agricultural tax.” The people wanted to “denitively settle the amount 
of rice tax that they have paid so as to achieve some peace of mind.” Again, the 
report makes no mention of feudal exploitation as a major cause of the famine.
This was also the case in an April 10 report on hunger from the Economic 
Committee of Interzone 3, a fact that seems to have inspired the ire of Phạm Văn 
Đồng. A section of that report described the situation in Nam Định province:
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Among the people who lack food, the majority are landless, poor, and 
lower-middle peasants. The reason is that, aside from rice farming, they 
have no other source of work. In Y Yên, even the landlord and rich peasant 
families [are short on food]. Landlords in Bình Điện (Bao Dai subdistrict 
have had to sell their beds and bureaus in order to eat mixed rice mash, or 
they eat a meal of rice followed by a meal of corn. In Vụ Bản, many cadres 
in the subdistrict are also struggling with hunger, eating a full meal and 
then a hungry meal, with their families le needy. This has also had an 
impact on cadres’ work. A number have turned to trading or they have 
taken their families [south] to Interzone 4 in order to nd work. There 
are cadres who, because of hunger, spend the morning hunting for craysh 
and snails. In the aernoon they return and carry out their political work. 
Those cadres who themselves have not yet been able to pay all their taxes 
do not dare urge the people to pay theirs.
The high-ranking party leader who read the report underlined the third and 
fourth sentences in the above extract describing the diculties of landlord and 
rich peasant families. In the margin he wrote, “You were fooled!”
As we saw, Phạm Văn Đồng had released his directive on the famine in May; 
the impact appears immediately in the report on famine in Interzone 3 written 
on June 16, 1953. Clearly taking its cue from Đồng’s directive, the report writer 
was quick to replicate in the document’s “causes” section those that had been put 
forward by the prime minister in the May directive: (1) the enemy, (2) weather, 
and (3) feudal exploitation. Those were the “objective reasons” for the famine.
As for the “subjective” reasons, all dealt with the shortcomings of the inter-
zone administration from top to bottom. The report did have an interesting 
section devoted to “secondary reasons for the famine.” Of these six secondary 
reasons, the rst was the handling of the agricultural tax, but, in accordance 
with the new anti-landlord wind coming from the party leadership, the report 
writer explained the agricultural tax in a way that cohered with the ocial nar-
rative of landlord and local-cadre collusion:
As was the case in Hòa Bình and Ninh Bình provinces, the implementa-
tion of the agricultural tax policy has also contributed to the peasants’ lack 
of rice. There are places where the peasants have eaten through all their 
rice, and [local cadres] have made a point of collecting rice from them rst 
in order to give landlords and peasants time to disperse all their rice. Then 
when the cadres set out to collect the rice [for the agricultural tax], they 
cannot collect enough anymore. There are a few places where local cadres, 
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when collecting taxes, have overstated the tax level for poor and middle 
peasants and not, in a timely fashion, recalculated and returned to the peas-
ants the rice due to them. In Gia Viên district, there are subdistricts where 
[local cadres] have used rice collected from poor and middle peasants in 
order to compensate for shortfalls in the amount of rice collected from 
landlords and rich peasants (to ensure that the subdistrict as whole has met 
its agricultural tax target). There are places (such as Lương Sơn) where local 
cadres have, in a self-serving manner, falsely reported the land of landlords 
and rich peasants while calculating poor and middle peasants’ land so that 
they must pay more in taxes. This enables cadres to reduce the amount of 
taxes that landlords and rich peasants must pay. Local cadres have collected 
the tax too slowly (the month of March), contributing to the inability of 
our countrymen to prepare the amount of rice needed to pay the tax. Aer 
they have paid the tax, they are short on food. There are places where yields 
have suered shortfalls of over 20%, yet [local cadres] did not reduce tax 
burdens in a timely fashion, contributing to our compatriots’ lack of food.
The recruitment of large numbers of peasants for “people’s porters” (dân công) 
also contributed to the production declines. As he had with the agricultural 
tax, the writer of the June 16 report described the policy of mandatory service 
as “people’s porters” in a way that attributed all negative eects to the manner 
in which the policy had been implemented by supposedly corrupt local cadres, 
rather than from the inevitable consequences of the policy itself. “The mobili-
zation of people’s porters has also, in many instances, harmed production. In 
Hòa Bình province, there was a subdistrict that made people serve as people’s 
porters for 17 or 18 days in a month.” The report criticized government oces for 
allegedly recruiting people’s porters “when it was convenient and not thinking 
about the impact on the livelihood of the people.”
In his May 1953 directive, Phạm Văn Đồng had called upon party members to 
resolve food shortages, as much as possible, through mobilization of the masses 
to pressure local elites into lending their extra rice. Soon aer, descriptions of 
these “forced lendings” became a common feature of famine reports. It appears 
that the “forced lendings” were organized by the interzone-level party leaders 
and carried out by special “interzone-level cadres” sent into chosen localities. In 
his assessment of how this approach fared, the report writer from Interzone 3 
followed the typical format of “strengths and weaknesses.” He began by stating 
that these interzone cadres had “helped many localities, and, in many places, 
had mobilized peasants to participate enthusiastically in the forced lendings.” 
But the report writer appears to damn with faint praise these special cadres, 
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writing that they had “grasped the guidelines” of the policy only “relatively well” 
(tương đối).
As he turned to their “weaknesses,” the report writer listed eight issues related 
to these “forced lendings.” One of the eight criticisms took cadres to task for 
“lacking a rm class political standpoint,” for being too accommodating to land-
lords, for “pitying” them and advising peasants to lower their demands on land-
lords targeted for “forced lending.” The other seven criticisms, however, painted 
just the opposite picture. For example, the report writer expressed frustration 
with some cadres for how they chose “forced lending” targets:
Cadres do not grasp the fact that the target is the stubborn landlords and 
rich peasants. This means that there is no discrimination among the ranks 
of the landlords—between those who are stubborn and those who are rela-
tively okay—so as to sow divisions among them. Cadres do not distinguish 
between a rich peasant and a middle peasant. They do not recognize that 
every class requires a dierent approach. As a result, in some places even 
middle peasants have become targets of struggle. Cadres operate under 
the slogan of “struggle” against anybody who has rice and money, forcing 
them to lend it. Or, cadres mechanically hold the view that all landlords 
are “stubborn;” the result is that “struggle” is preferred over persuasion. 
Cadres’ notion of what qualies as “stubborn” behavior is too harsh. There 
are places where a rich peasant, having only begun uttering a few apologetic 
and conciliatory sentences, is immediately branded as stubborn. There are 
places where merchants have become the target of struggle.
Another theme of the criticisms was the way in which the “forced lendings” 
were carried out.
Cadres have been too inclined toward using orders instead of patient per-
suasion. Their impatience, their desire to attain immediate results, has led 
to leist and anarchic actions. There are places (such as Kim Bang, Y Yên, 
Gia Viên, [. . .]) where, aer gathering the peasants, they all ock to the 
landlord’s house and immediately start searching. In a rage, they start car-
rying o rice and taking furniture. There is no explanation or attempt at 
persuasion aorded the landlord at all. There are places where they beat 
the landlord. There are places where they abuse landlords by making them 
kneel and then striking them; [other times] they make them wear a basket 
on their heads when pushing them forward to be “struggled” against. In 
Ninh Thắng, a landlord’s daughter was seized and tied up in a bualo pen.
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The report writer complained that cadres, when leading the peasants in these 
“forced lendings,” did nothing to curb their “ardor” and did not intervene when 
things went beyond policy guidelines. “There are some circumstances in which 
[cadres] hold that, because the landlords and rich peasants have exploited the 
peasants so much, it is okay if the peasants commit a few leist excesses.” As a 
result, “cadres tacitly agree to allow the masses to beat landlords, believing that 
only through torture will the landlords cough up their belongings for the peas-
ants to borrow.” When the crowd of peasants arrived at the landlord’s house, “if 
he acted as though he had nothing, the cadre would just let the peasants into 
the house to take anything, including everyday things like trays, bowls, forks, 
and even sh sauce.”
Aer putting forward these criticisms, the report writer moved to the issue 
of how dierent classes viewed the “forced lendings.” With respect to the vil-
lage poor, “Generally speaking, they enthusiastically participate in the “forced 
lending,” and, aer successfully carrying it out, they believe in their strength 
and praise the Party and Government.” However, the report writer expressed 
concern about the precedent that these “forced lendings” would set in the coun-
tryside. “A few poor peasants are starting to have the mentality of relying upon 
the Party and the Government.” One poor peasant was apparently recorded as 
saying: “From now on, I am not going to be afraid of hunger anymore. If I am 
hungry, I will just ‘struggle.’”
With respect to the reaction of “middle peasants” to the “forced lending,” the 
report noted that the lower-middle peasants “zealously” participated in them, 
showing solidarity with the poor peasants, but were not quite as enthusiastic. 
As for the “upper-middle peasants”:
A number of upper-middle peasants were worried initially that they had 
enough to food or even extra food and could therefore become a “struggle” 
target. Some were afraid to admit that they were middle peasants. But aer 
they understood the policy of the Government, realized that they were not 
the targets of the “forced lending” sessions, they became less anxious. A 
number also participated in the “struggles” but seemed a bit half-hearted. 
A number made allegations in support of the landlords and rich peasants, 
asserting that “forced lending” was actually the brutalization of landlords 
and rich peasants.
A number [of upper-middle peasants] who had relations with land-
lords and rich peasants secretly entered their houses in order to warn 
them to hide their belongings. When the “forced lending” session became 
190 chapter 9
enthusiastic, the middle peasant would gradually lean toward the side of 
the poor peasants. But when [some middle peasants] saw a landlord sur-
render, they would oen try to reduce the hatred of the landless and poor 
peasants, or they would be eager to compromise when the landlord had 
conceded close to the amount demanded, frequently showing pity for the 
landlord. 
The “rich peasants,” it was reported, were “very worried” by the “forced lend-
ing” sessions and attempted to hide their belongings and rice. A few had appar-
ently conspired with landlords to nd a way of dealing with the poor peasants’ 
“forced lending” campaigns. Nevertheless, the report explained, oen aer a 
landlord had surrendered before a “forced lending” confrontation, a number 
of rich peasants would then seek out poor peasants in order to lend them rice 
and to try to “win their hearts.” A number of rich peasants tried to nd a way 
of becoming a member of the Peasant Association. Others, because they were 
afraid of becoming targets of “struggle,” asked if there was any way to become a 
middle peasant. However, other rich peasants were apparently less conciliatory:
On the other hand, a number of rich peasants (the majority being bullies) 
showed themselves to be stubborn. When forced to lend they complained 
bitterly and spread negative ideas about the landless, poor, and middle 
peasants. For example, “they don’t want to work but they still want to eat” 
or “what’s the point in trying to become wealthy—whatever one is able to 
save and put aside is just taken away.”
As for the landlords themselves, they appear much like the rich peasants in 
the report, with some choosing a conciliatory approach and others “stubbornly” 
resisting. Whichever approach was taken, though, it was all typical landlord 
treachery. Thus, some landlords apparently met with each other to devise a 
group strategy for handling the “forced lending” challenge. Others tried to gain 
sympathy from the poor peasants through “sweet talk” or by “pretending” that 
they, the landlords, were also suering from hunger. The writer of the report 
described one landlord in Hòa Bình province who, aer learning that the peas-
ants were going to demand a loan from him, started to “go into the forest digging 
for wild yams” as though out of food. According to the report, some landlords 
threatened the peasants, saying that they, the landlords, would get revenge when 
the “enemy” returned.
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In this report, the comments alleged to have been made by members of local 
communities seem mostly plausible, though one wonders about some quotes 
that match too well with the regime’s propaganda. A Nam Định province report 
produced in July of 1953, for example, quoted poor peasants as saying, “If we had 
not had the Government and Chairman Hồ during this period, we would have 
starved to death.” Another peasant is alleged to have stated: “With the Party, 
the Government, and Chairman Hồ, we are denitely not afraid of starving 
to death.”
2. Famine in Interzone 4
Interzone 4 was composed of the two large and populous provinces of Thanh 
Hóa and Nghệ An along with the two more modest-sized provinces of Hà Tĩnh, 
and Quảng Bình. Together, these four provinces form what appears roughly as 
a long neck on which rests the Red River delta to the north. Since the beginning 
of the war, the French command had le most of this interzone to the DRV. 
Though seeing little ghting, Interzone 4 no doubt suered economically from 
the general disruptions caused by the war, especially disruptions to the ow of 
goods in and out of the region.
The reports on the famine situation in Interzone 4 were all written in April 
1953, before Phạm Văn Đồng’s May directive. As an April 4 report on Thanh 
Hóa province stated, “Here and there, in all districts of the province, there are 
a number of families who have slid into a situation of hunger. The hunger prob-
lem is concentrated in villages and subdistricts of the following districts: Nông 
Cống, Tĩnh Gia, Quảng Xương, Hậu Lộc, Hoàng Hoa, Nga Sơn.” Below is the 
report’s description of the situation in the districts of Nông Cống and Tĩnh Gia:
Nông Cống: From Tân Phúc [in the northern part of the district] down 
through Hoàng Sơn, Tế Nông, Minh Khôi, Vạn Thiện, Thăng Bình, and 
Công Liêm, the people are living poorly. This is not to mention those fam-
ilies that are truly struggling and lack food.
Công Liêm subdistrict has 8 families suering from hunger.
Tân Phúc has two families that have begun to beg.
The village of Yên Dân in Trung Chính subdistrict has 24 families that 
are truly suering from hunger.
Thặng Bình subdistrict is the worst:
65 families have to go without eating for 3 or 4 days. Their health has 
already started to deteriate (bodies are thin and their skin, pale).
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For 341 families, life has become precarious. When the weather is clear 
they are able to eat, but they have to eat mush and in a reduced quantity. If 
it rains for 3 or 4 days, they do not eat.
Tĩnh Gia:
Cát Sơn sub-district: 300 families are suering from hunger, eating a 
meal of rice followed by a meal of gruel.
Tượng Lĩnh: 300 families [suering from hunger]
Tượng Văn: 460 families (the majority living next to the mountain)
Xuân Lâm: 30 families in the village of Thanh Thủy (a Catholic village)
Hải Lĩnh: 220 families
Every day, 20 to 30 people climb up to mountain elds in order to dig 
for yams to bring home and eat. On the days when it rains, they don’t eat.
With respect to the causes of the famine, not one of the reports from the four 
dierent provinces of Interzone 4 referred to feudal exploitation as a signicant 
factor. For example, the section devoted to Thanh Hóa described the situation 
as follows:
Thanh Hóa—reasons for famine:
Objective reasons:
1. Destroyed by the enemy air attacks Gia Hà, ạch Tân (?), Yên Dân.
2. Enemy sweeps: Đ. . . (unreadable), Giáp Ngoại, Liên Sơn.
3. Enemy blockade by sea, hampering of local shing (the coastal sub-districts).
4. Lost harvest last year because of western wind, high salination water ood-
ing (Tĩnh Gia, Nông Cống).
Subjective reasons:
1. The main reason is the lack of leadership [by local cadres] in the eld of 
agricultural production, especially in those regions that lost their irrigation 
canals. Aside from that, there are other reasons.
2. [Peasants] have contributed only a little in advanced tax payments. Then 
they eat through most of their rice and money. When the October harvest 
comes, they must pay everything [at one time]. Or, if the October harvest 
agricultural tax is carried out slowly, they overspend on farming.
3. Deviations in the mobilization of people’s porters. Mobilization of people 
who are primarily laborers without zealously helping their households with 
production.
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4. A number of landless and poor peasants (Hậu Lộc) have invested every-
thing into ensuring production on more land than they have had in previ-
ous years (because they have [received extra land] through redemptions or 
through temporary distribution) and have not received any help.
Another problem pointed out in the Thanh Hóa province report was that a 
“great many” of the hungry subdistricts were occupied by people whose liveli-
hood depended solely on rice farming. They survived by gathering and selling 
rewood from the nearby forest, but the price of rewood had “dropped con-
siderably,” meaning that an enormous amount of wood needed to be collected 
to earn enough money for the purchase of food.
The Problem of Hunger Viewed from Below
Three “Hungry” Subdistricts in Interzone 4’s Nghệ An Province
On May 13, 1953, a member of Nghệ An province’s Resistance Committee sent 
a report on the famine to his immediate superiors in the secretariat of the In-
terzone 4 Resistance Committee. In his message, this local cadre explained that 
the attached report dealt with the three struggling subdistricts of Văn Hiền, 
Hoa Lưu, and Nhân Mỹ. To research the situation there, the Nghệ An province 
Resistance Committee had sent one of its members, Mr. Nguyễn Đức Thi, along 
with Mr. Hoàng Trần Trực, the vice-chairman of the Anh Sơn district Resis-
tance Committee, directly to Văn Hiền and Hoa Lưu to investigate.
At the same time, an attaché of the Anh Sơn district Party Committee had 
been sent to investigate the food situation in Nhân Mỹ, the third of the hungry 
subdistricts. Aer investigating the situation, Mr. Thi held a meeting with the 
subdistrict’s Resistance Committee and mass organizations (attended by cad-
res from each village). The meeting’s purpose was to reach a consensus on the 
hunger situation’s causes and solutions. That meeting, apparently in Hoa Lưu, 
was also attended by the attaché recruited to inspect the situation in Nhân Mỹ.
The report provided brief, shorthand descriptions of the situation in ve vil-
lages of Văn Hiền subdistrict and two in Hoa Lưu subdistrict. All of these were 
considered “typical” of the situation throughout that subdistrict. Not a single 
family in any of these three subdistricts had qualied as a “landlord” according 
to the criteria used to carry out the census in 1950 and 1951. In the village of Văn 
Thái, it was reported that 130 families lacked food and that the village had two 
rich-peasant families—less than 2 percent of the total population. The village of 
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Văn Đông had 179 total families, ve of which were labeled as rich peasants—
less than 3 percent. The village of Văn Thơ had 140 total families, two of which 
qualied as rich peasants—less than 2 percent.
In all the descriptions of these seven Nghệ An villages, only two negative 
comments about rich peasants appear. Two rich peasant families in the village of 
Văn Thái were reported a month earlier to have each had 400 to 500 kilograms 
of rice. One of them had apparently sold on credit some corn to people in need 
and had the “trick” of lending people plates that could be sold for money or 
food. Though certainly negative, there is nothing particularly “feudal” in this 
description of the village’s two rich peasants. Nor does the report link them in 
any direct way to the causes of the famine.
The second negative comment about a rich peasant appears in the description 
of one of the villages in Hoa Lưu: “The situation with rich peasants: there are 
six families (1 rich peasant specializes in exploiting high interest loans and sup-
plemental rents for bualos and cows).” This was the only mention of “feudal” 
exploitation in the entire report. Moreover, in none of the summaries of the 
reasons for the famine and in none of the reports on the people’s ideas about 
the causes behind the famine does feudal exploitation or any action of rich peas-
ants appear.
The relationship that appears to be of greater concern to starving local peas-
ants was the one between themselves and the DRV state, especially with respect 
to the agricultural tax. The cadre who wrote the report clearly did not dare state 
too strongly that the tax was a fundamental cause of the hunger in these three 
subdistricts, but he had subtle ways of making this an unavoidable conclusion. 
For example, he commented that many of the people who were suering from 
hunger had paid their agricultural tax.
The report on the village of Vạn Thái in Văn Hiền subdistricts notes that 
40 of the roughly 139 families in the community still owed some amount of 
agricultural tax, with a few middle peasants short 400 to 500 kilograms of rice. 
In the section “opinion among the people,” the report states that people had not 
been able to gather the amount of rice required by the government in time and 
thus had felt compelled to sell furniture and water bualos in order to meet the 
requirement.
The report from the village of Văn Đồng states that only 22 of the 179 families 
in the community had been able to pay their agricultural tax—and all families 
who were hungry were also short on their agricultural tax. “Of the 165 families 
short on food, only three had been able to pay their agricultural tax. The entire 
village still owes 40,000 kilograms [400 tạ] of rice.”
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This description coheres with the picture of the agricultural tax as a govern-
ment rice requisition that used estimated yield percentages as a means of punish-
ing peasants for underproduction. With respect to the general opinion among 
the people, the report stated: “because [people] are short on their tax payment, 
they do not speak up about their hunger.” Another opinion was that “this year 
we can’t produce enough—we are dead whether we eat or not.”
As for the village of Hoa Trung, the report stated that, of the 188 total fam-
ilies in the village, “only 66 families had handed in their agricultural tax and, 
of the 96 families lacking food, the majority had paid their agricultural tax.” 
The report claimed that, “of the [village’s] six rich peasant families, three are 
still short in paying their agricultural tax but have already run out of rice. The 
other three have paid their agricultural tax but are now short on rice.” Under the 
category “public opinion,” the report stated that people felt “the estimated yield 
is too high (what should be 17 tạ is set at 23 tạ).”
The report included a section dealing with the “aspirations” of the people 
moving forward. First, villagers “want the agricultural tax to be reduced.” Sec-
ond, they wanted to be able to borrow rice seed. Third, they wanted to borrow 
bualos. And fourth, “poor and middle peasants want to be able to donate land.” 
This last aspiration raises a number of questions. First, why would poor, hungry 
peasants desire to “donate” their land rather than sell it? Second, why did this 
need to be expressed as an “aspiration” to the visiting cadre, as though they were 
not being permitted to do so? Third, why were poor and middle peasants in this 
village trying to own less land in the rst place?
Answers to these questions were suggested in the report’s account of Hoa Tân 
village. There it was claimed that the village had collected 421 tạ of the 528 tạ 
of rice that was required of the community for the agricultural tax and that 46 
of the 109 families in the village had been able to pay the tax. As for the “public 
opinion,” the report writer described the people as saying: “no matter what, we 
will have to donate our land because we have no bualos. If the government does 
not accept [the donated land] then we will just abandon the eld and not bother 
to harvest it.” It appears that many peasants wanted to reduce their amount of 
farmed land to ease the burden of agricultural tax.
Đặng Thai Mai Letter to Trường Chinh
On June 19, 1953, one of the DRV’s leading intellectuals, the y-one-year-old 
literature scholar, Đặng Thai Mai, penned a letter to his old friend, Trường 
Chinh. Thai Mai wrote from his native Nghệ An province in Interzone 4, where 
196 chapter 9
he apparently spent much of the war. In the letter’s opening lines, he explained 
to Chinh, “I am sending this letter up to you to present a few more things. I also 
sent a letter to the Interzone 4 Party branch (K.U.L.K.IV). But there are some 
issues that I need to report so that the [Party] Central Committee has a clear 
understanding.”10
The rst issue concerned taxes for 1953:
On the issue of 1953 taxes, I already put forward a couple of ideas in my 
previous letter. Now, aer having inspected the situation myself—aer 
having asked a few comrades and a number of regular people [dân chúng], 
I hope that you can pay some attention to the issue of tax rate [thuế biểu]. 
Maybe Nghệ An province’s yield levels need to be reconsidered. In 1951, 
usually four bushels of harvested rice stalk (including the owers) was cal-
culated to produce one tạ [100 kilograms] of rice. In 1952, the province 
Party leadership set the amount of rice required for each district. Each 
district would then divide the required amount among the subdistricts. 
There are some subdistricts that have set the rice productivity level at two 
and a half bushels for 100 kilograms of rice, though the majority of districts 
were set at three bushels. It was the same for Hà Tĩnh province. The result 
is that there are some places where an acre [mẫu] of paddy is required to 
produce a yield of 3,200 or 3,500 kilograms. In the past, even the best rice 
elds were only expected to yield 2,500 or 2,800 kilograms of rice per acre. 
I asked many peasants who farmed one or two acres and they all said that 
there was no way of meeting that yield level. I dare to put forward this issue 
because I have followed the situation in my region pretty carefully. And the 
reality is that this year I have heard many peasants complaining a lot about 
the attitude of cadres who set the [agricultural tax] yield levels. Therefore, 
I feel that I need to report this situation to the Zone Party branch and to 
the Central Committee.
To buttress his point, Đặng Thai Mai referred to the recent economic re-
port of Maksim Saburov, who was the Chairman of the Soviet Union’s State 
Planning Committee. Saburov’s report had been delivered at the CPSU’s 19th 
Congress the previous October. Thai Mai pointed out that Subarov, in his dis-
cussion of the “Five-Year-Plan to Develop the Soviet Union,” had stated that the 
country, in its estimation of the yields for irrigated lands, had only planned for 
a productivity level of 4,000 to 5,000 kilograms per hectare. “Therefore, four 
years from now, even with their technology, even with their manpower, the So-
viets are only expecting to reach a productivity level of 2,000 to 2,500 kilograms 
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per half-hectare, which is still more than one of our acres (in Central Vietnam, 
an acre is 4,900 square meters).” The strong implication of Thai Mai’s letter was 
that the Party Central Committee was out of touch with reality.
In the politest terms, Thai Mai also complained to Trường Chinh about the 
party’s policy of political struggle against the landlord class:
Second thing: the current struggle movement being led by the Central 
Committee surely will bring about the good result that the people’s regime 
will be respected. However, at the same time, it would be good if the Party 
and government could send an inspection group here to determine whether 
the people had any anger or concerns with how the general policy was being 
implemented. That inspection group could then report to the Zone Party 
branch and the Central Committee so that all local shortcomings could be 
adjusted. I am certain that the result would be very good for the political 
awakening and condence of the people [in the Party leadership].
Đặng Thai Mai found it particularly galling that the granddaughter of the great 
patriot Phan Bội Châu (1868–1945) had been ensnared in the growing political 
campaign against “landlords.” This woman’s husband was a lieutenant in the 
DRV army. Back in her Nghệ An village, she served in the women’s branch of 
the United Vietnam Association. Cautiously, Thai Mai pointed out that this 
granddaughter of Phan Bội Châu rented out two acres (one mẫu) of land because 
her husband was absent serving the military eort. “In the recent May harvest, 
that paddy produced ten bushels of rice, but she only received received 5 ‘armfuls’ 
[lượm] when each bushel has 8 armfuls (there are places where landlords have to 
reduce rents by 85% . . .).” As a result, Thai Mai pointed out, her family “lived in 
extremely dicult circumstances.”
In his letter, Thai Mai also let Trường Chinh know that Phan Bội Châu had 
another granddaughter in the village. She only had a third of an acre of paddy on 
which to raise her two children of nine and twelve years. They only had enough 
food to eat every other meal. Thai Mai requested that Trường Chinh arrange 
with the Interzone party branch to have these two children sent to China for 
study, insisting that his motivation for this request was not based on a “notion of 
how to treat the descendants of a great revolutionary.” Rather, the main reason 
was that Phan Bội Châu still had a fair number of admirers in Nghệ An and 
Hà Tĩnh provinces. “If we allow his family to live in miserable circumstances, it 
creates an opportunity for those who are dissatised to spread criticisms. This 
is truly a small matter, yet I still wrote this letter to you—please do not blame 
me too much.” In a revealing concluding sentence, Đặng Thai Mai wrote to 
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Trường Chinh: “Please believe that I always try to be close to the actual lives of 
the people.”
The primary causes of peasant hardship in 1953 were the disruptions and dif-
culties brought about by the war along with the severe tax burden placed on 
the countryside by the party leaders, who had no choice but to inspire, cajole, 
and, if needed, force peasants to feed the DRV’s war eort. In comparison to 
these things, feudal exploitation by local elites does not seem to have been a 
meaningful factor contributing to the spreading hunger crisis in 1953. Over the 
seven years of war, the key drain on peasant rice certainly shied from local elites 
to the DRV state.
This new tax burden, extracted initially by the party-state through means 
of straight requisition and then through an agricultural tax based on (highly 
elevated) estimated yields, seems to have been great enough to kill much of the 
joy of free land distributions carried out by the regime since taking power. In 
the reports, we see examples of peasants who had returned to the local party 
apparatus land that had been allocated to them. Other peasants (in Nghệ An) 
apparently wished to do so as a means of reducing their tax burden and avoiding 
the accumulation of debt to the DRV state. Thus, the archival le on hunger in 
1953 also does not support another key pillar of the regime’s ocial justication 
for land reform—the notion of great land hunger among peasants in the DRV 
countryside. Had peasants been oered these land distributions with a lower 
tax obligation to the DRV state, such that the receipt of land correlated to an 
increase in the peasants’ disposable income, no doubt the land hunger claimed 
by the party leaders would have rapidly materialized.
Let’s consider for a moment how some of the above-mentioned reports about 
peasant attitudes and behaviors might have appeared to Politburo members in 
1953. These were patriotic men who had spent most of their adult lives working 
as professional revolutionaries for the liberation of their country and for the 
dream of a socialist Vietnam. In many cases, their careers had involved long, bru-
tal stays in prison. Four years ago, Chinese Communists had prevailed, meaning 
that the world’s largest country was now socialist. Vietnam lay on the southern 
border of a unied Communist bloc that covered most of Asia and Europe. In 
late 1950 and early 1951, the DRV forces had turned Soviet and Chinese military 
support into a devastating blow to France, nearly taking Hanoi. For the last 
couple of years (1952 and 1953), the DRV had held the initiative in the ghting 
but had not been able to deliver the dramatic victory needed to end the conict. 
The war was now in its seventh year. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese had been 
killed or wounded, but the French were wavering in their resolve.
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In the light of these circumstances, the thinking of Thành, Trường Chinh, 
Phạm Văn Đồng, Võ Nguyên Giáp, and other party leaders about the behavior 
of the rural population can be imagined: We have the French on the ropes; tens 
of thousands of our soldiers and civilians have already been killed; we desper-
ately need more food for our troops. How can villagers demand that we subtract 
their xed-rice-purchase contributions from the agricultural tax? How can poor 
peasants refuse to farm temporarily distributed land on the grounds that the 
tax rate is too high? How can other villagers intentionally reduce their area of 
cultivation to limit their agricultural tax exposure? How can villagers complain 
that the recruitment of people’s porters occurs at inconvenient times? War is 
inherently inconvenient and cannot be managed according to your schedule. 
What about the inconvenience of having been colonized for eighty years?
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Điện Biên Phủ and Geneva, 1954
Toward the end of 1953, the DRV leaders learned that the French had parachuted 
six thousand troops into a remote valley on the Laotian border. It appeared that 
the French, as they had done at Nà Sản, were going to construct an entrenched 
camp in this valley, named Điện Biên Phủ, and tempt the DRV forces into an-
other costly attack. Actually, the French intention was to prevent the DRV forces 
from attacking westward into Laos. If the French did not contest such a push, 
who would believe in the concept of the French Union (i.e., French Indochina)? 
In most respects, the valley of Điện Biên Phủ was a more advantageous battle-
eld from the DRV perspective than had been the case at Nà Sản a year earlier.
During late 1953, the international environment had also changed in import-
ant ways that would ultimately benet the DRV side. First, in July, participants 
in the Korean War had agreed to an armistice. This meant that more attention 
and weapons from the Chinese and Soviets could be channeled the DRV’s way, 
though the French and their allies, the State of Vietnam, could hope for a similar 
boost from the United States. Second, the Great Powers, notably the United 
States and the Soviet Union, were becoming increasingly interested in convening 
some sort of large diplomatic conference to resolve the situations in Korea and 
Indochina. These diplomatic developments suddenly gave the showdown in the 
valley of Điện Biên Phủ a meaning that the French had not anticipated. Rather 
than being the rst stage of a two-year plan (the “Navarre Plan”) to win the war, 
Điện Biên Phủ became the last major battle of the First Indochina War.
The Lead-up to Điện Biên Phủ
In the middle of 1953, the DRV leaders probably felt themselves to be in an 
agonizing position. On the one hand, their military capacity was heading in 
a positive direction. Their Leninist organizational techniques—the focus on 
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discipline, the centralization of power, the maintenance of secrecy, the careful 
control of information, and the vigorous and exible use of propaganda—were 
well suited to the leadership of an army and the management of a war. Once the 
party leaders had a young man in their military system, they were usually able to 
train him and motivate him to ght eectively.
On the other hand, the economic situation of the DRV was headed just as 
steadily in the opposite direction. What was working for young men in the army 
was not working for peasant agricultural producers in the villages, whose re-
sults, in direct contrast to those of the army, were worsening. Though Chinese 
food aid,1 along with foodstus requisitioned from Cambodian and Laotian 
farmers,2 must have helped to some extent, internal party reports on the food 
situation suggest that whatever these outside sources amounted to, it was not 
nearly enough to oset the dwindling supply. All DRV-controlled areas were 
now, more or less, on dierent points of the same downward sloping continuum 
whose end was famine.
The steady spread of the food crisis had a terrible logic to it that must have 
weighed on the party leaders: with every harvest, rice collection became more 
imperative and more dicult as the amount needed to feed the army, bureau-
cracy, and now, increasingly, areas suering from famine, became a larger por-
tion of a shrinking pie. Eventually, a tipping point would be reached when the 
collection of rice from villages would start to condemn a certain percentage of 
the community to severe malnutrition or even death, taking more people out of 
the workforce, resulting in yet more land le fallow, further decreases in pro-
duction, worse famine, and so on. At that point, no matter how skilled, brave, 
and well-equipped the army was, the logic of the food crisis would overpower 
all other eorts. The DRV was not at that point in the summer of 1953, but its 
leaders must have recognized that they were heading there.
Looking at the situation with their French foes, the DRV leaders could see 
a similar combination of positives and negatives. On the one hand, there were 
some bright signs in France that the DRV’s opponents might be edging toward 
an abandonment of the ght. On June 26, 1953, the new French prime min-
ister, Joseph Laniel, promised the French people that “his government would 
search tirelessly for an end to the conict, whether that would be during the 
negotiations that followed the signing of an armistice in Korea or in any other 
negotiations taken in agreement with the Associated States [of Indochina].” 
This was the rst time that a French leader had put in writing the government’s 
determination to end the war through any means, including negotiations.3
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For many people in France, the Korean War armistice, which was concluded a 
month aer Laniel’s statement, stirred up hopes of an armistice in Indochina as 
well.4
While pleased that French popular opinion was pressuring democratically 
elected French political leaders to speak of ending the war, the DRV leaders 
were, at the same time, wary of this discourse. They appear to have feared that 
such talk of peace coming from France would infect their own side with similar 
dreams. An August 16, 1953 editorial in The People explained how readers of the 
newspaper (i.e., rank-and-le party members and anyone else connected with the 
DRV side) should interpret the Korean armistice and the peace discourse coming 
from the French government. Any talk of peace from French politicians other 
than Communist Party ones was a “Machiavellian scheme” meant to “fool” the 
French public and to “dampen the ghting spirit of the Vietnamese people.”
The editorial insisted that the “French colonialists and the American inter-
ventionists” still hoped to defeat the DRV and were looking toward “stepping 
up” their war eort to do so. The new French general, Henri Navarre, the arti-
cle stated, was “owned by the Americans,” and “the Navarre plan is the Ameri-
cans’ plan.”5 In the fall of 1953, the DRV leaders were able to piece together the 
basic elements of the “Navarre Plan,” which involved another two whole years 
of ghting. Nguyễn Tất Thành and his comrades in the Politburo must have 
felt that their cynical interpretation of the French government’s peace discourse 
was justied.6
The Navarre Plan
When he had selected Navarre to take command of the Indochina war eort, 
the French prime minister, Rene Mayer, had informed his new hire that the gov-
ernment was looking for “an honorable departure” from Indochina. As usual, 
such a departure required a convincing military victory that would put France 
in a strong negotiating position. In this sense, the DRV analysis in The People 
was not o the mark: The French government wanted peace, but most felt that 
there was still work to be done on the battleeld before a suciently “honorable” 
peace could be secured. The possibility of destroying the DRV forces and ending 
the war through force of arms alone had been questioned by French political and 
military leaders since the CCP victory in 1949. From that point onward, such a 
hope seems to have faded from most people’s realm of possibility.7
As mentioned, Navarre’s plan stretched over a period of two years. During the 
rst year (the upcoming autumn campaign), French forces would “contain” the 
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DRV forces, which meant avoiding major confrontations in the northern third 
of the country where DRV divisions were based, seeking instead soer targets 
in central and southern Vietnam. This cautious approach would buy time for 
further training of the Associated State of Vietnam’s army as the key part of a 
broader eort to build up the forces of the anticommunist French Union.
Navarre envisioned that, during the following year (1954–1955), he would have 
larger and stronger forces under his command, along with a boost in American 
military aid. This would enable him to carry out a large-scale oensive in the 
North, striking painful blows against the DRV’s main forces and convincing 
Hồ Chí Minh to negotiate. To facilitate this plan, Navarre asked the French 
military command for an additional twelve battalions (roughly 30,000 troops) 
along with an increase in aircra for bombing and transport. The French mil-
itary command in Paris was only able to provide him with an additional nine 
battalions and a modest boost in aircra.8
In July, shortly before departing for Indochina, Navarre had attended nal 
briengs with the French Joint Chiefs and the National Defense Committee to 
discuss his plan and clarify his mission in Indochina. According to the historian 
Bernard Fall, there had been some talk in these meetings about whether Navarre 
should challenge the DRV in Laos or not. Navarre had felt strongly that the 
DRV should not be allowed to march unopposed through Laos as this would 
damage the morale of France’s allies in Indochina.9
A similar logic applied vis-à-vis the ethnic minority groups on the Laos- 
Vietnam border—French eorts over the past couple of years to recruit, arm, 
and train ethnic minority members living in the high region between the coun-
tries had borne some fruit.10 It seemed worthwhile to prevent this part of Indo-
china from coming under complete DRV control. Ultimately, France’s National 
Defense Committee le the decision about Laos up in the air. Receiving no spe-
cic directions to deviate from past commitments to defend Laos, which seemed 
to be rearmed subsequently by France’s October 22, 1953 defense treaty with 
the Kingdom of Laos, Navarre planned to contest the DRV in this neighboring 
country.11
He and the other French commanders decided that the current center of 
operations in the northwestern region, Nà Sản, was not close enough to the 
Laotian border to challenge the expected DRV push into that country. Travel-
ing westward from Hanoi toward Laos, Nà Sản was about 290 kilometers from 
the city, only about two-thirds the distance to the northwestern section of the 
Lao border where the French thought that the DRV would begin a stab toward 
Luang Prabang (Laos’s traditional capital). A better location for the defense of 
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Laos, in the eyes of Navarre and other French military leaders, was the border 
town of Điện Biên Phủ.12 It lay an additional 180 kilometers west of Nà Sản 
along Route 6 at the junction of three major roads, one of which cut straight 
across the northern part of Laos. Điện Biên Phủ took on additional importance 
when the French decided to make it the new capital of the recently created (1948) 
“Tai Federation,” which comprised the mountainous region between Laos and 
Vietnam.13
There were those within the French command, however, who questioned the 
logic of creating a base at Điện Biên Phủ, arguing that it would not have the in-
tended eect of “blocking” the DRV troops from entering Laos. Air force leaders 
were concerned that Điện Biên Phủ lay at the outer limits of their ghter planes’ 
fuel capacity, allowing only a few minutes of air support. Others pointed to the 
valley’s frequent rain and fog, which would cut the air bridge between the base 
and supplies in Hanoi.14
At some point in August and September, the DRV leaders and their Chinese 
advisers decided that their next oensive would be, as the French had antici-
pated, northwesterly toward and into Laos. There had been some discussion of 
a major oensive in the Red River delta, but ultimately this had been abandoned 
for the safer option toward the northwest, where remoteness would mitigate the 
French advantage in repower. As usual, French intelligence services, through 
both listening to radio conversations and following DRV troop movements via 
aerial photography, were soon able to piece together the basic outline of their 
opponents’ plan.15
On November 2, 1953, Navarre called on subordinates to prepare for the oc-
cupation of Điện Biên Phủ, code-named “Operation Castor.” Later that month, 
the operation began with the drop of a parachute battalion into the valley. Aer 
a few hours of combat with a regiment of DRV troops guarding the valley, the 
French forces were able to seize control of the main town (Mường Thanh) in the 
valley and prepare the way for four more parachute battalions and a company of 
engineers. These additional troops arrived over the next three days. By Novem-
ber 25, the French forces had gained control over the valley and improved the 
airstrip enough to begin fortifying the base at Điện Biên Phủ.
Between General Navarre and his second-in-command, there had been some 
miscommunication about the actual function of the base at Điện Biên Phủ. Na-
varre had assumed that it would be made into an entrenched camp much like 
the recently abandoned one at Nà Sản, though he had thought that it would 
be of only secondary importance. The commander of the French forces in the 
Tonkin theater, however, had thought that the new base would only be used as 
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a “mooring point” for launching guerrilla-style attacks on DRV troops menac-
ing Laos or the “Tai Federation.” This confusion would have disastrous conse-
quences for the French Union side.
Neither Navarre nor any other French military leader expected that Điện 
Biên Phủ would become the decisive battle of the war.16 This misunderstanding 
over the purpose of the garrison at Điện Biên Phủ meant that it was not fortied 
to the extent that the previous entrenched camp at Nà Sản had been. By the time 
the French military leadership realized that the garrison was surrounded by four 
DRV divisions (roughly 45,000 soldiers) and that the upcoming Geneva Confer-
ence would give the impending battle an enormous unanticipated signicance, 
it was too late to improve the camp’s decient fortications.17
The DRV “Combat Plan” for Điện Biên Phủ
While General Navarre and other French military leaders had not expected 
Điện Biên Phủ to assume the importance that it eventually did, the DRV lead-
ers had quickly grasped the battle’s potential signicance. A December 6, 1953 
report to the Politburo by Võ Nguyên Giáp estimated that the French had about 
six battalions in the valley by early December and noted their eorts to improve 
the airstrip and build fortications. Perhaps the French command did intend to 
take a stand at the new base in Điện Biên Phủ:
Right now we cannot yet determine [French intensions]. However, the 
Central Committee is determined to destroy the enemy and liberate the 
region of Lai Châu-Phongsaly all the way to Luang Prabang during the 
Winter-Spring [period]. Therefore, we must focus on and prepare for a 
situation in which the enemy strengthens [its forces] into a collective 
entrenched fortication [at Điện Biên Phủ].
In this situation, the battle at Điện Biên Phủ would be the largest attack 
on a fortied position up to this point, not less than Nà Sản, with the road 
even farther [away]. Therefore, our preparations will have many dicul-
ties, and only with a rapid and massive eort to concentrate our forces will 
we be able do so in time. But if, with determination, we can overcome our 
diculties and carry out the campaign, this victory would be a huge one.18
Giáp’s “Combat Plan” estimated that the DRV forces would need to commit 
a total of 43,000 troops to the Điện Biên Phủ campaign. The French garri-
son would be attacked in two stages, the rst of which ending in late January, 
1954. At that point, DRV forces would pause for about twenty days to “make 
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adjustments” and integrate reinforcements before beginning the second stage 
of the battle. According to Giáp’s calculations, DRV troops would be able to 
attack for about forty-ve days, meaning that the campaign would need to be 
completed by early May.19
With respect to supplies, the DRV’s plan estimated that the attack would 
require 4,200 tons of rice, not including the additional rice needed to feed the 
roughly 30,000 “people’s porters” mobilized for the campaign. Where would 
the 4,200 tons of rice come from? Giáp stated that the DRV would “make the 
most of the potential of areas in the Northwest, with the rest to be taken from 
[the provinces of] Phú Thọ and Thanh Hóa.” In addition to the 4,200 tons 
of rice, the Điện Biên Phủ campaign would require one hundred tons of dried 
vegetables, one hundred tons of meat, eighty tons of salt, and twelve tons of 
sugar, “all of which will mainly be brought up from Thanh Hóa province,” the 
plan stated.20
For some perspective on how much food this was, the reader might consider 
that the average tractor-trailer truck today (the largest on the road) carries a max-
imum load of 30 tons, meaning that the amount of rice needed for the troops 
alone would be equivalent to what could be carried by at least 120 of these trucks 
(for some less-dense foodstus, the volume of 30 tons would far exceed the spa-
tial capacity of one truck).
How would this enormous quantity of food be squeezed out of a local popu-
lation that was desperately short of food, with pockets of famine appearing in 
all DRV-controlled regions? Fortunately for the DRV, their Chinese allies were 
apparently able to rush 1,700 tons of grain to Điện Biên Phủ, lowering the bur-
den somewhat.21 Still, that le at least another 3,000 tons of rice to be collected. 
As was the case throughout the war, this dicult and essential task would fall 
primarily on the shoulders of party members at the grassroots level, the people 
who collected the agricultural tax from their village communities, who recruited 
the “people’s porters” to carry the rice and other supplies, and who draed young 
men to ght the battles. For most peasants in the DRV-controlled areas, it was 
these local party members who were the face of the regime. As we have seen, they 
were a source of great frustration to the party leaders, who tended to blame them 
for the disappointing results of the party’s various economic policies and for the 
hardships of rural life in general. The land reform program had already marked 
these local party members for purge.
By December 27, 1953, the DRV forces were in place and had cut o all escape 
routes from Điện Biên Phủ. The 12,000 French Union troops in the garrison 
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were surrounded by about 45,000 DRV troops. Despite this seemingly dire sit-
uation, the French command apparently remained condent that the garrison 
would be able to defeat any attempts to overrun it much the same way the simi-
larly outnumbered camp at Nà Sản had done the previous year.22
The Possibility of Negotiations
During August and September 1953, while General Navarre was thinking about 
the implementation of his two-year plan, the Soviet Union made public propos-
als to the United States, Great Britain, and France that “ve-power” talks be held 
among them and, controversially, that they include the PRC. The purpose of 
these talks was to “reduce tensions” throughout the world. At that time, Moscow 
was trying to raise the prestige of the PRC on the world stage. The United States, 
still bitter over both the “loss of China” in 1949 and, more recently, the U.S. 
military’s retreat before PRC forces in North Korea, remained adamantly op-
posed to any diplomatic move that could be construed as a de facto recognition 
of the PRC. These Soviet initiatives for “ve-power talks” were enthusiastically 
supported by Beijing in their press.23
As historians point out, the three Western powers disagreed on how Com-
munist China should be handled. The United States disliked the idea of negoti-
ating with the PRC, but France viewed such negotiations as a possible means of 
extricating itself from the war in Indochina. On November 3, the Soviet Union 
backed o its insistence on “ve-power” talks with the PRC and returned to 
the “four-power” model for a proposed conference limited to the situations in 
Germany (unication) and Austria (neutrality).24 Undeterred by this setback, 
Moscow continued to promote the prestige of the PRC and to campaign for a 
ve-power conference at a later date.”25
Two days aer the Soviet Union’s November 3, 1953 appeal to the Great 
Powers, a Swedish journalist based in Paris and working through the Swedish 
embassy in Peking was able to forward some questions to Thành about the 
possibility of negotiating an armistice in Indochina. It appears that the Soviet 
proposals for talks (and their warm support by the PRC) had caused a change 
of heart among Thành and his comrades. On November 29, 1953, the Swedish 
newspaper Expressen published Thành’s response, which was written in English 
and transferred to the Swedish newspaper via the country’s embassy in Peking. 
To the question of whether he and his government welcomed negotiations, 
Thành wrote:
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If the French colonialists continue their war of aggression, the Vietnamese 
people are determined to continue the patriotic war until nal victory. 
If, having learned a lesson during these past years of war, the French 
Government wishes to carry out a ceasere, to engage in negotiations as 
a means of solving the question of Vietnam by peaceful means, the peo-
ple and government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are ready for 
that motion.26
To the question of whether a “neutral” country could act as a go-between 
to facilitate peace negotiations, Thành replied that, although the DRV “wel-
comed” such eorts, the negotiation of a ceasere was “primarily” the task of 
the French and DRV governments. There was not a single mention or even hint 
in the letter of the State of Vietnam’s existence. Not surprisingly, the prospect 
of Paris coming to some sort of separate agreement with the DRV raised anx-
iety among members and supporters of the State of Vietnam. Within days of 
the Hồ Chí Minh letter, anticommunist nationalists whose fates were tied to 
the State of Vietnam began pressing France with renewed urgency for complete 
independence. They also pressed their Head of State, the former emperor, Bảo 
Đại, to make governmental changes that would give the State of Vietnam a more 
nationalist and independent character.27
In his Hồ Chí Minh letter, Thành attempted to sow dissent among the forces 
opposing him, suggesting that the French people and the Vietnamese people 
shared a common enemy—the United States:
With respect to the French people and French peace soldiers, I, as before, 
express my sympathy and aection. Today, it is not only the independence 
of the Vietnamese people that is seriously violated, but that of France itself. 
The American imperialists, on the one hand, pressure the French colo-
nialists to continue and expand their war of aggression against Vietnam, 
making France grow weaker as it continues to ght, with the intention of 
taking France’s place in Indochina. On the other hand, [the Americans] are 
forcing the French to approve the treaty on the defense of Europe, which 
means allowing German militarism to live again.28
Thus, the key danger to Indochina was not the French colonialists but the 
American imperialists, who were waiting in the wings to seize Indochina aer a 
depleted France had been brushed aside. In Thành’s conceptualization, French 
military eorts were inextricably linked with American aid while the DRV was 
apparently a completely autonomous actor. He made no mention of the relation-
ship between the DRV and its two big allies, the Soviet Union and PRC.
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Similarly, Thành highlighted the political complexity of France, stressing 
contradictions between its people, its “peace soldiers,” and its colonialists. He 
contrasted this with the simplicity of Vietnam, which he depicted as having only 
one people and one state—that of the DRV. Despite the party’s move to land 
reform, the regime’s most ambitious and radical project of socialist transforma-
tion to date, Thành made no mention of ideology as a source of contention in 
Vietnamese political life. In his Expressen letter, he conceptualized the conict 
between the DRV and France as simply between French and Vietnamese patri-
otism on the one side and French colonialism allied with American imperialism 
on the other.
Thành’s image of Vietnamese, Indochinese, and world politics in his Novem-
ber 20 letter to Expressen hints at some of the party’s subsequent policy choices 
during and immediately following the Geneva Conference (namely the attempt 
to ally with France again). It also shows, as the historian Pierre Asselin stresses, 
that there was a convergence of interests between the Soviet Union, PRC, and 
DRV on the desirability of keeping America out of Indochina.29
It was a ne line that Thành and the party leaders had to walk when depicting 
their situation to the Soviets and Chinese. On the one hand, America’s support 
for the anticommunist forces in Vietnam and its steps toward direct interven-
tion provided the DRV leaders with an opportunity to sell themselves to the 
Soviets and Chinese as proxy warriors against the United States, the great enemy 
of the Communist camp. No doubt Thành hoped that this would make the 
DRV’s two key allies more willing to increase the ow of weapons and aid. On 
the other hand, it was possible that this narrative would have the opposite eect 
on Soviet and Chinese thinking, convincing them to keep their aid at limited 
levels so as not to provoke an American intervention in Indochina. Ironically, 
Thành’s eorts to promote the DRV as the vanguard of the struggle against the 
American-led “imperialist camp” may have made it more dicult for him to 
complain when the Soviets and Chinese, a few months later, used that American 
threat in Indochina as a reason to negotiate a ceasere at Geneva.
The Road to the Geneva Conference
Still determined to promote the PRC, the Soviet foreign minister, Vyacheslav 
Molotov, had used his opening speech at the Berlin Conference (January 25 
to February 18, 1954) to make another pitch for the Soviet goal of ve-power 
talks. At the conference, the Soviets, Americans, French, and British made no 
headway on the issue of German reunication or Austrian neutralization; the 
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Soviets continued to reject the proposal that Germany be reunited through free 
elections supervised by the four powers—a method that obviously would have 
resulted in the end of East Germany. And the Western powers similarly contin-
ued to reject the Soviet proposal for the unication of Korea.
By making some concessions to American semantic demands, however, and 
taking advantage of French eagerness to end the conict in Indochina through 
negotiations, Molotov was nally able to secure his wish. In the nal week of 
negotiations in Berlin, his three Western counterparts agreed to a ve-power 
conference on the situations in Korea and Indochina. The nal communiqué 
of the Berlin Conference, released on February 19, 1954, stated that a meeting 
of the United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the People’s 
Republic of China, along with “other interested states,” would begin on April 
26, 1954. The conference would tackle Korea rst and Indochina second.30 Thus 
was the Geneva Conference born.
The coming Geneva Conference was not good news for General Navarre, 
who saw how it jeopardized his two-year “Navarre Plan” to end the war. How, 
though, was news of the conference received by the DRV leaders? Without access 
to the transcripts of discussions between Thành and other top party leaders, we 
are forced to interpret the regime’s public statements. The VWP’s main organ, 
The People, printed ve Geneva Conference articles, which, viewed together, 
suggest a few important things.31 First, the DRV leaders initially downplayed the 
prospect of peace talks on Indochina. Not until February 21, 1954 did the The 
People reveal that the proposed Geneva Conference would address the situation 
in Indochina. And this was done in a discreet and blasé manner that seems to 
have been intended not to generate excitement about the prospect of peace. As 
the February 21, 1954 article stated:
However, from this initial victory to actually resolving international prob-
lems by means of peaceful negotiations still requires that we pass through 
an intense and erce stage of struggle. It is in the nature of the imperialists 
to start wars in order to gain great prots. Therefore, the people who love 
world peace still need to increase their vigilance and resolutely struggle 
further. Only in this way can we stop those who start wars and carry out 
aggression, forcing them to respect the will of the people.32
But this low-prole, lukewarm DRV press coverage of the Geneva Confer-
ence announcement should not necessarily be taken as a reection of how the 
party leaders felt about the news. Since the Soviets had promoted the ve-power 
talks doggedly, Thành may have surmised (or have been directly informed) that 
Điện Biên Phủ and Geneva, 1954 211 
Moscow and Beijing would be eager to see a result—that is, an armistice in Indo-
china—from the negotiations. The shape of that armistice, however, would have 
much to do with what happened on the battleeld over the next few months. 
Whether or not the DRV leaders were privately excited or relieved by the pros-
pect of an armistice, they surely appreciated the psychological danger of this 
news: It would be harder to compel soldiers to risk their lives in an important 
nal burst of bloodletting if they believed that an armistice were only a few 
months away.
The Battle of Điện Biên Phủ Begins: March 11, 1954
As these preparations for the Geneva Conference were happening, the roughly 
45,000 DRV soldiers were tightening their grip around the 15,000-man French 
garrison in Điện Biên Phủ. On March 11, when the DRV forces began to shell 
the garrison, using new heavy artillery that had only just become available from 
China, they quickly destroyed six ghter aircra parked by the airstrip. This 
immediately took from the French forces a major weapon. As Võ Nguyên Giáp 
pointed out in a report that he wrote for a March 17, 1954 conference on the 
progress of the battle:
But [the enemy’s] biggest failure is their incorrect estimation. They thought 
that we could only destroy “support points” [point d’appui] in the style of 
Nà Sản, but that we could not destroy “centers of resistance” in the style 
of Điện Biên Phủ, especially because they sent their best troops to guard 
them. The enemy thought that we would not dare attack Điện Biên Phủ, so 
they landed troops at Quy Nhơn [in southern Vietnam], further dispersing 
their forces there. That ill-timed operation has created yet more diculties 
for the enemy, putting them in an even more defensive position.
Now, [at Điện Biên Phủ] Him Lam and Independence Hills have been 
destroyed; the airstrip has been limited; dozens of airplanes have been shot 
down or destroyed [on the ground]; and their supplies have dwindled with 
one part having been burned. It is just as we have said: today it is the ene-
my’s troops who are the ones worried about heavy artillery; it is the enemy’s 
troops who are the ones worried about fatigue; it is the enemy’s airplanes 
that are worried about our anti-aircra guns.33
The key weakness of the entrenched camp’s construction (lack of protection 
for the airstrip) was thus exposed immediately. Indeed, within two days of ght-
ing, the DRV forces had captured a hillock positioned a few hundred meters o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the northern end of the runway. Now able to aim their guns down it, the DRV 
forces rendered the airstrip virtually unusable. This le parachute drops as the 
only means of resupplying the French forces at the garrison.
During the weeks leading up to the start of the battle in March, the DRV 
forces had installed their artillery pieces high on the jungle-covered slopes of 
the surrounding mountains. Carefully camouaged and aimed downward with 
direct line of re, these guns were virtually impossible to spot and extremely 
accurate. Moreover, misunderstandings between the French military leadership 
about the purpose of the garrison had meant that its defenses were only partially 
constructed, leaving its defenders with much less protection than had been the 
case at Nà Sản the previous year.34 The DRV forces attacked the various hills 
and knolls surrounding the French position, making signicant inroads, but 
suering terrible losses themselves. Finally, on May 7, 1954, they were able to 
overrun the last pockets of French resistance at the garrison, securing one of the 
most remarkable victories of the 20th century.
Christopher Goscha is the rst scholar to tackle directly the issue of the 
battle’s terrible physical toll on the DRV side, a topic that remains taboo in 
Vietnam.35 By examining specialized party histories of the DRV medical eort 
during the war and by combining these with a few candid accounts of the battle 
by medical personnel, Goscha was able to capture some of the horror of the 
battle from the DRV perspective. What ultimately emerges from his account is 
normal young men (i.e., reluctant to die no matter how noble the cause) pushed 
by ambitious political leaders into a World War I–style trench battle, with limbs, 
blood, corpses, and the dying strewn about the landscape. Internal party reports 
on the battle suggest that Giáp and other party leaders found their peasant sol-
diers’ fears, hesitations, and sometimes outright insubordination (all referred to 
as “rightist deviations”) to be frustrating and disappointing.
A thirty-page report delivered by the Secretary of the Central Military Com-
mittee (Nguyễn Chí Thanh) to a May 29, 1954 meeting of commissars and de-
partment heads involved in the battle of Điện Biên Phủ captures the extent of 
this top-level frustration. It should be noted that the report was delivered nine 
days before the DRV forces nally prevailed over the French garrison. A theme 
of the report was “negative rightist deviationist thinking” among commanders 
and soldiers on the battleeld. According to Giáp, these actions were manifest 
in two forms:
The rst is hesitation, fear of diculty, fear of hardship, fear of death, fear 
of injury, fear of depletion, and submission to fatigue. Standing before 
these diculties, [cadres] lack the resolve to overcome them. With respect 
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to the enemy, [cadres] lack the will to destroy him. With respect to a cadre’s 
own mistakes and those of his soldiers, there is a lack of resolve to struggle 
[against them]. [Cadres and soldiers] see the enemy but do not want to 
shoot him. They have weapons but do not hang on to them and do not 
want to use them to strike the enemy. Though in a good battle position, 
[cadres and soldiers] do not want to exploit it to destroy the enemy. They 
are not eager and enthusiastic about being victorious in the campaign, 
about improving the army, and about benetting the revolution, the Party, 
and the people.36
The second form in which “negative rightest deviationist thinking” became 
manifest was a false outward appearance of condence and enthusiasm made to 
conceal a reluctance to confront the enemy:
[They] do not want to nd out the enemy’s actual situation for fear that it 
would uncover diculties that need to be resolved; they fear having to ght 
bravely in dicult conditions. They want to score easy victories, and, as a 
result, they frequently fail. They are not absolutely revolutionary. Our rev-
olutionary responsibility is to ght to the end in order to secure indepen-
dence for our people, peace for the world, and to implement communism. 
Victory in one ght is nothing but a grain of sand on an ocean beach, and 
yet they quickly conclude that [their small victory] is more than enough 
already, a major accomplishment. As a result, they do not continue to strug-
gle resolutely. That is “half-assed” [nửa vời] revolution, which means not 
revolution.37
The DRV victory at Điện Biên Phủ greatly strengthened their position at the 
Geneva Conference. For the French, the defeat sent a pulse of panic and despair 
through their country, “as though [France were] trying to drown its errors in 
a sea of grief.”38 The DRV also beneted from the leverage gained by taking 
10,000 prisoners from the battle. Thành and his lieutenants understandably 
decided that these prisoners would be used as human shields to give the badly 
battered DRV troops a respite from strang by French ghter planes during the 
march toward the Red River delta.39
The Geneva Negotiations on Indochina: May 8–July 21, 1954
The section of the Geneva Conference devoted to negotiating a ceasere in In-
dochina stretched from May 8 to July 21, 1954—almost two and a half months. 
The complexity and length of these negotiations, with a game-changing battle 
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(Điện Biên Phủ) ending just as the talks began, key actors coming and going, a 
French government changing midway through, and dierent levels of negotia-
tions taking place simultaneously, make pithy descriptions of the conference dif-
cult. The most high-prole negotiators were arguably Molotov (USSR), Zhou 
Enlai (PRC), Phạm Văn Đồng (DRV), Georges Bidault (France), and Anthony 
Eden (UK), with input from Bảo Đại (State of Vietnam), John Foster Dulles 
(US), Walter Bedell Smith (US), Phoui Sananikone (The Kingdom of Laos), 
Tek Phan (The Kingdom of Camobdia), and others.
The French foreign minister, Georges Bidault, laid out his government’s 
ceasere proposal on May 8, 1954, the opening day of the Indochina negotia-
tions. The earliest DRV proposal for a position at the Geneva Conference was 
titled, “A Comprehensive Solution for Restoring Peace in Indochina,” dated 
April 4, 1954. This was more than a month before the DRV victory at Điện 
Biên Phủ, yet far enough along in the battle to know that victory was the most 
likely outcome.40 It appears that this proposal was never publicized but rather 
formed the basis of the ocial DRV proposal presented by Phạm Văn Đồng over 
a month later on May 10.
The negotiations bogged down quickly over a few issues. The rst was neu-
tralization of Cambodia and Laos, which meant the evacuation of DRV forces 
from those countries. The second was whether Vietnam would be partitioned, 
and if so, how? A third diculty was the issue of “free elections” to unify the 
country. The DRV wanted these elections to happen within six months while 
the French wanted more time. A fourth sticking point was the issue of supervi-
sion. The DRV wanted all supervision to be carried out “in house” rather than 
through an international body. Eventually they yielded to the idea of an inter-
national supervisory body, but there was much disagreement over who would 
serve on that body. What combination of countries would be acceptable to 
both sides?41
How were the DRV and France able to overcome these obstacles and reach 
an agreement? As a Canadian participant in the conference later explained, the 
truce was made possible by “a combination on the one side of Dulles’ veiled 
threats and the willingness of Eden and Mendes-France to negotiate, and, on 
the other side, . . . the Chinese and Russians pressing Hanoi to compromise in 
order to keep the Americans out of Indochina.”42
One of the reasons most scholars have concluded that the Soviets and Chi-
nese must have exerted “great pressure” on the VWP leaders to compromise 
stems from the fact that the DRV delegation, in its rst proposal for a partition 
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line, put forward the 13th parallel. This line would have given them, roughly 
speaking, all of northern and central Vietnam. The French proposal of the 18th 
parallel would have le the DRV with northern Vietnam (Tonkin) and a mod-
est-sized slice of northern central Vietnam. Zhou Enlai’s original proposal from 
March 2 had suggested as a goal the 16th parallel, 333 kilometers north of the 13th 
parallel. The dierence between the DRV proposal and the French one was 555 
kilometers—no small distance. Ultimately, the two sides agreed on the 17th par-
allel, meaning that the French conceded 111 kilometers and the DRV 444. Had 
the DRV been able to secure the 16th parallel as the demarcation line, it would 
have acquired Huế, with the city of Đà Nẵng becoming the northernmost city of 
the State of Vietnam. As it turned out, both cities went to the State of Vietnam 
led by the former emperor, Bảo Đại. He, however, was soon elbowed aside by the 
anticommunist and America-friendly Ngô Đình Diệm, who transformed the 
State of Vietnam into the Republic of Vietnam in 1955.
The historical disputes and gray areas of the Geneva Accords mostly revolve 
around two questions concerning the DRV side. The rst is how the top DRV 
leaders felt about the help received from the Soviet Union and the PRC during 
the negotiations. The second concerns the overall strategy of the DRV leaders 
aer the accords had been signed. Did Thành and his comrades respect the ac-
cords and believe that elections would take place?
With respect to the rst question (DRV feelings about Soviet and Chinese help 
at Geneva), most historians consider the DRV to have been the losers, having been 
deprived at the negotiating table of territory that they had won on the battleeld. 
To blame was the “great pressure”43 that Khrushchev and Mao had put on Thành 
to yield ground in the negotiations. This notion of a bad deal imposed on Thành 
is supported by retrospective statements of both DRV and PRC leaders. The his-
torian Mari Olsen, for example, notes a 1968 conversation between Mao, Zhou 
Enlai, and Phạm Văn Đồng during which Mao stated that Thành had not wanted 
to hold negotiations, that the conference had been Khrushchev’s idea, and that the 
PRC and DRV had made a mistake by attending instead of ghting on.44
Khrushchev’s retrospective view of the Geneva Accords, produced at roughly 
the same time as the above conversation, casts the accords in just the opposite 
light. He depicts the DRV leaders as having been desperate for an armistice, 
their revolutionary movement on the verge of collapse during the months lead-
ing up to the battle at Điện Biên Phủ. Khrushchev’s characterization makes the 
Soviet Union appear to have been good advocates for the DRV at Geneva, help-
ing Thành achieve what he needed:
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At a preparatory conference in Moscow, China was represented by Zhou 
Enlai and Vietnam by President Ho Chi Minh and Prime Minister Pham 
Van Dong. We jointly worked out our position for the Geneva Conference 
and looked into the situation existing in Vietnam. The situation was very 
dicult and painful: The liberation movement was on the verge of col-
lapse, and the guerrilla ghters needed an agreement with us so that the 
conquests that had been achieved by the Vietnamese people in the ght 
against the occupation forces could be preserved. Hanoi was in the hands 
of the French, and the guerrilla ghters could not aspire to retake it. Other 
cities and provinces were also controlled by the French. . . .
Aer one of our sessions in Catherine’s Hall at the Kremlin, Zhou 
button-holed me, drew me aside into a corner, and said: “Comrade Ho has 
told me that their situation is hopeless. If they don’t get a ceasere in the 
near future, they won’t be able to hold out against the French forces. They 
have therefore decided to retreat to the Chinese border, so that China can 
move its troops in, as it did earlier in North Korea, and help the Vietnam-
ese people drive the French out of Vietnam.”45
Khrushchev’s description of the situation in the DRV leading up to Điện Biên 
Phủ and the Geneva Conference seems to be contradicted by the Vietnamese 
Communist Party’s (i.e., the party general secretary Lê Duẩn’s) 1979 “White 
Paper” on relations with the PRC.46 This political tract blamed the CCP for the 
settlement at Geneva, interpreting the PRC’s supposedly uninspired advocacy of 
DRV interests at the conference as an early sign of a Chinese desire to compete 
with the DRV for inuence over Laos and Cambodia.
That interpretation, of course, needs to be seen in the context of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam’s (1976 to today) actual battle with the PRC over inuence 
in Indochina at the time, twenty-ve years aer the Geneva Conference. This 
struggle had resulted in the short (February 17 to March 16, 1979) but bloody 
border war between the two countries. At that time, the Soviet Union was Viet-
nam’s key ally against the PRC, so it is not surprising that none of the retrospec-
tive blame was placed on the shoulders of the Soviet Union.
Both Pierre Asselin and Christopher Goscha, in recent scholarship dealing 
with the Geneva Accords, present (from internal VWP documents published in 
the Party Documents series) evidence that supports Khrushchev’s characteriza-
tion.47 One of their most important pieces of evidence is a speech that Trường 
Chinh delivered during a meeting of the party Central Committee held July 15–
17, 1954. This was during the nal week of the Geneva Conference, when many 
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of the terms of the accords between the DRV and France were being frantically 
hammered out before the July 20 deadline.48 As Chinh explained to Central 
Committee members at the meeting:
The more we ght, the stronger we become. The more our enemy ghts, 
the weaker he becomes. Aer the Điện Biên Phủ campaign, the relative 
forces between us and the enemy changed in our favor, but they have not 
yet changed fundamentally. On some battleelds, and to some extent, our 
side is stronger than the enemy, but speaking of the entire country in gen-
eral, our strength and the enemy’s strength are only more or less similar 
[mới xấp xỉ].49
In other words, a roughly equal division of Vietnam between the forces of the 
French Union and those of the DRV accurately reected the relative strengths 
of the two sides in mid-July. Chinh’s report to the Central Committee, how-
ever, probably also needs to be treated with some skepticism since its purpose, 
as Goscha notes, was partly to justify the soon-to-be-signed Geneva Accords, to 
make his comrades see the terms of the accords in a positive light.50 At that time, 
reasons of faith still required that the party leaders depict their Soviet and PRC 
allies as seless advocates of the DRV cause—and, following the signing of the 
Geneva Accords on July 20, the DRV would immediately hail the ceasere as a 
great victory for their side.
Attempts to shape public perceptions of the Geneva Accords in a positive way 
can be found in the DRV’s press organs. For example, it is no coincidence that 
on July 16, only four days before the accords were signed, The People provided 
a timeline “summary” of the major battles and events of the conict. With the 
exception of one mention of the DRV forces “liberating” Kontum (the Battle of 
Yang Mang Pass), located in southern Central Vietnam, all the DRV victories 
noted on the timeline had occurred in the northern half of the country. The 
timeline included no mention of any DRV military victories in Cochinchina 
(not to mention Laos or Cambodia).51
This may have been a way of suggesting to party members that the 
soon-to-be-announced partition of the country was based mostly on the reality 
of how the ghting had gone. The majority of the important battles had been in 
the North, with the implication being that it was there that the DRV had earned 
the right to demand real estate. But was a list of key battles really an accurate 
way of assessing the balance of forces at the end of the war? The French military 
leaders certainly did not use this standard; their maps indicated the division of 
the country into regions of political control. The fact that the DRV published 
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a map of battles rather than a map of political control in The People suggests an 
attempt on their part to make the balance of forces in Vietnam seem more even 
than it had been.
Another argument, which can be inferred from Goscha’s study of Điện Biên 
Phủ, is that previous scholars have not fully appreciated the extent of the losses 
suered by the DRV forces in their eort to win the battle. If the French esti-
mate of 22,000 DRV casualties is roughly correct, it means that the DRV lost the 
equivalent of more than two divisions’ worth of soldiers. This was the positive 
spin on the French Union defeat that General Navarre and President Eisen-
hower advanced in the days following the garrison’s fall. I tend to agree with 
Goscha’s and Khrushchev’s description of the DRV as a victorious but danger-
ously exhausted ghter with much to gain from the Geneva armistice.
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The Period of the 300 Days: 1954–1955
The signing of the Geneva Accords on July 20, 1954 and the release of the con-
ference’s “Final Declaration” the following day made the DRV’s party leaders the 
internationally recognized masters of the country’s northern half.1 The “Demo-
cratic Republic of Vietnam” had suddenly been transformed from an aspiration 
into a denite geographic entity reected in its new, informal name, “North 
Vietnam.” The problem for Nguyễn Tất Thành and his comrades in the Polit-
buro, however, was that their conception of the “Democratic Republic of Viet-
nam” remained the one of August 1945, which was a polity that encompassed the 
whole country, not just the territory above the 17th parallel.
The question now was how the party would approach a range of issues related 
to the war’s sudden end. What would be the DRV’s ocial attitude toward the 
Geneva Accords? What would be the unocial internal approach? How would 
the DRV establish control over the northern Vietnamese regions that had been 
under the control of the French and their Vietnamese ally, the State of Vietnam? 
How would the central government transition back to city life in Hanoi? What 
would happen with the land reform campaign now that peace had arrived, es-
pecially given the fact that key provisions of the Geneva Accords supposedly 
protected all Vietnamese people from any sort of state repression?
As stipulated by the Geneva Accords, within 300 days, the French military 
forces were to evacuate the North and regroup to the South, which would in-
creasingly be referred to as “South Vietnam.” Vietnamese political leaders asso-
ciated with the noncommunist State of Vietnam, whose power had been enabled 
to a large extent by the French military presence, would be heading south as 
well. According to the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference, national 
elections were to be held in two years’ time (July 1956) to unify the country.
Publicly, Thành and his lieutenants promoted the accords as a great victory, 
propagandized hard for their implementation, and depicted the DRV as strict 
and earnest adherents of Geneva’s terms. Did the public image of adherence, 
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however, correspond to internal reality? In his classic, America’s Longest War: 
The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, the historian George Herring de-
scribed Washington and Saigon as using “alleged North Vietnamese truce viola-
tions” to justify their rejection of the national elections called for by the Geneva 
Accords (the key word being “alleged”).2 Edwin Moise, in his 1982 account of the 
DRV land reform, was more circumspect. He pointed out that the party contin-
ued, through their land reform campaign, to punish landlords for collaborating 
with the French, despite having ocially dropped the slogan, “Overthrow trai-
tors and reactionaries.” But Moise then wondered why the International Control 
Commission (ICC), which had been set up to monitor implementation of the 
accords, and which, according to him, “could move with a fair degree of freedom 
in North Vietnam,” did not report more violations. “[T]hey should have been 
aware of any widespread violations of the accords,” Moise argued.3
The period of the “300 days” refers to the time of “free movement” imme-
diately following the signing of the Geneva Accords. All Vietnamese were to 
be allowed by the governments in both Hanoi and Saigon to move freely north 
or south across the 17th parallel to live under the regime of their liking. The 
300-day period was closely tied to article 14c of the Geneva Accords on “no re-
prisals,” which strictly forbade either regime from carrying out reprisals against 
civilians who had supported the opposing side during the war. Because DRV 
adherence to these two key articles is an important theme of this chapter, it is 
worth providing the text from the Geneva Accords:
Article 14c: Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or dis-
crimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities 
during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties.
Article 14d: From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement 
until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a dis-
trict controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned 
to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities 
in that district.
The period of the 300 days was originally supposed to conclude on May 18, 1955, 
but pressure from the ICC forced the DRV leaders to extend the period for two 
additional months until July 20. According to the scholar Peter Hansen, at least 
810,000 Northerners, three quarters of whom were Catholics, emigrated to the 
South during this period.4 Concerned that fear of the land reform might con-
vince even more Northerners to move south, Thành and his lieutenants decided 
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to adjust aspects of the campaign during the immediate post–Geneva Accords 
period of the 300 days.
The DRV’s “Implementation” Policy
One of the obvious ways in which the DRV leaders were able to make a case for 
themselves as conscientious followers of the Geneva Accords was through their 
ocial policy of “implementation.” 5 This meant expressing public support for 
and faith in the accords, avoiding being agged for violations, and keeping up a 
steady and loud press campaign demanding that the anticommunist regime in 
Saigon meet for talks about holding the general free elections in July 1956. Did 
Thành and other party leaders believe that elections would take place?
In my view, a slight majority of scholars have tended to agree with the assess-
ment of the historian George Kahin that the DRV leaders “had ample basis” for 
believing that the July 1956 elections would take place. According to Kahin, that 
belief stemmed from the fact that elections were “clearly promised” in both the 
ceasere agreement between the DRV and France and in the Final Declaration 
of the accords.6 More recently, Pierre Asselin and Mari Olsen have interpreted 
the DRV’s strong propaganda campaign for implementation of the Geneva Ac-
cords as well as internal communications between DRV leaders and their Soviet 
and Chinese allies discussing the “struggle to implement the Geneva Accords” as 
indications of a genuine commitment to reunication through peaceful means.7
The opposite (and, in my view, more convincing) argument—that the DRV 
leaders did not expect the elections to take place—is made by scholars such as 
Victor Bator, Jerey Race,8 and Ralph Smith. In his International History of the 
Vietnam War, Smith explains that “[i]n the international climate of May 1955 
there was every reason to expect—despite the face-saving clauses of the Final 
Declaration—that the partition of Vietnam would be of indenite duration.” 
Smith points to the basic similarity between the partition of Vietnam and the 
partitions of Germany and Korea, “which had likewise been military in ori-
gin and had been accompanied by pious statements about the eventual politi-
cal reunication.”9 In Smith’s estimation, North Vietnam’s diplomatic strategy 
vis-à-vis the Geneva Accords—pushing hard for elections—“was probably based 
on the safe assumption that [the South Vietnamese leader] Diem would never 
agree to consultation and that the blu would never be called.”10 Echoing the 
sentiments of Race and Smith, Ilya Gaiduk, in his 2003 book dealing with Soviet 
policy toward Vietnam from 1954 to 1963, argues that “nobody believed that the 
elections themselves would ever take place.”11
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During the negotiations, representatives of the non-communist State of Viet-
nam (soon to become the Republic of Vietnam) and their American backers 
had made it clear that they rejected any elections not supervised by the United 
Nations—a condition that was unacceptable to Nguyễn Tất Thành.12 Moreover, 
past experience and the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the VWP leaders suggested 
that inherently greedy imperialist countries and their Vietnamese allies would 
not yield an inch of ground to the DRV that had not been won on the battleeld. 
The Soviets basically rejected free elections for Germany, and the same could 
be said of the PRC with respect to elections for Korea. Therefore, why should 
France and the United States not act similarly in Vietnam, where the numbers 
this time were not in their favor? And how could the Soviets and Chinese, aer 
rejecting elections in Germany and Korea, suddenly demand them in Vietnam?
The 6th Plenum of the VWP Central Committee: July 15–17, 1954
Thành and the VWP leaders introduced their new policies and slogans at the 
6th Plenum of the Central Committee, held from July 15 to 17, 1954 (during 
the last week of the Geneva negotiations). He opened the July plenum with a 
brief report that presented the basic outlines of the party’s new policies. In typ-
ical fashion, Thành’s report began with an assessment of the “world situation.” 
In the eight paragraphs of this section, the proper noun “France” appears nine 
times, while the proper noun “America” appears thirty-one times. This reected 
the report’s main assessment: The United States was replacing France as the 
dominant Western power in Indochina and the main foe of the DRV.
To prepare party members for a surprising about-face in DRV policy, Thành 
spent the majority of this section describing the “deep and expanding internal 
contradictions of the American-led imperialist camp” as opposed to the “Viet-
namese-Chinese-Soviet camp,” which was “very unied.” He pointed out dif-
ferences in the American and British approaches toward the PRC along with 
American infringements on British interests in Pakistan, New Zealand, and 
Australia.13 As for the United States and France, he highlighted the latter’s re-
luctance to join NATO and the former’s eorts to “shove” France aside in Indo-
china.14 Suggesting how bizarre his new policy would appear to party members, 
Thành reminded his audience that the “correctness” of the party’s policies in 
the past was what had enabled their side to achieve the “good results” of today.
The policy about-face for which Thành was preparing his audience was alli-
ance with France. Thành obviously hoped that by reaching out to France and 
suggesting the possibility of a friendly relationship, he could inspire that country 
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to resist American incursions in Indochina. The policy might also win over 
French public opinion to some degree. According to Thành:
In order to resist the direct and long-term intervention of the American 
imperialists, to resist their expansion of the war in Indochina, we need to 
rmly grasp the ag of peace. Our policy has changed: before, we cons-
cated the property of the French imperialists, now, since we have negoti-
ated, following the principle of equality and mutual benet, we can protect 
the economic and cultural interests of the French in Indochina. In our way 
of speaking, we need to compromise with each other to the right extent. 
Before, we said “attack and liquidate all the French troops.” In the past, we 
wanted no part of the French Union. Now, because we have spoken with 
each other, because we have demanded that France remove its troops and 
they have agreed to do so in steps, we have agreed to discuss the issue of 
participating in the French Union on an equal and voluntary basis. Before, 
our policy was to liquidate the puppet army and the puppet administration 
in order to achieve unity. Now, we will use a gentler policy—we use the 
means of national elections to unify the country.15
Toward the end of his report, Thành rearmed that “right now, America is the 
main enemy of the world’s people, and it is becoming the main and direct enemy 
of the Indochinese people, so all work needs to be aimed against the American 
imperialists.” To this end, he explained, “any person or country not friendly with 
America can be in a unied front with us, even if only temporarily.” Apparently, 
France fell into that category.
In his report, Thành also claried, through example, the basic language to be 
used in descriptions of Indochina’s political situation. The important thing was 
to avoid using the term “anticommunist” or any such conceptual framework sug-
gesting that the United States had become involved in Indochina for ideological 
rather than materialistic reasons. Similarly, the DRV’s discourse was in no way 
to reect the notion that what was at stake in Indochina was a choice between 
communism and noncommunism for the Vietnamese people.
The Soviet Union, the DRV, and the PRC were not communist countries 
but rather “democratic” ones. Publicly, the party was not to say that they were 
implementing communism but rather democracy. The Soviet Union was not the 
leader of the international Communist movement but of the “world movement 
for peace and democracy.” Instead of saying that the United States was establish-
ing the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO)16 to contain the spread 
of communism, Thành wanted his propaganda organs to state that SEATO 
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was established “so that Asians could be used [by the United States] to ght 
Asians.” America was not the enemy of the Communist bloc; it was the “enemy 
of world peace.” And America’s refusal to sign the Geneva Accords had nothing 
to do with anticommunism—it was an eort to “sabotage peace.”17 The point 
was to keep the contentious issue of communism out of the public discourse as 
much as possible.
Members of the Central Committee attending the meeting might have 
wondered whether Thành’s sudden gesture of warmth and reconciliation with 
the French would aect the DRV’s treatment of alleged “traitors,” “landlords,” 
“spies,” and “saboteurs” targeted in the land reform. Would Thành’s public stress 
on a “gentler policy” for national reunication translate to a “gentler” approach 
to the party’s alleged internal enemies in North Vietnam? This was not to be 
the case. Thành, Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and other top party leaders 
might court French friendship on the international diplomatic plane, but in the 
villages of North Vietnam, through the vehicle of the land reform, the repression 
of actual and imagined opponents of the DRV regime would continue as before, 
though with a few supercial adjustments.18
The Secret Politburo Meeting of September 5–7, 1954
It appears from the party’s internal documents that, at some point in early Au-
gust, Thành and the Politburo began to realize how disastrous the “free move-
ment” clause of the Geneva Accords could be for the DRV’s image and for the 
party’s implementation discourse. By the end of the month, about 60,000 people 
had le by airplane and another 80,000 by boat, with tens of thousands still 
awaiting passage.19 The picture of hundreds of thousands of North Vietnam-
ese civilians abandoning their ancestral villages to start a new life in the South 
undermined the DRV leadership’s public insistence that the partition of the 
country was only temporary. It also showed that the real Vietnamese nation, 
as opposed to the imagined one promoted by the party, was not unied. The 
question of communism versus noncommunism did matter.
On September 1, 1954, the ICC sent the DRV representative a communiqué 
demanding that the regime publicize to all inhabitants of North Vietnam the 
fact that the Geneva Accords guaranteed basic democratic freedoms for all Viet-
namese, that all people had the right to move freely between the two halves of 
the country, and that nobody was to suer state-sponsored retribution for any 
acts committed during the war.20 The party leaders printed this announcement 
in the September 9, 1954 issue of their main newspaper, The People. This ICC 
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communiqué seems to have set o alarm bells for Thành and perhaps was part 
of the motivation for calling a secret, three-day Politburo meeting four days later 
from September 5 to 7. It is likely that the letter from the ICC warned the DRV 
leaders of evidence that they were violating the Geneva Accords in some way 
related to the “free movement” clause.
Curbing the Emigration
The three-day Politburo meeting in early September appears to have covered a 
number of strategic issues related to Vietnam’s complicated post-Geneva situa-
tion. First and foremost was the emigration. In a directive from the Party Secre-
tariat, released on September 5, 1954, Trường Chinh spoke with great concern 
about the intention of the new South Vietnamese leader, Ngô Đình Diệm, along 
with the French and the Americans, to encourage the emigration to the South 
of 500,000 to 1 million Northerners. According to Chinh, these were mostly 
“puppet soldiers and their families along with Catholics, youths, civil servants, 
teachers, intellectuals, professionals, etc.” As he explained, “In order to imple-
ment the above scheme, they use Machiavellian propaganda such as: if you go 
to the South you will be happy, if you stay you will be terrorized, you will suer 
retribution, you will not have religious freedom, etc.” Chinh remarked that, by 
the end of August, about 60,000 people had emigrated to the South—appar-
ently a signicant underestimation of the actual number, which, according to 
the historian John Prados, was closer to 100,000.21 Though DRV propaganda 
had been somewhat eective in convincing “puppet soldiers” not to emigrate, 
“basically,” Chinh wrote, “we have not yet broken up the enemy’s plan.”22
Since the use of propaganda was not going to be enough to prevent people 
from leaving, a more direct physical intervention from the DRV apparatus 
would be required. To make these interventions seem not to violate the Geneva 
Accords, the party leaders created a semantic template that turned eorts to 
prevent people from leaving into eorts to uphold the accords. The template 
would deny all agency on the part of the émigrés. No peasants would leave the 
DRV on their own volition; all had been “forced and enticed” (bắt ép và dụ dỗ) 
into such a bold action. In this way, eorts by the regime to prevent Northerners 
from leaving could be depicted as altruistic rescue attempts. As is well known, 
the United States and the Diệm regime did carry out a propaganda campaign 
to encourage (or scare) people into leaving, but, as Peter Hansen has recently 
argued, that campaign probably reached and aected only a tiny fraction of the 
people who le.23
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An interesting question is why, considering the party’s professed obsession 
with “landlords,” “internal enemies,” “saboteurs,” “traitors,” “reactionaries,” 
“spies,” and so on, the Politburo did not welcome the departure from the DRV 
of people who had reservations about the regime? This would have been a much 
easier and less expensive way to “purify” (làm trong sạch) the population. To the 
party rank-and-le, Chinh explained:
We must recognize that the task of wrecking the enemy’s scheme of forc-
ing compatriots to go South is a tense and urgent political struggle mainly 
for the purpose of angling for the masses to stay in their home regions, in 
their villages, to participate in the work of building the country and not 
being forced by the enemy to serve as soldiers or as plantation coolies where 
they would be full of misery and hardship. If the enemy succeeded in their 
scheme, it would be disadvantageous for us politically. They would be able 
to fool both world and domestic opinion by claiming that Vietnamese went 
to the South because our regime is not good, creating disadvantages for us 
in the subsequent free elections. Moreover, [the emigration of large num-
bers of people to the South] would also lead directly to diculties for us in 
our task of assuming control over and managing the cities as well as in the 
task of building the country.24
Chinh chided rank-and-le party members for not recognizing the importance 
of this “grave and Machiavellian ruse” of the enemy. He complained that DRV 
propaganda aimed at curbing the emigration had not “gone deep enough.”
Yet within Chinh’s directive, when discussing how “puppet soldiers” should 
be handled to prevent their emigration, the general secretary still inserted 
a time-qualier to signal that today’s leniency was only a temporary tacti-
cal measure:
Suspend the forcing of puppet soldiers to carry out “confessions”; do not in-
vestigate them for documents and crimes. Call for puppet soldiers to turn 
in their weapons, but do not force them to do so. With the exception of 
those puppet soldiers who are zealously carrying out counterrevolutionary 
activities, now, on a temporary basis, we should not try puppet soldiers who 
committed crimes, and we should not mobilize the masses to denounce 
their crimes. We should explain clearly our puppet-soldier policy to the 
masses at this time; we only punish those who are zealously carrying out 
sabotage. When accepting those puppet soldiers who, here and there, had 
deserted, we can educate them appropriately—we should not “open up a 
re-education class.”25
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The directive also provided instructions on how to handle Catholic commu-
nities, which had had a dicult relationship with the regime and were the most 
likely to leave en masse for the South. Chinh stated that in areas containing large 
concentrations of Catholics, such as Bùi Chú and Phát Diệm, the mass mobili-
zation for rent reduction and land reform should be “temporarily put o.” And, 
to the extent that local resources permitted, Chinh advised cadres to provide 
Catholics with production loans, aid, and medical treatment.
On the propaganda front, the directive ordered cadres to “mobilize those peo-
ple who had been forced [to emigrate] but had then subsequently escaped back 
[to North Vietnam]. Their experience should be used to make Catholics see 
the enemy’s trick.”26 Obviously, bureaucrats and teachers who had worked for 
the Bảo Đại regime were another segment of the population likely to emigrate. 
To convince them to stay, Chinh stated that they were to be promised the same 
salary that they had received under the Bảo Đại regime.27
Renements to the VWP’s Strategy for the South
On the second day of the September 5–7 Politburo meeting, Chinh released 
another directive. It claried the party’s overall strategy for gaining political 
control over the South or “unifying the country,” as they were careful to phrase 
it. The party leaders were intent on repeating the basic tactics that had brought 
them success in the recent war against the French and their anticommunist 
Vietnamese allies, the State of Vietnam. While DRV land-reform teams were 
methodically purging elites from local political organizations in the Northern 
countryside, the regime would advertise itself to the Southern population and 
the world as the ally of all patriotic Vietnamese willing to combat or, at least, 
not support, the Ngô Đình Diệm regime and its American backers in Saigon.
With slogans of peace, unity, independence, and democracy, along with 
a people’s united front that has a truly broad character, we can win over a 
large segment of the popular masses. We can gain inuence over and win 
the sympathy of a broad segment of society. We can make the French and 
their puppets unable not to respect the Ceasere Agreement, unable not to 
recognize people’s democratic freedoms, and unable not to accept the uni-
cation of the country by free election. [We must] avoid slogans and forms 
of mobilization that are too far to the le [quá cao], and avoid giving o a 
tense oppositional attitude. We must make members of the higher classes 
and many people working for the puppet regime see that aer the country 
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is unied, they will not just have a means of surviving but will actually be 
able to maintain their given position in society.28
Following through with this promise to elites in the Ngô Đình Diệm govern-
ment would have meant renouncing Marxist-Leninist principles of class warfare 
and the principle of revenge that was then supposed to be animating the land 
reform. Thus, there was a danger, perhaps not fully appreciated by Thành and 
Chinh, that prescriptions designed for winning over the South would take some 
of the revolutionary sting out of the land reform.
What would land reform cadres think, for example, when they learned about 
the class composition of the DRV’s new front organization, the “United People’s 
Front”? As Chinh explained:
The front needs to be truly broad, but it needs have as its basis the 
worker-peasant alliance, and it must be under the leadership of the working 
class (this point is not essential to put forward in the front’s new Political 
Platform and Regulations).
The composition of the Front will include the working class, the peasant 
class, the petit-bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, and patriotic nota-
bles. The Front can even attract those elements of the comprador bour-
geoisie and the landlord class who support peace, unity, independence, 
and democracy while at the same time resolutely struggle against those 
who are pro-American, who sow divisions [among the people], and who 
are stubborn.29
The new front for the South was to attract members of the landlord class just as 
the old Vietminh and its replacement organization, the United Vietnam Associ-
ation, had done. It must have seemed strange for land reform cadres to see that, 
while they were organizing the public trials and executions of alleged landlords, 
the slogan to be applied in the South for “puppet soldiers” was “Vietnamese 
people should not shoot Vietnamese people.”30
In addition to the two directives, the secret meeting of the Politburo from 
September 5 to 7 also resulted in a broader resolution that summarized the major 
aspects of the current situation. “Our people’s task of national liberation has not 
yet been completed; the patriotic struggle has not stopped just because of the 
ceasere.” Indeed, as the resolution armed, the “struggle continues,” though it 
would be carried out with “dierent methods.” The impact of the struggle over 
the South meant, as the resolution explained, that the VWP would need to be 
more discreet in its outward revolutionary appearances:
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Generally speaking, the DRV’s policies as compared with those of the 
PRC, when it rst began the construction of its country in 1949, must be 
a little more conciliatory, with the class composition of the government a 
little broader, the speed of development of policies a little slower. Our po-
litical regime, in its content is a people’s democracy, but in its form, to some 
extent, must still use old democracy. Only in this way is [our government] 
appropriate for the current situation in our country, and only in this way 
is it easy for us to unite the whole people of the nation, to have a good in-
uence on the South, and to create favorable conditions for the unication 
of our country.31
These calls for “moderate” appearances, the maintenance of vigilance before 
the threat of an image-tarnishing large-scale emigration of Northerners to the 
South, and the preservation of the regime’s image as implementers of the Ge-
neva Accords, meant that some other adjustments needed to be made to the 
land reform campaign. From a geographic perspective, the areas of greatest con-
cern were those close to the port city of Haiphong. This was to be the last area 
controlled by the French and the major departure point for Northern émigrés 
heading to the South.
For regions of the northern countryside that had been under French control 
until the end of the war (estimated by the party to contain about two million 
people),32 the Politburo Resolution stated that “for at least one year (that is, be-
fore we take control over Haiphong), we should not carry out land reform, but 
in recently liberated places in the countryside that are far from Haiphong, we 
can carry out mass mobilization for rent reduction . . . to prepare for land re-
form later.” The resolution also stated that, in those recently recovered parts 
of the countryside, the issue of the party purge should not be mentioned “too 
soon.” Thus, the threat of the emigration directly impacted the structure of the 
land reform campaign. The Politburo’s policy was to keep the land reform away 
from places where people had a relatively easy escape route to Haiphong and the 
South.33 Again, the fear of losing targets for the campaign is apparent.
Toning Down the Land Reform Propaganda
In addition to these geographical implications, the post-Geneva situation had 
implications for the way the campaign was to be propagandized. The party 
leaders understandably instructed the editors of their main newspapers to avoid 
direct references to the killing of landlords and, generally speaking, to lower the 
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prole of the campaign. This meant fewer and less sensational articles about the 
land reform for a period to avoid providing the enemy with evidence of Geneva 
Accords violations. An examination of the coverage of the campaign in The Peo-
ple shows what appears to be the point at which the new propaganda strategy 
went into eect. An article titled, “The Results of the Four Waves of Mass Mo-
bilization through Rent Reduction,” which was published in The People three 
weeks before the September Politburo meeting, began as follows:
In the four recent waves, mass mobilization for rent reduction was carried 
out in 631 subdistricts belonging to 14 provinces: Thái-nguyên, Phú-thọ, 
Tuyên-quang, Bắc-giang, Cao-bằng, Lạng-sơn, Bắc-cạn, Vĩnh-phúc, 
Yên-bái, Thanh-hóa, Nghệ-an, Hà-tĩnh, Ninh-bình, Hòa-bình.
Including the 195 subdistricts of wave 5 [currently undergoing the cam-
paign], mass mobilization through rent reduction will have been carried 
out in 826 subdistricts. This means that we have mobilized 64% of the 
subdistricts in the old free zone in accordance with our original plan.
The population of these mobilized subdistricts is 3,479,545 people 
(the population in the subdistricts undergoing mobilization in wave 5 in 
Cao-Bắc-Lạng [Cao Bằng, Bắc Cạn, and Lạng Sơn provinces] have not yet 
been counted). The total population of the 14 provinces is 5,733,429.
Peasants struggled against 1,215 landlords (not yet including wave 4 in 
Thanh Hóa). The total number of landlord families during the 4 waves 
was 10, 147 people.34
Two days aer the September 5–7 Politburo Meeting, The People published an 
article of similar character, reporting the results of the rst wave of land reform, 
when the attack on the landlord class was supposed to be stronger than during 
the rent reduction phase:
Wave 1 of the Land Reform in the Vietnamese North Interzone Has  
Concluded
The land reform work teams in 47 subdistricts of the three districts: 
Phú-Bình, Đồng-hỷ, Đại-từ (Thái Nguyên province) have completed wave 
one of their work task. Now, the teams are reconvening to carry out a 
debrieng meeting.
Below are the results of the division of land, bualos, and agricultural 
tools in the focal commune of Phúc-xuân, Đồng-hỷ district:
Land:
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57 landless peasant families (162 total people) received 49 mẫu 4 sào 
4 thước [of land], with the average person aer land reform having 3 
sào 10 thước.
136 poor peasant families (563 total people) received 132
Bualos, agricultural tools:
53 bualos were distributed to 87 poor and landless peasants, 1.5 [bua-
los] were distributed to three middle-peasant families. 45 landless peasants 
and 94 poor peasants received 146 plows.35
The second article makes no mention of “struggles” against landlords, and, in-
deed, the word “landlord” does not appear. We hear of land, bualos, and farm 
tools being distributed, but nothing of how the land reform team in the subdis-
trict had come into possession of these things.
Fear of being agged for Geneva Accords violations also inspired the party 
leaders to change some of the slogans and terms used during the campaign. As 
the Politburo Resolution stated, “the Geneva Accords and the task of unifying 
the country compel us to change a few things in the Land Reform Law and in 
our method of implementing that law.” The policy of “conscating” the land of 
the “French colonialists” and either “conscating” or “requisitioning” the land 
and belongings of “Vietnamese traitors” as stated in the Land Reform Law was 
to be soened to “French plantation owners” and “those Vietnamese landlords 
who cooperated with the adversary (đối phương).” The words “conscate” and 
“requisition” would be changed to “compulsory purchase” (trưng mua).
Preventing the Loss of Struggle Targets
The Geneva Accords compelled other cosmetic changes in the land reform that 
were discussed at the secret Politburo meeting:
The method of struggling against landlords in the mass mobilization has 
changed somewhat. Now we must stress the importance of legal authority 
and use judicial forms to deal with landlord resistance. With respect to 
satisfying the basic demands of the peasants and creating political power 
for the peasants in the countryside, the direct actions of peasants strug-
gling against landlords must be more exible now. This is to avoid giving 
our opponents a pretext for claiming that we are terrorizing those who 
cooperated with them. At the same time, we need to avoid a situation in 
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which landlords who are being struggled against ee to the South in great 
numbers, hurting our eorts to unify the country.36
Finally, the Politburo decided that the threat of emigration compelled them 
to “reconsider” the land reform from a chronological perspective. How much 
time should be devoted to carrying out the mass mobilization in the areas con-
trolled by the DRV during the war?
If class relations are too tense and the time of that tenseness carries on too 
long, it will not be advantageous for the eort to consolidate the peace, 
restore production, and restore construction of the economy. Therefore, we 
need to shorten the time for the land reform, eliminating those tasks that 
can be eliminated, and reducing those demands that can be reduced. We 
need to shorten the time of each mass mobilization wave, prepare enough 
cadres, and devise a concrete plan that allows us to complete the mass mo-
bilization in our region (excluding ethnic minority areas) within about 
two years.37
Here was a dierent explanation for the rush to complete the campaign (we 
saw before the alleged need to complete the campaign before the elections). It 
is unclear what Chinh actually meant by class relations being “too tense,” but it 
appears to have been an attempt to convince rank-and-le party members that 
peasant demands for an attack on the landlord class had reached such high levels 
of intensity that the land reform needed to be carried out as quickly as possible.
This seems to be another case of Chinh feeling compelled to depict an arbi-
trary decision by the party leaders as stemming from actual conditions on the 
ground. It does not seem logical, in the same report, to express fears of landlord 
departures to the South and then also claim that class relations in the country-
side were intensifying. If anything, the departure of large numbers of landlords 
would ease whatever “class tensions” allegedly existed in communities at the 
time. And subsequent complaints by the party leaders that the campaign was 
running out of steam, with cadres committing “rightist errors,” suggests that 
the gulf between the actual situation on the ground and the party’s land reform 
narrative was widening, not narrowing.
The Politburo resolution acknowledged that these changes were “naturally” 
going to have some inuence on the mass mobilization—but, for the above rea-
sons, they still needed to be implemented. However, it was important to make 
cadres and peasants understand that, despite these changes, “our land policy 
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basically has not changed; the aspects [of the policy] that have changed are all 
secondary and contingent.”38
Further Adjustments to the Land Reform Program
The tinkering with the land reform by Thành and Chinh to avoid being agged 
for Geneva Accords violations continued. Providing clarication on some of the 
adjustments to the campaign, Chinh announced in a November 3, 1954 direc-
tive that, “from now on,” the land reform would no longer carry out “struggle 
sessions” organized and led by the Peasant Association. Now, the district-level or 
interdistrict-level “special people’s courts” would simply set up and “guide” the 
trials of “cruel and despotic landlords.” These trials would be combined with 
peasant “denunciations” of the accused landlords, so the spirit of the old “denun-
ciation sessions” was preserved. Chinh explained how the process would work:
Aer having mobilized the thinking of the masses, organized the peasant 
forces, collected enough crimes of the landlord, prepared enough witnesses 
and evidence, and established a case le for the cruel and despotic landlord, 
[cadres] should immediately begin a trial of the landlord combined with 
peasant denunciations in order to satisfy in a timely manner the peasants’ 
demands for struggle. If we are too slow to try the case, it will reduce the 
mass’s will to struggle. It will also negatively impact our struggle on the 
economic front.
Therefore, the Case Assessment Bureau [Ban xử trí] at all levels needs 
to approve the cases in a timely manner. Any subdistrict whose cases have 
been approved by the upper-level needs to immediately set up a court and try 
the case. Any subdistrict that has not yet received upper-level approval of its 
case should not wait for that approval before beginning the trial. All that 
is needed is higher-ups to prepare the list of landlords who need to be tried 
in the special people’s court (in other words, the list of cruel and despotic 
landlord ringleaders for the rent reduction and the list of cruel and despotic 
landlords for the land reform). The special people’s court can immediately 
set up public trials at which the masses can denounce the landlords’ crimes. 
During those public trials, the court should not announce a verdict but 
wait until aer higher-ups have approved the case. At that point, [ocial] 
trials can be held in each subdistrict or for a group of subdistricts where the 
verdicts can be announced.39
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Again, the “verdict” of the case was decided not by the people on hand carrying 
out the trial but by “higher-ups.” Moreover, the second trials, which were to be 
held aer the initial “public trials,” were apparently to take place aer the ver-
dicts had already been decided. ere were other proposed measures to speed up 
the land reform’s judicial process:
In those places where the movement is expanded broadly, the district-level 
or inter-district level special people’s court will not be able to travel to many 
dierent places to hold many dierent trials at the same time. Therefore, a 
court session needs to be held in every subdistrict. If there are not enough 
juridical cadres for the establishment of these courts, then juridical cadres 
need only be used in places holding the most important trials or in those 
places near cities where we need to create a good political inuence among 
the various classes of people. As for the other places, the Land Reform 
Brigade leaders can select a land reform team leader or vice-leader to act 
as judge for the district-level special people’s court and act as a tribunal 
president [chánh án phiên tòa]. So that each trial brings good results, Land 
Reform Brigade leaders must coach and share experiences with the leaders 
and vice-leaders of land reform teams.40
Concluding the directive, Chinh instructed that it was only to be sent to Land 
Reform Brigade leaders and provincial party leaders, who would relay its content 
“by word of mouth” to the leaders and vice-leaders of land reform teams.
Handling the ICC
As noted above, the September 5–7, 1954 meeting of the Politburo appears to 
mark a turning point in how the party leaders saw the situation in the DRV, es-
pecially the danger posed by the possible emigration of large numbers of people 
to the South and the troubles that could be created by the ICC if its inspection 
groups were not carefully monitored. A September 26, 1954 directive from the 
Party Secretariat discussed how local party members should prepare in the case 
of an ICC visit.
Frequently the Control Commission will visit locations to inspect and 
investigate. Aside from investigating specic issues, they will try to nd 
a way to gure out all aspects of our general situation. They could go to 
a place and start asking the locals questions, etc. Therefore, we need to 
prepare and let those local people know how to respond cleverly to the 
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International Control Commission’s questions; we cannot just let them 
say whatever they want.41
In November 1954, a month aer the regime had moved back to Hanoi, their 
worst-case emigration scenario began to look increasingly possible. The DRV 
leaders were furious with what they saw as the weak and passive response to the 
emigration by party leaders in the provinces. Estimates in Zone III (provinces of 
Nam Định, Ninh Bình, Hòa Binh, Thái Bình, etc.) were that about one quarter 
of that region’s large Catholic population had already le and that an “import-
ant part” of the remaining three quarters was preparing to follow suit:
There are regions such as Gia Viễn, Nho Quan, or dierent localities in 
Thanh Hóa [province] that underwent mass mobilization. Previously, the 
masses there struggled and denounced with great enthusiasm, but now they 
also are leaving—even the “roots” and “beads” [from the mass mobiliza-
tion] leave. There are places where, before leaving, our countrymen salute 
the ag, leave behind some money to pay o debts to the bank, and write 
goodbye letters to cadres. Generally speaking, the Catholic masses have 
been wickedly tricked, enticed, and forced [into emigrating].42
According to Trường Chinh, the “scheme” used by the “puppet enemy” had 
four basic components. The rst was “tricking and hypnotizing Catholics” by 
saying such things as “God has gone to the South already” or by saying that “the 
communists will ban their religion, will destroy Catholics, or will put them all 
in prison for following the French.” The second method was “distorting the 
Party and Government’s policies,” claiming, for example, that the agricultural 
tax and the industrial tax would be “very heavy” and that they would “starve to 
death” if they stayed. On the other hand, if they went to the South, they would 
receive American aid. The third was to “use armed force or the prestige of the 
church in order to compel [Catholics to emigrate].” The fourth method was to 
“disseminate nonsensical rumors,” making people think that life in the North 
was “unstable” and yearn for a new life in the South, which they imagined as 
“quieter and more stable.”43
The party leaders’ assessments of Catholics in particular and of the country-
side in general paid little attention to the question of how the regime’s policies 
might have generated receptivity among Catholics to these alleged “ruses” for 
convincing them to emigrate. Once again, the explanation stressed the imple-
mentation of the party’s policies rather than the policies themselves. “According 
to the assessment of the Central Committee, the dangerous situation described 
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above is not the result of the masses not being good, and it is also not the result 
of the party’s policies lacking clarity.” The problem, explained Chinh, was that 
“our cadres had rightist deviation thinking,” which meant that they thought 
ghting against the “reactionaries” who “forced” Catholics to emigrate would be 
tantamount to violating the Geneva Accords. Cadres had also committed “de-
viations” in implementing the party’s religious policy, and “many cadres” were 
guilty of “not following the mass line correctly.”44
Chinh suggested a number of methods for ghting against the emigration. 
First of all, on the propaganda front, cadres were to try harder to convince Cath-
olics that the DRV regime would respect religious freedom, even making eorts 
to repair churches that had been damaged during the war or that had been aban-
doned because of the departure of priest and parishioners. Second, he called for 
eorts to inltrate and sow divisions among Catholic priests. Third was to use 
trials and punishments as a means of intimidating priests so that they would stop 
calling for Catholics to go south:
[Cadres] need to collect enough evidence and then punish some of the re-
actionary ringleaders, accusing them before the masses in order to warn 
others. [Cadres] need to make sure that, when accusing [these ringleaders], 
they must be convicted of violating the ceasere agreement and violating 
the people’s democratic freedoms, such as catching the people, conning 
them in one place, and sending them away without asking the permission 
of our government, etc.45
The party leaders wished to dissolve holding areas (such as churches) where 
Catholics waiting to emigrate had congregated. Chinh suggested that cadres 
mobilize people in the vicinity of that staging area to “send petitions” to the 
DRV government, demanding that it intervene on behalf of those who were 
being “forcibly detained” for emigration. Evidently these petitions could then 
be shown to the ICC if it accused the DRV of preventing people from leaving. 
Indeed, Chinh instructed cadres that, in places where the ICC had scheduled 
an inspection, they should mobilize people to send similar petitions to the ICC, 
demanding that it “intervene” for family members who had been “forcibly 
detained.”46
A few weeks aer goading cadres into being more aggressive in their eorts 
to prevent Northerners from emigrating, the party leaders organized a “public 
meeting” in Hanoi’s opera house to stage an ocial protest against violations of 
the Geneva Accords by Ngô Đình Diệm and his American backers. The con-
tent and structure of the meeting was determined by the party leaders, but the 
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meeting itself was run by noncommunist public personalities connected with 
the United Vietnam Association and the DRV’s Committee for the Protection 
of World Peace.47 Chinh followed up the November 23 public meeting three days 
later with a Politburo directive titled, “On Creating a Large and Powerful Move-
ment Comprising All Classes of the Entire Country for the Purpose of Resisting 
our Opponent’s Blatant Violations of the Geneva Accords.” Toward the end of 
that directive, Chinh armed that, “We have many advantages. Because justice 
is on our side and because we respect the Geneva Accords, legitimate public 
opinion supports us.”48
The internal directives of the Party leaders show increasing frustration at 
their inability to stop the emigration and a growing willingness to take bolder 
and riskier measures to stem the ow of people. A February 16, 1955 Politburo 
directive (about three months before the 300-day period was supposed to end) 
warned that a large number of people were still preparing to go south. To help 
this situation, the Politburo recommended the following course of action:
• Choose a few model places where we will organize to help people emigrate 
(aer choosing the place, check it with the Central Committee). We should 
invite the International Control Commission to come and witness what we 
do there. These model places must be areas where we have a mass base so 
that when we organize to help people leave, only a few people actually ask 
to go. This is the only way that helps our cause. This work must be carefully 
planned so that it can be implemented rapidly.
• We must have a plan to crush reactionaries, to increase vigilance, to tighten 
our control, and to prevent the enemy from exploiting this opportunity to 
speed up concentration of the masses and create more troubles for us.49
A month later, on March 20, 1955 (two months before the end of the free-travel 
period) a communiqué from the VWP Central Committee to the various inter-
zones assessed the situation:
The reactionaries in the International Control Commission group are 
operating zealously. Now they have formed three more groups to inspect 
coastal provinces: Thái Bình, Nam Định, Ninh Bình, Thanh Hóa, Nghệ 
An, and Hà Tĩnh. The goal of the reactionaries on the International 
Control Commission this time is to nd our weak spots, nd evidence to 
conclude that we have violated the Accords and bring that before the nine 
signatories [at Geneva]. They want to delay their departure from Haiphong 
and lengthen the period of emigration. They want to ruin the Accords and 
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immediately organize a means of forcing the masses to emigrate on a large 
scale all at one time.50
On that same day, the National Assembly convened for the rst time since 
meeting sixteen months earlier to “approve” the party’s land reform law. At the 
meeting, Phạm Văn Đồng and Võ Nguyên Giáp both delivered long reports 
touting the DRV’s “absolute” (triệt để) adherence to the Geneva Accords and 
condemning the many violations of the accords committed by the “opposition” 
regime in Saigon.
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Reinvigorating the Land Reform, 1955–1956
With the French gone, the threat of the Geneva Accords’ 300-day period of free 
movement over, and the doors out of North Vietnam ocially shut, the DRV’s 
party leaders quickly raised the mass mobilization campaign’s prole again. A 
little over a year remained before the regime’s self-imposed deadline of June 1956. 
The party had only carried out land reform in about 735 of the 3,314 subdistricts 
slated for the campaign. This amounted to less than two million of North Viet-
nam’s roughly ten million rural inhabitants. In other words, the party leaders 
had about one year to put roughly eight million people through the land reform.1
Between the ocial end of the 300 days of free movement in late May of 
1955 (the period ended up being extended for two months) and the 7th Plenum 
of the party Central Committee, scheduled for the middle of August, Nguyễn 
Tất Thành took the opportunity to visit Beijing and Moscow for the rst time 
as “President Hồ Chí Minh,” leader of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
This time, the Soviet leadership rolled out the red carpet—every single member 
of the CPSU Presidium waited on the Moscow airport tarmac for “Comrade 
Din’s” arrival. According to Ilya Gaiduk, however, this “splendid” reception was 
meant to compensate for the reluctance of the Soviet leaders to make any simi-
larly splendid military or economic commitments to the DRV.
Through negotiations with his hosts, Thành was able to secure for the DRV 
400 million rubles in economic aid, promises that Soviet technical advisers 
would be sent to Vietnam, and scholarships for DRV students at Soviet univer-
sities. But, as Gaiduk points out, this was “nothing like” the Sino-Soviet treaty 
of 1950 that Thành had coveted back then. The Soviet leadership still preferred 
that the DRV work primarily under the direct guidance of the Chinese, partic-
ularly in military matters.2
A few weeks before the Moscow visit, in a meeting with the Soviet ambassa-
dor to the DRV, Thành had apparently raised the issue of whether it would be 
expedient to have Võ Nguyên Giáp join the delegation so that he could meet 
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with Soviet military leaders. This suggestion had been declined. As a letter from 
the Soviet military’s general sta to the Soviet Foreign Ministry had explained: 
“the Vietnamese comrades could at any time receive necessary consultation from 
us through the command of the People’s Liberation Army of China as it is prac-
ticing in the present time.”3
Thus, Thành did not include Giáp in the delegation, but he did bring Trường 
Chinh, the party general secretary. This appears to have been Chinh’s rst time 
outside of northern Vietnam. During their month of travel together, Thành and 
Chinh would have had ample time together to discuss the situation back home. 
e top party leaders were apparently frustrated with how the land reform was 
proceeding, arguing that “rightist deviations” (i.e., being too so on the landlord 
class) had become all too common. In their thinking, the arrival of peace and the 
chaos of the Geneva Accords had aected the mentality of the mass mobilization 
apparatus, taking the sting out of the campaign.
The Fight against “Rightest Deviations” in the Land Reform
Looking back over the past four months, Thành and Chinh could count at least 
four measures taken to ensure that those serving in the land reform apparatus, 
currently 21,679 cadres, would make the campaign achieve the mass mobiliza-
tion’s unspecied “required goals.” First, in February of 1955, the party leaders 
had expanded the party “reorganization” up the rungs of power from the subdis-
trict to the district level. Such an upward expansion of the purge raised the stakes 
for those district-level party members considering whether to “stick their necks 
out” to save subdistrict-level members targeted in the land reform.4
Second, at the 7th Central Committee Plenum in March of 1955, the party 
leaders had apparently held discussions with Central Committee members who 
were concerned about “leist deviations” (i.e., too much violence in the attack 
on the landlord class) during the land reform. In the eyes of the party leaders, it 
was “rightist deviations” that were the far greater threat. According to the “Dis-
cussion” document produced at the end of the 7th Plenum, Thành and Chinh 
seem to have fallen back on the Leninist principle of party discipline to enforce 
their view of the situation.5
The apparent discord between the top party leaders and regular Central 
Committee members suggests the possibility that the true nature and goals of 
the mass mobilization campaign was a secret of the Politburo not shared with 
second-tier party leaders. It is possible that Central Committee members ques-
tioned the plausibility of the party leadership’s estimation of the “enemy.” The 
mass mobilization campaign was now nearly two years old—this was plenty of 
Reinvigorating the Land Reform, 1955–1956 241 
time for rumors about the “struggle sessions,” the execution of landlords, and 
the ferreting out of Nationalist Party cells to spread among the northern popu-
lation. By March of 1955, local elites and actual Nationalist Party members who 
thought themselves possible targets of the campaign had had eight months to 
leave for the South. Second-tier Central Committee members might have won-
dered why the Politburo had not adjusted its estimate of the enemy to account 
for this reality.
Third, in early June 1955, the party Secretariat had released a resolution deal-
ing with “Organization Work.” It called for the party reorganization to be ex-
panded upward yet again. Now provincial-level party organizations were to be 
targeted. As the resolution explained:
Through the land reform and the reorganization of district-level [party 
branches], it has become apparent that provincial-level [party branches] 
are still complicated. A number of provincial-level oces continue to be 
dominated by bad elements, which has hindered the implementation of the 
Party and Government’s policies. Therefore, immediately aer the comple-
tion of land reform in a province, that province’s [Party leadership] should 
be reorganized. The reorganization of provincial-level Party branches will 
be carried out directly by the Central Committee.6
This announcement surely gave provincial party leaders pause as they considered 
how to handle the land reform in their province. Who would dare act in a way 
that could be construed as having “hindered” the mass mobilization campaign?
Fourth, the party leaders had pushed to tie promotions and demotions more 
strongly to performance during the land reform:
The mass mobilization is a good opportunity to understand more clearly the 
substance of every cadre, which helps the Party’s leading organs promote and 
use cadres in a more correct and close manner. Currently, in our anti-feudal 
front, we have a very large force of cadres participating. That provides an 
extremely convenient occasion to promote and discipline cadres in order to 
reorganize their ranks. During the land reform, discipline and promotion 
can be carried out not only with a number of cadres participating in the 
mass mobilization but also, to a certain extent, with cadres who have not yet 
participated in the campaign. With respect to these cadres, discipline and 
promotion can be based on both their attitude toward the mass mobilization 
and on the materials discovered [about them] by the masses.7
As the resolution stated, “any cadres who, despite having been educated about 
the land reform, continue to refuse service as cadres, should be punished 
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appropriately.” Similarly, the party leaders wanted performance in the land 
reform to have a more direct impact on a cadre’s professional status aer his 
return from the campaign. A cadre who had been disciplined during the land 
reform should not return to his job and be kept in the same position, much less 
promoted.8
Further Radicalization aer Thành and 
Chinh’s Return from the Soviet bloc
Thành and Chinh returned from their trip overseas on July 23, 1955 with about 
three weeks to prepare for the Central Committee’s 8th Plenum, scheduled for 
the middle of August. What they heard and read apparently convinced them 
that the above measures had been insucient to curb the trend toward “rightist 
deviations” in the land reform. At the plenum, they announced the mass mobi-
lization campaign’s third phase, “Reinspection” (phúc tra). As Chinh explained 
in his report:
Our Party organization and leadership is not yet appropriate to the level 
and demand of the masses and cadres aer land reform. In the countryside 
today, the organization still has many levels and the division of work is not 
yet clear, with many cadres having overlapping responsibilities. There are 
places where the Party organization is not yet pure, where there is a lack of 
unity between new and old members of the Party branch, where the branch 
leadership is in a state of confusion. The district-level Party branches have 
been consolidated, but are still green, while zone and provincial-level lead-
ers have not yet improved their leadership in places that have carried out 
land reform. They are still heavy on formalistic meetings; they have not yet 
fully grasped the situation; and they do not yet see clearly the diculties 
of those below them. Many upper-level cadres have misperceptions about 
areas that have already gone through land reform. Either they believe that, 
aer land reform, everything is ne and no more problems exist, or, seeing 
diculties, they become pessimistic, thinking that the land reform has 
“gone nowhere.”
The situation described above has presented us with a task—we must 
consolidate those places that have undergone land reform. Therefore, we 
must organize the reinspection of the countryside. The Central Land 
Reform Committee must prepare a policy, a plan, and cadres in order to 
inspect communes that have gone through land reform. This is to help 
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peasants solve remaining problems, x weak points and mistakes, and orga-
nize peasants to engage in production correctly according to the Party’s 
principles and guidelines.9
The reinspection wave was based on Chinese Communist models and had surely 
been a part of the DRV’s three-stage mass mobilization plan (rent reduction, 
land reform, reinspection) from the beginning.10
The concept of reinspection was vague enough to be infused with dierent 
meanings. One possibility was to reinspect regions discreetly, making no eort 
to use the ndings to in­uence implementation of the campaign’s two preceding 
phases, rent reduction and land reform. A second possibility was to publicize the 
results of the reinspection as a means of moderating the implementation of the 
earlier two phases. In taking this option, the party leaders could announce that 
reinspection had revealed too aggressive an attack on landlords. A third option 
was to propagandize the results of the reinspection in a manner that pressured 
land-reform phase cadres to nd more targets for repression. This was the option 
taken by Thành, Chinh, and the Politburo.
Following the land reform phase’s fourth wave, carried out roughly during 
the latter half of 1955, Thành and Chinh made another move to ensure that 
the mass mobilization apparatus found the required number of targets for re-
pression. A January 27, 1956 directive written by Nguyễn Duy Trinh on behalf 
of the party Secretariat stated that “[d]uring wave 8 of the rent reduction and 
wave 4 of the land reform, the brigade leaders all had to carry out a thorough 
self-criticism because they saw that they were still disregarding the work of reor-
ganizing Party branches. That is a major weakness that needs to be addressed.”11
According to the directive, “brigade leaders and cadres had not probed deeply to 
grasp rmly the special situation of [local Party] branches.” These mass mobili-
zation leaders “had not fully recognized the wicked and sophisticated schemes 
of the landlord class and their reactionary political organizations that dominate 
party branches.”12
The Media Campaign
The Politburo also used a rigorous press campaign to reinforce these eorts at 
intimidating the mass mobilization apparatus into nding more targets. DRV 
newspapers released a steady stream of articles insisting that rural North Viet-
nam remained full of evil landlords, saboteurs, spies, Nationalist Party members, 
traitors, and landlord sympathizers. All were alleged to be working in concert 
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toward the collective goal of destroying the revolution. The party’s main vehicles 
for the promotion of this narrative were the Central Committee organ, The 
People, and the recently established theoretical journal, Study (December 1955).
Throughout June 1955, The People published a string of articles exhorting 
land reform cadres to attack the landlord class with more resolve. The June 11 
issue published an article titled “Sharpen Even More the Spirit of Vigilance 
with the Landlord Class: Resolutely Struggle against Rightist Thinking and 
Fear of the Enemy.”13 Two days later the newspaper published a pair of arti-
cles in a similar spirit. The rst was “Raise Vigilance and Destroy the Landlord 
Class’s Scheme of Sabotage” and the second was “Carrying out Self-Criticism for 
Rightist Thinking.14 On June 17, The People published an article titled “Land-
lord Ruses to Sabotage the Land Reform in Bắc Giang.” Similar articles appeared 
in July: “Aer Fixing the Rightist Thinking of Cadres, Land Reform in Lâm-
Thành Hamlet Was Successful;”15 in August: “Aer Undergoing Thought Re-
form for Step 2, Cadres Have Begun to Fix eir Rightist Thinking, Work Has 
Improved;”16 in September: “Recognize Clearly the Landlords’ Schemes and 
Promptly Repress eir Acts of Sabotage;”17 in October: “The Rent Reduction 
Team of Chiến Thắng Subdistrict (Lạng Sơn) Probed Deeply, Found a Cruel 
Despotic Landlord Ringleader, and Discovered a Commando Organization;”18
in November: “Working against Enemy Sabotage of the Land Reform in Bắc 
Ninh—Bắc Giang.”19 Similar ideas about the alleged reaction of the landlord 
class appear in dozens of other articles about the land reform.
The party’s theoretical journal, Study, delivered much the same fare. Its open-
ing issue contained an article by Hồ Viết Thắng, the vice-minister of agriculture 
and one of the most important members of the Central Land Reform Com-
mittee. Thắng began with a reformulation of the standard justication for the 
land reform and concluded with the following assessment of the campaign as it 
approached its h and nal wave:
The land reform movement is now entering its decisive phase. We are about 
to implement wave 5 of the land reform in a large area that had been oc-
cupied by the enemy for a long time, that is densely populated, and that 
is extremely complicated in many respects. The landlord class, which has 
allied with the Americans and their lackeys, is trying hard to sabotage the 
land reform and, generally speaking, is sabotaging us in all facets. They 
stop at no evil scheme to achieve their barbaric and dark goal.20
A shorter article in that rst December 1955 issue of Study was titled “Raise 
Revolutionary Vigilance.” It conveyed a similar picture of landlord ruses and 
cadre reluctance:
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During wave 4 of the land reform, the landlord class allied with the 
American imperialists and their lackeys, working to sabotage us ruthlessly. 
But many of our cadres demonstrated a critical loss of vigilance. The enemy 
would carry out murders, which one cadre quickly attributed to the de-
ceased people’s “fear of having their class raised, afraid of being targeted for 
struggle, and therefore having committed suicide.” The enemy organizes 
the throwing of dirt and rocks, the burning of houses, and the clipping of 
telephone wires. A number of comrades do not investigate, or they only in-
vestigate supercially. They conclude that “the house burned by accident,” 
or “the wires were cut by mischievous young kids.” These cadres fall prey 
to the arguments put forward by the enemy to throw them o track. Even 
more serious, there are cadres who blindly “relied” on the enemy’s hench-
men and listened to them, arresting good poor peasants, or allowing [these 
henchmen] to borrow documents and clothing to pretend that they are 
cadres. They [the henchmen] then go to another locality and sabotage the 
movement there. Because our cadres have lost their vigilance in this way, 
for a long period of time in a number of places, the enemy was not attacked, 
the masses were not mobilized, and the work of land reform was delayed.21
An article in the following issue of Study (January 1956) hammered home the 
same theme: “The landlord class, especially its cruel and despotic members, its 
saboteurs, and its spies, are even more furiously, madly, and perdiously resist-
ing. A number of cadres, having not recognized this situation in a timely man-
ner, have committed serious rightist deviations.”22 In February 1956, the journal 
published an article titled “The Enemy Must be Resolutely and Promptly At-
tacked in Order to Push Forward Wave 5 of the Land Reform.”23
The Fih Land Reform Wave: January-July 1956
The mass mobilization campaign had been designed largely along the Chinese 
model of visiting villages three times (rent reduction, land reform, reinspection). 
Toward the end of 1955, over half of the DRV rural population had still not ex-
perienced the second, land-reform phase of the mass mobilization. Yet the goal 
of the party leaders had been to complete the campaign in the summer of 1956. 
At some point toward the latter part of 1955, Thành must have decided that the 
campaign should not drag on past their self-imposed summer-of-1956 deadline.
The Politburo’s solution to the pressure of time was to condense and accel-
erate the campaign. Communities that had not undergone any of the three 
mobilization phases would skip rent reduction and immediately undergo the 
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more radical land-reform phase as part of one enormous h and nal wave. 
Still concerned about “rightist tendencies,” Thành and the Politburo decided to 
call this giant h wave the “Điện Biên Phủ wave” in the struggle against the 
landlord class. It is unclear whether the revised schedule aected the campaign’s 
reinspection phase.
The Politburo managed reinspection as they had the rent reduction and land 
reform phases of the mass mobilization: carry out a small experimental wave in 
a few subdistricts followed by a summing-up meeting that would arm rein-
spection’s general goals. The party leaders also released a special reinspection 
directive, which is referred to in an archival document from the Vietnamese 
North Interzone Land Reform Committee (to be discussed presently). That di-
rective does not appear in the Party Documents series. Yet the document on the 
reinspection from the Vietnamese North Interzone claims to be “based” on it, 
enabling us to infer its main points.
As noted above, the reinspection of places that had been through the 
land-reform phase of mass mobilization could be used to send a signal to land-re-
form brigade leaders currently preparing to or actually carrying out the cam-
paign’s h and nal wave. A description of the reinspection in the party’s the-
oretical journal, Study, shows the meaning that party leaders gave to this third 
and nal phase. The experimental wave of reinspection in ve communes of 
Phú Thọ province showed that the land reform phase had, “generally speaking,” 
been carried out well. This represented “a basic revolutionary victory” for the 
people of the ve communes. “However,” the Study article cautioned, “a number 
of weaknesses remain, such as letting landlords slip through the net (để lọt), in-
cluding some cruel and despotic ones who act as ringleaders of sabotage eorts.” 
Obviously, the message here was that land-reform brigade leaders had lacked 
thoroughness in their attacks on the landlord class. “Through reinspection, the 
scheme of the landlord class to raise their heads up and carry out sabotage was 
repressed, the spirit of unity in the countryside further strengthened, and pro-
duction pushed forward.”24
A report on reinspection produced by the Land Reform Committee of the 
Vietnamese North Zone shows that repression of alleged enemies remained the 
primary concern:
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Proposed plan for carrying out land reform reinspection waves 2,3,4,5 in 
the Vietnamese North Interzone.
Based on the directive of the Central Committee and the Interzone 
leadership, the Vietnamese North Interzone Land Reform Committee 
held a meeting with the Party leaders of Bắc Giang, Thái Nguyên, Vĩnh 
Phúc, and Phú Thọ provinces in order to discuss preparations for carrying 
out the reinspection of the land reform in those provinces that have carried 
out land reform. In accordance with the spirit of the Central Committee’s 
directive, [reinspection] will rst be carried out in important subdistricts 
such as those lying next to key roads, around provincial towns, in places 
that have leading [Party and government] oces, and in places where there 
are important state-owned enterprises. At the same time, [the reinspection 
of key places] needs to clean up districts, making it easier for the district 
Party leaders to lead and focus on the task of reinspecting the land reform 
when completed in their district. Aer discussing this with provincial lead-
ers, we have come to the following resolutions:
. . .
The Situation and Special Characteristics of Regions Where We Are 
Preparing to Reinspect the Land Reform in 4 Provinces of the Vietnamese 
North Interzone
Aer studying the spirt of the Central Committee’s directive as men-
tioned above, the interzone leadership made preparations and delegated to 
comrade Nguyễn Tân Phúc (the interzone Party member responsible for 
reinspection) responsibility for meeting with provincial leaders to carry 
out the plan. On February 22, 1956, they met and discussed with provincial 
leaders how to prepare reinspection for the above-mentioned subdistricts 
and to [discuss] the special characteristics of these places:
1. Bắc Giang: We will carry out reinspection in those subdistricts around 
the provincial town of Phủ Lạng Thượng [now Bắc Giang City]. This was 
a center of activity for the counterrevolutionaries during the resistance 
war as well as aer the establishment of peace and during the land reform. 
Moreover, it is a place where we have many of our enterprises such as facto-
ries, a train platform, and important oces. It also has important road and 
water transportation routes such as highway 1, the railroad, a large bridge, a 
port, etc. It is a densely populated place. During the third wave of the land 
reform there, the enemy carried out serious acts of sabotage such as the mur-
der of six people in Hung Tien and three murders in Thọ Xương. In Sông 
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Mai, Tân Mỹ, and Chi minh, there occurred serious incidents of sabotage 
such as killing people and burning houses. This was the region where the 
enemy operated most strongly against the land-reform brigade during Wave 
3. But we struggled against the enemy’s eorts at sabotage very weakly. 
There was not a single subdistrict where the culprit of a planned murder 
was found in a satisfactory way, and there was no place where the base of 
the enemy’s reactionary organization was thoroughly discovered. Aer 
the land reform, the enemy carried out serious acts of sabotage. Common 
among the above subdistricts were eorts to sabotage tax collection, sabo-
tage production, and burn houses. Even more serious is the fact that there 
are places like Thọ Xương where mines have been set three times (one time 
was by a pile of bamboo planks about to be used by the army for the con-
struction of a house, one time by the door of the Agricultural Department, 
and one time a bomb was set just before the arrival of a French peace convoy 
to visit us—it was defused aerward.) Also, in this subdistrict, aer the 
land reform, there are 11 youths who meet on their own initiative to engage 
in debauchery [chơi bời] and to go [text unreadable] with each other. Four 
months ago, in Tân Mỹ, there was a murder that remains unsolved, or, as in 
Thái Sơn during a morning meeting about taxes, a guerrilla hid and threw 
a grenade into the meeting spot. With respect to our organization, there are 
places where 2/3 of the Party cell executive committee lies silent like in Thờ 
Xương, where we suspect that the general secretary of the Party branch is 
an enemy element. 25
The report’s descriptions of the other three provinces slated for reinspection 
had the same focus on security and repression, with little time devoted to issues 
of agriculture. Reinspection cadres, like rent-reduction and land-reform cadres 
before them, would enter communities and, for a third time, look for people who 
could be punished as “cruel despotic landlords” or “enemy elements.”
Khrushchev’s Secret Speech (February 24, 1956)
In early February 1956, as wave 5 of the land reform was picking up steam, 
Trường Chinh and fellow Politburo member Lê Đức Thọ traveled together to 
Beijing. There they joined the Chinese Communist Party delegation heading 
to the Soviet Union for the CPSU 20th Congress, to be held in Moscow from 
February 14 to 24.26 This meant that Chinh would be absent from the DRV for 
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over a month during the largest wave of the mass mobilization, when more than 
half the North’s rural population would undergo land reform. This absence does 
not square with the level of blame that Chinh would end up shouldering for the 
campaign’s violence. Had Chinh played an indispensable role in the campaign’s 
implementation, would Thành would have permitted him to leave the DRV for 
over a month during the campaign’s crucial nal wave?
In reality, the land reform campaign was the project of the Politburo, and 
probably no one person of that body was indispensable to the campaign’s imple-
mentation. Hoàng Quốc Việt, Phạm Văn Đồng, and, of course, Thành himself, 
could just as easily have met with the Central Land Reform Committee and 
provided instructions to Hồ Viết Thắng, the person who connected the party 
leaders in Hanoi with the mass-mobilization brigade leaders in the countryside.
Khrushchev’s secret speech, delivered the night of February 24, 1956 at the 
CPSU 20th Congress, was titled, “On the Personality Cult and its Conse-
quences.” The term “personality cult” was the Soviet leader’s way of referring 
to what Westerners called “Stalinism.” In his speech, Khrushchev spoke for 
roughly four hours about Stalin’s crimes and shortcomings as a leader. In the 
words of Khrushchev biographer William Taubman, the secret speech “was the 
bravest and most reckless thing [Khrushchev] ever did. The Soviet regime never 
fully recovered and neither did he.”27
Khrushchev’s speech focused on how “the cult of the person of Stalin” be-
came “the source of a whole series of exceedingly serious and grave perversions 
of Party principles, of Party democracy, and of revolutionary legality.” Over the 
years, the “accumulation of immense and limitless powers in the hands of one 
person” had caused “great harm” to the CPSU and the Soviet Union. Provid-
ing quotes from Marx and Lenin, Khrushchev pointed out “how severely the 
classics of Marxism-Leninism denounced every manifestation of the cult of the 
individual.”28
Aer establishing the heterodox nature of Stalin’s personality cult, Khrush-
chev explored its manifestations. The bulk of the secret speech was devoted to 
the period from 1934 to 1938, what the historian Robert Conquest referred to as 
the “Great Terror.”29 According to Khrushchev, this was when “Stalin’s willful-
ness vis-à-vis the Party and its Central Committee became fully apparent.” In 
the speech, Khrushchev detailed Stalin’s “fabrication of cases,” his “false accu-
sations,” and his “glaring abuses of socialist legality, which resulted in the death 
of innocent people.”30 Among those innocent people were 98 members of the 
139-member Central Committee in 1934. These men, “oen no longer able to 
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bear barbaric tortures,” confessed to “all kinds of grave and unlikely crimes,” for 
which they “were arrested and shot.”
Though Chinh and Thọ did not attend the “Closed Session” during which 
Khrushchev delivered his famous speech, they would have received copies of it 
before leaving Moscow. Reading the speech, Chinh must have been concerned 
about its striking relevance to the situation back home in North Vietnam. First, 
the DRV obviously had a full-blown personality cult, which had now been shown 
to be contrary to the ideas of Marx and Lenin. Second, Chinh and his comrades 
in the Politburo had promoted Stalin as a great leader of the “democratic” camp. 
In the secret speech, he looked like a paranoid dictator, a mass murderer, and a 
disastrous bungler during early days of WWII. Third, the secret speech focused 
on Stalin’s crimes during a period, 1934 to 1938, that overlapped precisely with 
Thành’s longest stay in Moscow. Having witnessed this period, how would the 
DRV leader explain his promotion of Stalin and the Soviet system? Fourth, the 
violations of “socialist legality” described by Khrushchev were similar to prac-
tices that the VWP leaders were now employing in the land reform campaign: 
the idea that “enemies” lurked in every community, the extraction of false con-
fessions (usually through threats and torture), the abandonment of “normal” 
judicial procedures (the Special People’s Courts), and ocial pressure on those 
courts to deliver rapid verdicts.
If rank-and-le party members were to read Khrushchev’s secret speech, they 
might lose faith in the Politburo and the Soviet Union. How could Chinh, Thọ, 
and other party leaders continue to insist on the moral superiority of the So-
viet Union if Khrushchev’s shocking depiction of Stalin’s bloody reign were to 
become well known? Khrushchev all but guaranteed this eventuality when he 
ordered that the speech be distributed widely and studied carefully by party 
members in the Soviet Union.31 What if the speech fell into the hands of the 
Capitalist bloc and rank-and-le party members heard about it via news sources 
of that bloc? In such a scenario, it might appear that the DRV leaders were afraid 
of the speech and had intentionally tried to conceal its message. As it turned 
out, the West learned of Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin the day aer it 
happened, obtained a copy of the actual speech in mid-April, and published it 
in major newspapers in early June. In the next chapter, I will examine how the 
DRV’s party leaders handled the dangerous messages of the 20th Congress, es-
pecially its call for the Communist bloc to ght against the cult of personality.
The implications of the 20th Congress were addressed by the party leaders at 
the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee held from April 19 to 24, 1956. The 
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internal documents produced from that plenum express ideas about the Hồ Chí 
Minh personality cult and about some of the other main messages of the CPSU 
20th Congress. But the documents contain no discussion of how Khrushchev’s 
thoughts about Stalin’s crimes might be relevant to the DRV’s mass mobiliza-
tion campaign.
On May 5 and 6, 1956, ten days aer the close of the Central Committee’s 9th 
Plenum, the Central Land Reform Committee held its eighth meeting. Again, it 
seems signicant that the meeting was held immediately following the 9th Ple-
num of the Central Committee, as though the ideas about the campaign from the 
top party leaders were transmitted to the Central Land Reform Committee aer 
having been presented to the more powerful and important Central Committee.
Through informal means, I was able to obtain a copy of the report on the 
mass mobilization read by one of the campaign’s most important leaders, Hồ 
Viết Thắng, the vice-minister of agriculture. As with virtually all party reports 
on the implementation of policy, Thắng’s report to Central Land Reform Com-
mittee took a linear approach, criticizing “deviations” both to the right and to 
the le of the imagined correct line. Although Thắng did acknowledge the oc-
currence of “leist excesses” such as the use of torture to uncover “reactionary 
organizations,” on balance, he still leaned to the side of “rightist deviations” as 
the primary danger. Thắng began with the following description:
One: Achievements of Wave 5 aer Three Steps of Work
The special characteristic of wave 5 is [that it comprises] important regions, 
regions that have just recently been liberated, the area next to the demili-
tarized zone, the coastal areas, places heavily populated by Catholics, and 
areas surrounding cities. The situation in these areas is very complicated.
Throughout the past period, the landlord class allied with the reaction-
ary lackeys of the American imperialists to furiously resist and sabotage 
the land reform. They carry out their sabotage in a comprehensive manner, 
using schemes that are sophisticated and Machiavellian, not stopping at the 
most barbaric and cruel actions. ey:
Propagandize a march to the North, propagandize war.
Plant the problem of being related [to landlords], distort all aspects of 
our policy in order to create anxiety among the masses.
. . . have their henchmen carry out confessions, make fake documents, 
use beautiful women, all with the intention of tricking cadres and getting 
them to focus on a dierent target of struggle.
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The most barbaric is killing people. They kill poor peasant denouncers 
[khổ chủ] to prevent them from speaking bitterness. They even kill chil-
dren in order to repress the spirit of the masses, murder cadres to carry out 
revenge, kill each other in order to silence informers. Up to now, they have 
instigated many cases of murder, een of which have led to the death of 
land reform cadres.
They destroy production and sabotage the government’s ability to 
implement its State plan. In many places, they wreck irrigation dams, 
dump insects into elds, and kill bualos.
The [Party] organizations in these areas are impure to a critical degree. 
In many cases of sabotage, [land reform cadres] have discovered the partic-
ipation of guerrillas that were planted by the enemy. 
Thắng then moved to the “successes” of the campaign in wave 5. These were 
listed numerically from one to six. Though we should not read too much into 
their order, it seems signicant that the rst was the land reform’s “overthrow” 
of “cruel despotic landlords” and the “strong repression” of “saboteurs.” As this 
rst of the six “successes” explained, “through the eective mobilization of the 
masses against the enemy’s sabotage, in many places [the campaign] was able to 
uncover most of the cases of sabotage.” And knowing how to “sow internal di-
visions among the enemy, [land reform cadres] were able to discover reactionary 
organizations, strike down their ringleaders and backbone elements while win-
ning over and educating those people who took the wrong path.”32 The second 
“success” was the expropriation of land and food from landlords; third was the 
conscation of weapons; fourth was the reorganization of party and state politi-
cal bodies at the local level; h was the (alleged) peasant enthusiasm for raising 
production; and sixth was the “dogged working spirit” shown by mass mobili-
zation cadres, who were willing to “endure hardships” to complete their tasks.
Aer establishing these “successes,” Thắng shied to the land reform’s weak-
nesses. Here the inherent ambiguity of the linear analytical approach is appar-
ent, as it is unclear from the following criticism how a cadre should act:
In general, there is still a lack of determination and especially a lack of thor-
oughness in striking the enemy. But there are also many places where signs 
of leist deviations have appeared (arresting too many people in a care-
less manner, repressing [enemies] without attempting to sow divisions as 
well). Signs of disorganization and lack of discipline have also appeared in 
many places, with [cadres] arresting people without asking higher-ups for 
directions. Through a lack of thoroughness in striking against the enemy, 
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a lack of combining strikes with eorts to propagandize broadly the pol-
icy, and through a lack of striking at the ringleaders in order to divide the 
enemy to the highest degree, up to now, there are still many places where 
the enemy carries out serious acts of sabotage and the masses are still afraid 
of the enemy.
A land reform cadre reading this passage could ask the question, “how hard do 
I need to attack the enemy to avoid being accused of exhibiting the ‘general’ 
lack of determination while not taking things too far, committing ‘leist devi-
ations?’” Or, the cadre might ask, “is the enemy still carrying out ‘serious acts of 
sabotage’ because cadres lacked thoroughness or because they have not conned 
their strikes to the enemy ringleaders?”
Thắng’s report acknowledged weaknesses in the land reform’s “reorganiza-
tion” of party branches. And here we see another early hint of the ocial expla-
nation that the party leaders would soon use to explain the violence of the cam-
paign. “The task of building our forces, of reorganizing Party branches, has not 
yet received the right amount of attention.” Without naming a subject, Thắng 
stated that the “estimation of the situation with respect to existing organiza-
tions [in the countryside] is not yet correct; it is still one-sided, stressing the one 
perspective of the organizations as dominated by the enemy with the result that 
many land reform teams punished too many Party members and old cadres.”
But in other sections of the report, the older narrative of the enemy as virtually 
omnipresent in the countryside appears again. For example, despite recognizing 
the “one-sided” judgment of local party organizations and having attacked “too 
many” party members during the reorganization, Thắng was still able to de-
scribe in positive terms the method of attacking the enemy during the campaign:
Compared with wave 4, this wave [we have] struck against the cruel and 
despotic landlords harder and more quickly. This is because we learned 
lessons from the experience from wave 4. Therefore, through propagan-
dizing our policies, through the masses’ speak bitterness sessions, when 
we saw any person who t the requirements for a cruel and despotic land-
lord we promptly arrested him, even though we had not yet held a large 
peasant meeting. Aer that, we promptly moved to mobilize the masses 
to carry out each step of struggle, starting small and expanding out, com-
bining that with the eorts to build forces [in the community]. In many 
subdistricts, right from the fourth or h day, cruel and despotic landlords 
were arrested, and on the thirteenth day, [cadres] immediately struggled 
against and tried those landlords who had many serious crimes. As a result 
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of this method, generally speaking, right from the beginning, we took the 
initiative to strike the enemy, to raise the movement higher, to generate 
momentum for the masses and to lower the momentum of the enemy. We 
also carried out these measures as a result of the special characteristics of 
the situation during this wave, for which a few features stand out:
According to Hồ Viết Thắng, one important feature of the campaign’s nal wave 
was its coverage of “recently liberated areas” that had not yet passed through rent 
reduction and where the enemy was “stubborner” than in the old liberated areas. 
Another characteristic was that the masses were in an “extremely wretched state 
aer having been occupied by the enemy for too long.” This allegedly meant that 
their “hatred was high.”
Thắng might also have pointed out that wave 5 of the land reform covered the 
densely populated regions of the Red River delta near the port of Haiphong. For 
rural elites or State of Vietnam supporters who heard rumors about the land re-
form and feared being targeted as “cruel despotic landlords,” escape to the South 
during the period of the 300 days was less dicult because of the proximity to 
Haiphong. Thắng’s report hints at the problem of too few targets:
The places that went in circles a lot usually did so because, from the begin-
ning, [cadres] did not promptly and strongly repress those saboteurs who 
were not from the landlord class. As a result, the masses did not dare speak 
bitterness strongly, and we did not nd cruel and despotic landlords. 
Where people were fooled was always in carrying out a right-deviationist 
approach to the enemy—more specically, not strongly repressing the 
saboteurs. This happened mainly because [cadres] did not grasp the new 
demand put forward by the Central Committee: repress the active coun-
terrevolutionaries and break apart reactionary organizations. Another fac-
tor [leading to the above steps] was that during wave four’s summing-up 
session, many brigade leaders criticized cadres for repressing recklessly in 
one direction. As a result, many cadres, whenever they saw saboteurs who 
were not landlords, or when they were still unsure whether a saboteur were 
a landlord, would not dare go aer them.
Before that impasse, the Central Land Reform Committee Standing 
Committee promptly straightened out these mistakes. This helped cadres 
grasp in a more concrete manner the demand for striking the enemy and 
helped them see more clearly the enemy’s movement. As a result, [cadres] 
attacked the enemy more forcefully, repressed saboteurs more promptly, 
and attacked more strongly the cruel despotic landlords and the backbone 
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elements of the counterrevolutionaries carrying out sabotage and con-
straining the masses.
Despite this heavy stress on “rightest deviations,” Hồ Viết Thắng was already be-
ginning to give ground and concede to the possibility of “leist deviations” as a 
problem of the campaign. However, Thắng expressed that problem in a manner 
that was still consistent with the Politburo’s characterization of the countryside 
as full of landlords and spies:
But when cadres struck strongly against the enemy, the enemy oen carried 
out sabotage, leading to the use of torture to make people confess to being 
members of reactionary organizations. There were places where cadres 
understood the punishment of cruel and despotic landlords currently in 
power to mean striking against members of the local puppet administra-
tion. So they tended to follow the list of puppet administration members 
and arrest accordingly.
The report at the 8th Meeting of the Central Land Reform Committee contin-
ued to discuss unsatisfactory results of the land reform in this manner, tending 
to blame the “leist excesses” committed by cadres as responses to “sophisticated 
and organized enemy sabotage.” Yet, here and there, cautiously and inconsis-
tently, Thắng also conceded that some aspects of the party’s conception of the 
rural situation in general and of the party organizations in particular may not 
have been entirely accurate. But a full-scale dislodgement of the ocial view 
seeing “rightist deviations” as the primary danger had not yet occurred. In his 
report, Thắng still included radicalizing elements similar to those used by the 
party leaders throughout much of the campaign, especially during the last year. 
An example is his account of the land reform reinspection:
REINSPECTION WORK
Landlords
During the land reform, the landlord class, generally speaking, was 
hit hard. But during the land reform, [cadres] did not yet discover all of 
the cruel and despotic landlords. During the current wave of land reform 
re-inspection, [cadres] still uncovered 23 cruel and despotic landlords com-
prising 13.29% of the number of cruel and despotic landlords found during 
the land reform [phase]. Even more serious is that there were landlords who 
had slipped down and were marked as poor peasants.
In addition to those, we found 30 landlords who slipped through the 
net, of which 10 were cruel and despotic ones, with 4 having been labeled 
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as middle peasants, one as a poor peasant, and ve as rich peasants. As such, 
we calculated that the total number of landlords [for these subdistricts] 
makes up 4.4% of the total population, with cruel and despotic landlords 
comprising 23% of the total number of landlords.
With respect to reactionary organizations, during the land reform, [cad-
res] had not discovered many. Now, of the 43 subdistricts assigned to the 
Phú Thọ land reform brigade for re-inspection, 39 were found to have re-
actionary organizations. Of the cruel and despotic landlords who slipped 
through the net and of those landlords who resist the law, the majority are 
in reactionary organizations. They carry out serious acts of sabotage. Aer 
the land reform and during the re-inspection, they killed 53 peasants. (18 
of those occurred during the re-inspection of the land reform). There were 
also 74 incidents of arson, 75 incidents of sabotage of production along 
with many other incidents such as the cutting of telephone wire, the de-
struction of the railroad, etc.33 
Throughout most of April 1956, the discourse in The People continued to 
mention landlords having “slipped through the net” and the discovery of cases 
of sabotage—the elements that were typically used by the party leaders to incite 
cadres to more determined attacks on the regime’s enemies. At some point in the 
middle of the month, though, the party leaders seem to have decided that the 
time had come to distance themselves from the campaign’s violence and injus-
tices. On April 21, Politburo member Nguyễn Duy Trinh released what appears 
to be the party’s rst internal directive acknowledging that “leist” mistakes 
were more numerous than “rightist” ones. His directive spoke for the rst time 
openly of “many places listening to enemy confessions and using torture to dis-
cover those party members who had participated in reactionary organizations.” 
Now positioning the party leaders as the dedicated advocates of legal due pro-
cess, “socialist legality” as Khrushchev referred to it at the CPSU 20th Congress, 
Trinh criticized mass mobilization cadres for “not investigating, researching, 
and checking documents [used as evidence] carefully.”
Indeed, this was the beginning of the process by which the brunt of the blame 
for the land reform’s violence would be placed on the land reform apparatus 
rather than on the top party leaders who conceived of and manipulated the cam-
paign from start to nish.
As for the reason why these mistakes occurred, one factor was the lack of 
clarity in the political standpoint and thinking of land reform cadres. is 
lowered their level of political awareness and resulted in substandard work. 
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They did not grasp rmly the method and policy of constructing the party. 
But another part [of the reason for these mistakes] was that land reform 
brigade leaders and interzone leaders lacked closeness in their management 
of the campaign.34
By the end of June, the Politburo had shied the public land reform discourse to 
“leist errors” as the campaign’s primary problem. On June 25, the Central Land 
Reform Committee held its 9th meeting, and, following the lead of the Nguyễn 
Duy Trinh directive of May 21, had begun to adopt the new view.35
A close examination of the campaign’s structure, the type of training that 
land reform cadres received, the content of land reform reports, and the Polit-
buro’s public discourse about the campaign all suggest the opposite of the o-
cial assessment. It was only through the Politburo’s and the land reform brigade 
leaders’ tight management of the campaign that the remarkable level of violence 
and injustice had been possible.
From the perspective of Nguyễn Tất Thành and the Politburo, the timing 
and content of Khrushchev’s secret speech could not have been worse. One day, 
scholars may be allowed to read the notes of DRV Politburo meetings. I be-
lieve that the meetings in March and April of 1956, the two months following 
Khrushchev’s secret speech, will reveal a sense of derailment with respect to how 
Thành, Trường Chinh, and other top party leaders had planned to handle the 
conclusion of the land reform. Their original plan was probably to carry out a 
90 percent whitewash of the campaign similar to what Mao had done in China.
The party leaders would have touted the overall success of the land reform 
and ­ooded the DRV media with narratives of peasant joy and prosperity. Next 
to this overwhelming narrative of success would have been ocial recognition 
that, here and there, land reform cadres had committed some “mistakes” in their 
implementation of the party’s “correct” policy. This would have been accompa-
nied by promises to investigate and address those mistakes as Mao had done in 
China. The party leaders may have planned that, aer this burst of praise for 
the land reform, they would promptly shelve the topic and turn attention to 
agricultural collectivization and the struggle for national unication.
Khrushchev’s secret speech, because it directly condemned brutal Stalinist 
methods that were fundamental to the land reform, because it called for party 
leaders to listen to voices from below, and because it criticized personality cults, 
put Thành and the Politburo in a position of uncertainty. In this weakened 
position, the planned 90-percent whitewash (my theory) was no longer safe—a 
60-percent whitewash would have to suce. But the toxic nature of the land 
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reform campaign meant that even a partial admission of responsibility would 
prove destabilizing. The fallout would begin a slow chain reaction that would 
result in a change in party leadership. Thành’s determination to protect the Hồ 
cult from the contagion of the land reform would require the scapegoating of his 
loyal lieutenant, Trường Chinh. By October 1956, the DRV’s leading foursome 
of Thành, Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and Võ Nguyên Giáp would begin to come 
apart, opening up room for the rise of two other Politburo members, Lê Duẩn 
and Lê Đức Thọ.
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Fallout, 1956
The year 1956 was a dicult one for the DRV. During the rst half of the year, 
the majority of North Vietnam’s rural population went through the terrifying 
experience of land reform. Thousands of arrests, imprisonments, trials, and exe-
cutions broke apart families and communities, leaving much of the countryside 
in a state of moral and material devastation. In August, a DRV intellectual in 
Hanoi wrote in his diary, “Aer land reform, the peasants ght with each other 
over water drainage, trying to save their crops from ooding. [Ngô Đình] Diệm 
is mobilizing a new movement for emigration. This time, maybe the entire mass 
base [quần chúng cơ bản] will go.”1 For about a week in early November, sev-
eral hundred angry Catholic Vietnamese in the province of Nghệ An (Quỳnh 
Lưu district) carried out protests against the DRV regime, claiming that their 
religion had been “violated.” The Politburo sent an entire infantry division to 
disperse the protesters and restore order—the number of people arrested or 
killed in this operation remains unknown.2
Indeed, the Politburo spent much of 1956 carrying out damage control related 
to the CPSU 20th Congress, fallout from the land reform, and intellectual calls 
for reform. Khrushchev’s calls for “socialist legality,” “party democracy,” and 
“struggle against the cult of personality” threw Thành and his lieutenants o 
balance but thrilled many of North Vietnam’s intellectuals. They took advan-
tage of the situation to demand reforms and push back the boundaries of the 
party-state. Uncertain how seriously to take Moscow’s recent calls for reform, 
Thành and the Politburo shied back and forth between repression and tolera-
tion in their handling of these internal challenges.3
The signals from Beijing in 1956 were also confusing. In September, Mao 
launched his 100 Flowers Campaign, encouraging PRC intellectuals to air 
their grievances. DRV reformers in Hanoi treated this as a green light to begin 
publishing a handful of independent journals, the most famous of which were 
the newspaper Nhân văn (Humanity) and the literary journal Giai phẩm 
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(Masterworks). Sensing the party leadership’s desire to stay in step with Khrush-
chev and Mao, these DRV intellectuals guessed correctly that their independent 
periodicals would be safe from party repression as long as the democratic winds 
from Beijing and Moscow continued to blow. The result was three tense months 
of something close to civil society in Hanoi. Dozens of DRV intellectuals par-
ticipated in what the regime would pejoratively call the “Nhân văn-Giai phẩm 
Aair” (named aer the movement’s two most important publications).
The Politburo’s Initial Response to the CPSU 20th Congress
The North Vietnamese press’s rst mention of Khrushchev’s term, “cult of per-
sonality” (sùng bái cá nhân), came in the February 27, 1956 issue of The People, 
three days aer the secret speech. The term appeared in a Vietnamese translation 
of the ocial resolution of the CPSU 20th Congress. But the resolution men-
tioned nothing of Stalin, merely instructing party members to apply Leninism 
in the “struggle against the cult of personality.” Buried in the middle of an entire 
newspaper page devoted to the resolution, the reference was not likely to attract 
attention from Vietnamese readers. The following day, The People published a 
front-page editorial titled “The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union Succeeded Spectacularly.” According to the editorial:
Every day the prestige of the CPSU grows and its relationship with the 
masses tightens. Under the collective leadership of the [Soviet Union’s] 
Central Executive Committee, the Party has xed mistakes and corrected 
deviations in its activities and work. The Party has struggled with great 
determination against the cult of personality and the overemphasis on the 
role of the individual in history.4
A person with no knowledge of Khrushchev’s secret speech was still not likely to 
notice this brief mention of the cult of personality. For years, Thành and other 
party leaders had been complaining about selshness and individualism among 
members of the DRV regime. Therefore, those party members who did read this 
message from Moscow probably would have interpreted the reference to a “cult 
of personality” as meaning roughly “individualism,” not the type of personality 
cult that Khrushchev had described in his February 24 secret speech.
Not accidentally, The People made no eort in this initial announcement 
to ensure that readers understood the dierence between Khrushchev’s “cult 
of personality” and the VWP’s “individualism.” The former was a sin of Sta-
lin’s—the latter was a sin of party underlings. Of the secret speech’s roughly 
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300 paragraphs, only four linked the cult of personality to anyone other than 
Stalin. (Those four paragraphs mentioned the practice of high-ranking CPSU 
leaders naming towns, factories, and collective farms aer themselves.) For the 
next month, Thành and the DRV leaders continued to avoid any substantive 
discussion of Stalin’s legacy or to provide any clues about what had happened at 
the 20th Congress. According to the DRV intellectual Vũ Thư Hiên, Thành 
and the Politburo decided that only they and a few other top-echelon members 
of the Secretariat would be allowed to read the secret speech.5
The diary of the prominent DRV intellectual Nguyễn Huy Tưởng (1912–
1960) shows why Thành had been reluctant to mention the criticism of Stalin 
much less distribute widely the actual secret speech. Tưởng’s rst mention of 
Khrushchev’s reappraisal of Stalin appears in the diary’s March 27 entry. On 
that day, Tưởng wrote: “I read the report from the 20th Congress of the CPSU. 
I am concerned—I don’t understand why Stalin could not be mentioned.”6 This 
diary entry suggests that the revolutionary writer and his intellectual friends 
in the eld of literature had not understood the context of the initial mention 
of the term “cult of personality” in the February 28 issue of The People. As a 
high-ranking party member with a chair on the editorial board of the DRV’s 
preeminent cultural newspaper, Literature and Arts, Tưởng would have been 
a daily reader of The People. He was also a member of the Soviet-Vietnamese 
Friendship Association, a position seemingly well placed to hear the latest news 
from Moscow. Indeed, he had spent a month touring the Soviet Union the pre-
vious November. Had other intellectuals in the DRV got wind of Khrushchev’s 
denunciation of Stalin, Tưởng surely would have heard about it through the 
rumor mill soon thereaer.
On March 31, The People printed a Politburo announcement about the CPSU 
20th Congress. Once again, there was mention of “collective leadership” and 
“struggling against the cult of personality,” but no Stalin. The following day, 
April 1, 1956, thirty-ve days aer Khrushchev had delivered his secret speech 
and ten days aer its content had been discussed in the South Vietnamese press, 
the party leaders ended their policy of concealment. The People published its rst 
article mentioning Stalin’s name in association with the cult of personality. This 
appears to have been done to coincide with the arrival of the CPSU Presidium 
member, Anastas Mikoyan, who was a strong supporter of Khrushchev’s move to 
denounce Stalin’s crimes. The article was a translation of a recent Pravda article, 
“Why the Cult of Personality Is Contrary to Marxism-Leninism.”7
By delaying until the day of Mikoyan’s arrival, the DRV leaders were able 
to benet from some of the damage control and backtracking that had already 
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begun in Moscow. By mid-March, the destabilizing eect of his secret speech 
had become apparent, and Khrushchev had begun to “walk back” his narrative. 
In the secret speech, he had described the cult of personality as a phenomenon 
created mainly by Stalin. In the subsequent Pravda article published in The Peo-
ple, the Soviet leaders had loosened the meaning of the term to shi blame away 
from Stalin and onto the masses. Thus, a personality cult now involved “eulo-
gizing people more than they deserve, assigning to them special qualities and a 
superhuman substance, as though turning them into people who specialize in 
the creation of legends and then bending one’s head down in reverence.”8 Stalin’s 
agency in the development of the cult was subtly reduced: “The cult of person-
ality spread and restricted the eectiveness of the Party and people, reduced the 
eectiveness of the Party’s collective leadership, and oen brought about serious 
weaknesses in work.”
The Pravda article praised Stalin’s contributions to the workers’ movement, 
claiming that he was one of the best Marxist-Leninist theoreticians and that 
he had risen to power because of his important position as party general sec-
retary. There was no mention of Lenin’s opposition to Stalin’s assumption of 
power (Khrushchev had pointed this out in the beginning of his secret speech) 
or of Stalin’s use of police terror in his consolidation of power. Indeed, the secret 
speech had suggested that people praised Stalin because their lives depended 
on it. Now:
The cult of personality grew and developed on the basis of the great his-
torical achievements of Marxism-Leninism, the great successes of our 
Soviet people and Communist Party in the tasks of building socialism, 
the victory in the great patriotic war, the unceasing consolidation of our 
society and state regime, and the raising of our international prestige. 
Those great achievements . . . were not explained correctly according to a 
Marxist-Leninist perspective but rather were incorrectly attributed to one 
person, Stalin himself, and considered to be the special achievements made 
on the basis of his leadership position. Lacking modesty, Stalin did not nd 
a way to stop the adulation that people bestowed on him, but rather looked 
for any way to increase and inspire that adulation.9
Despite the retreat from secret-speech explanations and the move toward de-
pictions of Stalin as a victim of his own greatness, DRV intellectuals still seem 
to have found the article shocking. Apparently referring to this article, Nguyễn 
Huy Tưởng wrote in his diary on the day of the Pravda article’s publication:
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Just read the Pravda article criticizing comrade Stalin’s big weakness: 
the cult of personality. I’m not very happy. This is a big victory. The CPSU 
must be really great to do this. But I still keep feeling puzzled. Is there 
sabotage? What is the benet at this time? What if the enemy distorts 
it? Now I am thinking about the graves of Lenin and Stalin. What about 
Stalin’s statues? What about the books that mention Stalin? I pity Sta-
lin. This great man has already died—what is the point of digging up this 
issue? Why did people not struggle against [the personality cult] when 
comrade Stalin’s reign rst began? However it is, we still need to believe 
in the CPSU. The reality is that the Soviet Union’s policy of peace these 
past few years has achieved great victories. Just read Khrushchev’s report. 
Very good. Really big. So correct. Many new ideas. But there is still a cloud 
hanging over my head.10
As it appears, only aer reading this April 1st Pravda article in The People did 
Tưởng realize that Khrushchev had criticized Stalin. The question that Tưởng 
asks, “Why did people not struggle against [the cult of personality] when com-
rade Stalin’s reign rst began?” was probably the one that caused Thành, Trường 
Chinh, and other party leaders around the world to lose the most sleep. For it 
suggested that the Soviet Union under Stalin had been a dictatorship, pure and 
simple, and had had nothing to do with democracy, “old” or “new.”
On April 8, 1956, The People printed another article about the 20th Congress, 
“The Historical Experience of the Proletarian Dictatorship.” This one was writ-
ten by the editorial sta of the Chinese Communist Party’s main newspaper, 
The People’s Daily, and reected the ideas of Mao and his Politburo. As with the 
March 28 Pravda article, the Chinese one suggested that, to some extent, Stalin 
had been a victim of his greatness. The cult of personality had initially developed 
around him without his active participation.11
In support of this view, the Chinese article claimed that Stalin had made 
his mistakes in the nal part of his life (i.e., aer all the accomplishments and 
not as a means of consolidating his power). This departed from Khrushchev’s 
secret speech, which had focused on Stalin’s behavior from 1934 until 1938, the 
early-middle part of his reign. The Chinese article was the rst in the DRV 
press to mention specic mistakes Stalin had made: his lack of preparedness in 
WWII, his lack of attention to agriculture, his poor handling of Yugoslavia, and 
his overestimation of the problem of purging traitors. In these areas, Stalin had 
been guilty of “subjective” thinking.
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The CCP article contributed to the discourse by advancing a theoretical ex-
planation for personality cults. The desire to exonerate Marxism-Leninism, the 
Soviet system, and Stalin from the cult of personality is apparent:
The cult of personality is a rotten remnant le behind by mankind’s long 
history. The cult of personality not only has a basis in the exploitative class, 
but also in the small producers. . . . The cult of personality is also mainly a 
force of habit of millions of people. With such a force remaining in society, 
it can inuence people who work for the State, and even inuence leaders 
like Stalin.
On the day when this Chinese article was published, Nguyễn Huy Tưởng wrote 
in his diary:
April 8th, 1956. Still lots of focus on the speech “Against the cult of per-
sonality.” Cadres are concerned [thắc mắc]. Stalin’s books, his statues, his 
pictures, his songs? There are those who still kept their funeral sashes from 
Stalin’s death; now they bring them out, look at them, and cry. Mr. Trường 
Chinh at the 20th Party Congress, on learning of this, was also concerned 
and could not sleep the entire night.12
On April 15, 1956, The People printed a 20th Congress article written by the 
French Communist Party leader, Maurice Thorez. It was titled, “Some Basic 
Problems Advanced at the CPSU’s 20th Congress.” Similar to Mao, Thorez 
claimed, in stark contrast to Khrushchev’s original secret speech, that “Sta-
lin’s mistakes had occurred during the last period of his activity when he did 
not respect a few rules concerning Party activities and leadership, rules that he 
himself had taught to communists of the world, especially in his book, Issues 
of Leninism.”13 In Khrushchev’s secret speech, Stalin’s theoretical works did 
not correspond to the way he ruled. Whatever Stalin had accomplished as a 
leader appeared to have resulted mostly from other principles and tactics not 
mentioned in his books.
Ocial Party Explanations of CPSU 20th Congress
The DRV’s party leaders nally oered their own analysis of the personality 
cult and Stalin’s legacy at the 9th Meeting of the Party Central Executive Com-
mittee held April 19–24, 1956. It was now nearly two months since the CPSU 
20th Congress. This party meeting produced three documents that addressed 
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Stalin and the question of whether the “struggle against the personality cult” 
applied to the DRV. The rst was a Politburo report written by Trường Chinh 
and titled, “On the Task of Grasping Thoroughly the Principle of Collective 
Leadership and Raising the Party’s Role.” The second was the ocial “Resolu-
tion 9” produced at the end of the meeting, and the third was Thành’s closing 
statement. The party leaders also provided ocial explanations in their theoretic 
journal, Study.
On the question of Stalin’s legacy, the Central Committee resolution stated:
The 20th Congress criticized in a serious way a few views and styles that are 
contrary to Marxism-Leninism. It highlighted the importance of collective 
leadership, the ght against the personality cult, specically against the 
personality cult of Stalin. . . . Stalin is one of the most outstanding Marxists 
and he made an enormous contribution to the CPSU and the Soviet people 
as he did to socialist and people’s liberation movements around the world. 
But in the last period of his life, Stalin committed some serious mistakes 
and didn’t realize it.14
What was a cult of personality and how could one have existed in a progres-
sive, democratic, and modern state such as the Soviet Union? According to the 
scholar E. A. Rees, “[a] leader cult is an established system of veneration of a 
political leader, to which all members of the society are expected to subscribe, 
a system that is omnipresent and ubiquitous and one that is expected to persist 
indenitely.”15 According to Trường Chinh:
The cult of personality is an ugly remnant of ages past. It has its basis in the 
exploiting classes and in the small producers. Aer the exploiting class was 
destroyed and the small producers were replaced by collective production, 
under the proletarian dictatorship, socialism was built. A number of rem-
nants of the ugly thinking of the old society remained for quite a long time 
in the heads of the people. Many of those thoughts became the custom of 
millions of people, turning into a fearsome force. The cult of personality is 
one of those ugly old remnants. When it became the custom of a majority 
of society, it created an atmosphere of veneration capable of inuencing 
the leaders of the Party and State, making them enjoy receiving that ven-
eration. This gradually led to arrogance, separation from reality, distance 
from the masses and from the collective, and a failure to humbly study the 
masses. It also led to a lack of respect for the Party’s principles of collective 
leadership turning into dogmatic individualism.16
266 chapter 13
In his denition, Rees stresses that the leader cult is a “deliberately constructed 
and managed mechanism, which aims at the integration of the political system 
around the leader’s persona.” Chinh’s anxiety about the role of communist par-
ties in creating leader cults appears in his sentence construction. None of his 
sentences about personality cults has “party” as the active subject:
When the proletarian dictatorship was rst established in history in an 
agricultural country, with the working class lacking leadership experience, 
the cult of personality was able to slip in and cause damage. It arose and 
developed on the basis of the great historic successes achieved by the Party 
and State of the Soviet Union. It’s not unlike a dark shadow stuck to the 
great successes of the people in the process of building socialism.17
A Cult of Personality in the DRV?
Trường Chinh began his section on the cult of personality with two questions: 
“Today in our Party, in our attitude toward our leader, do we see a personal-
ity cult? And if we do, how has the phenomenon aected the leadership of 
our Party?” The report immediately conceptualized the cult of personality as 
a bottom-up phenomenon restricted in importance to the functioning of the 
party. This meant that the question of Thành’s responsibility for the Hồ cult 
was not on the agenda. Neither were larger philosophical questions such as 
whether a state-managed personality cult (not acknowledged in Chinh’s charac-
terization of the cult as a spontaneous phenomenon) was a healthy development 
for regular Vietnamese people or whether democracy and socialism were possible 
under a regime that maintained such a cult. Ultimately, Chinh steered clear of 
any language that acknowledged the party leadership’s deliberate creation, pro-
motion, and protection of the Hồ cult and limited his discussion mostly to the 
question of how much Central Executive Committee members idolized Thành:
Chairman Hồ is our Party’s leader. Chairman Hồ has made a great contri-
bution to the establishment and education of our Party. He has sacriced 
his entire life for the revolution, and his spirit of struggle is absolute. . . . 
Chairman Hồ is the sagacious leader of our Party, our people, and our race 
[dân tộc]. Therefore, our Party’s promotion of Chairman Hồ’s role and our 
reverence for him as a person is correct.18
The report then stressed Thành’s respect for the ideas of others and his gen-
eral implementation of “collective leadership.” Moreover, “Chairman Hồ is 
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public-spirited and seless, willing to forget himself for the good of the collective 
and to share in joys and sorrows.” Essentially, the Politburo report stayed care-
fully within the connes of the Hồ Chí Minh cult. “He is simple and modest. 
Many times the Central Committee has asked to award Chairman Hồ medals, 
and every time Chairman Hồ refuses. We can tell many such stories.”19
However, according to Chinh’s Politburo report, to some extent, a personality 
cult around Chairman Hồ did exist. “Because, generally speaking, our leader’s 
role has been raised to a greater extent than that of the Party, today, in the Party 
as well as among the people, a certain reliance on our leader has come about, 
and more or less, our leader has been deied.” As for the impact of the Hồ cult:
These deviations have aected our ability to mobilize enough collective 
leadership in the Party. They have impacted the sense of responsibility held 
by Central Committee members and have aected our self-condence. 
They have aected the sense of responsibility and the zealous creative spirit 
of all Party levels, of all mass organization members, and, speaking even 
more generally, of all the people.20
Why had this cult of personality come into existence? Chinh stressed the 
large professional gap between Thành and other party members. “Chairman Hồ 
is an old revolutionary with lots of experience, prestige, and accomplishments. 
Because of that, we have come to rely on him and to serve his person. Sometimes 
we are even hesitant and timid.”21 And nally, the report blamed the existence of 
the Hồ cult on Vietnam’s feudal past. “The inuence of feudal thinking, of the 
small producers, of the patriarchal system remains in our heads.”
As for Thành, in his concluding statements for the party meeting (printed 
next to Resolution 9 on the front page of The People), he mentioned the per-
sonality cult: “We need to consider all aspects when we judge comrade Stalin. 
Comrade Stalin made an enormous contribution to the revolution, but he 
also committed serious mistakes.” With respect to the situation in the DRV, 
Thành wrote:
We need to recognize that the cult of personality does exist to some extent 
inside and outside the Party. Though it has not created any serious damage, 
it has still limited creativity and the proactive spirit of party members and 
the people.
From the central committee down to the grassroots level, that phenom-
enon exists.
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In order to address the cult of personality, what is mostly needed is edu-
cation. At the same time, we also need to elevate the role of the Party, the 
collective, and the people.22
Thành’s closing remarks to the Central Executive meeting were published in 
The People and in the party’s recently established theoretical journal, Study. In 
both cases, though, these remarks contained no byline—obviously this was done 
purposely on Thành’s order. It is only through the Party Documents series and 
Hồ Chí Minh’s Collected Works that we learn of his authorship.
Thành’s Hagiographic Hồ Chí Minh Biography
At some point in early-1956, the party leaders had decided to release a new edi-
tion of Thành’s (self-written) biography of Hồ Chí Minh, Glimpses of the Life 
of Chairman Hồ. This new edition was completed in August 1956—about ve 
months aer the CPSU 20th Congress. Had he agreed with Khrushchev’s warn-
ings about the negative consequences of personality cults, Thành might have 
delayed the rerelease of this hagiographic biography or possibly have removed its 
most egregious cult-building elements. Comparing the 1955 and 1956 versions of 
the book, though, we see no attempt to tone down the self-praise. Once again, in 
the new edition’s early framing plot, the ctitious biographer of Hồ Chí Minh 
describes the diculties he faced in trying to enlist the DRV leader’s help:
The rst time I met Him, I had the sense that He was like a teacher in the 
countryside.
I walked into his room and said hello. The Chairman stood up, shook 
hands with me, and invited me to sit before his desk. Before anything, He 
asked aer my parents and only aer that asked, “How may I help you?” 
I explained clearly my goal. The Chairman listened carefully. Aer I had 
nished speaking, He chuckled and said:
“A biography. That’s an interesting idea. But right now, there is more 
important work that needs to be done. Many of our countrymen are hun-
gry and suering. Aer 80 years of slavery, our country has been devas-
tated—now we have to rebuild it. We should work on these pressing tasks 
rst. With respect to a biography of me . . . we can turn our attention to 
that in due time.”
It was as though I had come up against a brick wall. But I was not 
disappointed.
Aerward, I came up with another plan: The direct approach, in other 
words, speak directly with Chairman Hồ in order to get material, did not 
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work. Aer thinking carefully, I realized that that method could not but 
fail. A person like our Chairman Hồ, with his modest, seless character, 
and during a time when He was busy with so much work, how could I 
possibly get Him to talk about his life with me?23 
The many cult-building elements of Thành’s Glimpses of Chairman Hồ re-
mained. One simple adjustment would have been to de-capitalize the pronoun 
“He” (Người) in the biography and to stop this practice generally in the DRV. 
Thành obviously did not desire such a change. Especially on the biography’s nal 
pages, he laid it on thick:
When He reads the letters sent to Him by children, the revolutionary’s 
determined eyes light up with happiness. Those letters are written very 
innocently and honestly. For example:
“Dear Uncle Hồ, we know how to read and write, and we wash our faces 
more carefully than before. We play happily. Uncle Hồ, Uncle—come visit 
us! We kiss you a thousand times, etc. etc.”
The Chairman never thinks of himself. He only thinks of others and 
of the people.
The people love Chairman Hồ because of His plain-spoken personal-
ity and His pure heart. He is completely honest. He explains complicated 
problems in a simple manner so that everybody clearly understands.
Everybody loves Chairman Hồ, especially young people.
On the battleeld, when soldiers surge forward, they shout out loud: For 
the Fatherland and for Uncle Hồ, onward!
Because of Uncle Hồ, workers in factories and farmers in elds raise 
their productivity.
With children, the name Uncle Hồ is like a good luck charm. One only 
need mention Uncle’s name and children immediately behave themselves.
About Chairman Hồ there are many other stories—they could be writ-
ten in small books, turned into songs and poems.
A few stories told here are enough to show the Vietnamese people’s rev-
erence for Uncle Hồ.
A small photograph of Him in Hanoi was bought by a compatriot for 
1,300,000 Vietnamese đồng.24
Thành’s determination to preserve the Hồ cult seems to have been unshaken by 
the CPSU 20th Congress. Indeed, the chaos that resulted from Khrushchev’s 
dismantling of the Stalin cult may have made Thành and the Politburo more 
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determined than ever to protect their own leader cult. On that front, there was 
still work to do.
Protecting “Uncle Ho” and the DRV 
Regime from the Land Reform
A second, and arguably more signicant, threat to the Hồ cult was the land 
reform’s violence and injustice. In his handling of this challenge, Thành and 
the Politburo appear to have followed the damage-control blueprint developed 
by Communist leaders for Stalin’s crimes. Nguyễn Huy Tưởng’s diary provides 
a sense for the land reform stories swirling around Hanoi during the summer of 
1956, shortly aer the campaign’s conclusion:
July 7, 1956:
Wave ve of the land reform should have made the people enthusiastic 
but instead has brought about enormous grief. So many people unjustly 
punished. It’s extremely painful to consider those comrades who had con-
tributed to the resistance war, who had risked their lives, who had lived in 
the trenches, and who were then brought out and shot. There were people 
who, following the Central Committee’s directive, signed papers for peo-
ple to migrate to the South and then found themselves brought out and 
abused—there is no word of an apology, no justice. There were people with 
a badge from Điện Biên Phủ. Then comes the land reform—the head of the 
land reform team rips o the soldier’s medals, puts him in prison, and beats 
him. There were people who had been given a shirt from Uncle [Hồ]—the 
land reform cadres ripped it o and accused the person of pretending, of 
being a spy. . . .
August 5, 1956:
We must admit one thing: we have many times been cruel to the people, 
with comrades trampling all over those timeless aspects of human life that 
cause people the most pain: love of one’s parents, love of one’s siblings, love 
between husband and wife. A father dies in [the province of] Hà Đông—a 
family member requests a death certicate and has to wait three days. Of 
course they are resentful!
August 26, 1956:
A story about an older woman. She had great prestige in her village, tak-
ing care of everybody. During the mass mobilization for rent reduction, she 
challenged anyone to disrespect her. But when the land reform came, she 
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was picked as a target for struggle. A youth in the village took her rice and 
hit her. She died. Doesn’t get any more inhumane than that.
September 5, 1956:
A person under investigation [during land reform] has hand burned. 
Brutal torture. Force brother to denounce brother, wife to denounce hus-
band, child to denounce father, friend to denounce friend. Hike up the 
estimated crop yields. The lack of humanity is horric, creating a danger-
ous hatred.
The father of Phạm Ngọc Khuế was imprisoned and died. His 
75-year-old mother was forced to do reform labor. The children of land-
lords are given bad land and have their yield estimates hiked up. They can’t 
produce enough to pay the tax. They go to gather rewood and are not 
permitted. Go to catch shrimp and crabs—can’t do that, either. There are 
children who die. What is terrible is that there is not sympathy for young 
kids—their parents are brought out for struggle and they are brought out 
to watch. . . .
Land reform cadres who achieve results, quickly promoted to [Land 
Reform] Brigade leader. . . . They fabricate stories in order to arrest peo-
ple. They miss their target. Then arrest. In order to show their zeal, they 
take the dicult subdistrict—in the end, they discover all [spies and cruel 
despotic landlords], arrest many reactionaries, etc. etc. In Thái Bình, aer 
receiving the Central Committee’s order to x their mistakes, the Land 
Reform Brigade leaders change the order. Those people wrongly accused, 
wrongly punished, deserve an apology and the restoration of their posi-
tions. Yet the Brigade makes these people apologize to the peasants and 
thank the Party for its mercy, etc. etc.
Incorrect investigation: One woman was accused of being a spy for 
France when she was twelve years old.
September 10, 1956:
The peasants are afraid of the land reform because the estimated yields 
and acreage of elds are hiked up. (In the province of Bắc Ninh, it was 
raised 9,000 meters.) There are people who refuse land, even landlords.
The atmosphere of suspicion, of horror, of desolation. The land reform 
teams don’t dare enter subdistricts. Those with children or siblings killed 
demand the return of the land reform team to carry out revenge. There 
was a team that tied the father of one person to a tree and shot him. 




During the land reform. A young couple love each other out in the eld. 
The land reform team sees it and calls it a scheme of sabotage. In the end, 
the team fabricates a case against them as spies. The couple admit that they 
are reactionaries, but they do not dare to admit that they love each other. 
The land reform team kills them.25 
To protect the Hồ cult from the contagion of the land reform, Thành rst 
and foremost had to distance “Uncle Hồ” from the campaign. He had to pre-
tend that he and the Politburo, instead of having bullied the mass mobilization 
apparatus into meeting wildly exaggerated landlord quotas (5.68 percent of the 
population), had been unaware of what was happening. A problem with this 
narrative was the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of letters and appeals appar-
ently sent to Thành by people during the three-year campaign. A June 29, 1956 
directive suggests a couple of strategies that Thành adopted to distance Hồ Chí 
Minh from the campaign:
From before up until now, and especially aer the establishment of peace, 
there were many personal and unit appeals sent to Chairman Hồ asking 
him to consider things that were of concern to these people. The number 
of petitions became greater and greater with every passing day, with one 
month seeing over 80 letters. Among these, the majority were appeals for 
[Chairman Hồ] to reconsider cases of injustice during the land reform or 
during the [Party] reorganization. There were letters from Party mem-
bers, and there were also many petitions sent by fellow countrymen from 
all classes.
There were a few petitions of a provocative character sent by saboteurs. 
However, most petitions were inspired by local oces of mass organiza-
tions, the government, and the party having handled aairs in a way that 
was not yet truly appropriate. And there were also incidences of [these 
oces] handling things incorrectly or, having handled the thing correctly, 
not explaining the move carefully, resulting in the current concerns.26
First, the directive strongly insinuated that the “injustices of the land reform and 
of the party reorganization” stemmed from mistakes committed by local-level 
oces rather than from Hồ Chí Minh’s policies. Second, the directive at-
tempted to generate a convincing narrative of those letters and petitions not 
having reached Chairman Hồ:
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In order to resolve those appeals, according to a directive of the Central 
Committee, a branch has been established in the Oce of the National 
Chairman, which has the following responsibilities:
Promptly investigate these appeals, put forward the ideas in them to 
Chairman Hồ for consideration and discuss a method of resolution with 
the responsible oces and localities in accordance with each incident.
Keep track of the way each oce and locality resolves the problem. 
Because it wants the newly established National Chairman Oce to carry 
out its responsibilities, the Central Committee has sent this message to 
Party executives at all levels, asking them to pay attention to the follow-
ing things:
1. When you receive a petition sent to Chairman Hồ, it needs to be transferred 
quickly to him along with the thoughts of the respective oce or locality.
2. You should work closely with the National Chairman Oce in order to 
investigate and resolve the appeals such as by doing the following: recruit a 
cadre to go and investigate the area where the incident happened; push the 
responsible oces that fall within your jurisdiction in their eorts to solve 
the problem; report the results of these cases to the Presidential Oce; 
and provide help to cadres of the Presidential Oce sent to your locality to 
work [on these problems], etc.
3. Pay attention to promptly resolving petitions sent to your level so that peo-
ple do not have to appeal to Chairman Hồ.
This is important political work; if implemented well, it will make the dif-
ferent classes of the people believe more in the Party, in the Government, 
and in Chairman Hồ, contributing to the implementation of the Party and 
Government’s policies.27
Having established that Chairman Hồ was unaware of what had been happen-
ing during the land reform campaign, the path was clear for his overall assess-
ment of the campaign and its “errors.”
About six weeks later, on August 18, Thành published his ocial “Hồ Chí 
Minh” assessment of the campaign on the front page of The People. As with the 
aforementioned July 1 statement to land reform cadres, he began by stressing 
the positives of the campaign, characterizing it as a “great victory.” Again, the 
reason for such a victory was the “Party and Government’s correct policy, the 
powerful strength of working peasants unied in struggle, the zealous support 
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of the army and the people, and the spirit of sacrice and eort of the cadres.” 
Aer congratulating DRV peasants on their “victory,” Thành moved to the issue 
of “mistakes”:
The land reform is a class struggle against feudalism, a revolution that 
moves the heavens and shakes the earth. It is erce and intense. Moreover, 
because the enemy carried out mad acts of sabotage; because a number of 
our cadres had not yet grasped fully the policies and did not follow the 
correct mass line; because the Central Committee and Government’s lead-
ership of the campaign lacked concreteness in some aspects; and because 
there was a lack of inspection and supervision, weaknesses and mistakes 
occurred during the land reform. [For example, mistakes occurred] in the 
implementation of rural unity, in the attack on the enemy, in the Party 
reorganization, in the implementation of the agricultural tax, etc.
The Central Committee and the Government have carried out a solemn 
assessment of these mistakes and weaknesses and have come up with a plan 
to resolutely x them. The plan aims at unifying cadres, unifying the people, 
stabilizing the countryside, and pushing forward production.28
Three days later, Thành was apparently still concerned about building the 
case for Hồ Chí Minh’s and the party leadership’s unawareness of the land re-
form’s violence and injustices. On August 21, 1956, he published an article, “The 
Ideas of the Masses Must Be Respected.”
The responsibility of government and mass organization cadres is to take 
seriously the criticisms and requests of the masses. Cadres (or oces and mass 
organizations) that receive criticism must sincerely and openly carry out 
self-criticism and try to x their mistakes. If the criticism is not truly cor-
rect in some aspect, it must be explained clearly so the masses understand. 
But whether the criticism is entirely correct or only partly correct, we must 
always welcome the criticism of the masses. We must absolutely not stie 
criticism. We must remember that cadres of mass organizations as well as 
of the government, from top to bottom, are all the servants of the people, 
and we must respect the ideas of the people. Many cadres have tried to act 
in that correct way.
But there are still many cadres who do not act in that correct way. Here 
are a few examples:
Newspapers frequently publish the people’s criticisms. But many times, 
this was like “water o a duck’s back,” with the cadres, oces, and mass 
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organizations that received criticism just continuing to sit silently, not car-
rying out self-criticism, not publishing in the newspaper their self-criticism 
and promising to x their mistakes.29 
In his article, Thành returned to the issue of letters and petitions in another 
apparent attempt to suggest how these might not have reached him and the 
other party leaders—that is, how it would have been possible for him and the 
Politburo not to know about the campaign’s “errors:”
There are even local cadres who, at their own convenience, opened up the 
letters that higher-ups have sent to the people, hesitating and handing that 
letter over to the people in a slow manner, or not handing it over at all but 
rather writing a response to higher-ups themselves (as was the case with 
the Administrative Committee of Đồng Minh subdistrict in Nam Ninh 
district). There are cadres who threatened the people because they sent 
letters to higher-ups (such as the vice-Chairman of Xuân Yên commune 
in Hà Tĩnh province).
To do this is to violate discipline: rstly, through opening the private 
letter of another person; and secondly, through covering up the ears and 
eyes of higher-ups, and muzzling the mouth of the masses. That mistake 
must stop.
One more thing that needs to be said: the right to criticize and the right 
to petition are the democratic rights of all citizens. When a person sends a 
letter, he must think carefully and express his ideas with sincerity. The per-
son should write his entire name and address clearly so that the oce that 
receives the letter can look into it. A letter that has no name and address 
has no value at all.30
All these instructions about “sincerity” and the importance of putting one’s 
“entire name” on letters were written by Thành under one of his many pen 
names, “C.B.”
Protecting Uncle Hồ from Conditions of  
Quasi-Free Speech: The Nhân văn-Giai phẩm 
Movement (September to December 1956)
The sincerity of Thành’s claim to welcome open criticism from the masses was 
soon tested in Hanoi by dozens of disgruntled DRV intellectuals who partici-
pated in the Nhân văn-Giai phẩm movement. These writers, scholars, painters, 
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and musicians had long been frustrated by the party’s tight and corrupt manage-
ment of cultural life. As the scholar Hue-Tam Ho Tai points out, the possibility 
of “personal self-realization and the emancipation of the individual from the 
tyranny of the group and from ideological conformity” had been an important 
draw of revolutionary politics during the late-colonial period.31 The extraordi-
nary conditions of war, the cause of national independence, and the military 
brilliance of the DRV leaders had led most of the regime’s intellectuals, young 
and old, to accept party control over their artistic production and personal lives.
With the end of the war, though, the Nhân văn-Giai phẩm intellectuals felt 
that their sacrices over the past decade had earned them a reprieve from this 
stiing treatment. They wanted Thành and Politburo to accept them as loyal, 
but independent, watchdogs who would help the DRV improve. The dominant 
theme of their publications was “democratic freedoms.” These intellectuals were 
also genuinely frustrated with the poor quality of DRV intellectual production. 
It was obvious that party control had produced works of propaganda, not works 
of literature. Under party guidance, late-colonial cultural luminaries such as 
Xuân Diệu, Nguyên Hồng, and Nguyễn Tuân had been unable to produce any-
thing that matched the greatness of their pre-revolutionary works—this was 
despite having witnessed one of the most remarkable episodes in Vietnamese 
history. Many intellectuals were also upset by the violence and injustices of the 
recently concluded land reform. Indeed, one of the movement’s main contrib-
utors, the legal scholar Nguyễn Mạnh Tường, would question the nature of a 
policy that adopted as a motto, “It is better to kill ten innocent people than to 
let one enemy escape.”32
In his description of Stalin’s methods, Khrushchev indirectly criticized many 
of the same brutal methods employed in the mass mobilization campaign, em-
boldening Nhân văn-Giai phẩm participants to demand change. One of the 
movement’s most charismatic leaders, Nguyễn Hữu Đang, called for the DRV 
state to move away from a party dictatorship and establish a law-governed society:
During the Land Reform, the arrest, imprisonment, and investigation 
(using brutal torture) of people followed by sentences of imprisonment, 
execution, and property conscation were done in an extremely sloppy 
manner. The same was the case with the policy of putting landlord fami-
lies (or, in many cases, peasant families that had been incorrectly labeled) 
under siege to the point of making their innocent children starve to death. 
These were not entirely the result of poor leadership—they were also the 
result of not having a proper legal regime.33
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In the following issue of Humanity, Đang published a front-page article titled, 
“How Do the Vietnamese Constitution of 1946 and the Chinese Constitution 
Guarantee Democratic Freedoms?” From the DRV Constitution, he quoted Ar-
ticle 10: “Vietnamese citizens have the right to freedom of expression, freedom of 
publication, and freedom of organization and assembly, and freedom of move-
ment inside and outside the country.” Đang pointed out that the failure to give 
citizens these rights promised in the 1946 Constitution could lead to troubles 
for the DRV similar to those recently experienced by the Communist regimes in 
Poland and Hungary.”34 Here Đang was referring to Poland’s Poznan protests in 
June and Hungary’s anticommunist uprising from October 23 to November 11.
Nhân văn-Giai phẩm and the Personality Cult
The issue of how writers “deied” (thần thánh hóa) Hồ Chí Minh was rst 
raised publicly in April of 1955 by the feisty young DRV intellectual (and future 
Nhân văn-Giai phẩm leader) Lê Đạt. In a tough review of a poetry collection 
published by Tố Hữu, one of the regime’s most powerful (and resented) cultural 
ocials, Lê Đạt opined: “In my opinion, this poem suers from the disease of 
leader veneration bordering on feudal deication so common among us.”35 Thus, 
the idea that the DRV had a Hồ Chí Minh personality cult and that the cult had 
a “feudal” character antithetical to Marxism-Leninism had existed among DRV 
intellectuals long before Khrushchev’s secret speech. One can imagine how the 
CPSU 20th Congress’s strong stand against personality cults must have electri-
ed Lê Đạt and other DRV intellectuals who shared his view about the “dei-
cation” of Hồ Chí Minh.
It is surely no coincidence that the editors of Humanity included on the 
front page of their rst issue a passage from Thành’s 1947 book, Fix the Way of 
Working, which he had published under the pseudonym “X.Y.Z.”36 That book 
described the proper behavior of party members.37 Thành had released a sec-
ond book, also under the pseudonym “X.Y.Z.”, which was titled Bitter Medicine 
Cures the Disease: Speak the Truth and Oend Somebody in November of 1950.38
Introducing Thành’s passage on self-criticism, the Humanity editors ex-
plained, possibly with a hint of facetious contempt: “You have read the books 
Change the Way of Working and Bitter Medicine Cures the Disease, etc.; proba-
bly you also know that Mr. X.Y.Z. is a ‘public-spirited and seless’ person who 
always speaks the truth, speaks directly, and speaks it all. We introduce to you 
one of his passages on criticism.” From Thành’s book, Humanity printed a 
twenty-eight-line passage, the opening lines of which stated:
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There are cadres who think that: if I openly criticize my shortcomings, it 
will be harmful because:
The enemy will exploit it to counter our propaganda.
It will reduce the prestige of our organization and regime.
It will cause a loss of face for the Cadre who had that shortcoming.
Only carrying out general criticism internally is enough.
To think in that way is to misunderstand. To think in that way reects 
a person who is sick and fears medicine. To think in that way is to not 
understand the meaning and power of criticism.
Humanity’s publication of the passage directly challenged Thành to get on board 
with the spirit of the CPSU 20th Congress and to live up to his own words. He 
had put these DRV intellectuals through the bizarre and demeaning experience 
of “thought reform.” Now it was his turn to “walk the walk” and carry out some 
self-criticism or at least tolerate some criticism from below. Had they not known 
it already, these DRV reformers would soon learn that “criticism and self-crit-
icism” was meant for party underlings, not for the party leaders. It was about 
power and control, not about democracy, reform, voices from below, or truth.
If this bold initial engagement with X.Y.Z.’s (i.e., Thành’s) ideas about criti-
cism had made Thành nervous, he must have been relieved by the cautious ap-
proach intellectuals of the Nhân văn-Giai phẩm movement took in their dis-
cussions of the cult of personality. For the most part, they limited the term to 
their own leaders in the eld of culture. The clearest challenge to the regime’s 
conceptualization of the personality cult was the intellectual Trương Tửu’s arti-
cle in the second issue of the literature journal Masterworks. In his article “The 
Personality Cult in the Literature and Arts Leadership,” Tửu wrote:
The cult of personality is a common disease among the literature and arts 
leadership in our country. And it has caused considerable damage in the 
eld of culture. I am saying that [the cult of personality] is a common 
problem in the literature and arts leadership. I am not saying that it is a 
problem among rank-and-le writers and artists. The reason is that, in the 
past as well as today, intellectuals who have self-respect never accept the cult 
of personality. Art is creativity and freedom. The cult of personality is blind 
veneration and slavery. Those two things are like re and water; if we have 
one, we cannot have the other.39
Tửu went on to argue that writers and artists had been ghting against the cult 
of personality among the literature and arts leadership since back in 1948. At 
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that time, the painter Tô Ngọc Vân had debated with Trường Chinh topics 
related to the ne arts. Notably, Chinh had strongly denounced Picasso and 
cubism as “reactionary.” In words that must have made Chinh burn, Tửu re-
counted that DRV “artists met with each other, discussed the issue, and came to 
the collective conclusion that Trường Chinh, because he knew little about art, 
had come to an incorrect conclusion about cubism.”40
In mid-December, Thành and the Politburo, possibly emboldened by 
Khrushchev’s November invasion of Hungary, shut down these independent 
and reform-oriented periodicals. As Peter Zinoman shows, Thành and the 
party leaders framed this undemocratic move as a democratic response to the 
demands of the people—in December, DRV newspapers printed letters from 
people expressing alleged outrage over the Nhân văn-Giai phẩm publications 
and demanding that they be shut down.41 That ended the discussion on person-
ality cults and any semblance of civil society in North Vietnam. It also ended the 
possibility of a public discussion of the land reform’s high politics.
Over the ensuing decades up to today, Vietnam’s party leaders would per-
mit historians and novelists to mention the land reform and, especially aer 
1986, to describe its ill eects at the local level. However, a condition of these 
depictions, enabled by the party’s control over all publishing in the country, has 
been that they not overtly challenge the ocial narrative of the campaign’s high 
politics. That ocial explanation was introduced in its most complete form 
by Võ Nguyên Giáp in his October 29, 1956 “Speech to People of the Capital.” 
The speech was published in The People two days later, taking up over thirteen 
full-length columns of the newspaper.42
Two words in Giáp’s speech are of paramount importance. The rst is “error” 
(sai lầm), which the party leaders introduced as an orthodox euphemism for the 
violence and injustice of the campaign. To call the actions of cadres “errors” or 
“mistakes” was to suggest that they were departures from what the party leaders 
had expected and desired. The second key word was “discovered” (phát hiện). 
As Giáp stated in his speech, “From April of this year, when we discovered the 
errors, the Politburo released a directive that was the rst step toward xing 
them.” One can see from Giáp’s statement how “errors” and “discovered” worked 
together to promote the idea that Hồ Chí Minh and the Politburo had not in-
tended for the mass mobilization campaign to have the high levels of violence 
and injustice that it did.
Thành bolstered this “errors-discovery” narrative with two additional moves. 
One was to carry out a “correction of errors” campaign during which some of the 
wrongs suered by land reform victims (those still alive) were to be addressed. 
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Another was to orchestrate wrist-slap demotions for four party leaders closely 
associated with the campaign: Trường Chinh (general secretary), Lê Văn Lương 
(head of the Party Organization Bureau), Hoàng Quốc Việt (head of the Peo-
ple’s Mobilization and Fatherland Front), and Hồ Viết Thắng (vice-head of the 
Central Land Reform Committee). The idea was that these four would bear the 
brunt of ocial blame for the land reform. In his “Speech to People of the Cap-
ital,” Giáp described the mass mobilization apparatus as a rogue organization 
that had operated outside normal party and government institutions. While this 
was true, Giáp implied that this independent status of the mass mobilization 
apparatus had been an unintended and unfortunate development—something 
that just happened. (In fact, the Politburo, working with Chinese advisors and 
following the Chinese mass mobilization model, had purposely structured the 
campaign’s apparatus in this manner so that it could be unleashed on the party 
and state.) To further strengthen this “errors-discovery” narrative, Thành ar-
ranged for himself to replace Trường Chinh as party general secretary. The idea 
was that things had gone awry because Chairman Hồ had not been involved. 
Now he was stepping in to x a problem supposedly created by others.
The year 1956 created dangerous conditions for the Hồ cult, one of the DRV’s 
most important mobilization tools and an enduring feature of Vietnamese polit-
ical life today. Through concealment, delayed reaction, subtle misdirection, and 
through Trường Chinh’s willingness to play the role of scapegoat for the land 
reform, Thành and the Politburo were able to see the Hồ cult through Khrush-
chev’s bloc-wide campaign against the cult of personality, through fallout from 
the land reform, and through a three-month period of semi-free speech in Hanoi.
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Re-Stalinization and Collectivization: 1957–1960
The December 1956 crackdown on reform-minded DRV intellectuals and their 
subsequent dispersal from Hanoi to the countryside for various labor assign-
ments began a process that might be referred to as “re-Stalinization.” By the 
beginning of 1957, Nguyễn Tất Thành and other party leaders seem to have 
found their footing aer the challenges of 1956: Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization, 
land-reform fallout, Mao’s Hundred Flowers movement, Socialist-bloc convul-
sions in Poland and Hungary, the Nhân văn-Giai phẩm movement, and the 
Catholic revolt at Quỳnh Lưu.
The economic situation, however, continued to pose a severe challenge to the 
regime. In mid-1957, the Politburo assessed the situation as “growing more crit-
ical by the day.” DRV tax collection continued to “suer dramatic shortfalls.” 
And “speculation and hoarding” continued to “grow more serious.” Because the 
DRV state still needed to purchase rice at “xed-prices,” which is to say, at much 
less than market price, peasants were no doubt desperate to sell to any buyer 
other than the state. As the party leaders described it, “The free market is ex-
panding and strongly resisting our control of it, resisting our management of the 
state, and resisting the leadership role of the national economy.” As happened 
in the Soviet Union during the mid-1920s, the desire of peasants to avoid selling 
to the state made it harder for the DRV regime to look aer its bureaucrats and 
workers. This had “caused a decline in living standards among both workers and 
those who live o salaries. It has also created diculties for our implementation 
of the 1957 state plan. The political eect of this has not been good.”1
To inspire DRV citizens to overcome these diculties, Thành called on 
people to think of the rst fourteen years of the Soviet revolution. Before an 
audience of “people’s representatives” in Haiphong, he reminisced about his ex-
periences in the Soviet Union:
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Men did not need starched collars and neckties; women did not need any-
thing ashy. Vehicles only needed to be able to carry things; everything 
was channeled into construction rst. And buying anything required a 
ticket—whether it be bread, meat, cloth, or shoes. Because of their spirit of 
sacrice, their ability to endure hardship, their belt-tightening measures, 
and that particular way of organizing trade—speculation and hoarding 
disappeared.2
In his speech, Thành provided his audience with a preview of the “subsidy” (bao 
cấp) system that the party leaders were soon to employ in the country. Markets 
would be illegal, and the population would be provided with tickets for the pur-
chase of basic goods such as rice, salt, meat, vegetables, cloth, and soap.
Re-Stalinization
The party’s “correction of errors” campaign, which was promised to the DRV 
people at the height of de-Stalinization in October of 1956, steadily lost steam 
in 1957 as Moscow and Beijing retreated from their more liberal policies of the 
previous year. The “corrections” included the rehabilitation of purged party 
members, the “appropriate” material compensation of “working peasants” who 
had had their property conscated, and the reduction of agricultural tax levels, 
which had been uniformly raised during the campaign.3
The country’s agging economic situation, however, surely ruled out any sort 
of comprehensive policy of compensation for victims of the land reform. In Janu-
ary, the party leaders announced internally that “the cultivation area of rice, cot-
ton, and other agricultural products is, in many places, less than it was in 1956.”4
Rehabilitation of Purged Party Members:
In May 1957, the Party Secretariat, now ocially under Thành’s guidance, re-
leased a directive titled, “On the Rehabilitation of Party Members from the 
Landlord and Rich Peasant Class Who Were Tried during the Rent Reduction 
and Land Reform.” The directive claimed that inspections in “a number” of 
subdistricts from the provinces of Hưng Yên, Thanh Hóa, and Nghệ An had re-
vealed three “problems.” First, “the majority of these [rehabilitated] Party mem-
bers had troubles with the peasants before the August Revolution and, since 
regaining their membership, did not have a correct attitude toward the Party.”5
Basically, the directive glossed over the fact that the class demarcation carried 
out during the land reform had been discredited as unreliable. By referring to 
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these purged party members as “landlords” and “rich peasants,” the directive 
signaled that the class assignments from the land reform were now to be consid-
ered mostly valid. “The masses are not in agreement with rehabilitating Party 
members from the landlord and rich peasant classes.” As the directive further 
explained:
Party members from the landlord and rich peasant classes have been edu-
cated by the revolution, but their class character has not changed much. 
If they remain in the Party, it will complicate the character of the Party’s 
organization. As for those people who have contributed to the resistance 
war, to the revolution, the Party already has a policy of accommodating 
them appropriately.
In the countryside aer the land reform policy became clear, the class 
consciousness of the masses was promoted. If party members from the 
exploitative classes return to the Party’s ranks and return to leading the 
masses, the masses will protest. On the other hand, the exploitative class 
could easily use this opportunity to reestablish their position among the 
masses, hindering the correction of errors today and the implementation 
of Party and Government policies tomorrow.6
The last part of the directive instructed cadres working on the correction of 
errors campaign to re-purge party members who had been rehabilitated “against 
the wishes of the masses” or who were causing diculties for the correction 
of errors. Showing the party leaders’ anxiety over this move, the directive told 
correction-of-errors cadres that “[b]efore purging them from the Party, you must 
explain clearly to them that not recognizing them as party members is correct.”7
Property Restitution or Compensation
Two weeks later, on May 23, 1957, the party Secretariat released another “correc-
tion of errors” directive. This claried issues related to the restoration of prop-
erty expropriated from suburban residents who had been “incorrectly” targeted 
during the campaign. The directive divided the property into three categories. 
The rst was “tools of production such as sewing machines, water pumps, rice 
processors, looms, candy making cauldrons.” As the directive explained, “If 
these things are still present in the subdistrict, the people should be mobilized 
to return them. If these things have already been sold, explain to the original 
owner that he needs to accept the loss and not demand repayment.” The same 
policy was to be used for the second category, “consumer goods,” such as “bicy-
cles, watches, ballpoint pens, electric fans, and record players.”8
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For small owners and handicra workers who had lost their means of pro-
duction and were suering “hardships,” the correction-of-errors cadres were to 
“mobilize peasants of the subdistrict to negotiate some degree of compensation.” 
If the peasants of the community no longer had the capacity to compensate the 
family, and the family were still in dire straits, having no way of earning a living, 
“the Government will help to some extent,” the directive explained.
The third and nal category, “other property,” included “gold, silver, wom-
en’s cosmetics, cash, rice, agricultural produce, sh, etc.” The party directive 
ordered cadres to “mobilize the owner not to demand repayment.” And again, if 
the aggrieved owner had “lost too much,” the cadre was supposed to “mobilize 
the peasants to negotiate some degree of compensation so that the person could 
make a living.”9 We can see from these and other party directives that the DRV 
regime, which was entirely responsible for the land reform, took little material 
responsibility for the losses that people suered.
Agricultural-Tax Yield Levels:
As we saw, an important component of the land reform campaign was the raising 
of agricultural yield levels in rural communities. Since the agricultural tax was 
calculated as a percentage of a eld’s estimated yield level, the government could 
(theoretically) increase its rice intake by raising these estimates. In the latter half 
of 1956, the DRV leaders had promised peasants that these estimated yield levels, 
that is, tax levels, would be recalibrated. By September of 1957, the party leaders 
were backtracking on this promise as well:
With respect to the yield levels, many places have not yet adjusted these, 
or they were adjusted but not yet to the right level, either hurting our State 
budget or making the masses remain concerned. But the basic situation in 
places that underwent the adjustments is that the process was not led care-
fully and the masses not educated properly. Therefore, the yield levels are 
quite a bit lower than reality requires. These need adjustment so that the 
masses make a fair contribution and do not bankrupt the State budget.10
The consequences of that tax policy, combined with rumors of coming agri-
cultural collectivization, which peasants correctly interpreted as a policy that 
would see them lose their land, were apparent toward the end of the year. In 
November, the party Secretariat released a directive titled, “Agricultural Pro-
duction and the Spring Harvest of 1958.” It reminded party members that their 
“leadership of agricultural production for the upcoming May harvest was very 
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important.” The problem was a “tendency” of peasants these days to “reduce 
their area of cultivation, to ‘ip two bowls into one,’ to return their land and do 
other work (such as the land of Catholics who went South, the land le over from 
the correction of errors and the land reform).” Similarly, the November directive 
warned of “a number of people who received land during the campaign but now 
wanted to return the land and do some other type of more lucrative work.”11
Rehabilitating Stalin
Khrushchev’s secret speech had humiliated Communist leaders around the 
world by arming the truth of the generally accepted non-Communist view of 
Stalin as a brutal dictator. As the events of 1956 showed, open acknowledgement 
of Stalin’s crimes had an immediate destabilizing eect on the Communist bloc. 
How could the bloc tout the superiority of their system and the Soviet Union if 
it had been ruled for thirty years by a person like Stalin? As noted, the speech 
was especially dicult for Thành because of its focus on the period of the Great 
Terror, 1934–1938, which he had spent in Moscow, and because of its opposition 
to personality cults, which Thành had constructed around the character Hồ 
Chí Minh. In his secret speech, Khrushchev had pointed out how contrary a 
personality cult was to the ideals of Marx and Lenin.
For these reasons, it is not surprising that Thành and other DRV leaders were 
quick to rehabilitate Stalin when circumstances allowed. That moment came 
in the wake of the 1957 International Conference of Communist and Workers’ 
Parties, held in Moscow from November 14 to November 15. Thành and his new 
protégé, Lê Duẩn, attended the conference, which resulted in a joint rejection of 
the calls for reform that had bedeviled party leaders during much of 1956.
For Thành and other DRV leaders, the bold armation of Stalin’s greatness 
came at the Central Committee’s 13th Plenum, held a few weeks aer Thành’s 
and Duẩn’s return from the conference:
In summary, the world and domestic situation for over a year now has 
taught us many important and profound things.
We must always stand rmly on the Marxist-Leninist position, the rev-
olutionary viewpoint of the proletarian class, and clearly demarcate right 
and wrong. We should not take the CPSU 20th Congress’s criticism of 
comrade Stalin and become bewildered, uncertain, leading to suspicion 
even of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. For the CPSU as for us, 
comrade Stalin is always a great follower of Marxism-Leninism. His entire 
revolutionary contribution is great; his accomplishments are of a primary 
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character and his mistakes are of only a secondary character. Stalin’s writ-
ten works are still part of the Marxist-Leninist canon.12
But the 13th Plenum Report provided no explanation for why it was only of 
“secondary importance” that Stalin had ordered the arrest and execution of 98 
of the Central Committee’s 138 members in the period from 1934 to 1938. Why 
had Stalin promoted the use of torture to extract false confessions from thou-
sands of innocent party members and Soviet citizens? And what was it about 
the Soviet system that had seemed to make it virtually impossible to stop Stalin 
from committing his crimes over a span of at least fourteen years? Thành and 
his comrades provided no explanation for why these and other questions related 
to Khrushchev’s revelations were not legitimate topics for discussion.
Agricultural Collectivization 1958–1960
Implementing a system of collectivized agriculture in Vietnam had been a dream 
of Communist Party leaders since the 1930s. In those days, before these revolu-
tionaries had seized power and carried out a war, agricultural collectivization 
probably appealed because it seemed morally superior and more modern than 
Vietnam’s small-farmer system. Also, since the 1930s, collectivized agriculture 
had been the rural economic system of the Soviet Union, which held a mythic 
position in the minds of many revolutionaries.
In 1957, these original, idealistic motivations for collectivization were surely 
supplemented by two practical reasons that stemmed from the experiences of the 
past decade. First, the DRV regime’s survival still depended on extracting a huge 
contribution from an unproductive rural economy. The diculty of this task 
had tormented the party leaders throughout the war, frequently jeopardizing 
the military eort. The reality was that peasants would not voluntarily boost 
production just to serve the war eort or to build socialism. Land redistributions 
carried out during the years of war had done nothing to stem the decline in 
production. Thus, there was no practical basis on which to conclude that land 
reform would solve this problem.
Second, the regime still had no means of earning the quantity of money 
needed to achieve its ambitious economic and political goals: industrialization 
of the economy and military defeat of the rival regime in Saigon. Thus, the DRV 
was heavily dependent on Soviet-bloc aid. Because that aid could only be de-
manded in the name of proletarian internationalism, the DRV needed to present 
itself as the model student of the Soviet Union and China. This meant dutifully 
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following in Moscow’s and Beijing’s footsteps. Not to undergo collectivization 
was to challenge the wisdom of Soviet and Chinese leaders and to question the 
superiority of the Soviet system.
In December 1957, the party leaders explained that “Consolidating the North 
and gradually constructing socialism” was one of the regime’s three essential 
tasks. The meaning of “gradually” was not explained. At the end of 1955, the 
DRV leaders had invested in six “large” collective farms and ten “small” ones. 
These test collective farms were supposed to be carefully nurtured and gener-
ously supported so that they could succeed and generate popular excitement 
about collectivization. In March 1957, the party leaders held a conference de-
voted to assessing the results of these sixteen collective farms. In typical fashion, 
the leaders of the conference produced a lengthy report (forty pages), which was 
probably read to attendees. The report provides a window into what the party 
leaders had learned about collective farming in Vietnam before pushing forward 
aggressively with this transformation in late 1958.13
The Ministry of Agriculture had invested into these sixteen collective farms 
60 percent of its development budget, a quantity that was “enough to construct 
two light-industry factories.” The sixteen state-run farms employed a total of 
8,500 “cadres and workers.” Aer a year of operation, despite being generously 
supplied with the latest Soviet-bloc farm equipment, fourteen of the sixteen 
farms were operating at a loss. The two earning a prot were an orange farm 
and a coee farm.
The collective-farm crop that was most likely to aect the everyday lives of 
Vietnamese peasants was rice. Unfortunately, despite the provision of Roma-
nian tractors and other farm machines from the Soviet Union, debt from rice 
production comprised over half the total debt accumulated by the sixteen farms. 
According to the report, “Generally speaking, the collective farm work gener-
ated many losses for the Nation.”
The report also discussed the eect of the collective farms on both the people 
working in them and on the local people living in surrounding areas. “Gener-
ally speaking,” the farms had an intrigue factor. Many peasants were fascinated 
by the Romanian tractors and other modern farm equipment. To these local 
residents, working for the state farm held great appeal. As the report explained, 
“one easy-to-understand reason is that the collective farm is operated by the 
Government.” It was obvious to outsiders that, for collective farm members, 
their livelihood was guaranteed by the government and not dependent on what 
was produced in the elds. Yet the report acknowledged that “we have not yet 
served as a model for the people in terms of our production organization and our 
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farming technique.” In some places, “our sloppy way of working has generated 
concern among our compatriots, who nd our mistakes and weaknesses painful 
(for example, the waste of chemical fertilizer at the Thạch ngọc farm).”
From the perspective of the collective farms’ productivity, there were signs of 
serious trouble. Though the report explained in exhaustive detail the waste that 
accompanied the misuse and abuse of expensive farm equipment and supplies, 
it still concluded that the “biggest waste is in manpower.” The report described 
how “serious waste and corruption” characterized the work regime of the farms:
Extremely common is wasted work, with people arriving late and leaving 
early. And we have used 3 million days’ worth of pay on labor mobilized 
from people outside the collective farm. On an ordinary workday, losing 
only one hour of work would be unusually little. Therefore, the amount 
of wasted work amounts to 380,000 workdays, the equivalent of nearly 
450 million Vietnamese dollars. Also, the number of non-working people 
in the farm is high, perhaps as much as 1,200 people during the last three 
months of the year. The amount of waste from this is over 100 million 
Vietnamese dollars during this three-month period.14
The report expressed grave concern about the extensive use of “mobilized man-
power” (nhân lực huy động), which referred to non-collective-farm members 
who lived in the surrounding area. In parentheses next to “mobilized man-
power,” the report claried this term with the French word, “corvée,” i.e., 
forced labor. The extensive use of outside labor showed that the farms were 
not self-sucient and were terribly inecient, despite the DRV government’s 
generous provision of machinery. The outside labor “did not just help the col-
lective farm with a particular job for one day but rather did work for the farm 
on a daily basis.”
And nally, the report expressed concern over the way the members of the 
state farm were treated:
When we throw out some new work task, we do so in a great rush to open 
new land, to plow the earth and plant crops, but we don’t think about the 
lives of the workers. Seize land in order to break it down—that is the initial 
situation in many places. Meanwhile, the workers have very little and live 
in cramped quarters. They work a lot and are helped little. Gradually, these 
workers see that we do business like the capitalists, of course not thinking 
about helping to improve the labor power of workers as is supposed to hap-
pen in a people’s democratic regime.15
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Despite these warnings about the ineciency of collective farms, the party 
leaders pushed forward with collectivization. Always anxious about the degree 
to which Soviet and Chinese Communist policies were being imposed on the 
DRV people, the party leaders again attempted to frame this policy as some-
thing that the people had demanded. Thus, in December 1958, when the Polit-
buro decided that the time to push forward with collectivization had come, the 
party Secretariat released a directive stating that “the masses in many places are 
demanding that they be organized into agricultural collectives” and that the 
party had to “give special attention to the consolidation and development of the 
collectivization movement in order to satisfy the demands of the masses . . .”16
A directive released by the party Secretariat in February of 1960, however, 
suggested that the collectivization movement probably was not warmly em-
braced in many communities:
The process of carrying out a socialist revolution and building socialism is, 
at the same time, a complicated, tense, and decisive process of class warfare. 
We want to protect our revolutionary accomplishments and guarantee the 
eectiveness of our socialist reform and socialist construction. Therefore, 
the revolutionary regime led by the working class absolutely must severely 
repress any action of resistance carried out by counter-revolutionary forces. 
That is an essential responsibility of any country’s working class carrying 
out a revolution.17
Over the next two years (1959 and 1960), the party leaders would complete 
collectivization of the North. In typical fashion, the campaign required that 
party members write “general conclusions” about its strengths and weaknesses. 
Realizing that, from the perspective of agricultural productivity at least, the 
farms were not yet a success, the party leaders feared an honest appraisal. Thus, 
they released a “Dra Proposal for Guiding the Content of General Conclusions 
on the Movement to Mobilize Agricultural Collectivization Combined with the 
Completion of Democratic Reforms in Mountainous Areas.”18
What the party leaders wanted to avoid was having the policy of collectiv-
ization itself become a topic of discussion in these “general conclusions.” There-
fore, while the “Dra” instructed cadres to report on the “results and remain-
ing tasks” of the movement, the specic directions about how these were to be 
reported strongly suggested that the party’s policies were not up for discussion. 
Any bad results needed to be framed as a problem with “implementation.” The 
Dra put forward ten dierent work areas to be assessed, every one of which, in 
one way or another, provided a ready-made scapegoat for poor results.
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The rst category was “policy education and ideological mobilization,” for 
which the party leaders wanted local cadres to “assess and review the class con-
sciousness and socialist consciousness of cadres, Party members, and the masses.” 
In other words, poor collective farm results could stem from a lack of class con-
sciousness and socialist consciousness on the part of those involved. The second 
category was “Agricultural Collectivization.” The VWP leaders wanted the 
report to discuss “strengths and weaknesses in the implementation of policies 
. . .” The fourth category was the “consolidation and development of base organi-
zations and the training of backbone cadres.” The h category, “boosting pro-
duction,” called for a discussion of the “leadership of production.” The sixth cat-
egory, “Order and Security, the Repression of Reactionary Saboteurs” called for 
a discussion of “implementation of the Central Committee’s [above-mentioned] 
Directive 186-CT/CTW, of 17/2/1960.”
The end of the directive reminded party members that the General Conclu-
sions were to focus on “a location’s general leadership and command.” These 
were divided into two elements: (1) “understanding of the Central Committee’s 
policies” and “how that understanding was manifest in the implementation of 
those policies,” and (2) “The organization of implementation.”19 The entire exer-
cise was carefully constructed to ensure that the results of collectivization were 
not the measure of the policy itself.
Completing the Totalitarian State
At some point between 1958 and 1960, the party’s leadership foursome of Thành, 
Trường Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and Võ Nguyên Giáp came apart and lost 
their hold on power. Thành gradually retreated into semiretirement. Trường 
Chinh had not yet been able to recover his status aer having been compelled 
to take most of the blame for the land reform. Phạm Văn Đồng remained prime 
minister, but his inuence had diminished. As for Võ Nguyên Giáp, he remained 
secretary of defense, but his inuence also declined as he increasingly came under 
attack from the party’s new leader, Lê Duẩn. According to historian Liên-Hằng 
Nguyễn, Duẩn was a man of “focus, administrative skill, and iron will.” He 
would inherit and preserve the Hồ Chí Minh personality cult as a mobilization 
tool for the regime.20
Duẩn would do the same with the old Politburo’s collectivization project. By 
the end of 1960, he had placed roughly 85 percent of the DRV’s rural population 
into 40,422 collective farms. As the Vietnamese scholar Thái Duy explains, “in 
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addition to the method of mobilizing through persuasion, in many places, [cad-
res] used coercion, forcing peasants into collective farms.” The farms were based 
on the principle of “collectivized means of production and labor, centralized 
management, and unied distribution.” They would be a dening feature of 
Duẩn’s twenty-six-year reign.21
How did peasants gain access to the food produced by the collective farm? 
Aer the DRV state had taken its required amount, the collective farm’s remain-
ing produce was distributed to members according to the principle of “work 
days.” Collective farm managers calculated a “work day” by assigning “points” 
to the dierent tasks carried out on the farm. Ten points equaled a “work day.” 
Each task, such as plowing, planting, and harvesting the collective crop, had cer-
tain criteria for measuring its completeness. If the manager of the collective farm 
determined that a farm member had completed a task according to standard, the 
member would receive a predetermined number of points.
As in the Soviet Union and China, collective farm members were allowed 
to keep for themselves roughly 5 percent of their original land. This small piece 
could be worked privately as in the past, and its yield was nontaxable. These 
family plots became vital to survival as the collective farm’s ineciencies and 
inequities steadily reduced productivity. For example, when pulling up rice seed-
lings for the “family plot,” not a single stalk would be broken. When complet-
ing this task for the collective farm, such care was not necessary because work 
points were calculated by the pile. Whether the seedlings in that pile had been 
carelessly snapped in half and were thus useless was not part of the calculation.
Meanwhile, the collective farm ocials held all the power in a village. They 
allotted themselves work points for attending meetings, studying, or visiting 
elds. As Thái Duy explains:
Laboring members of the collective lost the right to ownership and inde-
pendence in production. Meanwhile, the power of cadres who held ocial 
positions in the collective was tremendous. They determined how many 
“work points” members earned and decided how each grain of rice would 
be divided among the community. Without the signature of a local ocial, 
regular members of the collective and their children could not enter the 
Party, mass organizations, schools, or educational institutions. Without 
the collective farm ocial’s signature, members could not leave the village 
to carry out work. And this was a weakness of these farms that cadres of 
poor character used to pressure and exploit the people.22
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During the period from 1961 to 1965, DRV collective farms opened up about 
200,000 hectares of new land, but agricultural productivity fell dramatically 
enough to oset this expansion. The cost of production began to rise, and the ef-
fectiveness of state investments steadily declined. According to ocial statistics, 
the average amount of rice distributed each month to collective-farm families in 
1961 was twenty-four kilograms. By 1964, that amount had fallen to an average 
of fourteen kilograms.23 Mobilization for war surely played a role.
Despite the failure of these collective farms from the perspective of produc-
tivity, the party leaders pushed forward with the system. Economics was not the 
only motivation. Pride was a factor. The party leaders had staked their reputa-
tions on the superiority of the socialist system. To acknowledge that the collec-
tivized economy was a failure was to acknowledge that three decades of revolu-
tionary belief, oen expressed in a tone of shrill contempt for doubters, had been 
misguided. To abandon collective farms was to abandon the socialist dream.
A second factor was the desperate need for Socialist-bloc military, nancial, 
and moral support, particularly from the Soviet Union and China. In the Soviet 
case, this aid could only be demanded on the grounds of proletarian internation-
alism. With Mao, DRV leaders could tout the benets of a strong socialist ally 
on his southern border, acting as a buer against capitalist-bloc encroachment. 
The DRV leaders could also oer Mao prestige by following his revolutionary 
blueprint, helping to bolster his claims to be the leader of the Communist bloc. 
For the DRV leaders, the need for Soviet and Chinese support was an enor-
mous disincentive to deviate from a sacred Socialist-bloc policy such as economic 
collectivization.
A third factor was the leverage that collective farms aorded the DRV state 
over the North Vietnamese people. The virtual elimination of private property 
in the countryside weakened people’s position vis-à-vis the state, making resis-
tance to government policies more dicult. The lack of private property also 
raised the stakes for ocials at all levels. There was no viable private economic 
sector to join if a person were expelled from ocialdom, making the cost of 
losing an administrative position a steep one.
Some of the leverage that the state gained from collectivization came as an 
indirect byproduct of measures needed to keep the collective farms aoat. For 
example, the presence of free markets where agricultural goods could be ex-
changed at actual value would always tempt peasants and ocials to bypass the 
state system. To ensure that the DRV state was the primary buyer and distrib-
uter of agricultural products, the regime had to eliminate existing markets and 
stop new ones from emerging. Small local markets for exchange, oen by barter, 
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between members of the community, were acceptable. But larger markets that 
could compete with the state were not. To prevent such markets from emerging, 
the DRV regime constructed hundreds of inspection stations along major roads. 
These functioned to interdict peasants attempting to transport and sell large 
quantities of agricultural products in another region.24
The viability of collective farms also depended on people remaining in their 
villages to work their local farm, especially during the key periods of sowing and 
harvesting. If people were able to move freely from one location to another, the 
labor needed for the local farm would be uncertain. Thus, local party leaders 
were able to use their control over the collective farm food supply (and the threat 
of its withdrawal) to limit people’s movement.
These ways in which the DRV state intervened in people’s lives to protect 
the socialist economy also beneted the regime’s mobilization of human and 
material resources for war. Indeed, many of the above measures taken to ensure 
the survival of collective farms had already been put in place to facilitate the 
DRV’s war eort against the French and the State of Vietnam. These include 
such things as the implementation of an internal passport system (hộ khẩu), at-
tempts to prevent peasants from selling agricultural goods to buyers other than 
the DRV state, eorts to take inventory of the DRV food supply available for the 
war eort, and various campaigns to put agricultural production in the hands 
of local ocials. The need to protect and nurture the collective economy, built 
primarily during a time of peace, provided a moral and ideological justication 
for maintaining these wartime measures of social and economic control.
One of the great strengths of DRV leaders such as Thành, Chinh, and Duẩn 
was realism about collectivization’s appeal to peasants. In mobilizing support 
among Southern peasants for the war eort against the Diệm regime, Duẩn 
followed Thành’s lead by instructing party cadres to be discreet about the so-
cialist future. As a former party cadre in the South explained to the scholar 
Jerey Race:
In this situation, the communists are very clever. They never propagandize 
communism, which teaches that the land must be collectivized. If they 
did, how would the peasantry ever listen to them? Instead, they say: “the 
peasants are the main force of the revolution”; if they follow the Party, they 
will become masters of the countryside and owners of their land, and that 
scratches the peasants right where they itch. But if the Party were to say: 
in the future, you will be a laborer, your land will be collectivized, you will 
no longer own any farm animals or buildings, but will become a tenant 
294 chapter 14
farmer for the Party or the socialist state—if the Party were to say that, the 
peasants would not heed them. Thus, the peasants never think of the dis-
tant future of communism. Indeed, the Party cadres are instructed never 
to mention these things because, according to the teaching of Lenin, the 
peasant is the greatest bourgeois of all: he thinks only of himself. Say one 
word about collectivism, and he is already against you. This is a truth the 
Party has studied and learned to exploit.25
Eventually, the truth of the “distant future” was revealed in the South as it had 
been in the North. Aer the DRV’s 1975 victory, would the economic policies 
of the victorious but poverty-stricken North be implemented in the defeated 
but wealthier South?
The pressures to do so were enormous. Any hesitation to implement socialist 
transformation in the South risked tacitly acknowledging the failure of these 
policies in the North and oending the Soviet Union—the party’s most import-
ant ally at this time. Second, the party leaders did not yet know any other way 
to rule. How could the Northern collective economy survive if there were mar-
kets and private enterprises in the South? How could the party seize desperately 
needed Southern rice if the region’s peasants were able to sell their produce in 
markets that actually paid for it? Thus, soon aer the party’s 1975 victory, Duẩn 
sanctioned attacks on the capitalist economy. Within a few years, the Southern 
economy was in shambles, suering from the same maladies (ineciency, cor-
ruption, waste, lack of productivity, etc.) that plagued the North.
“Đổi mới” (1986) and the Dismantling of the Totalitarian State
By the early 1980s, the eort required to preserve the socialist economy was sap-
ping the revolutionary vigor of Vietnam’s aging party leaders. As the scholar 
Benedict Kerkvliet shows, the will of Vietnamese peasants to push back against 
and undermine the party’s project of collective agriculture seems to have eroded 
the resolve of Lê Duẩn and the Politburo.26 These leaders ruled a country beset 
by food crises, the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of “boat people,” ram-
pant ination, widespread corruption, and many other serious challenges. Calls 
for reform began to grow and, indeed, more as a result of lapses in revolutionary 
vigilance than conscious policy, the reform process had already begun.27
One cautious proponent of change was Trường Chinh. In 1981, Duẩn and 
Thọ had orchestrated for him to leave behind his position as National Assembly 
Standing Committee Chairman and assume the more inuential position of 
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National Chairman. In 1985, Duẩn’s failing health forced him to withdraw from 
many of his leadership duties as party general secretary. The Politburo nomi-
nated the reform-minded Chinh (not Lê Đức Thọ) to serve as the de facto party 
leader in Duẩn’s absence.
In July 1986, Duẩn died of heart disease and Chinh, now 79 years old, was 
ocially proclaimed general secretary. It must have been an emotional moment 
for him, returning to the position that he had been forced to abandon in disgrace 
thirty years earlier. Chinh would serve as general secretary for the remainder 
of the year until the party’s Sixth Congress (held in December 1986). At that 
point, Chinh, Phạm Văn Đồng, and Lê Đức Thọ retired from ocial politics, 
serving as “advisors” to a new crop of younger party leaders who would continue 
Chinh’s reform agenda.
During his brief return as general secretary, Chinh strongly promoted the 
reforms that he believed vital to the health of the country and to the survival 
of the party’s regime. Justifying these reforms, which would soon be given the 
general name, Đổi mới (New Change), required summarizing the negative phe-
nomena that threatened the country. This Chinh did in several policy docu-
ments produced during the months leading up to the Sixth Party Congress. The 
terms that Chinh and other party leaders used frequently to describe the ills of 
Vietnam’s government and economic system were “bureaucratic centralism” (tập 
trung quan liêu) and “subsidization” (bao cấp). Both terms were products of the 
socialist system.
“Bureaucratic centralism” referred to the concentration of all economic 
decision-making in the hands of central state oces. The state owned and man-
aged all legal business enterprises in the country. In this “command economy,” 
a company’s fundamental strategic decisions were determined by ocials in 
high-level government oces. Thus, the on-the-scene manager of a company 
had little power to determine such basic things as how much raw material would 
be obtained for production, how many goods would be produced, the price at 
which goods would be sold, how many employees would be hired, and what 
salaries they would be paid. “Bureaucratic centralism” meant that local factory 
managers were not accountable for the quality of the goods that their factories 
produced. And the men and women in the government’s high-level planning 
oces in Hanoi were not responsible for the decisions that they imposed on 
factories around the country.
Trường Chinh’s second term, “subsidization,” referred to the government’s 
policy of setting the price of consumer goods lower than the actual market price. 
As happened in the Soviet Union and in other socialist countries, the policy of 
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subsidizing essential goods meant that demand far exceeded supply. Because 
prices were oen set below the level needed to meet the costs of production, 
many companies operated in a constant state of insolvency. As a result, they 
needed to be propped up (or subsidized) by the government. A company whose 
existence did not depend on earning a prot had little economic incentive to 
operate eciently or to produce competitive products. An important overarch-
ing goal of the “subsidy system” was the regime’s management of the popula-
tion’s consumption habits in an environment of chronic scarcity and unyielding 
ination.
As Chinh observed, “over the past ve years, production has gone almost no-
where and labor productivity has declined while the cost of production has un-
ceasingly grown—the economy and society grow more unstable by the day.”28 In-
deed, ination during 1986 grew to over 700 percent. In another speech, Chinh 
explained some of the broad causes of Vietnam’s problems:
We have made mistakes due to “leist infantilism,” idealism, and to the 
contravention of the objective laws of socio-economic development. These 
mistakes were manifested in the [emphasis given to] developing heavy in-
dustry on a large scale beyond our practical capacity . . . [maintaining] the 
bureaucratically centralized mechanism of economic management based 
on state subsidies with a huge superstructure which overburdens the infra-
structure. As a result, we relied mostly on foreign aid for our subsistence.
Another cause of the country’s problems was corruption. Chinh noted the 
prevalence of ocials who “make shady arrangements, steal goods, form nefar-
ious partnerships, practice bribery, and abuse socialist property.” According to 
Chinh, what was “even more serious” was the tendency of ocials to “use their 
power to repress and silence whistleblowers.”29 It was the “legitimate right of 
citizens to voice criticisms in newspapers,” he stated, though, in an obvious qual-
ication, remarked that this right needed to be “implemented in an orderly way.” 
Chinh lamented the lawlessness of society, but he avoided suggesting that the 
law be equally binding on party and nonparty members: “every Party member is 
equal before the Party’s law; every citizen is equal before the law.”30
Within a narrative framework that still espoused the cause of socialism, 
Chinh acknowledged that the regime would now “use selected parts of the 
private capitalist economy.” While calling for the constant strengthening of 
the “collective economy,” Chinh stated that the party now “recognizes the 
role of petit-bourgeois production and the private capitalist economy, at a lim-
ited level for a relatively long time.” Ultimately, “bureaucratic centralism” and 
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“subsidization” were features of a totalitarian state, which is to say a state con-
structed to exert the maximum possible control (total control being impossi-
ble) over a nation’s economic, political, and social life. Chinh repeatedly called 
for the elimination of these two negative features but, to the disappointment 
of many Vietnamese intellectuals then and today, insisted on maintaining the 
party dictatorship.
Aer 1986, the party pushed forward with the dismantling of Vietnam’s col-
lective economy in the countryside. The boost that this provided to agricultural 
production was immediate and enormous. In the early 1980s, Vietnam had been 
forced to borrow 770,000 tons of rice and grain from the Soviet Union to feed a 
population teetering on the brink of famine. By the early 1990s, Vietnam’s agri-
cultural production had increased so dramatically that the country had become 
the world’s third largest rice exporter. While not without bumps along the way, 
Vietnam’s economic transformation since 1986 has been spectacular.
The dismantling of collective farms ultimately meant the dismantling of the 
party’s totalitarian state and its reestablishment as a merely authoritarian one. 
Instead of a state focused on mobilizing its citizens for “total war,” Vietnam’s 
state in recent decades has focused on economic development and regime pres-
ervation. In the eyes of Vietnam’s party leaders, that second focus continues to 
require that a few features of the old totalitarian state be maintained—notably, 
the Hồ Chí Minh personality cult, state ownership of all public media, and tight 
party control over ostensibly democratic institutions.
298
Conclusion
The DRV regime sits at opposite ends of two yardsticks of political legitimacy. 
The rst is a military yardstick, which includes the ability to mobilize troops, to 
win battles, and to expel a foreign power. The second is a democratic yardstick, 
which includes the ability to win a free election, to survive in conditions of free 
speech, and to improve the material and spiritual wellbeing of the governed. 
When measured by the military yardstick, Nguyễn Tất Thành and his comrades 
succeeded spectacularly, but when measured by the democratic yardstick, they 
fell short in many ways. Were he asked privately to defend his record on the 
democratic front, though, Thành might have replied that the party’s military 
goals never could have been achieved under “bourgeois democratic” conditions; 
and the goal of national independence, aer eighty years of French subjugation, 
justied any means.
During and immediately aer the period of the Second Indochina War, 
Western assessments of the DRV regime tended to rely mainly on its military 
successes. The battleeld was the only place Westerners encountered the DRV 
because journalists such as David Halberstam, Stanley Karnow, and Neil Shee-
han were not allowed to live in and scrutinize North Vietnam. Thus, to a large 
extent, the success of the DRV regime had to be inferred from the performance 
of its outstanding soldiers. Battleeld victory and political legitimacy were 
strongly connected, especially in the thinking of Americans, who had never ex-
perienced military defeat leading to occupation. Histories of America’s major 
wars tended to imply a link between military performance, the justness of the 
cause, and eventual battleeld success.
This mindset was something noticed by the German émigré scholar Guenter 
Lewy, a perceptive observer of American culture. Even some leaders of America’s 
pacist movement, Lewy observed, celebrated the DRV’s military successes.1 In 
his controversial 1978 book on the Second Indochina War, Lewy attempted to 
refute this connection between military performance and political legitimacy. 
(One can imagine how his experience as a Jew in 1930s Germany shaped his views 
of nationalism, the meaning of military prowess, and the question of American 
military intervention around the world.) Discussing the inferior performance 
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of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, he wrote, “As history demonstrates 
abundantly, there is, of course, no necessary connection between the eciency 
of an army and the absolute value of the political ideas it serves. The outcome of 
a military contest has no moral signicance.”2 This was an idea singled out by the 
inuential American historian of Vietnam, David Marr, as especially troubling 
and as having contributed to Lewy’s failure to draw the “necessary lessons” from 
the Second Indochina War:
More specically, he rejects the importance of “abstract ideology,” arguing 
that there is no necessary connection between the eciency of an army 
and the political ideas it serves. Because the German Wehrmacht and the 
French Foreign Legion fought well even in extreme adversity, he suggests 
that the Saigon army somehow could have done likewise—thus completely 
ignoring what he previously accepted was a revolutionary historical context 
in Vietnam.3
Judging from Marr’s writings on Vietnamese history, when he referred to “ab-
stract ideology,” he meant nationalism. In his thinking, the Vietnamese Com-
munist Party had seized the banner of Vietnamese nationalism in 1945 and had 
never relinquished it. Thành and his successors were able to recruit dedicated 
followers and motivate them to ght well because the cause of expelling foreign-
ers and unifying the country was simple and just.
Nationalism was an important part of the party’s success. Thành and his 
comrades took pains to promote themselves as patriots and to denounce Viet-
namese political rivals rst and foremost as “traitors.” Only internally did the 
party leaders speak of rivals as being “anti-Bolshevik.” And the DRV regime 
obviously earned great nationalist credit for their victory over the French. But 
could that victory have been achieved without the party’s Marxist-Leninist ide-
ology? I believe not. As the war against the French dragged on, Thành and the 
Politburo found that they needed coercion, sometimes reinforced by terror, to 
extract the necessary sacrice from an exhausted population. Soviet and Chinese 
Communist precedents gave the Politburo a set of institutional mechanisms for 
that coercion and an ideology, Marxism-Leninism, to justify them.
Explaining the Mass Mobilization Campaign (1953–1956)
The party’s use of coercion and terror climaxed with the mass mobilization 
campaign from 1953 to 1956. Many scholars have attempted to explain this 
episode, which is arguably the most sensitive and controversial in the history 
300 conclusion
of Vietnamese Communism. In their studies of the campaign, Edwin Moise, 
Christine White, and Andrew Vickerman exhaustively analyze a 1968 history of 
the land reform produced by the DRV social scientist Trần Phương.4 His book 
provides many DRV statistics about the alleged class composition of the coun-
tryside as well as some of the alleged regulations of the campaign. The above 
scholars analyze those statistics and regulations with admirable care. Moise, for 
example, points out the inherent trouble in the land reform’s redistribution pol-
icy, which stated that poor peasants were to receive enough land to raise their 
holdings close to the village’s per capita average: “This was a very dangerous pol-
icy and must have been among the major causes of the errors and illegalities in 
the later stages of the land reform.” As Moise sensibly points out, because of the 
“nature of an average,” such a redistribution goal “would require major inroads 
into the holdings not only of the rich peasants but even of the middle peasants.”5
One number, “5.86 percent,” seems to be especially revealing about the nature 
of the mass mobilization campaign. That number was the Politburo’s gure for 
the percentage of the population comprising the landlord class. First, it was f-
teen times higher than the landlord percentage determined in a 1951 test census 
conducted in a “typical” district of Nghệ An province. Also, in their 1938 book, 
The Peasant Question, Trường Chinh and Võ Nguyên had stated plainly that, 
in Central Vietnam and Tonkin, “there are many villages that do not have land-
lords—their highest class is rich peasant.”6 In other words, the landlord ratio of 
5.86 percent was a wild exaggeration. Second, the use of the “.86” was obviously 
an attempt to disguise with pseudoscientic precision the arbitrary nature of 
the gure, which had been pulled out of thin (Chinese) air. Fourth, the num-
ber shows that the party leaders did not take seriously their class demarcation 
criteria since these should have obviated the need for landlord quotas. Fih, the 
decimal “.86” signaled to mass mobilization cadres that they should err high on 
their landlord numbers—this is another reection of the Politburo’s fear that 
too few landlords would be found.
Ultimately, the gure 5.86 percent shows that the so-called errors of the cam-
paign—the enormous number of regular villagers labeled as landlords—were 
not “errors” but an intended result. This is the conclusion reached by Georges 
Boudarel, Bertrand de Hartingh, Olivier Tessier, and Alex Thai Vo in their re-
spective studies of the DRV. As de Hartingh wrote in 2003, “Nobody was ready 
to accept that the “mistakes” were not errors, nor that the cadres had acted ex-
actly as asked to.”7 I would use a stronger verb than “asked,” though, to describe 
the Politburo’s treatment of mass mobilization cadres—“pushed” or “coerced” 
to make “landlords” out of regular peasants strikes me as more realistic. The 
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method of compelling cadres to carry out “thought reform” before heading 
into their assigned village was especially eective. This involved having cadres 
confess to and oen write down in an ocial dossier various preselected “sins 
against the revolution,” as one DRV writer described it.8 As Goscha notes, these 
mostly false confessions put land reform cadres in the weak position of having to 
“prove” themselves through vigorous attacks on the landlord class and through 
uncovering (nonexistent) Nationalist Party cells.9
In his classic historical ction account of the land reform, appropriately titled 
Nightmare (Ác mộng), the former land reform cadre and writer Ngô Ngọc Bội 
has a memorable chapter titled “Landlord Ratio” (tỷ lệ địa chủ). In the chap-
ter, the main character’s land reform team meets with their brigade’s “statistics” 
cadre. The problem is that their team has not found enough landlords in their 
assigned subdistrict of Quảng Hà. As their statistics cadre explains:
“According to the statistics, Quảng Hà has 1,240 families. On the basis 
of a landlord ratio of 6 percent, Quảng Hà must have 74.4 landlords. In 
the entire sub-district, we have only found 58, which means we are still 
short 16.4 landlords.” During the Brigade statistics meeting the other day, 
we complained that ‘6 percent landlords is too high for our country.’ The 
Brigade quickly sent our appeal to higher-ups. They reduced our landlord 
ratio to 5 percent. I heard a rumor that the ‘[Chinese] advisors’ did not 
agree, but that our higher-ups remained determined. If the ratio is 5 per-
cent, then Quảng Hà is short exactly fourteen landlords. In other words, 
the sub-district needs to have seventy-two landlords. Compared with the 6 
percent ratio, we are allowed to reduce our total by 2.4 landlords.”
The imposition of this unrealistic ratio guaranteed that most people targeted as 
“landlords” in the campaign would be regular community members. Many of 
the brutal aspects of the land reform, especially the use of torture to elicit con-
fessions, stemmed from this dilemma faced by land-reform cadres.
Chinese Pressure
What was the role of Chinese pressure in the land reform? Thành’s original 
rural policy plan was to follow the orthodox Leninist model of the two-stage 
revolution. A radical attack on the landlord class and a large-scale redistribution 
of land to poor peasants would not happen until aer independence had been 
won from the imperialist power, France. Reading between the lines of the party’s 
reports at their Second Congress in February of 1951, we see a concerted eort to 
justify a continuation of this classic Leninist two-stage approach. It appears that 
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the DRV’s Chinese advisors began to promote land reform to their Vietnamese 
clients soon aer arriving in northern Vietnam.
By 1952, the war had reached a point of stalemate. Desperate for military aid, 
Thành traveled to Moscow in October of that year to ask Stalin for more help. 
The Soviet leader told his Vietnamese guest, “Comrade Din,” to stop delaying 
and to carry out land reform as the Chinese had been recommending. Thành 
complied with Stalin’s order, which meant a sudden deviation from the long-held 
two-stage model. As we saw, Thành and Trường Chinh attempted to cover up 
the Moscow impetus for the policy change with some awkward explanations. In 
Chinh’s case, the cover-up involved changing rural policy comments made in a 
1951 speech so that they anticipated more strongly the new move to land reform. 
Given the amount of blood already spilled in the war, the economic diculties 
faced by the DRV, and the desperate need for more aid, the pressure on Thành 
to accede to Mao’s and Stalin’s wishes by carrying out land reform would have 
been enormous.
I believe, though, that the DRV’s victory over the French at Điện Biên Phủ 
in the summer of 1954 must have given Thành some breathing room in his re-
lationship with the Soviets and the Chinese. Having become the best story of 
the Communist bloc, could the DRV be abandoned by Moscow and Beijing? 
Moreover, the Soviets and Chinese had wanted a result from the Geneva nego-
tiations and had pressured Thành to accept less than satisfying terms. One of 
those terms guaranteed democratic freedoms for all Vietnamese and explicitly 
forbade any state-sponsored repression from either regime. Since the mass mo-
bilization campaign contradicted both the letter and the spirit of the Geneva 
Accords, which Thành had been pushed to approve, I believe that he could have 
used those accords to justify delaying the campaign indenitely. Thus, in the 
light of the currently available evidence, Thành’s continuation of the land re-
form aer the war seems to suggest true belief in the campaign as an antidote to 
problems in North Vietnam.
Mass Mobilization as DRV Electoral Strategy?
Aer Điện Biên Phủ and the Geneva Conference, did the land reform become a 
means of assuring electoral victory for the party leaders? Following the Geneva 
Accords, Thành and his comrades in the Politburo took measures to keep the 
campaign going but to conceal its nature from roving International Control 
Commission teams. And, as Alex Thai Vo points out, during the 300-day period 
of free movement following the accords, the Politburo kept the land reform away 
from coastal areas where people had the easiest route out of North Vietnam. 
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In this way, the campaign could be continued with less risk of the DRV being 
agged for Geneva Accords violations and without encouraging more emigra-
tion to the South. Thành also called for a campaign of public complaint over 
repressive actions taken by their rival regime in Saigon, hoping to keep the narra-
tive of Geneva Accords violations focused on the region below the 17th parallel, 
South Vietnam.10
Why did Thành and the Politburo stick with their policy of mass mobili-
zation? In his 2003 book, de Hartingh describes the ocial DRV explanation 
of the land reform’s “errors” to National Assembly members in December of 
1956. At that time, the party leaders provided two reasons for what had hap-
pened. The rst was the application in Vietnam of the Chinese experience. The 
second was the rush to nish the campaign before the proposed 1956 national 
elections—pushed to move quickly, cadres allegedly lacked the time to discern 
between friend and foe.
Intriguingly, de Hartingh argues that the proposed national elections were 
a motivating factor behind the land reform’s violence. In his view, Thành and 
the Politburo feared that many Northerners might vote for the anticommunist 
leader of the South, Ngô Đình Diệm, “the election’s other possible winner.”11
Since I do not believe that the DRV leaders viewed the elections as possible—
Diệm explicitly rejected this measure—I disagree with de Hartingh’s theory 
that the party leaders had “miscalculated” on the elections and that the land 
reform had evolved into a round of repression to ensure electoral victory. How-
ever, it is worth considering the measures that the party leaders were willing to 
take in their eorts to depict the land reform’s violence as stemming from honest 
mistakes. Basically, as de Hartingh shows, the Politburo was willing to acknowl-
edge openly that their approach to the “free elections” would have involved a 
campaign of mass repression to “strike out all elements it was not sure of.”12
The Economic Justication
Did Thành and his lieutenants believe that “poor peasants,” if only given land, 
would provide a great boost in agricultural production? In 1938, when Trường 
Chinh and Võ Nguyên Giáp wrote their book, The Peasant Question, they prob-
ably did believe this to be true. Fieen years later, aer seven years’ experience 
managing the DRV economy, Chinh, Giáp, Thành, and other party leaders must 
have had doubts. The party’s policy of temporary land redistribution, which had 
been carried out since seizing power in 1945, had yielded no promising results. 
According to the regime’s own questionable statistics, over half the total “feudal 
landlord land” in northern Vietnam had already been distributed by the time 
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the land reform began in 1953. As the Vietnamese scholar Đặng Phong points 
out, during the land reform, only about a quarter of the total feudal landlord 
land was seized and redistributed.13
Similarly, there is no proof that poor-peasant soldiers at Điện Biên Phủ were 
more motivated to ght because of the promise of land reform, as is commonly 
asserted in ocial DRV justications of the campaign. DRV soldiers appear to 
have fought no less bravely or eectively during the pre–land reform battles such 
as the 1950 Border Campaign, the Battle of Hòa Bình (1951), and the Battle of 
Nà Sản (1952).
Moreover, the ultimate goal of the DRV leaders was not a bustling 
small-farmer economy but one based on the large, modern collective farms of 
the Soviet Union. This, in their view, was the solution to the problem of agri-
cultural production. Still, the land reform, in theory, was supposed to be a tran-
sitional phase that provided an economic boost. It would help lay the conditions 
of plenty in which the shi to agricultural collectivization would occur.
In his excellent article on the land reform, Olivier Tessier argues that the re-
form did have a “positive impact on production and on the living standards” of 
the DRV people. The evidence for this alleged production boost is DRV statistics 
that seem especially questionable. In 1954, the DRV government claimed that 
its total rice production was 2.5 million tons—in 1959, they boasted of having 
produced 5.19 million tons.14 Are we to believe the DRV claim that its rice pro-
duction, despite the chaos of the land reform, the departure of 850,000 people, 
and the disruptions of land reform and agricultural collectivization, had more 
than doubled in only ve years? Assuming that a boost had occurred, it may have 
resulted more from the cessation of war than from land redistributions. The 
rapid move to collectivization aer land reform suggests that the party leaders, 
in reality, did not expect land redistributions to provide any meaningful produc-
tivity increase. I doubt one happened.
Winning Over the Poor-Peasant Majority?
Was the mass mobilization a campaign to win over the poor-peasant majority? 
In their public justications, Thành and the Politburo claimed that this was the 
case. But three aspects of the land reform cast doubt on this justication. First was 
the fact that an important part of the campaign was the raising of agricultural-tax 
yield estimates. Redistributed land that was, in theory, supposed to win the hearts 
of poor peasants was accompanied by a tax so onerous that many peasants were 
reluctant to receive land. Second is, again, the party leaders’ rapid move to collec-
tivization. Belief that providing land to peasants would win their support implies 
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that taking that land away would result in a loss of that support. The move to 
collectivization indicates that the party leaders placed little value on the peasant 
goodwill that land redistribution was supposed to earn for the regime. Third, 
most accounts of the land reform paint a picture of the campaign as a terrifying 
experience for the entire village—poor included. One of the tasks of the land 
reform cadres was to lead the crowd in cheers aer a local member of the commu-
nity had been shot as a “landlord.” Obviously, the DRV leaders felt that peasants 
could not be trusted to display the required joy of their own volition.15
In light of the available evidence, the most convincing explanation for Thành 
and the Politburo’s motivation in putting northern Vietnam through mass mo-
bilization is that oered by the French Communist, Georges Boudarel. He 
worked for and lived in the DRV from 1949 until 1964. In his 1991 book on DRV 
intellectuals, Boudarel argued that the land reform campaign was “essentially 
political” and “aimed at the radical destruction of all potential oppositional 
forces more than at economic or social goals.” Pushing Boudarel’s explanation 
further, I argue that the mass mobilization campaign was, under the guise of 
class warfare, a massive and thorough round of terror imposed on the entire 
DRV countryside, including poor peasants.
“Awakening” the Northern People
Why did Thành and his comrades feel that such a campaign of repression was 
necessary? In tracing the party leaders’ internal directives during the war, we see 
a steady buildup of frustration over the diculties in mobilizing the required 
contribution from people in the countryside. While recognizing the diculties 
and disruptions caused by the war, Thành, Trường Chinh, and other Politburo 
members may have quietly raged over some actions of Vietnamese in the coun-
tryside. Why did many villagers attempt to hide their rice instead of willingly 
giving it to the DRV state? Why did some villagers attempt to sell their rice to 
the French when it was so badly needed by DRV soldiers? Why did so many Viet-
namese peasants leave enormous areas of paddy uncultivated? How could these 
things happen when soldiers were suering and dying on the battleeld to win 
the country’s independence? Why was tax collection so dicult? Why couldn’t 
villagers forget their local problems, pull together, and dedicate themselves en-
tirely to serving the war eort? Why couldn’t local cadres motivate peasants to 
raise production? These questions are implied by many of the party’s internal 
directives over the course of the war.
It is possible that Thành and his lieutenants thought that too many peo-
ple in the countryside had not yet fully “awakened” (giác ngộ) and committed 
306 conclusion
themselves to the cause of DRV victory. In his explanation of the land reform, 
the DRV historian Nguyễn Khắc Viện argued that, for poor peasants, the cam-
paign was a form of “shock” treatment. It forced them to awaken, to develop 
a class consciousness, and to overthrow their local oppressors.16 I interpret 
the campaign as a type of terrifying “shock” treatment aimed at rural society 
in general.
The message was that nobody could stand outside of the party’s agenda. No-
body was safe. The state could make “spies,” “Nationalist Party members,” and 
“cruel despotic landlords” out of dedicated Communist Party members, coura-
geous Điện Biên Phủ soldiers, loyal parents of DRV bureaucrats, and patriotic 
leaders of local DRV mass organizations. Similarly, no sacred institution such as 
the family, no source of village solidarity such as the local đình (meeting house), 
and no humane legal principle such as the right to due process could protect a 
person targeted in the campaign. Most of all, though, the campaign showed rural 
communities that the DRV state could make facts and truth mean nothing.
Knowing that agricultural collectivization would not be welcomed by most 
peasants—aer all, Thành had lived in the Soviet Union from 1934 to 1938—he 
may have viewed this experience of terror and violence as a means of preparing 
the countryside to accept this radical change. Benedict Kerkvliet, in his his-
tory of agricultural collectivization in Vietnam, describes the process as a more 
peaceful one relative to that of the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union. “Authori-
ties in Vietnam rarely used brute force to herd people into cooperatives, punish 
those who broke rules, or conscate their possessions.”17 I agree. But, aer the 
land reform campaign’s elimination of local leaders, its pressure on community 
members to denounce each other, its destruction of local meeting houses and 
temples, and its spectacular public trials and executions, what was le of North 
Vietnamese rural society to resist collectivization?18
Completed by the end of 1960, collectivization fullled a dream held by party 
leaders since the 1930s and, by arming the DRV’s membership in the Commu-
nist bloc, assured Soviet military and economic aid. It also solved mobilization 
problems that had arisen during the First Indochina War. As Trường Chinh had 
expressed in February of 1950, “During this period of intense struggle, we must 
announce that the people’s labor, property, tools, and materials are the Gov-
ernment’s to use. The Government has complete power to use [these things] to 
the benet of the resistance struggle.”19 Collectivization made that totalitarian 
principle a reality by transferring virtually the entire DRV food supply directly 
into the hands of the state. Now the DRV’s rural population had to ask the state 
for rice instead of vice versa. This gave the party leaders tremendous leverage 
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over the rural population. Thành and his comrades had found during the First 
Indochina War that no amount of leverage could be too much in war.
The close chronological alignment between the completion of agricultural 
collectivization in the DRV and the party’s move to “armed struggle” in the 
South (1960) deserves more appreciation. The problem of agricultural produc-
tion and rice supply during the First Indochina War had placed severe pressure 
on the party leaders, threatening the viability of a promising war eort. They 
were determined that things would be dierent when they mobilized manpower 
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